“Materialism” is an empty word. An incendiary article.

[Ron_Tomkins]

That includes, of course, a rather large body of mathematics.

In fact, as stated, it includes a rather large part of science. Cosmology, for instance, has no immediate use in practical, daily life.

No, I agree with you. I think I didn't express myself correctly. I don't think mathematics and cosmology are useless forms of knowledge. They may be more abstract in their nature, but they help us understand where we are standing, and that is a practical use. Perhaps using the "daily life" term was my mistake because yes, a lot of mathematics theory is still useless for daily practical life. But it isn't completely useless information that serves no other purpose but semantic games... as opposed to a lot of philosophy.

And notice too, that I never said "all philosophy" is useless, as there is philosophy that does provide information about the world we live in, that can prove useful. For instance, the works of Dennett on consciousness.

 

[tsig]

This is utterly distinct from the argument that materialism is an empty thesis (a claim, by the way, that seems plausible to me but I certainly don't hold any strong opinions).

If the answer is no, matter cannot think (and evidently you and I are capable of thinking), then materialism is of course false.

If the answer is yes, matter can think, then materialism is not inconsistent with this fact, though it is not obviously true.

Mouline's concern is considerably more fundamental. The word "matter" is undefined in the materialist thesis (and also, of course, in your question regarding thinking). If this is so, your question is utterly irrelevant, as well as fundamentally meaningless.

Thus, I see no reason to offer a half-thought answer to your question, given that it is simply beside the point. You have evidently misread the thread to the point that you think the question is, "Can matter think?" This is not Mouline's concern.

definition of matter:

[mat-er]

Synonyms
Examples
Word Origin

noun
1.
the substance or substances of which any physical object consists or is composed:
the matter of which the earth is made.
2.
physical or corporeal substance in general, whether solid, liquid, or gaseous, especially as distinguished from incorporeal substance, as spirit or mind, or from qualities, actions, and the like.
3.
something that occupies space.
4.
a particular kind of substance:

Do you have another definition?

 

[phiwum]

No, I agree with you. I think I didn't express myself correctly. I don't think mathematics and cosmology are useless forms of knowledge. They may be more abstract in their nature, but they help us understand where we are standing, and that is a practical use. Perhaps using the "daily life" term was my mistake because yes, a lot of mathematics theory is still useless for daily practical life. But it isn't completely useless information that serves no other purpose but semantic games... as opposed to a lot of philosophy.

And notice too, that I never said "all philosophy" is useless, as there is philosophy that does provide information about the world we live in, that can prove useful. For instance, the works of Dennett on consciousness.

Fair enough.

The term "immediate" was probably overstatement, too, since arguably cosmology may eventually provide useful insights, although we have no immediate uses.

Mouline's argument is not obviously useless either. If we are interested in advancing science, it is plausible that some attention to the foundational presumptions can be useful.

But I certainly wouldn't say that the working scientist has any pressing need to be concerned with this kind of argument.

 

[phiwum]

definition of matter:

[mat-er]

Synonyms
Examples
Word Origin

noun
1.
the substance or substances of which any physical object consists or is composed:
the matter of which the earth is made.
2.
physical or corporeal substance in general, whether solid, liquid, or gaseous, especially as distinguished from incorporeal substance, as spirit or mind, or from qualities, actions, and the like.
3.
something that occupies space.
4.
a particular kind of substance:

Do you have another definition?

Clearly, this definition isn't what the materialist thesis has in mind, since it precludes energy (aside, perhaps, from (4) which says almost nothing at all).

 

[Nonpareil]

But you haven't offered *any* definition of matter aside from "that which exists". You've made no claim at all regarding what sort of stuff exists.

This is correct.

The idealist can play exactly the same game, and end with exactly the same pointless result: nothing exists other than stuff which exists.

This is not, because idealism comes with an ostensible "type" of stuff: thought and/or consciousness. And, again, this is an incoherent position to hold, requiring that the definition of "consciousness" be stretched so far that it loses all meaning.

If idealism is reformulated in such a way that it doesn't come with this rider attached, it might be valid, but it ceases to be idealism.

Then the materialist thesis is just as empty as Moulines says. It is a dull tautology.

Yes. I've never disagreed with this. It has, in fact, been my point since the beginning: all ontological positions are, by definition, this empty and pointless. They are inherently semantic in nature and serve no purpose other than to provide a name for whatever you want to call the universe.

This is not clear at all. I suppose you mean that to exist is to be perceptible (in principle, at least), but I can't imagine why anyone (other than idealists!) would think this is the case.

If an entity is defined in such a way that it is not detectable by any means, there is no difference between it and any given imaginary entity. There is no meaningful way to say that it is real.

This is the point that Carl Sagan was making in his chapter on garage dragons in The Demon-Haunted World. He asks "what is the difference between [the garage dragon] and no dragon at all?"

The only coherent answer is that there is no difference. Garage dragons do not exist.

I won't defend his claims for pluralism.

So long as you concede that the "thesis" that nothing exists except stuff that exists is a pointless, empty thesis, we have no disagreement.

It's not a concession. It's been my position since the beginning.

Ontology is, by its very nature, a pointless and trivial field.

 

[phiwum]

This is correct.



This is not, because idealism comes with an ostensible "type" of stuff: thought and/or consciousness. And, again, this is an incoherent position to hold, requiring that the definition of "consciousness" be stretched so far that it loses all meaning.

If idealism is reformulated in such a way that it doesn't come with this rider attached, it might be valid, but it ceases to be idealism.

I'd think that most materialists would also say that materialism commits one to the existence of a certain kind of stuff, not merely that which exists.

Your version is compatible with dualism and idealism. You've made no effort to argue that mental substance does not exist, or that anything other than mental substance exists. You've only argued that nothing exists, except that which exists.

Yes. I've never disagreed with this. It has, in fact, been my point since the beginning: all ontological positions are, by definition, this empty and pointless. They are inherently semantic in nature and serve no purpose other than to provide a name for whatever you want to call the universe.

In this very same post, you've claimed that idealism is not empty and pointless, since it makes a specific claim about what sort of stuff exists. I take it that idealism is an ontological position, in which case, we seem to have a contradiction.

If an entity is defined in such a way that it is not detectable by any means, there is no difference between it and any given imaginary entity. There is no meaningful way to say that it is real.

This is the point that Carl Sagan was making in his chapter on garage dragons in The Demon-Haunted World. He asks "what is the difference between [the garage dragon] and no dragon at all?"

The only coherent answer is that there is no difference. Garage dragons do not exist.

This is not correct. There is nothing incoherent in positing the existence of something undetectable. There may well be good heuristic reasons (parsimony, for instance) not to do so, but there is nothing at all in the notion of existence that requires detectability.

It's not a concession. It's been my position since the beginning.

Ontology is, by its very nature, a pointless and trivial field.

Well, perhaps the word "concede" was poorly chosen, but my point is merely that you seem to agree with Mouline entirely: the materialist thesis is an empty claim.

 

[Nonpareil]

I'd think that most materialists would also say that materialism commits one to the existence of a certain kind of stuff, not merely that which exists.

Perhaps. If they want to commit to describing a universe in which, say, telepathy exists as being dualist rather than materialist, it is their business, though I personally fail to see why one would consider telepathy to necessitate dualism any more than, say, electromagnetism.

Again, it is all semantics in the end.

Your version is compatible with dualism and idealism.

Dualism, maybe. Idealism, no. Nothing is compatible with idealism. Idealism is not compatible with idealism, because idealism is incoherent.

In this very same post, you've claimed that idealism is not empty and pointless, since it makes a specific claim about what sort of stuff exists. I take it that idealism is an ontological position, in which case, we seem to have a contradiction.

That is rather my point. This is part of why idealism is incoherent.

Idealism wishes to be treated as an ontological position. All right. We will. It is a means of putting a name to the substance of the universe, and wants to use the term "consciousness". Oops - that term is already in use, and to say that "the substance of the universe" is equivalent to its established definition is simply not true. Treating idealism as a simple naming convention, it fails because it has tried to co-opt an existing term and rendered it meaningless. It is technically usable, but unnecessarily confusing and results in a need for constant clarification as to which meaning of "consciousness" you are currently using.

But that isn't how idealism is actually used. Idealists generally assert that there is some sort of mechanical difference between an idealist universe and a materialist one, though they never give any coherent explanation as to how or, indeed, even why. Idealism as generally used is not just a naming convention, but an actual assertion that the universe somehow is consciousness, as the term is generally used. This idea is completely worthless and incoherent. And, if there is an actual mechanical difference formulated, it ceases to be ontology and becomes an actual predictive model - at which point it ceases to compete with materialism in the first place, as well as invariably collapsing due to a lack of support for its claims.

In either form, it fails.

This is not correct. There is nothing incoherent in positing the existence of something undetectable.

Save that existence requires interaction, and interaction mandates that the interaction - and thus the entity - can be detected.

Any entity which fails to interact with another entity cannot be stated to exist.

Any interaction which cannot be detected cannot be stated to happen.

Thus, entities which cannot be detected do not exist.

Well, perhaps the word "concede" was poorly chosen, but my point is merely that you seem to agree with Mouline entirely: the materialist thesis is an empty claim.

I am unsure why you seem to keep missing the part where I state that the rest of his argument is nonsensical. I agree with Moulines on that specific point; the rest of his statements are non sequitur incoherent nonsense. To say that I agree with him entirely because I agree with one premise is entirely false.

 

[phiwum]

Perhaps. If they want to commit to describing a universe in which, say, telepathy exists as being dualist rather than materialist, it is their business, though I personally fail to see why one would consider telepathy to necessitate dualism any more than, say, electromagnetism.

Again, it is all semantics in the end.



Dualism, maybe. Idealism, no. Nothing is compatible with idealism. Idealism is not compatible with idealism, because idealism is incoherent.



That is rather my point. This is part of why idealism is incoherent.

Idealism wishes to be treated as an ontological position. All right. We will. It is a means of putting a name to the substance of the universe, and wants to use the term "consciousness". Oops - that term is already in use, and to say that "the substance of the universe" is equivalent to its established definition is simply not true. Treating idealism as a simple naming convention, it fails because it has tried to co-opt an existing term and rendered it meaningless. It is technically usable, but unnecessarily confusing and results in a need for constant clarification as to which meaning of "consciousness" you are currently using.

But that isn't how idealism is actually used. Idealists generally assert that there is some sort of mechanical difference between an idealist universe and a materialist one, though they never give any coherent explanation as to how or, indeed, even why. Idealism as generally used is not just a naming convention, but an actual assertion that the universe somehow is consciousness, as the term is generally used. This idea is completely worthless and incoherent. And, if there is an actual mechanical difference formulated, it ceases to be ontology and becomes an actual predictive model - at which point it ceases to compete with materialism in the first place, as well as invariably collapsing due to a lack of support for its claims.

In either form, it fails.

The word "matter" has a prior meaning as well.

But I'm not interested in your argument that idealism is incoherent and the only good ontological position is one which reduces to a dull tautology. I think we've covered this ground rather well.

Save that existence requires interaction, and interaction mandates that the interaction - and thus the entity - can be detected.

Neither of the above claims are obvious at all. You have replaced the dubious premise that existence presupposes detectability with the equally dubious premise that existence presupposes interaction.

Note that, even were this the case, your conclusion doesn't follow. After all, the universe (or metaverse?) may be partitioned into multiple separated parts, so that in each part, the things interact, but between parts, they do not. Hence, there would still be things that exist undetectable by us.

Any entity which fails to interact with another entity cannot be stated to exist.

Any interaction which cannot be detected cannot be stated to happen.

Thus, entities which cannot be detected do not exist.

These kinds of arguments are pretty easy when you make up premises like "existence requires interaction" and "interaction implies detectability".

I am unsure why you seem to keep missing the part where I state that the rest of his argument is nonsensical. I agree with Moulines on that specific point; the rest of his statements are non sequitur incoherent nonsense. To say that I agree with him entirely because I agree with one premise is entirely false.

I didn't mean to imply anything about pluralism.

 

[Nonpareil]

Neither of the above claims are obvious at all. You have replaced the dubious premise that existence presupposes detectability with the equally dubious premise that existence presupposes interaction.

If you disagree, then perhaps you could elaborate on how an entity which does not interact with anything, in any way, can be coherently said to exist.

Note that, even were this the case, your conclusion doesn't follow. After all, the universe (or metaverse?) may be partitioned into multiple separated parts, so that in each part, the things interact, but between parts, they do not. Hence, there would still be things that exist undetectable by us.

In what sense could these other universes coherently be said to exist at all? What is the difference between these other universes and complete fictions?

 

[Fudbucker]

I've always understood materialism as a claim that reality consists of mind-independent and god-independent stuff. We have some basic descriptors for some of this stuff (elementary particles, fields, energy, etc.) and how it behaves, while other stuff remains a mystery (dark energy/matter, undiscovered fundamental particles, possible supersymmetrical particles, etc.), but even the mysterious stuff is still mind and god independent.

Even using the nebulous term "stuff", materialism makes definite claims, and is clearly distinguishable from immaterialism, theism, and dualism, so I don't see it as "an empty word".

Regarding telepathy (and miracles in general), even if miracles (suspensions of the laws of nature) were commonplace (e.g., the stars in the sky all suddenly move around to spell "Jesus is Lord") I don't see why a materialist would be convinced of anything other than materialism. They would just assume they exist in a simulation, rather than "god did it". Or that they're insane.

 

[phiwum]

If you disagree, then perhaps you could elaborate on how an entity which does not interact with anything, in any way, can be coherently said to exist.

I don't understand the puzzle.

I see nothing incoherent about something which exists but does not interact with any other thing. There is just no mystery at all.

In fact, we often speak of the universe existing, but if there is only one such universe -- that is, if everything which exists is either a part of or the whole of the universe -- then it is clear that the universe is a thing that exists but doesn't interact with anything else.

In what sense could these other universes coherently be said to exist at all? What is the difference between these other universes and complete fictions?

The fact that (hypothetically speaking) they refer to real things?

I am puzzled why you think that existence requires accessibility (to us, ultimately). There really is no apparent paradox in supposing that there are distinct universes, incapable of interacting with one another. We may, of course, think that such a supposition is pointless, but not that it is literally incoherent.

 

[phiwum]

I've always understood materialism as a claim that reality consists of mind-independent and god-independent stuff. We have some basic descriptors for some of this stuff (elementary particles, fields, energy, etc.) and how it behaves, while other stuff remains a mystery (dark energy/matter, undiscovered fundamental particles, possible supersymmetrical particles, etc.), but even the mysterious stuff is still mind and god independent.

Even using the nebulous term "stuff", materialism makes definite claims, and is clearly distinguishable from immaterialism, theism, and dualism, so I don't see it as "an empty word".

That doesn't sound stupid to me. You're suggesting that materialism is really about mind-independence. I wonder if Moulines has a response. (The immediate response is, of course, that we now need a clear definition of mind-independence. That might not be too hard, though it will probably be the case that whether something is mind-independent is not decidable with certainty.)

Regarding telepathy (and miracles in general), even if miracles (suspensions of the laws of nature) were commonplace (e.g., the stars in the sky all suddenly move around to spell "Jesus is Lord") I don't see why a materialist would be convinced of anything other than materialism. They would just assume they exist in a simulation, rather than "god did it". Or that they're insane.

Sure, materialism is probably compatible with any experience and hence undecidable.

 

[Fudbucker]

That doesn't sound stupid to me. You're suggesting that materialism is really about mind-independence. I wonder if Moulines has a response. (The immediate response is, of course, that we now need a clear definition of mind-independence. That might not be too hard, though it will probably be the case that whether something is mind-independent is not decidable with certainty.)

Like you brought up before, if minds are material things, then mind-independent has as much meaning as Saturn-independent.

But yeah, the heart of materialism is A) there is no being that is not bound by the laws of nature and B) this desk, whatever it ultimately is, would still stick around if every mind brain in the universe disappeared.

Sure, materialism is probably compatible with any experience and hence undecidable.

Yeah, which is a real bummer if you hope to ever know much about reality.

 

[JoeMorgue]

"Words don't work if I purposely use them poorly."

That about sums it up.

Damn three materialism threads. Figments of my imagination seem to have a vested interest in convincing figments of their imagination that they are just figments of an imagination that doesn't exist.

I'm serious I wish 1/10th of the percent of the effort people put into proving they don't exist was used for literally anything else.

 

[LarryS]

I've always understood materialism as a claim that reality consists of mind-independent and god-independent stuff. We have some basic descriptors for some of this stuff (elementary particles, fields, energy, etc.) and how it behaves, while other stuff remains a mystery (dark energy/matter, undiscovered fundamental particles, possible supersymmetrical particles, etc.), but even the mysterious stuf is still mind and god independent.

Even using the nebulous term "stuff", materialism makes definite claims, and is clearly distinguishable from immaterialism, theism, and dualism, so I don't see it as "an empty word".

Regarding telepathy (and miracles in general), even if miracles (suspensions of the laws of nature) were commonplace (e.g., the stars in the sky all suddenly move around to spell "Jesus is Lord") I don't see why a materialist would be convinced of anything other than materialism. They would just assume they exist in a simulation, rather than "god did it". Or that they're insane.

since (according to Materialism) mind emerges from matter, we can't then turn around and define matter in terms of mind - - we can't define the primary in terms of the secondary

 

[Nonpareil]

I've always understood materialism as a claim that reality consists of mind-independent and god-independent stuff. We have some basic descriptors for some of this stuff (elementary particles, fields, energy, etc.) and how it behaves, while other stuff remains a mystery (dark energy/matter, undiscovered fundamental particles, possible supersymmetrical particles, etc.), but even the mysterious stuff is still mind and god independent.

Yes. This is what I mentioned at the beginning of the discussion, with the universe having objective existence independent of us.

It's still barely a claim - even this is in large part simply semantics - but it isn't entirely null, which is why I prefer the term "trivial" to "empty".

I don't understand the puzzle.

I see nothing incoherent about something which exists but does not interact with any other thing. There is just no mystery at all.

An entity which does not interact with any other cannot be said to be real, as there is no actual difference between it and any given fiction.

If your definition of "exists" is so broad as to include fictional entities, then it isn't much good.

In fact, we often speak of the universe existing, but if there is only one such universe -- that is, if everything which exists is either a part of or the whole of the universe -- then it is clear that the universe is a thing that exists but doesn't interact with anything else.

The universe is the set of all existing entities.

The fact that (hypothetically speaking) they refer to real things?

I think that you may be missing the point. To be a real thing, there must be a difference in the universe where it exists versus the universe where it does not - that is, it must interact with the rest of the universe in some fashion.

To say that it is "real, but non-interactive" is equivalent to saying "blue, but not blue".

I am puzzled why you think that existence requires accessibility (to us, ultimately).

It does not require accessibility to us. It requires that it be accessible by something, no matter how small. If it can't ever be interacted with in any way, what does it mean to say that it is there?

 

[Nonpareil]

"Words don't work if I purposely use them poorly."

That about sums it up.

About ninety percent of the threads I participate in boil down to this, sadly enough.

 

[phiwum]

"Words don't work if I purposely use them poorly."

That about sums it up.

Damn three materialism threads. Figments of my imagination seem to have a vested interest in convincing figments of their imagination that they are just figments of an imagination that doesn't exist.

I'm serious I wish 1/10th of the percent of the effort people put into proving they don't exist was used for literally anything else.

What thread are you reading?

 

[JoeMorgue]

What thread are you reading?

Well since I don't exist I guess none.

Wait since you don't exist how did I read that? I couldn't have "observed" it since that would make me an observer and observers don't exist because of... philosophy I guess.

Man this makes me nostalgic for being out beyond the event horizon of the formless.

 

[phiwum]

An entity which does not interact with any other cannot be said to be real, as there is no actual difference between it and any given fiction.

If your definition of "exists" is so broad as to include fictional entities, then it isn't much good.

There really is absolutely no incoherence in imagining a second universe (or a disconnected piece of this universe, if you prefer), perhaps populated by intelligent beings. I'm stunned that you think this is the least bit paradoxical.

I just don't have anything more to say on this, I suppose. Your pronouncements that existence presupposes interactions (with every single part of that which also exists, I suppose) just comes out of nowhere, near as I can figger.

The universe is the set of all existing entities.

This is still consistent with the hypothesis that the universe consists of distinct, disconnected partitions, incapable of interacting with one another.

I think that you may be missing the point. To be a real thing, there must be a difference in the universe where it exists versus the universe where it does not - that is, it must interact with the rest of the universe in some fashion.

To say that it is "real, but non-interactive" is equivalent to saying "blue, but not blue".

I see that you say this, but I see no reason to think that it is true.

I invite others to weigh in and see which of us has odd intuitions here. It might, I suppose, be me, but I would honestly be surprised.

It does not require accessibility to us. It requires that it be accessible by something, no matter how small. If it can't ever be interacted with in any way, what does it mean to say that it is there?

The universe as a whole exists, but does not interact with anything else, right? Obviously, bits of the universe interact with other bits, but not with anything else.

Now, imagine that the universe has two distinct parts, disconnected and incapable of interacting with one another. The bits in the first part interact with other bits in that part, and the same with the second. If we can agree that the one-part universe exists, then surely there is no reason at all to suppose that this two-part universe is an incoherent concept.

Of course, from the perspective of the people in Part A of the two-part universe, there is no reason to take seriously the possibility that Part B exists, but there is no incoherence in doing so. It would be a perfectly undecidable proposition which has no predictive or explanatory value at all, but it is not an incoherent proposition.

I cannot see any problem with this hypothetical situation.