What is the appeal of "objective morality"

[David Mo]

There is not a doubt in my mind that that sentence is objective. I think that you're confusing "objective" with "true".

It looks like you and I are using the words “objective” and “subjective” with different meanings.
I use this words according these texts (square brackets are mine).

The terms “objectivity” and “subjectivity,” in their modern usage, generally relate to a perceiving subject (normally a person) and a perceived or unperceived object. The object is something that presumably exists independent of the subject’s perception of it. (…) The perceiving subject can either perceive accurately or seem to perceive features of the object that are not in the object. [Objectivism and subjectivism] For example, a perceiving subject suffering from jaundice could seem to perceive an object as yellow when the object is not actually yellow. Hence, the term “subjective” typically indicates the possibility of error.
(…)Philosophical theories about the nature of morality generally divide into assertions that moral truths express subjective states and assertions that moral truths express objective facts, analogous to the fact, for example, that the sun is more massive than the earth. [Subjectivism and objectivism].
(Dwayne H. Mulder: “Objectivity”, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy , http://www.iep.utm.edu/objectiv/ )

Moral relativism [subjectivism] is the view that moral judgments are true or false only relative to some particular standpoint (for instance, that of a culture or a historical period) and that no standpoint is uniquely privileged over all others. (Emrys Westacott; “Moral Relativism”, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/moral-re/)​

And so, a sentence (or a knowledge) is “objective” if it reflects accurately what an object (or a fact) really is. A sentence is subjective if it refers to features that are not in the object but in the way the subject perceives or conceives it. These are my definitions.
Relativism and subjectivism in moral are two similar words for me. In both cases the moral value is not in the object, but is a subjective or relative evaluation.

I don’t understand well how you are using these words. I have been looking for your definition of “objective” and “subjective” but I have not found it. Please, put your definition again and perhaps we can solve our disagreements.

 

[Craig B]

Yet they were the paragons of Catholicism... and the Vatican found that the Franco regime had many "moral points of contact" with "us"... no?

So your assurances, that Franco's regime was devoid of any kind of morals, were apparently not shared by the Holy Roman Catholic Church nor by the POPE nor by the Vatican.

Eh? Well if the Pope in the Vatican liked a fascist - as he often did - that makes the fascist a moral paragon? Perhaps I'm misunderstanding you. By that standard, Mussolini was pretty moral too, a few minor spats notwithstanding.

One of the reasons why Mussolini pushed the idea that women should stay at home and look after the family while their husbands worked, was because this was an idea pushed by the Roman Catholic Church. Mussolini voiced his disapproval at the use of contraception – an identical stance to the Roman Catholic Church. Like the Roman Catholic Church, Mussolini also wanted divorce banned in Italy. By doing all of this, Mussolini was trying to bring the Roman Catholic Church onto his side to get its support and give added credibility to his government. However, the relationship was not always harmonious ...

Another part of the treaty was called the Concordat. This made the Roman Catholic faith the state religion – this was a fait accompli anyway. The pope appointed his bishops, though they had to receive the government’s blessing. Religion had to be taught in both primary and secondary schools. The Roman Catholic Church was given full control of marriage.

When these agreements were signed in 1929, Mussolini’s popularity was at its highest. He had got what he wanted – the support from the members of the public who may not have supported the Fascists but who saw the Roman Catholic Church working with the Fascist government, and that by itself created a tacit acceptance of Mussolini’s government.​

http://www.historylearningsite.co.u...1939/mussolini-and-the-roman-catholic-church/

 

[phiwum]

It looks like you and I are using the words “objective” and “subjective” with different meanings.
I use this words according these texts (square brackets are mine).

The terms “objectivity” and “subjectivity,” in their modern usage, generally relate to a perceiving subject (normally a person) and a perceived or unperceived object. The object is something that presumably exists independent of the subject’s perception of it. (…) The perceiving subject can either perceive accurately or seem to perceive features of the object that are not in the object. [Objectivism and subjectivism] For example, a perceiving subject suffering from jaundice could seem to perceive an object as yellow when the object is not actually yellow. Hence, the term “subjective” typically indicates the possibility of error.
(…)Philosophical theories about the nature of morality generally divide into assertions that moral truths express subjective states and assertions that moral truths express objective facts, analogous to the fact, for example, that the sun is more massive than the earth. [Subjectivism and objectivism].
(Dwayne H. Mulder: “Objectivity”, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy , http://www.iep.utm.edu/objectiv/ )

Moral relativism [subjectivism] is the view that moral judgments are true or false only relative to some particular standpoint (for instance, that of a culture or a historical period) and that no standpoint is uniquely privileged over all others. (Emrys Westacott; “Moral Relativism”, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://www.iep.utm.edu/moral-re/)​

And so, a sentence (or a knowledge) is “objective” if it reflects accurately what an object (or a fact) really is. A sentence is subjective if it refers to features that are not in the object but in the way the subject perceives or conceives it. These are my definitions.

You do realize, I suppose, that neither of those quotations came even close to defining "objective sentence".

Your own definition unfortunately makes "objective sentence" more or less the same as "true sentence", at least when a sentence is about things external to the subject.

I offered a definition some pages ago. From memory, it is something like this.

A sentence is objective insofar it is the case that the proposition it refers to has the following property: there is a set of possible observations and relevant arguments such that any rational being familiar with the relevant arguments and having experienced the observations would come to the same conclusion on the truth value of the proposition.

So, for instance, decidable mathematical statements are objective, since any rational being acquainted with the relevant arguments would come to the same conclusion on the truth value of the sentence.

Statements about the earth orbiting the sun (or the sun being carried in a chariot) are objective, since anyone capable of observing the solar system from a good vantage over time would see that the earth does indeed orbit the sun (and that the sun is not carried in a chariot).

More controversially, certain normative statements are objective. I've argued that any rational being necessarily prefers (ceteris parabus) to believe true statements over false. Hypothetical norms, such as, "If you don't wish to experience electrical shock, then you shouldn't stick that live wire in your mouth," are pretty obviously objective.

This is what I mean when I say a sentence is objective. Since we are discussing my argument that moral realism is not obviously false, surely it makes sense to consider my definition. After all, I am not defending this claim in the context of any meaning of objective but my own.

That said, I recognize that there is a certain naivety regarding observations and such in my definition. This is not a topic I've studied and so I'm sure that we could tighten it here and there as needed, but it serves its purpose in getting across a basic understanding of my claim.

 

[David Mo]

I offered a definition some pages ago. From memory, it is something like this.

A sentence is objective insofar it is the case that the proposition it refers to has the following property: there is a set of possible observations and relevant arguments such that any rational being familiar with the relevant arguments and having experienced the observations would come to the same conclusion on the truth value of the proposition.

So, for instance, decidable mathematical statements are objective, since any rational being acquainted with the relevant arguments would come to the same conclusion on the truth value of the sentence.

See this, please:

It is natural to suppose that the concept of evidence is intimately related to the cognitive desideratum of objectivity. According to this line of thought, individuals and institutions are objective to the extent that they allow their views about what is the case or what ought to be done to be guided by the evidence, as opposed to (say) the typically distorting influences of ideological dogma, prejudice in favor of one's kin, or texts whose claim to authority is exhausted by their being venerated by tradition. To the extent that individuals and institutions are objective in this sense, we should expect their views to increasingly converge over time: as shared evidence accumulates, consensus tends to emerge with respect to formerly disputed questions. Objective inquiry is evidence-driven inquiry, which makes for intersubjective agreement among inquirers.[26] Thus, it is widely thought that the reason why the natural sciences exhibit a degree of consensus that is conspicuously absent from many others fields is that the former are evidence-driven—and therefore, objective—in ways that the latter are not.( Kelly, Thomas, "Evidence", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/evidence/).

Understanding means having a sense of, grasping, or comprehending the meaning of something such as a text or human action. An understanding is inter-subjective when it is accessible to two or more minds (subjectivities). ("INTER-SUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING", Thomas A. Schwandt, https://srmo.sagepub.com/view/the-sage-dictionary-of-social-research-methods/n105.xml) ​

What you call “objectivity” is a specific case of what is usually called in philosophy “intersubjectivity”. There are three definitory characteristics in your definition.

(a) A consensus is required.
(b) Between “rational” persons.
(c) They are “familiar” with a “relevant” method or argumentation and “having experienced the observations”.

No problem with (a) and (c). The consensus is a sign of objectivity in all theories on it. Point (c) indicates a rational method as condition of objectivity. If this is the sense of “relevant”, I agree. But “rational person” (b) is a vague concept. Many people say they are “rational” or have taken a “rational” decision without any warranty. What features define a “rational” person? How is possible to distinguish him from an irrational person?

Another question:
How call you (a) individuals that allow their views about what is the case or what ought to be done to be guided by the evidence, as opposed to (b) those guided by the typically distorting influences of ideological dogma, prejudice in favor of one's kin, or texts whose claim to authority is exhausted by their being venerated by tradition?
What is the name for (a) and (b)?

 

[phiwum]

See this, please:

It is natural to suppose that the concept of evidence is intimately related to the cognitive desideratum of objectivity. According to this line of thought, individuals and institutions are objective to the extent that they allow their views about what is the case or what ought to be done to be guided by the evidence, as opposed to (say) the typically distorting influences of ideological dogma, prejudice in favor of one's kin, or texts whose claim to authority is exhausted by their being venerated by tradition. To the extent that individuals and institutions are objective in this sense, we should expect their views to increasingly converge over time: as shared evidence accumulates, consensus tends to emerge with respect to formerly disputed questions. Objective inquiry is evidence-driven inquiry, which makes for intersubjective agreement among inquirers.[26] Thus, it is widely thought that the reason why the natural sciences exhibit a degree of consensus that is conspicuously absent from many others fields is that the former are evidence-driven—and therefore, objective—in ways that the latter are not.( Kelly, Thomas, "Evidence", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/evidence/).

Understanding means having a sense of, grasping, or comprehending the meaning of something such as a text or human action. An understanding is inter-subjective when it is accessible to two or more minds (subjectivities). ("INTER-SUBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDING", Thomas A. Schwandt, https://srmo.sagepub.com/view/the-sage-dictionary-of-social-research-methods/n105.xml) ​

What you call “objectivity” is a specific case of what is usually called in philosophy “intersubjectivity”. There are three definitory characteristics in your definition.

(a) A consensus is required.
(b) Between “rational” persons.
(c) They are “familiar” with a “relevant” method or argumentation and “having experienced the observations”.

No, a hypothetical consensus is required, of the sort that any two rational beings would converge, were they aware of the requisite arguments and observations. This is not mere intersubjectivity. This is much broader, closely related to Kant's notion of objectivity.

No problem with (a) and (c). The consensus is a sign of objectivity in all theories on it. Point (c) indicates a rational method as condition of objectivity. If this is the sense of “relevant”, I agree. But “rational person” (b) is a vague concept. Many people say they are “rational” or have taken a “rational” decision without any warranty. What features define a “rational” person? How is possible to distinguish him from an irrational person?

This is indeed the primary issue of this definition, and I'm not prepared to define rationality in explicit terms. But a rational person is one who chooses what to do on the basis of its fitness to achieve his goals, given his background beliefs. He also comes to believe on the basis of evidence and reason, and on methods which are effective in coming to true beliefs. This is, admittedly, all very vague, but you and I both use the term "rational" to refer to some beings and not others. We share a basic understanding of what rationality entails. I think our understanding is good enough for an informal discussion in an online forum.

Another question:
How call you (a) individuals that allow their views about what is the case or what ought to be done to be guided by the evidence, as opposed to (b) those guided by the typically distorting influences of ideological dogma, prejudice in favor of one's kin, or texts whose claim to authority is exhausted by their being venerated by tradition?
What is the name for (a) and (b)?

I'm not sure what you're asking. Persons of type (a) seem to be doing what I call rational. The rationality of persons of type (b) is not so clear -- they may be irrational, or it may be that their beliefs are so influenced by their environment that, though their rational faculties function, the background beliefs lead to false conclusions.

If I may avoid a tedious "gotcha" moment, I do hope that you aren't about to suggest that moral realists fall into category (b). That would rather be begging the question, you know.

 

[David Mo]

No, a hypothetical consensus is required, of the sort that any two rational beings would converge, were they aware of the requisite arguments and observations. This is not mere intersubjectivity. This is much broader, closely related to Kant's notion of objectivity.

This is indeed the primary issue of this definition, and I'm not prepared to define rationality in explicit terms. But a rational person is one who chooses what to do on the basis of its fitness to achieve his goals, given his background beliefs. He also comes to believe on the basis of evidence and reason, and on methods which are effective in coming to true beliefs. This is, admittedly, all very vague, but you and I both use the term "rational" to refer to some beings and not others. We share a basic understanding of what rationality entails. I think our understanding is good enough for an informal discussion in an online forum.

I'm not sure what you're asking. Persons of type (a) seem to be doing what I call rational. The rationality of persons of type (b) is not so clear -- they may be irrational, or it may be that their beliefs are so influenced by their environment that, though their rational faculties function, the background beliefs lead to false conclusions.

If I may avoid a tedious "gotcha" moment, I do hope that you aren't about to suggest that moral realists fall into category (b). That would rather be begging the question, you know.

This is the concept of objective knowledge by Kant:

For Kant, a defining feature of our representations of objects is their objective validity. For a representation to be objectively valid it must be a representation of an objective feature of reality, that is, a feature whose existence and nature is independent of how it is perceived. ( Pereboom, Derk, "Kant's Transcendental Arguments", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/kant-transcendental/).​

As you can see, Kant’s concept of “objectivity” is similar to other quotations I have put here and similar to mine. Consensus and progress are a mere signs of objectivity and they must to be actual, not hypothetical. They are the sign that scientific statements have objective validity and the metaphysical claims have not.

But this is not our problem now. You have chosen a personal definition of “objective” and I am doing a semantic analysis in order to understand if our disagreements are only a question of words or we disagree on facts.

I think my position is easier than yours because I have taken the usual meanings in philosophy. They are already done.

Your definition of rationality sounds very pragmatist to me: “A rational person is one who chooses what to do on the basis of its fitness to achieve his goals”, and relativist: “given his background beliefs”. I have a problem with the last part of the definition because it allows the qualification as “rationalist” to someone with absolute irrational beliefs (“given his background beliefs”). A fundamentalist, a believer in the car of the Sun or similar would be “rationalist” if they were coherent with any set of absurd beliefs (their background). I think this is in contradiction with the usual meaning of the word, both in human sciences as in the common language (this forum, for example). And this is useless for distinguishing the points (a) and (b) in my previous question.

I think that the second part of your definition is more accurate: “He also comes to believe on the basis of evidence and reason, and on methods which are effective in coming to true beliefs”. I agree now. And it is important to me, because you have introduced the rational method (“effective in coming to true beliefs”). So, an objective assertion must be accepted by persons that use “methods which are effective in coming to true beliefs”. I am sorry if I insist on your sentence. It is of capital importance to me in the matter we are discussing and I think it is well said.

We know what the objective-rational methods are the cause of a real consensus between scientists. We don’t know any similar method in moral. So, we can say with Kant (Critic of Pure Reason) that moral sentences have not “objective validity”. (Another Kant is the philosopher of the moral imperative, but no one has defended this aprioristical theory here).

And I am not concerned with claims about the possibility of moral objective knowledge in God’s mind, nor super-intelligent aliens, nor humans of the 30th Century, if this kind of animals will exist at this date (really, I doubt it).

Finally, note that the universal imperative “everybody prefers truth to falsehood” you have proposed above, if really universal, it is not a moral imperative. Moral imperatives are referred to my relation to other people.

 

[phiwum]

This is the concept of objective knowledge by Kant:

For Kant, a defining feature of our representations of objects is their objective validity. For a representation to be objectively valid it must be a representation of an objective feature of reality, that is, a feature whose existence and nature is independent of how it is perceived. ( Pereboom, Derk, "Kant's Transcendental Arguments", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2014 Edition), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/kant-transcendental/).​

As you can see, Kant’s concept of “objectivity” is similar to other quotations I have put here and similar to mine. Consensus and progress are a mere signs of objectivity and they must to be actual, not hypothetical. They are the sign that scientific statements have objective validity and the metaphysical claims have not.

Sorry, I am speaking of "objective propositions". I don't think that representations of objects are the same as propositions, and I don't know that the word "objective" applied to one is precisely the same as the others. I suppose it all depends on what counts as a representation of objects.

In any case, I was thinking of Kant's treatment in Metaphysics of Morals. What he says is actually less informative than I remembered, but he wrote:

That is practically good, however, which determines the will by means of the conceptions of reason, and consequently not from subjective causes, but objectively, that is on principles which are valid for every rational being as such. It is distinguished from the pleasant, as that which influences the will only by means of sensation from merely subjective causes, valid only for the sense of this or that one, and not as a principle of reason, which holds for every one.​

I will admit that my definition is rather loosely based on this passage.

But this is not our problem now. You have chosen a personal definition of “objective” and I am doing a semantic analysis in order to understand if our disagreements are only a question of words or we disagree on facts.

I think my position is easier than yours because I have taken the usual meanings in philosophy. They are already done.

I dispute this. You have not defined "objective proposition" at all, with the exception of one attempt which reduced to "true proposition about external stuff". And I do not find a common definition of objective proposition thus far. The various quotes you have given are either not about propositions or fail to give an explicit definition or both. This is why I have tried to come up with my own working definition.

Please, if you know what "objective proposition" means, state the meaning as clearly as possible. And if it means "true proposition about external stuff", then clearly that is not what anyone could possibly mean when they speak of objective morality (where "stuff" here evidently means the physical realm).

Your definition of rationality sounds very pragmatist to me: “A rational person is one who chooses what to do on the basis of its fitness to achieve his goals”, and relativist: “given his background beliefs”. I have a problem with the last part of the definition because it allows the qualification as “rationalist” to someone with absolute irrational beliefs (“given his background beliefs”). A fundamentalist, a believer in the car of the Sun or similar would be “rationalist” if they were coherent with any set of absurd beliefs (their background). I think this is in contradiction with the usual meaning of the word, both in human sciences as in the common language (this forum, for example). And this is useless for distinguishing the points (a) and (b) in my previous question.

I think that the second part of your definition is more accurate: “He also comes to believe on the basis of evidence and reason, and on methods which are effective in coming to true beliefs”. I agree now. And it is important to me, because you have introduced the rational method (“effective in coming to true beliefs”). So, an objective assertion must be accepted by persons that use “methods which are effective in coming to true beliefs”. I am sorry if I insist on your sentence. It is of capital importance to me in the matter we are discussing and I think it is well said.

I took it implicitly that a rational person who has come to bad beliefs could, in the presence of appropriate arguments and evidence, disavow those beliefs, so I think the difference matters little for our purposes.

But let me point out this: rational persons necessarily rely on authority (we cannot all participate in experiments for the Higgs Boson) and hence rational persons can come to false beliefs. Appeal to authority is one of the methods a rational person employs, subject to the usual concerns of reliability of the authority, and this is an effective method. You can't exclude religious persons from rationality, because the fact is that they've come to their beliefs in more or less the same manner that I've come to believe in the Higgs Boson.

Let that pass, and let's move on.

We know what the objective-rational methods are the cause of a real consensus between scientists. We don’t know any similar method in moral. So, we can say with Kant (Critic of Pure Reason) that moral sentences have not “objective validity”. (Another Kant is the philosopher of the moral imperative, but no one has defended this aprioristical theory here).

I wasn't aware of that statement from Kant in Critique. Could you provide a quote? (Evidently, he changed his mind.)

And I am not concerned with claims about the possibility of moral objective knowledge in God’s mind, nor super-intelligent aliens, nor humans of the 30th Century, if this kind of animals will exist at this date (really, I doubt it).

Ah, but recall the definition of objective. It deals with rational beings with the requisite observations, arguments, etc. It is a hypothetical claim, and if you and I are unaware of the "right" method, should it exist, perhaps we would converge on moral claims.

This is just the same argument over and over. You point out that we do not have a method for deciding moral claims. I agree, and point out that this does not conflict with the hypothesis that such claims are nonetheless objective -- though we lack evidence that this is the case. I've never once said I could show moral realism is true, so there is no contradiction here.

I wonder if our discussion has played out.

Finally, note that the universal imperative “everybody prefers truth to falsehood” you have proposed above, if really universal, it is not a moral imperative. Moral imperatives are referred to my relation to other people.

Right. That's why I have repeatedly referred to it as an objective, non-moral norm. I use it merely to show that the concept of objective norm is not self-contradictory. I have never called it a moral norm.

 

[David Mo]

Sorry, I am speaking of "objective propositions". I don't think that representations of objects are the same as propositions, and I don't know that the word "objective" applied to one is precisely the same as the others. I suppose it all depends on what counts as a representation of objects.

A proposition is the representation of an object. We affirm or deny something about an object. We represent what the object is or is not.
“The dog is green”, implies a representation of what the dog is.

In any case, I was thinking of Kant's treatment in Metaphysics of Morals.

I think there is not any contradiction in Kant. “Objectivity” has a different sense in moral imperatives from factual assertions. In science (or in the empirical knowledge) is a priori plus experience. In moral is a priori plus deduced maxims.
I only quoted Kant on the concept of objectivity. I have not time to do an explanation of my idea. It was not clear in itself. I am aware of this.

I dispute this. You have not defined "objective proposition" at all, with the exception of one attempt which reduced to "true proposition about external stuff". And I do not find a common definition of objective proposition thus far. The various quotes you have given are either not about propositions or fail to give an explicit definition or both. This is why I have tried to come up with my own working definition.

I repeat:
-“The perceiving subject can either perceive accurately or seem to perceive features of the object that are not in the object”.
-“According to this line of thought, individuals and institutions are objective to the extent that they allow their views about what is the case or what ought to be done to be guided by the evidence, as opposed to (say) the typically distorting influences of ideological dogma, prejudice in favor of one's kin, or texts whose claim to authority is exhausted by their being venerated by tradition”.
-“For a representation to be objectively valid it must be a representation of an objective feature of reality, that is, a feature whose existence and nature is independent of how it is perceived”.

And so, a sentence (or an idea, or a perception) is “objective” if it reflects accurately the features that belong to the object itself. A sentence (etc.) is subjective if it refers to features that are not in the object, but in the subject. These are my definitions. They match the common use in philosophy.

I took it implicitly that a rational person who has come to bad beliefs could, in the presence of appropriate arguments and evidence, disavow those beliefs, so I think the difference matters little for our purposes.

But let me point out this: rational persons necessarily rely on authority (we cannot all participate in experiments for the Higgs Boson) and hence rational persons can come to false beliefs. Appeal to authority is one of the methods a rational person employs, subject to the usual concerns of reliability of the authority, and this is an effective method. You can't exclude religious persons from rationality, because the fact is that they've come to their beliefs in more or less the same manner that I've come to believe in the Higgs Boson.

I disagree. We trust in science because it has showed that its theories are effective in predicting and controlling the reality. That is to say consensus and progress (objectivity). There is not anything similar in religion. In religion the argument is the pure authority and faith.

I wonder if our discussion has played out.

Maybe.

Right. That's why I have repeatedly referred to it as an objective, non-moral norm. I use it merely to show that the concept of objective norm is not self-contradictory. I have never called it a moral norm.

In reality the sentence was not a norm. It was a description of facts. My mistake also.
If everybody without exception really prefers truth to falsehood, the norm is superfluous. Everybody is already doing this.
If someone prefers the false to the true (and I know some cases) you ought to justify the norm. On what base? Objective or subjective?

 

[phiwum]

A proposition is the representation of an object. We affirm or deny something about an object. We represent what the object is or is not.
“The dog is green”, implies a representation of what the dog is.

If you want to interpret representation so widely that a proposition is a representation, we can work with that. I'm not so sure that every proposition is a representation of an object, but let's presume so for now.

If a proposition is of the kind that two rational beings equally acquainted with the relevant observations and arguments will converge on the same judgment regarding the truth of the proposition, then it must be the case that the feature under discussion is "independent of how it is perceived," since no matter who the perceiver is, given adequate observation and mental grasp, the perception will be the same in this respect.

And, I should think, vice versa, though this is perhaps less obvious. (It is possible that some objective features are imperceptible, I suppose.)

So, I think the two definitions are not so different.

I repeat:
-“The perceiving subject can either perceive accurately or seem to perceive features of the object that are not in the object”.
-“According to this line of thought, individuals and institutions are objective to the extent that they allow their views about what is the case or what ought to be done to be guided by the evidence, as opposed to (say) the typically distorting influences of ideological dogma, prejudice in favor of one's kin, or texts whose claim to authority is exhausted by their being venerated by tradition”.
-“For a representation to be objectively valid it must be a representation of an objective feature of reality, that is, a feature whose existence and nature is independent of how it is perceived”.

And so, a sentence (or an idea, or a perception) is “objective” if it reflects accurately the features that belong to the object itself. A sentence (etc.) is subjective if it refers to features that are not in the object, but in the subject. These are my definitions. They match the common use in philosophy.

What, then, is different between objective and true? I see none.

Hence, we may as well drop the word "objective" in favor of the word "true", since clearly a proposition is true if it reflects accurately the features that belong to the object itself.

As far as I'm concerned, if objectivity has any utility, it must be orthogonal to truth, so that there are objective but false propositions (2+2 = 5, "The sun is carried by a chariot," etc.). These are objective, because their falsity is not a matter of mere subjective opinion.

I disagree. We trust in science because it has showed that its theories are effective in predicting and controlling the reality. That is to say consensus and progress (objectivity). There is not anything similar in religion. In religion the argument is the pure authority and faith.

I have no firsthand knowledge of any of the successes of particle physics. I must defer to the authorities who report such successes.

I have no firsthand knowledge of anything to do with genomics, astronomy (aside from that visible with the naked eye or simple telescopes), geology, etc. I learn about the successes you allude to only by reference to authorities.

In reality the sentence was not a norm. It was a description of facts. My mistake also.

The sentence, "One ought to prefer true beliefs to false," is a norm. So is, "True beliefs are preferable to false." Evaluations such as these are clearly normative in nature. I cannot imagine why you say otherwise. (They may be descriptions of facts as well, if norms can be facts. It rather depends on what counts as a fact.)

If everybody without exception really prefers truth to falsehood, the norm is superfluous. Everybody is already doing this.

It thereby expresses a universal value. In principle, such values are exactly what would suffice to get an objective morality rolling, but of course this particular value is non-moral.

If someone prefers the false to the true (and I know some cases) you ought to justify the norm. On what base? Objective or subjective?

On the basis that the goal of rational reflection is to come to true beliefs, and hence rational beings are such that they aim for the true over false. This is a fact about rationality, and hence the norm is objective, since every rational being would accept it.

 

[tsig]

If you want to interpret representation so widely that a proposition is a representation, we can work with that. I'm not so sure that every proposition is a representation of an object, but let's presume so for now.

If a proposition is of the kind that two rational beings equally acquainted with the relevant observations and arguments will converge on the same judgment regarding the truth of the proposition, then it must be the case that the feature under discussion is "independent of how it is perceived," since no matter who the perceiver is, given adequate observation and mental grasp, the perception will be the same in this respect.

And, I should think, vice versa, though this is perhaps less obvious. (It is possible that some objective features are imperceptible, I suppose.)

So, I think the two definitions are not so different.



What, then, is different between objective and true? I see none.

Hence, we may as well drop the word "objective" in favor of the word "true", since clearly a proposition is true if it reflects accurately the features that belong to the object itself.

As far as I'm concerned, if objectivity has any utility, it must be orthogonal to truth, so that there are objective but false propositions (2+2 = 5, "The sun is carried by a chariot," etc.). These are objective, because their falsity is not a matter of mere subjective opinion.


I have no firsthand knowledge of any of the successes of particle physics. I must defer to the authorities who report such successes.

I have no firsthand knowledge of anything to do with genomics, astronomy (aside from that visible with the naked eye or simple telescopes), geology, etc. I learn about the successes you allude to only by reference to authorities.


The sentence, "One ought to prefer true beliefs to false," is a norm. So is, "True beliefs are preferable to false." Evaluations such as these are clearly normative in nature. I cannot imagine why you say otherwise. (They may be descriptions of facts as well, if norms can be facts. It rather depends on what counts as a fact.)



It thereby expresses a universal value. In principle, such values are exactly what would suffice to get an objective morality rolling, but of course this particular value is non-moral.



On the basis that the goal of rational reflection is to come to true beliefs, and hence rational beings are such that they aim for the true over false. This is a fact about rationality, and hence the norm is objective, since every rational being would accept it.

Since every rational being would accept it obviously one who does not accept it is not a rational being. Pies are round but arguments should not be.

 

[phiwum]

Since every rational being would accept it obviously one who does not accept it is not a rational being. Pies are round but arguments should not be.

My argument proceeds from the meaning of rationality to conclude that every being who is rational would accept this conclusion upon reflection.

There is no doubt some vagueness to the concept of rationality, but I think that it is clear enough that the aim of rational reflection is to produce true beliefs and avoid false beliefs. That is enough for my conclusion.

I don't think that it is circular in the way you suggest. Your "rebuttal" is no different than, "Since every right triangle satisfies the Pyth. theorem, a triangle which doesn't satisfy it is not a right triangle." Yes, that's true.

I'm probably wasting my time here, since you don't really engage in thoughtful argument, preferring instead the two sentence drive-by. Please, show me I'm wrong and we can discuss your allegation.

 

[tsig]

My argument proceeds from the meaning of rationality to conclude that every being who is rational would accept this conclusion upon reflection.

There is no doubt some vagueness to the concept of rationality, but I think that it is clear enough that the aim of rational reflection is to produce true beliefs and avoid false beliefs. That is enough for my conclusion.

I don't think that it is circular in the way you suggest. Your "rebuttal" is no different than, "Since every right triangle satisfies the Pyth. theorem, a triangle which doesn't satisfy it is not a right triangle." Yes, that's true.

I'm probably wasting my time here, since you don't really engage in thoughtful argument, preferring instead the two sentence drive-by. Please, show me I'm wrong and we can discuss your allegation.

The aim of rational reflection is to produce true beliefs and we know they are true because they were reached by rational reflection.

 

[Leumas]

The aim of rational reflection is to produce true beliefs and we know they are true because they were reached by rational reflection.

Basically the sum total of a truly firm faith... I call it rationalized faith in faith.


[imgw=350]https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/ea/TheosophicalSocietyBudapest.jpg[/imgw]

 

[phiwum]

The aim of rational reflection is to produce true beliefs and we know they are true because they were reached by rational reflection.

Where in the world did I say that?

ETA: Honestly, tsig, your "paraphrase" of what I said borders on the delusional. What makes you think I've said anything about how (or if) we come to know that our beliefs are true?

All I've said is that we would prefer that they be true rather than false.

 

[tsig]

Where in the world did I say that?

ETA: Honestly, tsig, your "paraphrase" of what I said borders on the delusional. What makes you think I've said anything about how (or if) we come to know that our beliefs are true?

All I've said is that we would prefer that they be true rather than false.

How do they know what is true and what is false? I thought it was obvious that they would use reason to do this but perhaps you have another way.

 

[phiwum]

How do they know what is true and what is false? I thought it was obvious that they would use reason to do this but perhaps you have another way.

That's a distinct issue entirely.

Yes, reason and experience are used in making judgments about what is true. That is partly my point, but I'm not here talking about how one determines what is true, but that preferring true beliefs over false is a precondition of rationality.

The two issues are distinct.

ETA: in particular, you suggested that I've claimed rational reflection is infallible, a guarantee that one has a true belief. I've never said any such thing.

 

[tsig]

That's a distinct issue entirely.

Yes, reason and experience are used in making judgments about what is true. That is partly my point, but I'm not here talking about how one determines what is true, but that preferring true beliefs over false is a precondition of rationality. The two issues are distinct.

ETA: in particular, you suggested that I've claimed rational reflection is infallible, a guarantee that one has a true belief. I've never said any such thing.

Wait, now the rational man has to chose true beliefs over false before he can even be considered rational? How is he supposed to make the true/false determination without rationality?

Your assertion that rational men prefer true beliefs is disproved by many rational men holding beliefs that range from the dead walking to humans flying in the air.

 

[phiwum]

Wait, now the rational man has to chose true beliefs over false before he can even be considered rational? How is he supposed to make the true/false determination without rationality?

My point is that the entire aim of epistemic rationality -- that is, the capacity to reason about propositions -- is to produce true beliefs rather than false. Of course, reason is not infallible, and we all are drawn to beliefs which are false, but none of us are indifferent to truth over falsity. It is the nature of rationality itself which is intimately tied to the intrinsic value of truth.

I'm not even saying that there are no false beliefs which we would prefer to believe. I think there may be a case to be made for that, since there seems to be an inherent contradiction in saying, "I believe X, even though I recognize that X is false." But I'm only speaking here about an intrinsic value of truth over falsity, not making a claim that extrinsic reasons will never outweigh the intrinsic benefits.

Your assertion that rational men prefer true beliefs is disproved by many rational men holding beliefs that range from the dead walking to humans flying in the air.

And how many of those people think those beliefs are false?

When I say that rational persons prefer true beliefs over false, I make no claim that each and every such person infallibly knows which are true and which are false. Those who believe the dead walk don't do so in spite of what I have said. They believe it because they've been led to the conclusion that this is true, and they aim to believe that which is true rather than that which is false.

Obviously, we may say that they've reached the wrong conclusion about the truth of this matter, but I don't think we can say they prefer falsity.

 

[David Mo]

If a proposition is of the kind that two rational beings equally acquainted with the relevant observations and arguments will converge on the same judgment regarding the truth of the proposition, then it must be the case that the feature under discussion is "independent of how it is perceived," since no matter who the perceiver is, given adequate observation and mental grasp, the perception will be the same in this respect.

And, I should think, vice versa, though this is perhaps less obvious. (It is possible that some objective features are imperceptible, I suppose.)

So, I think the two definitions are not so different.

My definition is not very different of yours. Only I stress the method. But I think it is supposed by your definition.

“Objective features” is larger than objective knowledge. Reality is larger than our knowledge of it. Sure.

What, then, is different between objective and true? I see none.

Hence, we may as well drop the word "objective" in favor of the word "true", since clearly a proposition is true if it reflects accurately the features that belong to the object itself.

In the tradition of the empiricism, that I am defending, true and objective knowledge are similar. However, false and subjective knowledge are not exactly synonyms.
In any case, the distinction between objective and subjective knowledge is useful when we are discussing with other theories with different concepts of truth.

As far as I'm concerned, if objectivity has any utility, it must be orthogonal to truth, so that there are objective but false propositions (2+2 = 5, "The sun is carried by a chariot," etc.). These are objective, because their falsity is not a matter of mere subjective opinion.

Therefore “2+2=5 is objectively false”. This proposition is more accurate. Is it not?

I have no firsthand knowledge of any of the successes of particle physics. I must defer to the authorities who report such successes.

I have no firsthand knowledge of anything to do with genomics, astronomy (aside from that visible with the naked eye or simple telescopes), geology, etc. I learn about the successes you allude to only by reference to authorities.

Do you think that “There is not any god that Allah” has the same rational authority than “The Earth turns around the Sun”? Both sentences have the same degree of rationality?

The sentence, "One ought to prefer true beliefs to false," is a norm. So is, "True beliefs are preferable to false." Evaluations such as these are clearly normative in nature. I cannot imagine why you say otherwise. (They may be descriptions of facts as well, if norms can be facts. It rather depends on what counts as a fact.)

It thereby expresses a universal value. In principle, such values are exactly what would suffice to get an objective morality rolling, but of course this particular value is non-moral.

On the basis that the goal of rational reflection is to come to true beliefs, and hence rational beings are such that they aim for the true over false. This is a fact about rationality, and hence the norm is objective, since every rational being would accept it.

If anyone could prove to me that Christ is outside the truth, and if the truth really did exclude Christ, I should prefer to stay with Christ and not with truth. (Fiodor M. Dostoevsky: Letter to Mrs. Fonvizina, 20 Fabruary 1854).
​

Do you think Dostoevsky was not a rational man?
Why not?

A terminally ill can prefer the “pious” falsehood to the truth about his illness. Is he irrational? Why?

 

[phiwum]

My definition is not very different of yours. Only I stress the method. But I think it is supposed by your definition.

To be sure, your most recent definition says nothing about method. You wrote

And so, a sentence (or an idea, or a perception) is “objective” if it reflects accurately the features that belong to the object itself.​

This happens to be the definition of truth, not of objectivity, unless the two are the same.

“Objective features” is larger than objective knowledge. Reality is larger than our knowledge of it. Sure.



In the tradition of the empiricism, that I am defending, true and objective knowledge are similar. However, false and subjective knowledge are not exactly synonyms.
In any case, the distinction between objective and subjective knowledge is useful when we are discussing with other theories with different concepts of truth.


Therefore “2+2=5 is objectively false”. This proposition is more accurate. Is it not?

I don't know. Does "objectively false" mean something different than "objective but false"? What does turning it into an adverb do? How is the meaning different?

Do you think that “There is not any god that Allah” has the same rational authority than “The Earth turns around the Sun”? Both sentences have the same degree of rationality?

I never said that all appeals to authority are equally strong. My point merely is that I don't use the scientific method to draw conclusions about most scientific claims. Rather, I appeal to authority, namely the authority of the media or texts, primarily. Thus, since you tie objectivity to the scientific method, I wonder whether my beliefs about science count as objective.

If anyone could prove to me that Christ is outside the truth, and if the truth really did exclude Christ, I should prefer to stay with Christ and not with truth. (Fiodor M. Dostoevsky: Letter to Mrs. Fonvizina, 20 Fabruary 1854).
​

Do you think Dostoevsky was not a rational man?
Why not?

A terminally ill can prefer the “pious” falsehood to the truth about his illness. Is he irrational? Why?

There are two responses. First, I rather doubt that one can believe that which he knows is false. This is contrary to the notion of belief. But I'm not sure that this is all that relevant, since Dostoevsky spoke about his preference, not his ability to believe.

So, here is the meat of my response. I have only said that there is intrinsic value in truth, so that it is generally preferred over falsity. There may be certain extrinsic features of a false belief (such as the comfort of believing one is the creation of a loving God) that may produce benefit, were one to believe it. This extrinsic value can, I suppose, outweigh the intrinsic value of truth in rare circumstances, so that one would say, "I know this is false and therefore I cannot believe it, but I would prefer to believe it nonetheless."

Thus, Dostoevsky need not be irrational if we read him as saying that, were there no God, he would nonetheless prefer to believe that there is one, because this belief produces such advantages that it outweighs the intrinsic value of truth.