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What is the appeal of "objective morality"

First, when I say that a statement is objective, I mean that any rational person acquainted with relevant evidence and arguments regarding the statement would come to the same conclusion regarding its truth. Thus, the usual observational claims about the world around us are objective, as are the claims of mathematics.

Consensus is not a sufficient condition to objectivity.

We need an additional guarantee: That the methods provide a knowledge about the external world and not a (inter)subjective consensus.

Mathematics are not objective in the usual sense of this word. A theorem is mathematically truth when correctly derived (deduced) from an axiomatic corpus. Diverse theorems can be deduced from different axiomatic systems (Euclidean or not-Euclidean). You can call this "objectivity" but this is very different from the physical objectivity. This is our subject, I think.
 
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Consensus is not a sufficient condition to objectivity.

We need an additional guarantee: That the methods provide a knowledge about the external world and not a (inter)subjective consensus.

Mathematics are not objective in the usual sense of this word. A theorem is mathematically truth when correctly derived (deduced) from an axiomatic corpus. Diverse theorems can be deduced from different axiomatic systems (Euclidean or not-Euclidean). You can call this "objectivity" but this is very different from the physical objectivity. This is our subject, I think.

Physical reality is not objective nor subjective.
 
There are two related "escapes."

They apply equally in mathematics and moral reasoning. The first is to show that the root assumptions are invalid or that the argument fails to include certain desirable properties of a system.

So, for example, in mathematics, I can explain how division works. Everything goes along fine until someone points out I have not accounted for division by zero - with zero as the denominator, my carefully constructed proof goes sideways. One has to be careful to define the properties allowed and disallowed going in. Those definitions are not part of the proof. We can call them a-rational, but they can form the basis of rejecting the logical train, even while acting as a rational being.

I don't see this as an issue at all. What you're pointing out is that a theory can be inconsistent. Obviously, that's true, but I was not saying we should accept mathematical theorems as being true about the real world, but only accept that the conclusion follows from the premises of the theorem.

This is true whether the theory is inconsistent or not. In an inconsistent theory, it is true that both P and NOT P are provable from the axioms and a rational person would accept this fact (and reject the theory as uninteresting).

The second problem is in application. The entire process may be fine, and the rational person may agree with the conclusion, but there's still the step of proving it works beyond the conceptual realm. Again, this arises for both mathematics and moral systems.

This latter challenge is huge. I would not accept a conceptual framework, no matter how good the proof "on paper" that yields erroneous results. We commonly do this with mathematics - if the math says light should act like a wave, but it only sometimes acts like a wave, then the math, not the experiment is wrong. So too with moral reasoning. If the moral calculus tells me I should kill my offspring, it is likely I will judge it flawed, instead of accepting the outcome.

I think this is precisely what we see in the abandonment of religious values based on ancient texts. Here we have a moral system one might argue is objective. But we both dismiss the premises (a God giving us commands) and dismiss the specific results (slavery, et al). The moral system is judged, not simply on a rational basis, but with our own subjective morality.

Sorry, but a mathematical theory says nothing about light or any other physical feature of the world. Let's not confuse the mathematical theory with its application in a scientific setting.

Similarly, I'm arguing that a moral claim is objectively true if all rational beings that are adequately acquainted with the relevant facts and arguments would assent to the claim. I don't see how it is conceivable that this is the case for a significantly counter-intuitive moral claim, unless our (non-rational) intuitions are completely broken and influence us to be irrational regarding this issue.

(There is a equivocation going on in my presentation thus far. The word "rational" sometimes means "capable of rationality" and other times means "behaving (ideally) rational". In judging objectivity, the latter condition is more appropriate, but harder for us to ascertain, since we do not behave perfectly rational ourselves.)
 
Consensus is not a sufficient condition to objectivity.

We need an additional guarantee: That the methods provide a knowledge about the external world and not a (inter)subjective consensus.


You misunderstand. My definition refers not to consensus, but the result of the careful consideration of any rational being. Roughly speaking, it is objective only if any possible rational being would, after adequate reflection, come to the right conclusion. Thus, inter-subjectivity can not be confused with objective in this sense -- although determining whether a claim is objective or not may be an issue, but I think it's an issue for physical claims as well as norms.

Mathematics are not objective in the usual sense of this word. A theorem is mathematically truth when correctly derived (deduced) from an axiomatic corpus. Diverse theorems can be deduced from different axiomatic systems (Euclidean or not-Euclidean). You can call this "objectivity" but this is very different from the physical objectivity. This is our subject, I think.

Mathematics is completely objective. The fact that there are different theories is beside the point. What is objective are statements such as

* The axioms of Euclidean geometry entail that the interior angles of any triangle add up to 180 deg.
* The axioms of spherical geometry entail that there exist triangles with three right angles.

There is nothing at all subjective about these statements.

And I don't know why you think our subject is physical objectivity. I'm speaking about the possibility of objective norms. Those are not physical things.
 
Physical reality is not objective nor subjective.

Agreed. If these terms have any clear meaning, they must apply to propositions, not stuff. So, let's presume that when Mo said "physical objectivity" he meant "the kind of objectivity that statements about physical stuff may have."
 
Physical reality is not objective nor subjective.

Sorry. I said it incorrectly. I wanted to refer to the objectivity as a property of the methods of natural science.
I was arguing with phiwum because I think that the "objectivity" of mathematics is a different thing than objectivity in natural sciences. When Sam Harris and other speak about "objectivity" in moral, they are thinking in a similar way to the objectivity in natural sciences.
 
Honestly, I kinda know what tautology means, but not in its entirety. And there seem to be several definitions and connotations. Could you spell out how you mean it? Also, I'm just taking it on your word that my claims represent psychological egoism, but I'm alright with that if you are.

Very roughly, a statement is tautologous if it is true in a trivial sense that tells us nothing at all. Somewhat more precisely, it is tautologous if the very form of the statement makes it true regardless of the meanings of its parts. (Much more precisely would require talking about propositional logic.)

The statement "If it is raining, then it is raining," is tautologous in this sense, as is any statement of the form "If P then P." I think that what you've defended is of this form, asserting that "If a person chooses to do X, then he chooses to do X."




Aha! Now we're getting somewhere! We've been using different definitions of self-interest, obviously. So let's ditch self-interest, at least for now. Let's talk about preference, since we were at least able to agree that when the soldier jumped on the grenade, that was the choice that he preferred.

When you say "tangible outcome", does that include emotions?

Yes. The word "tangible" seems only to confuse my meaning. Please ignore it.

Right. I think that altruism is when someone makes a sacrifice for the benefit of another. I think it is like a sacrifice play in chess. Give up the queen in order to make an even greater gain, or to take a less severe punishment. And so with morality. The fact that people take the actions that they find the most rewarding, and/or the least punishing is the very thing that allows us to make moral evaluations of character or action.

The soldier jumping the grenade is a good scenario to discuss, because I think it pushes the limits of sacrifice. But maybe a more mundane case would make my position clearer. Let's imagine a little old lady living on a government pension. She lives mostly off of generic brand canned soup over bulk rice. But she gives a large portion of her cheque to charity. Maybe she does it because she empathizes with people that are even less fortunate than her, and it makes her happy to see other people happy. And/or she likes the feeling that it gives her to be the agent of this altruism and this satisfies her moral sense. Personally, I would rank those as good moral reasons for a good outcome. On the other hand, maybe she's a total meanie and her main motivation is to rub her superiority in the face of her sister out of pure spite. Well, still a good outcome on the charity side of things, but not something I would rank as well on my own moral scale. In any of these cases we see what they are like by seeing what they find rewarding.

Here I'll reiterate that I can't imagine an example of someone making a meaningful choice without that choice being based on what they prefer. I'm not sure what that would even mean? Before, I gave the example of someone infected by a brain parasite. Or maybe someone could be possessed by some kind of spirit, but I don't believe in that kind of thing. And whether it's a brain parasite or a spectral parasite, I don't think the actor could be said to be making choices in a meaningful way. Could you give some other kind of example?

The devil seems to be in the details now on how we define "prefer". It seems to me that you use "prefer" to mean the option actually chosen is the preferred option, and that's fine if we want to define the term that way, at the cost of making your claim tautologous.

But we should also carefully note that people do say, "I'd prefer not to do this, but I will," without seemingly contradicting themselves. Obviously, they are using the word differently than you are, and we should take care that we don't equivocate between the two meanings.

In any case, regarding dear Granny, I absolutely agree that things which may appear to be purely altruistic can actually be in the person's interest, either because of some hidden selfish motive or because they are the kind of person who enjoys being generosity.

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Okay, not sure why you chose this example with an egoist as the central character? The moral philosophy that I'm trying to put forth is a descriptive one. Its success or failure doesn't depend on some individual acting as if they believe in it or not. Also, I don't see the relevance of such an implausible scenario. As if anyone, in such an instance, thinks about that stuff?

I just thought that we should take the example to the point of discussing utility in order to show that it is implausible the heroic soldier is really reasoning in terms of self-interest, but we've dropped self-interest in favor of preference, so we may also drop this line of argument.

Here's where I think we stand on a few claims.

(1) People always choose to do what they believe to be in their self-interest. I think that we agree this is false, though it may be that most actions are chosen according to self-interest.

(2)People always choose to do what they prefer to do. True if we use the term "prefer" to mean "what they choose to do", but in that case, it becomes tautologous and hence uninteresting.

(3)Some, perhaps most, apparently altruistic actions are actually in the person's self-interest. This seems to be both true and non-trivial.
 
Sorry. I said it incorrectly. I wanted to refer to the objectivity as a property of the methods of natural science.
I was arguing with phiwum because I think that the "objectivity" of mathematics is a different thing than objectivity in natural sciences. When Sam Harris and other speak about "objectivity" in moral, they are thinking in a similar way to the objectivity in natural sciences.

I certainly don't have Harris in mind when I speak of objectivity.
 
You misunderstand. My definition refers not to consensus, but the result of the careful consideration of any rational being. Roughly speaking, it is objective only if any possible rational being would, after adequate reflection, come to the right conclusion. Thus, inter-subjectivity can not be confused with objective in this sense -- although determining whether a claim is objective or not may be an issue, but I think it's an issue for physical claims as well as norms.

Mathematics is completely objective. The fact that there are different theories is beside the point. What is objective are statements such as

* The axioms of Euclidean geometry entail that the interior angles of any triangle add up to 180 deg.
* The axioms of spherical geometry entail that there exist triangles with three right angles.

There is nothing at all subjective about these statements.

And I don't know why you think our subject is physical objectivity. I'm speaking about the possibility of objective norms. Those are not physical things.

I am not saying that the diverse axiomatic systems of mathematics are subjective. They are deductive. They develop the consequences of a set of axioms in a deductive way. As axiomatic systems, they are not neither subjective nor objective in the same way of the sciences of Nature.
In mathematics you can use contradictory axioms and arrive to different theorems logically true.
For example:
There is one single parallel to a straight line passing by an external point.
There are an infinite number of parallels.
No parallel is possible.

These are axioms in Euclides’, Riemann’s and Lobachevski’s geometries. They are diverse but none of them is false.

I think you are not thinking in this kind of “objectivity” when applied to the moral problem. When we affirm that a moral imperative is “objective” we are saying that it can be inferred of some principle or set of principles that are true. And they will be the only true with exclusion of the others.

Furthermore, your definition of “objective” in terms of properties of states of mind (“rational being”, “adequate reflexion”) is vague. What is to be rational? What about “adequate”? If it is “objective” in any sense, the natural science reaches this status by means of a method. This method is based on deduction, implication, induction and experimentation. This method is not applicable to moral justification. Sam Harris, for example, doesn’t provide a single example of scientific method applied to moral problems in his book. Furthermore, I don’t know any example of a defence of scientific method applied to the moral that had never provided an example of deductive, experimental or inductive method to solve moral conflicts.

If you want plead the case of moral objectivity you would show here what you mean with “rational being” or “adequate reflexion” in terms that make its objective value possible and recognisable.
 
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But all of this merely describes our behavior in causal terms.


Are we not supposed to be trying to find the cause of what anyone (you & WLC in this case), means when you talk about human behaviour saying it exhibits "objective morals".


Objective morality is prescriptive.


What do you mean by "prescriptive". Afaik, you have yet to give any coherent definition of what you mean by morals, let alone "objective morals", far less "prescriptive objective morals".


If there is such a thing, it does not get its source from any facts about our DNA. Our DNA may explain certain of our behavior, but it cannot make it good or bad. It can make us tend to characterize it as good or bad, but there is no objective meat there.


By saying "If there is such a thing, it does not get its source from any facts about our DNA", you are now declaring your own philosophical beliefs as if they were unarguable facts about the physical world.

Who said that DNA determined what you regard as "good" or "bad".

You keep trying to declare things as either "good" or "bad". But "good" for what purpose? And decided to be "good" by whom?

Remember we are talking here about William Lane Criag's claim that what he regards as "morals" are (a) objective (whatever he means by that word), and (b) that his self-proclaimed objective idea means that the morals must have been implanted by a supernatural heavenly creator of Christian religious belief.

But so far we do not even have a coherent statement of what you, WLC, or philosophers would define as morality.

Presumably the Taliban thought they were being extremely moral when they tried to execute Malala Yousafzai. They are even absolutely certain that they are instructed to do such things directly by God (the same God who is the source of WLC's objective morals in all humans).

But as explained before - if anything at all is certain, then what is certain is that all children are taught by their parents from a very young age, what it is that their parents (however wonderful or appalling) claim is good and bad in respect of "moral" behaviour. It did not come to the children from God. It came from their parents, teachers, neighbours, and everyone else around them. And that's "nurture", not "nature".
 
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I am not saying that the diverse axiomatic systems of mathematics are subjective. They are deductive. They develop the consequences of a set of axioms in a deductive way. As axiomatic systems, they are not neither subjective nor objective in the same way of the sciences of Nature.
In mathematics you can use contradictory axioms and arrive to different theorems logically true.
For example:
There is one single parallel to a straight line passing by an external point.
There are an infinite number of parallels.
No parallel is possible.

These are axioms in Euclides’, Riemann’s and Lobachevski’s geometries. They are diverse but none of them is false.

I think you are not thinking in this kind of “objectivity” when applied to the moral problem. When we affirm that a moral imperative is “objective” we are saying that it can be inferred of some principle or set of principles that are true. And they will be the only true with exclusion of the others.

And when I say that mathematics is objective, I don't mean any of the statements you mention above, but rather statements of the form

The axioms of theory T entail the statement P.

This is clearly an objective claim. Any two beings of minimal rational ability and familiarity with the rules of inference can determine whether such a statement is true or false, and they will agree in their inference. What else could one mean by calling anything objective? It must mean that subjective incentives, wants, needs, preferences, etc., cannot prevent two rational beings from coming to the same conclusion.

Furthermore, your definition of “objective” in terms of properties of states of mind (“rational being”, “adequate reflexion”) is vague. What is to be rational? What about “adequate”? If it is “objective” in any sense, the natural science reaches this status by means of a method. This method is based on deduction, implication, induction and experimentation. This method is not applicable to moral justification. Sam Harris, for example, doesn’t provide a single example of scientific method applied to moral problems in his book. Furthermore, I don’t know any example of a defence of scientific method applied to the moral that had never provided an example of deductive, experimental or inductive method to solve moral conflicts.

If you want plead the case of moral objectivity you would show here what you mean with “rational being” or “adequate reflexion” in terms that make its objective value possible and recognisable.

First, you're right that one would like a clear definition of rationality, and that is beyond my abilities at present. But that need not keep us from reasonably applying my definition in many cases. You would surely agree that a man suitably acquainted with any of the valid arguments for the Pythagorean theorem would be bound to assent that the theorem is indeed entailed by the axioms of Euclidean geometry. If he did not do so, then he is behaving irrationally. It's difficult to define rationality very clearly, but we are clear enough that certain simple judgments such as that are beyond doubt.

Second, what is it about science that makes it objective? I suspect that the answer comes down along the same lines as mine -- that the claims of science are not subject to dispute over interpretation, preferences, etc. That is, that rational beings well acquainted with the evidence, theories, arguments, calculations, etc., would be bound to come to the same conclusion.

So, how is science fundamentally different in its objectivity than math? Only that some of the data that goes into drawing a conclusion about scientific claims is necessarily observational, whereas math depends only on assessing arguments.

Let's see where our difference lies. Tell me what you mean when you say that scientific claims are objective. I doubt your meaning is much different than mine, in the end.
 
Then, what method of objectivity you propose?

A deductive method? Inductive?......? Do you believe there is a single method of rationality? Adequate?

Please, an example.

What do you call the method I've applied to deduce that it is objectively true (i.e., all rational beings would assent to the claim) that truth is preferable to falsity? It's not inductive, surely not deductive in anything approaching the formal sense, but closer to deductive in nature.

Not sure what you mean when you ask about single methods of rationality. Seems silly on the face of it. Argument by analogy is different than formal proof, after all.
 
Are we not supposed to be trying to find the cause of what anyone (you & WLC in this case), means when you talk about human behaviour saying it exhibits "objective morals".





What do you mean by "prescriptive". Afaik, you have yet to give any coherent definition of what you mean by morals, let alone "objective morals", far less "prescriptive objective morals".





By saying "If there is such a thing, it does not get its source from any facts about our DNA", you are now declaring your own philosophical beliefs as if they were unarguable facts about the physical world.

Who said that DNA determined what you regard as "good" or "bad".

You keep trying to declare things as either "good" or "bad". But "good" for what purpose? And decided to be "good" by whom?

Remember we are talking here about William Lane Criag's claim that what he regards as "morals" are (a) objective (whatever he means by that word), and (b) that his self-proclaimed objective idea means that the morals must have been implanted by a supernatural heavenly creator of Christian religious belief.

But so far we do not even have a coherent statement of what you, WLC, or philosophers would define as morality.

Presumably the Taliban thought they were being extremely moral when they tried to execute Malala Yousafzai. They are even absolutely certain that they are instructed to do such things directly by God (the same God who is the source of WLC's objective morals in all humans).

But as explained before - if anything at all is certain, then what is certain is that all children are taught by their parents from a very young age, what it is that their parents (however wonderful or appalling) claim is good and bad in respect of "moral" behaviour. It did not come to the children from God. It came from their parents, teachers, neighbours, and everyone else around them. And that's "nurture", not "nature".

I'm sorry, Ian, but I really have tired of this exchange, after the umpteenth charge that I'm supposed to be defending Craig's ideas or something. With due respect, I'm bowing out.
 
What do you mean by "prescriptive".

You don't know? Really?

Maybe it will help you.


To say that moral requirements are prescriptive is to say that they tell us how we ought to act, to say that they give us reasons for acting. Thus, to say that something is morally good is to say that we ought to pursue it, that we have reason to pursue it. To say that something is morally bad is to say that we ought not to pursue it, that we have reason not to pursue it. To say that moral requirements are categorically prescriptive is to say that these reasons are categorical in the sense of Kant's categorical imperatives. The reasons for action that moral requirements furnish are not contingent upon the possession of any desires or wants on the part of the agent to whom they are addressed: I cannot release myself from the requirement imposed by the claim that torturing the innocent is wrong by citing some desire or inclination that I have. This contrasts, for example, with the requirement imposed by the claim that perpetual lateness at work is likely to result in one losing one's job: I can release myself from the requirement imposed by this claim by citing my desire to lose my job (perhaps because I find it unfulfilling, or whatever). Reasons for action which are contingent in this way on desires and inclinations are furnished by what Kant called hypothetical imperatives.

So our concept of a moral requirement is a concept of a categorically prescriptive requirement.

Alexander Miller: “Realism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, First published Mon Jul 8, 2002; substantive revision Thu Oct 2, 2014. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism/

Another excerpt:

“Laws should be obeyed”. Whether or not you should obey all the laws of the land is a problem of ethics. But a law of Nature is not the sort of thing you can obey or disobey, since it is not an order or command anyone has given. What could you do if someone says “Obey the law of gravitation”? Your motions, along those of stones and every particle in the universe, are instances of this law; but since the law only says us how the matter does behave, and doesn’t prescribe how this should behave, you cannot said either to obey or disobey it. A prescriptive law, moreover, could be still said to exist even if it were universally disobeyed.
(John Hospers: An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, Oxon, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1997, p. 102.​

You're welcome.
 
You don't know? Really?

It is a bit of jargon that could easily be unfamiliar to anyone outside of philosophy.

Roughly, it is about what one ought to do, not what one actually does.
 
It seems to me that David is thinking of objectivity as a term that applies to methods. And that's a sensible use of the term.

But I am spreading of the objectivity of propositions, not methods.
 
It seems to me that David is thinking of objectivity as a term that applies to methods. And that's a sensible use of the term.

But I am spreading of the objectivity of propositions, not methods.

A proposition can't itself be objective as far as I know.
 
It seems to me that David is thinking of objectivity as a term that applies to methods. And that's a sensible use of the term.

But I am spreading of the objectivity of propositions, not methods.

Both.
The objectivity of a proposition resides in the method to validate it.

It is a bit of jargon that could easily be unfamiliar to anyone outside of philosophy.

Roughly, it is about what one ought to do, not what one actually does.

Roughly, you are right.

I shall try to summarize in avoiding jargon:

Miller:
To say that moral requirements are prescriptive is to say that they tell us how we ought to act, to say that they give us reasons for acting. Thus, to say that something is morally good is to say that we ought to pursue it, that we have reason to pursue it. To say that something is morally bad is to say that we ought not to pursue it, that we have reason not to pursue it.

Hospers;
“Laws should be obeyed”. But a law of Nature is not the sort of thing you can obey or disobey, since it is not an order or command anyone has given. What could you do if someone says “Obey the law of gravitation”? Your motions, along those of stones and every particle in the universe, are instances of this law; but since the law only says us how the matter does behave, and doesn’t prescribe how this should behave, you cannot said either to obey or disobey it. A prescriptive law, moreover, could be still said to exist even if it were universally disobeyed.

Examples:
Descriptive sentence: A great black cloud crosses the moon and conceals it completely.
Analytic sentence: The moon is like the moon.
Prescriptive sentence: Look at the moon!


I hope I have centered the question.
 
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A proposition can't itself be objective as far as I know.

Why not? A proposition is objective if it represents a state of things independent of speaker's particular desires, point of view, etc.

" The Moon revolves around the Earth" is usually considered as objective.

" How strange the moon seems!!" is a subjective sentence because evaluative and referred to a personal point of view ("strange", "seems").
 
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