What is the appeal of "objective morality"

[Belz...]

Is it not exceedingly ironic that you can recognize your very own sophistry and claptrap shenanigans when someone else does them but you cannot even begin to understand that you are posting the very same twaddle too?

When do I dismiss your posts with smileys and laughing dogs, and when do I bolden, highlight and enlarge random words in posts in an attempt to impress others?

You still haven't demonstrated that I strawman your posts. Did you have me confused with someone else again?

I am hoping that using your own words back at you might eventually help you realize that

I guess the answer to my request to be substantive is a resounding "no".

Have fun with that.

 

[Pup]

I get the impression you find the idea of a ‘higher authority’ of any variety somewhat repugnant. Unfortunately, however you want to arbitrate the matter, such is reality. Everything that exists is, ultimately, a function of something that no-one has the slightest comprehension of. Since everything is a function of this ‘thing’…this ‘thing’ can quite accurately be regarded as a ‘higher authority’. The degree to which it is accurate or appropriate to conceptualize ‘everything’ (or our relationship with it) in such a manner is, ultimately, as unanswerable as the mystery which we are a function of. People do. That is evidence of something. Is it right, is it wrong…there are no answers to these questions. Such is also reality. And considering how singularly unique ‘consciousness’ is, it would hardly be a stretch to allow that it might endow human beings with some unique qualities.

In this particular case, I think "this thing" is how our brains have evolved to react. In that sense, of course, we're subject to a higher power or force that produces a feeling of guilt (discomfort) in our brains when we behave outside certain bounds, similar to a feeling of pain that makes us want to stop doing what's causing it and not do it again. Except a few outlying psychopaths of course, but I'm speaking in generalities.

It's a force that we can see in all social creatures because they survive best in stable groups. They may not be conscious of guilt, but something in their brain is still prodding them to certain behaviors. We may not know exactly the mechanism that triggers guilt and produces the exact feeling--heck, there's so much to know about genes, environmental pressures, neurons, etc. etc. that people will be busy for centuries. But I think the above explanation is a fair enough overview of what's going on.

 

[abaddon]

<snip>

Edited by jsfisher: 

Moderated content removed.

Au contraire. Your posts are trivially easy to rebut. You, however, as we can demonstrably see are reduced to editing your interlocuter's posts for lack of a cogent response.

 

[PixyMisa]

I don't understand why you think they're not meaningful. Please elaborate.

Well, what do they mean? Define all the terms objectively.

I also don't understand why you think they're not objectively true.

Because they're not objectively meaningful.

I think it is the aim of every rational being to come to true beliefs, insofar as it is possible to do so. I don't think any rational being is indifferent on believing truth or falsity.

Being rational means you consistently apply logic and evidence to achieve your goals. But your goals need to be explicitly (and objectively) defined to make your earlier statements meaningful.

And of course when you do that, they stop being normative statements. Science is not normative not because science is limited, but because normative statements are meaningless.

 

[PixyMisa]

The evidence for a universal objective morality is everywhere all-the-time. The evidence is the simple fact that the vast majority of men / women respond similarly to similar challenges and conditions.

That's not evidence for objective morality.

 

[David Mo]

Can you elaborate on the denials you refer to?

Thanks.

Excuse me, but a detailed account would be too long.
In synthesis: Scepticism and relativism.
Nietzsche: Truth and false are conventions. What matters is the will of power.
Montaigne: The rule in politic is the cunning. Even cowardice is recommended in some circumstances.
Camus: Reality is contradictory. Against the systematic thought.

What is important for our debate is that even these basic general rules of thought can be questioned. Therefore we cannot support any objectivity in a nonexistent consensus. Obviously, this occurs even more in the case of moral rules.

I insist: the sole solution to the antinomies of objectivity is give the concept up and replace it by intersubjectivity.

 

[marplots]

Excuse me, but a detailed account will be too long.
In synthesis: Scepticism and relativism.
Nietzsche: Truth and false are conventions. What matters is the will of power.
Montaigne: The rule in politic is the cunning. Even cowardice is recommended in some circumstances.
Camus: Reality is contradictory. Against the systematic thought.

What is important for our debate is that even these basic general rules of thought can be questioned. Therefore we can not support any objectivity in a nonexistent consensus. Obviously, this occurs even more in the case of moral rules.

I insist: the sole solution to the antinomies of the objectivity is give the concept up and replace it by intersubjectivity.

I likes.
This is from wiki:
In the debate between cognitive individualism and cognitive universalism, some aspects of thinking are neither solely personal nor fully universal. Cognitive sociology proponents argue for intersubjectivity—an intermediate perspective of social cognition that provides a balanced view between personal and universal views of our social cognition. This approach suggests that, instead of being individual or universal thinkers, human beings subscribe to "thought communities"—communities of differing beliefs. Thought community examples include churches, professions, scientific beliefs, generations, nations, and political movements. This perspective explains why each individual thinks differently from each another (individualism): person A may choose to adhere to expiry dates on foods, but person B may believe that expiry dates are only guidelines and it is still safe to eat the food days past the expiry date. But not all human beings think the same way (universalism).

Intersubjectivity argues that each thought community shares social experiences that are different from the social experiences of other thought communities, creating differing beliefs among people who subscribe to different thought communities. These experiences transcend our subjectivity, which explains why they can be shared by the entire thought community. Proponents of intersubjectivity support the view that individual beliefs are often the result of thought community beliefs, not just personal experiences or universal and objective human beliefs. Beliefs are recast in terms of standards, which are set by thought communities.

The International Skeptics Forum can be thought of as a thought community.

 

[David Mo]

In my notebook:

12 October 2014.
Sam Harris: doesn't differentiate between the formation of judgements (psychology) and the justification of judgements (epistemology/ethics).
​

Common mistake in this forum.

 

[phiwum]

Well, what do they mean? Define all the terms objectively.


Because they're not objectively meaningful.

You don't know what it means to say that believing truth is better than believing falsity?

Being rational means you consistently apply logic and evidence to achieve your goals. But your goals need to be explicitly (and objectively) defined to make your earlier statements meaningful.

And of course when you do that, they stop being normative statements. Science is not normative not because science is limited, but because normative statements are meaningless.

First, you're mistaken that conditional normative statements are not normative.

Second, again, I find it hard to imagine that you don't understand the meaning of the statement, "It is better to believe true statements than false statements." But if you insist that it is unclear to you, then I guess we are at an impasse.

 

[phiwum]

Excuse me, but a detailed account would be too long.
In synthesis: Scepticism and relativism.
Nietzsche: Truth and false are conventions. What matters is the will of power.
Montaigne: The rule in politic is the cunning. Even cowardice is recommended in some circumstances.
Camus: Reality is contradictory. Against the systematic thought.

What is important for our debate is that even these basic general rules of thought can be questioned. Therefore we cannot support any objectivity in a nonexistent consensus. Obviously, this occurs even more in the case of moral rules.

I insist: the sole solution to the antinomies of objectivity is give the concept up and replace it by intersubjectivity.

I don't think that objectivity entails that no person at any time could possibly dispute the claim.

(And I don't see your characterization of Montaigne as being opposed to what I said either.)

 

[Belz...]

That's not evidence for objective morality.

In fact, if anything, it's evidence against it.

 

[IanS]

I'm a bit confused by much of what you say here.

Let's start with your comments about belief. Each of us has different beliefs, of course, but this norm is about what we ought to believe. I think that every rational being accepts this norm, because I think an essential feature of rationality is aiming to believe what is true.

Let's look at your complaint about true and false. You're right that you and I may differ on which beliefs are true or false, because we have incomplete knowledge and faulty reasoning, but truth itself is objective. A belief is true if it expresses actual features of the world around us (not a very good definition of truth, but it will do for now). This fact is independent of whether we know it is true or not.

What the norm expresses is that we all prefer that the things we believe are accurate representations of the world. It doesn't say that we are infallible in judging whether this is so, but that this is what we aim for.

Finally, "better for what purpose?" Simply better. I can't believe that you need a reason to believe truth over falsity. I think that, even if there is some claim which has no practical advantages, I would prefer to believe the truth about that claim rather than otherwise.

Are you seriously saying that you are indifferent about whether your beliefs are true or false, all other things being equal?

OK, the above is the same stuff all over again, and we have been through it at least 5 times before.

What you seem to be doing is what all philosophy contributors do in all these threads, and that is to try talking the subject to death in the hope of "winning" a semantic argument about your own philosophical use of words. That is a worthless waste of everyone's time.

The example you gave about a hypothetical individuals personal beliefs in what they said they "ought" to do about something that was completely unspecified as any sort of of aim, were all very subjective indeed and not at all examples of any innate objective features that were somehow supposedly beyond the capacity of science to investigate.

If you cannot give a clear example of any such "ought" or "should" beliefs that are inherently beyond the reach of science, then you don't have a case and there is nothing to discuss.

Please give any example at all of where any real "objectively" existing thing is beyond the remit of science to investigate even in principle.

I must have asked you for that at least three times now. Where is the example please?

There might of course be such examples. I really don't know if there are. But as I said - I can't immediately think of any. However, if there are any such examples, one of them certainly does not appear to be the claim of so called "objective morality".

 

[phiwum]

OK, the above is the same stuff all over again, and we have been through it at least 5 times before.

What you seem to be doing is what all philosophy contributors do in all these threads, and that is to try talking the subject to death in the hope of "winning" a semantic argument about your own philosophical use of words. That is a worthless waste of everyone's time.

The example you gave about a hypothetical individuals personal beliefs in what they said they "ought" to do about something that was completely unspecified as any sort of of aim, were all very subjective indeed and not at all examples of any innate objective features that were somehow supposedly beyond the capacity of science to investigate.

If you cannot give a clear example of any such "ought" or "should" beliefs that are inherently beyond the reach of science, then you don't have a case and there is nothing to discuss.

Please give any example at all of where any real "objectively" existing thing is beyond the remit of science to investigate even in principle.

I must have asked you for that at least three times now. Where is the example please?

There might of course be such examples. I really don't know if there are. But as I said - I can't immediately think of any. However, if there are any such examples, one of them certainly does not appear to be the claim of so called "objective morality".

I agree we are at an impasse, and should leave it here.

As far as I'm concerned, it is self-evident that believing truth is intrinsically better than believing a false statement. Indeed, unless each of us accepts that claim, I honestly don't know what the point of argument is.

But, if you insist that you see no reason to prefer truth to falsity, all things being equal, then I guess I must accept your claim.

 

[Cl1mh4224rd]

I'm way late with this, but...

Pretty sure the kind of question David refers to is what he mentions upthread: Can moral emotions arise in an intelligent atheistic mind?

If I understand the question correctly, it is this: Consider a rational, self-interested person who does not believe in an afterlife and hence does not believe that he will be judged and rewarded or punished according to the morality of his behavior. What could possibly motivate such a person to behave with a necessary moral concern for others (prudential reasons notwithstanding)?

The fact that they will be judged and rewarded or punished according to their behavior. The judgment and reward or punishment, however, won't be handed out by a supernatural entity; it'll be handed out by the people around them.

What's so special about a divine observer that induces moral thought? What is it about the supposed existence of God that compels people to behave morally? Seems to me it's simple fear of punishment. There's nothing supernatural about that, so why would it suddenly go away without a belief in God?

 

[phiwum]

I'm way late with this, but...




The fact that they will be judged and rewarded or punished according to their behavior. The judgment and reward or punishment, however, won't be handed out by a supernatural entity; it'll be handed out by the people around them.

What's so special about a divine observer that induces moral thought?

Those are prudential reasons that you give. We agree that prudence applies regardless of objective morality, but there must be some instances where one has an opportunity to do what is regarded as wrong without suffering for the act. Maybe it's rare that the threat of punishment is negligible, but it surely occurs occasionally. It's those times that are at issue here.

The divine observer would presumably be special precisely because he takes away the possibility of "getting away with it."

 

[I Am The Scum]

I agree we are at an impasse, and should leave it here.

As far as I'm concerned, it is self-evident that believing truth is intrinsically better than believing a false statement. Indeed, unless each of us accepts that claim, I honestly don't know what the point of argument is.

But, if you insist that you see no reason to prefer truth to falsity, all things being equal, then I guess I must accept your claim.

In addition, I am unaware of how, even in principle, such a preference could be "proven" scientifically.

 

[phiwum]

In addition, I am unaware of how, even in principle, such a preference could be "proven" scientifically.

Well, that was one of the points of mentioning these principles.

I regard them as objective (non-moral) norms. Obviously, science doesn't deal in normative claims, so though I regard these as true, they are outside the scope of scientific investigation.

I am a bit surprised that people say they don't know what "It is better to believe truth than falsity," means, or that they doubt the truth of the claim. It strikes me as fairly non-controversial that rational beings aim at believing truth.

 

[marplots]

Those are prudential reasons that you give. We agree that prudence applies regardless of objective morality, but there must be some instances where one has an opportunity to do what is regarded as wrong without suffering for the act. Maybe it's rare that the threat of punishment is negligible, but it surely occurs occasionally. It's those times that are at issue here.

The divine observer would presumably be special precisely because he takes away the possibility of "getting away with it."

There is another mechanism that works just as well. Our own psychology.

I monitor my mind, my goals and my motivations - the basis for moral judgement - with the capability of inner observation just as the fictional deity is supposed to. In fact, as an atheist, this is how I would explain what's actually happening in a believer's mind. I cannot "get away with it" so long as I know what I'm up to and why.

I am perfectly capable of judging my own actions against some standard I hold to be morally ideal. I can also be punished - in real time - for my failures. In other words, doing what I feel is evil is emotionally painful. I feel guilty about the bad things I do and I feel great when I do commendable things. All this without any ingredient other than my own sense of self worth. I am simultaneously the law maker, breaker, judge, jury, and executioner. No God needed.

The situation is the same, whether morality is objective or subjective. All that's required is a conscience.

For me, this is no different than how I might observe my performance on any task - even without the moral dimension. If I am trying to do something, I will monitor my progress, get frustrated if I'm under-performing, and feel satisfaction when I do well. These are experienced as real emotional states and a large part of my quality of life depends on this mechanism of self appraisal.

 

[Belz...]

As far as I'm concerned, it is self-evident that believing truth is intrinsically better than believing a false statement. Indeed, unless each of us accepts that claim, I honestly don't know what the point of argument is.

I don't know. Seems there's a lot of people who think that believing a convenient lie is better than believing an uncomfortable truth.

 

[phiwum]

There is another mechanism that works just as well. Our own psychology.

I monitor my mind, my goals and my motivations - the basis for moral judgement - with the capability of inner observation just as the fictional deity is supposed to. In fact, as an atheist, this is how I would explain what's actually happening in a believer's mind. I cannot "get away with it" so long as I know what I'm up to and why.

I am perfectly capable of judging my own actions against some standard I hold to be morally ideal. I can also be punished - in real time - for my failures. In other words, doing what I feel is evil is emotionally painful. I feel guilty about the bad things I do and I feel great when I do commendable things. All this without any ingredient other than my own sense of self worth. I am simultaneously the law maker, breaker, judge, jury, and executioner. No God needed.

The situation is the same, whether morality is objective or subjective. All that's required is a conscience.

But if I recognize that morality is subjective, then it seems to me that it is in my interest to adopt the laxest morality possible. In this way, I would maximize utility.