What is the appeal of "objective morality"

[David Mo]

Has someone given a definition of "morality" in this thread?

Yes.

Morality is just a linguistic description of these emotional instincts pertaining to survival in the social environment... just like we have the word NEED to describe instincts pertaining to survival in the biological/physical environment.

This is not a definition. A definition is a description of the use of a word in a linguistic community. This is your theory about human behaviour in general. To give a correct definition you ought to say what features has the word "morality" that identifies its use and differentiates it form other similar words. This is to say, what distinguish this "linguistic description" from others (not moral descriptions).

Then we can pass to discuss your theories.

 

[David Mo]

Every thing the brain does is a FEEDBACK mechanism... I suggest you find out what that means.

Etc., etc.

You have not answered any question I put to you. Please, answer the specific questions.

Can you say who is the author of the definition of "emotion" that you have quoted? Is it the Oxford dictionary of English? I remember you that the Oxford dictionary is not a specialized text and can give some popular uses of a word.

NOTE ADDED: I see it is not Oxford, because it gives a more neutral first meaning: "A strong feeling deriving from one’s circumstances, mood, or relationships with other".

This is a good definition in Psychology:
Most people have little problem recognizing and identifying when we are having an emotion. However, emotion is one of the most difficult concepts in Psychology to define. In fact, emotion is such a difficult concept to define adequately that there are at least 90 different definitions of emotions in the scientific literature. A simple definition of emotion is that it is a response by a whole organism, involving (1) physical arousal, (2) expressive behaviors, and (3) conscious experience.

Read more: http://www.alleydog.com/glossary/definition.php?term=Emotion#ixzz3pZFVKyAj

This other is from APA: "Emotion: A complex pattern of changes, including physiological arousal, feelings, cognitive processes, and behavioral reactions, made in response to a situation perceived to be personally significant".

I little more long: http://www.britannica.com/topic/emotion

You're welcome.

In any case my question was not about the definition of emotion.

NOTE: I know what is a feedback and I don't know what it has to do with the appraisal of the self. Can you explain this relation?

 

[David Mo]

If however, the decision was for example, whether or not seek medical assistance if you have cut yourself and are bleeding to death, AND if your aim is to avoid dying from that injury, then science can certainly give a very good explanation of why you ought to seek a particular kind of medical help immediately.

I agree. This is usually described as "instrumental", that is to say, if we want X, we have to do Y.

But morality (in the sense b) doesn't pretend to be a system of instrumental rules but a universal (categorical) one.

Instrumental: "If you want Z you have to do X".
Categorical: "You ought to do X".

People usually think that the instrumental task is secundary or less singinificant than categorical one. I disagree.

 

[David Mo]

But I think that Mr. Craig is a bad telologician (from what I know of him), because the debate between religious moral and secular moral is not about objectivity.
The problem from a secular moral (both atheistic and agnostic) is the feeling of responsibility. Fiodor M. Dostoevsky, which was a more clever polemicist than Mr. Craig) has seen this.

According him, the sense of moral responsibility (and guilt) is only possible if I believe in the immortality of the soul. The atheist cannot find any foundation of the moral in the Reason, so he lacks the sense of responsibility and guilt and thinks only in egotistical: "If God doesn't exist all is permitted".

Therefore, the problem is not if the morality is objective, but if moral emotions can arise in an intelligent atheistic mind. (Of course, stupid atheists are other thing).

 

[Leumas]

This is not a definition. A definition is a description of the use of a word in a linguistic community. This is your theory about human behaviour in general. To give a correct definition you ought to say what features has the word "morality" that identifies its use and differentiates it form other similar words. This is to say, what distinguish this "linguistic description" from others (not moral descriptions).

Then we can pass to discuss your theories.

Abaddon must be a prophet

Yeah, that's lovely, but there will shortly be an appeal to the Spaghetti Monster of the Gaps. Nothing you or I can do about it, the believers can't help themselves.

All you can do is shrug and say "again with the baloney".
One might as well get vexed about mermaids.

ETA: Oh, it behooves me to add that what I really wanted to post contained so many naughty words that I would be banned.

 

[Leumas]

You have not answered any question I put to you. Please, answer the specific questions.

I think the problem is that you just do not like the answers so you have convinced yourself that they are not answers.

Can you say who is the author of the definition of "emotion" that you have quoted? Is it the Oxford dictionary of English? I remember you that the Oxford dictionary is not a specialized text and can give some popular uses of a word.

Oxford Dictionary: Appraisal (= assesing): Evaluate or estimate the nature, ability, or quality of.

Do you have a special definition for hypocrisy that makes the above not be one?

This is a good definition in Psychology:
Most people have little problem recognizing and identifying when we are having an emotion. However, emotion is one of the most difficult concepts in Psychology to define. In fact, emotion is such a difficult concept to define adequately that there are at least 90 different definitions of emotions in the scientific literature. A simple definition of emotion is that it is a response by a whole organism, involving (1) physical arousal, (2) expressive behaviors, and (3) conscious experience.
Read more: http://www.alleydog.com/glossary/definition.php?term=Emotion#ixzz3pZFVKyAj

So definitions are only good when you decide they are... but unfortunately for you, even your Adler University definition still shows that hunger is an emotion since hunger is a physical arousal as well as a conscious experience.

It is also an expressive behavior if one's stomach starts growling and mouth starts drooling and lips smacking at the sight of food.

This other is from APA: "Emotion: A complex pattern of changes, including physiological arousal, feelings, cognitive processes, and behavioral reactions, made in response to a situation perceived to be personally significant".

I little more long: http://www.britannica.com/topic/emotion

I think the problem is you just do not know what hunger is or you just do not understand what your very own sources are saying.

You're welcome.

Yes I thank you for proving me right and demonstrating your inability to understand your very own questions as well as the answers in your very own citations.

In any case my question was not about the definition of emotion.

See... there you go again demonstrating that you do not know what you are talking about.

...
I don't know any psychologyist that says the hunger is an emotion. Do you know someone?

In addition to the above two citations you have kindly provided, that you do not even realize that they say hunger is an emotion, as well as common sense which you are deliberately ignoring, as well as the dictionary definition which you ignore too.... here is another encyclopedia article that also shows that hunger is an emotion .... but I am sure you will deny that too.

From here

A distinction can be made between emotional episodes and emotional dispositions. Emotional dispositions are also comparable to character traits, where someone may be said to be generally disposed to experience certain emotions. For example, an irritable person is generally disposed to feel irritation more easily or quickly than others do. Finally, some theorists place emotions within a more general category of "affective states" where affective states can also include emotion-related phenomena such as pleasure and pain, motivational states (for example, hunger or curiosity), moods, dispositions and traits.

Another neurological approach distinguishes two classes of emotion: "classical" emotions such as love, anger and fear that are evoked by environmental stimuli, and "primordial" or "homeostatic emotions" – attention-demanding feelings evoked by body states, such as pain, hunger and fatigue, that motivate behavior (withdrawal, eating or resting in these examples) aimed at maintaining the body's internal milieu at its ideal state.[56]

Derek Denton defines the latter as "the subjective element of the instincts, which are the genetically programmed behaviour patterns which contrive homeostasis. They include thirst, hunger for air, hunger for food, pain and hunger for specific minerals etc. There are two constituents of a primordial emotion--the specific sensation which when severe may be imperious, and the compelling intention for gratification by a consummatory act."
​

NOTE: I know what is a feedback and I don't know what it has to do with the appraisal of the self. Can you explain this relation?

Read this article.

Feedback occurs when outputs of a system are routed back as inputs

Biological systems contain many types of regulatory circuits, both positive and negative. As in other contexts, positive and negative do not imply that the feedback causes good or bad effects. A negative feedback loop is one that tends to slow down a process, whereas the positive feedback loop tends to accelerate it. The mirror neurons are part of a social feedback system, when an observed action is "mirrored" by the brain—like a self-performed action.​

feedback

1. information about reactions to a product, a person's performance of a task, etc., used as a basis for improvement.
2. the modification or control of a process or system by its results or effects, e.g., in a biochemical pathway or behavioral response.
3. the return of a fraction of the output signal from an amplifier, microphone, or other device to the input of the same device;

 

[IanS]

Right, and when people consider certain philosophical concepts in more detail and with more care, they sometimes find that it is useful to introduce terms that were not required before. For instance, prior to the rejection of Descartes's program, there was no need for the terms rationalism and empiricism (as understood in modern philosophy). Afterwards, it was useful to distinguish these two approaches, and so terms were adopted.

There's no real difference there.



That might be a fact, or it might not. One requires argument to settle the point.

I've already told you what a realist thinks is the central feature of moral claims (objective normativity, or objective "ought" statements), and indicated why such claims are not anything that science could produce. Nor could science produce evidence that such claims are impossible. These are just not scientific matters.

Science is a descriptive endeavor. That is, it focuses on discovering how the world is, and not on how the world ought to be. Surely you agree with that? If so, isn't it obvious that if the central feature of morality is about "ought" statements, then morality is not a part of science? (Of course, science can describe what morality people tend to accept, but not the truth of any particular "ought" statement.)

OK, well I think we are just repeatedly going over the same old ground now.

However, if we get back to what I think was the issue behind the original opening post, namely that William Lane Craig claims that humans show not just morality, but what he calls "objective" morality, by which he means (afaik) that humans alone & apart from any other animals, have morality which is innate and which they are always born with. And in particular he says the "fact" that human morality is "objective" is proof of the existence of God, because that is the only way in which the objective morals could be present in humans.

Whether or not you agree with what WLC says, you seem to be claiming (a)that morality in humans could be objective in that same sense of being somehow automatic in all humans from birth, and not something learned or developed through evolutionary processes, and (b) that the only way to understand such statements about objective morality is through philosophy and not through any evidence-based scientific studies.

If that is what you are saying then I completely disagree with you. And I don't think you have any evidence at all of either any objective nature for whatever traits you call "morality", or any evidence to show that philosophy is even any use whatsoever in detecting and confirming any objectivity of morals, and far less that philosophy is capable of doing that where science is not.

Afaik, the claim of morals as objective, is only that, i.e. just an un-evidenecd claim. And afaik there is no evidence at all to show that philosophy has, or even ever could, discover any objective existing feature as the basis or cause of human "objective" morals.

However, in contrast to that, you could certainly make a scientific study of what anyone such as WLC or yourself means when they talk about "morality", and in particular what evidence they have for saying that the morality is objective in any sense of being an innate feature specific to homo sapiens.

So far from philosophy being the only game-in-town by which to understand so-called "objective morality", I think philosophy is actually quite useless as a means of ever discovering and explaining the physically existing nature of any such traits as "morals", let alone "objective morals". And that in fact, as we have found with virtually every other conceivable claim of anything that is actually said to really exist, the only credible way to investigate such claims is through objective evidence-based science.

But you can only do that (i.e. investigate and explain what is really meant when people use terms like "morality" and claim "objective morality"), if you first have a clear properly defined explanation of what morality is supposed to be. If you cannot even describe clearly what it is you are talking about, then there is nothing actually to investigate at all beyond empty ill-defined words and claims.

 

[phiwum]

I just think we're at the point of knowledge where talking about morals as possibly exterior things is like insisting we allow for external forces working the rod or planchet, and the burden of proof is on the person who would want to discuss that explanation.

Here's my thoughts on rebutting this argument. Let me know what you think.

Consider certain non-moral objective norms that we all agree exist (I presume). In particular, I'm thinking of norms of theoretical and practical reasoning, including

(1) It is better to believe truth that falsehood, generally speaking.
(2) If one intends to bring about P, then he must do what is necessary to bring about P.
(3) One ought not, insofar as it is possible, accept an inconsistent set of beliefs.

We have evolved to accept these principles. Even though we are not capable of applying them without error on every occasion, we recognize that these are principles which ought to guide our theoretical and practical lives.
And we can give a good story why evolution has pushed us to be the sort of thinkers who accept these principles.

But aside from an evolutionary story, we also have an intuition that these principles have objective strength. So far, so similar to the case of morality, but for these principles, I suspect that you would agree they actually have objective strength -- they seem to express some actual truth. Perhaps we could come up with arguments for some of them (though the first looks like a challenge, since it seems too fundamental).

Other principles of reasoning we also seem evolved to tend towards, although after reflection we regard them as fallacious. I'm thinking here of the Gambler's Fallacy or the many kinds of fallacies studied by Kahneman and Tversky. We can think about them and see the errors, so it isn't just that evolution causing us to think according to certain principles makes us see that those principles are objectively correct.

So, if you're with me so far, my point is that there are certain non-moral objective norms, that we've evolved to reason according to these norms, but this evolutionary story does not preclude their objectivity.

Moral norms, on the other hand, are much less obviously objective, but all I'm doing here is pointing out that, insofar as there are objective norms of one kind, the possibility of objective norms of another kind is thereby strengthened, sufficient to entertain the possibility regardless of the existence of an evolutionary explanation.

 

[Pup]

This kind of argument has been presented before on these threads, usually in relation to some blatantly abhorrent practice like female genital mutilation. Not easy to find anyone to argue for such a thing (no doubt there are some). But even with such black and white examples there is nothing more than a vague correlation. In no way, shape, or form can science empirically adjudicate ‘revulsion’ and establish some manner of explicit connection to this vague notion of ‘survival of the species’. How do you decide if someone is appropriately ‘revulsed’ to qualify as a metric…just to begin with?

…but the whole thing falls to pieces as soon as you notice that the moral landscape is knee deep in proverbial ‘grey areas’ where there are no clearly defined issues. The only reliable metric is normative. That’s it. Science is utterly lost amidst this landscape. Leumas inevitable opposition notwithstanding.

Well, all those gray areas pretty well eliminate evidence for objective morals, so then one needs to look for other explanations.

Evolution and fitness are, of course, messy things. Sometimes the results seem counter-productive--how can a peacock's tail help it avoid predators? Sometimes the results seem random, like numbers of legs. Both insects and spiders seem to get around fine and centipedes do no better. Maybe there's a reason for leg number, but I don't know it. So if one is looking for clear-cut answers, they just won't be found.

But I'm surprised you say it would be hard to find someone to argue for female genital mutilation. Simply find a parent who has just chosen it for their daughter. It's only blatantly abhorrent to people outside certain cultures. Within those cultures, it's a way of social control, dividing in-group from out-group, and all the classic urges that keep humans from becoming isolated.

 

[phiwum]

OK, well I think we are just repeatedly going over the same old ground now.

However, if we get back to what I think was the issue behind the original opening post, namely that William Lane Craig claims that humans show not just morality, but what he calls "objective" morality, by which he means (afaik) that humans alone & apart from any other animals, have morality which is innate and which they are always born with. And in particular he says the "fact" that human morality is "objective" is proof of the existence of God, because that is the only way in which the objective morals could be present in humans.

Whether or not you agree with what WLC says, you seem to be claiming (a)that morality in humans could be objective in that same sense of being somehow automatic in all humans from birth, and not something learned or developed through evolutionary processes, and (b) that the only way to understand such statements about objective morality is through philosophy and not through any evidence-based scientific studies.

I don't think the highlighted part is correct.

I don't regard the fact that we all feel something like morality as being a reason to think that morality is objective and true. After all, we all are born with tendencies to certain fallacies of reasoning, too, and I don't conclude that therefore these fallacies are objective and true.

As well, I don't know if humans are born with an innate sense of a moral code, or whether this is better explained by socialization (or, likely, both).

I agree that science doesn't settle the objectivity question (not even Pup's argument is purely scientific, I think) but of course it could settle whether these feelings are universal and innate.

If that is what you are saying then I completely disagree with you. And I don't think you have any evidence at all of either any objective nature for whatever traits you call "morality", or any evidence to show that philosophy is even any use whatsoever in detecting and confirming any objectivity of morals, and far less that philosophy is capable of doing that where science is not.

I haven't claimed any evidence that morality is objective. I've repeatedly said it's a hard question. Philosophers have discussed it a long time, made a few tentative conclusions here or there and managed to focus the problem, but I agree that there's a real question whether philosophy can settle this issue.

Philosophy simply hasn't the greatly successful methods of science. There are few reasons for that, but the fact that I say a problem isn't appropriately dealt with by science doesn't mean that I expect a conclusive solution by philosophy. Philosophy is, frankly, characterized by asking many of the same questions for centuries, although deriving new ways of looking at those questions.

I'm sure this is one reason people dismiss philosophy, and I don't blame them. As it happens, I'm interested in these questions and the arguments that people raise.

Afaik, the claim of morals as objective, is only that, i.e. just an un-evidenecd claim. And afaik there is no evidence at all to show that philosophy has, or even ever could, discover any objective existing feature as the basis or cause of human "objective" morals.

However, in contrast to that, you could certainly make a scientific study of what anyone such as WLC or yourself means when they talk about "morality", and in particular what evidence they have for saying that the morality is objective in any sense of being an innate feature specific to homo sapiens.

Right! Science can discover descriptive truths about humans and their moral beliefs. I've never denied that.

The question is whether science can ever discover that these beliefs do not and cannot correspond to objective principles. And I think the answer is "no". I think that even Pup's argument will not suffice to do this.

So far from philosophy being the only game-in-town by which to understand so-called "objective morality", I think philosophy is actually quite useless as a means of ever discovering and explaining the physically existing nature of any such traits as "morals", let alone "objective morals". And that in fact, as we have found with virtually every other conceivable claim of anything that is actually said to really exist, the only credible way to investigate such claims is through objective evidence-based science.

But you can only do that (i.e. investigate and explain what is really meant when people use terms like "morality" and claim "objective morality"), if you first have a clear properly defined explanation of what morality is supposed to be. If you cannot even describe clearly what it is you are talking about, then there is nothing actually to investigate at all beyond empty ill-defined words and claims.

Suppose I can't define Bingkauh, but I know it's a sport. I don't know which sport, what distinguishes it from other sports, etc.

That's enough for me to know that the Opera Review won't include reports on Bingkauh, because the Opera Review doesn't include sports.

Similarly, if the content of morality is practical norms, though I am at pains to discuss which such norms are moral and which not, and if I know that science aims at description, then I know that science won't settle questions of morality.

(Pup's recent argument is causing me to think about how everything fits together, and I suspect that I still will end up siding with the claim above, but I must think about it.)

 

[David Mo]

Do you have a special definition for hypocrisy that makes the above not be one?

Ein???

So definitions are only good when you decide they are... but unfortunately for you, even your Adler University definition still shows that hunger is an emotion since hunger is a physical arousal as well as a conscious experience.

It is also an expressive behavior if one's stomach starts growling and mouth starts drooling and lips smacking at the sight of food.

[ETc., etc, etc.]

I am afraid you have not understood what is exactly “expression” and “cognitive” in the context of the definition of emotions. And you don’t realize that emotions and biological impulses share some defining characteristics because they are members of the same family: motivations. But they are also some important differences that you don’t seem understand: “subjective expression” and “cognitive functions”. It would be difficult to explain these concepts to you and they are not important for our debate and this would take us away from it.

What is important:
You have gone to Wikipedia and have found a single author who call “emotions” to the biological impulses (hunger, thirst, sleep, etc.), a certain Derek Denton. But you don’t realize that Denton also separates “homeostatic emotions” (biological impulses) from “classical emotions” (emotions) and he includes hunger, thirst, etc. into the first class and the other emotions into the second class. There are different ways to express this difference in psychology by using different terminology, but the difference itself is essential.

This is according with my claim that moral emotions are different from the “homeostatic” emotions (biological impulses) and the other “classical emotions” because they include some kind of self-appraising.

And my question continues without answer:
What kind of self-appraisal is supposed when someone is feeling hungry or thirsty?
The feedback speech that you have recited has nothing to do with self-appraisal. Maybe you have no idea of what this word means. Do you need a clarification? Can you explain better this? In other words: What is the relation between hungry, feedback and self-appraisal?

NOTE: Sorry for the bold type. I am not in the habit to use it, but I think that you are a little inattentive with respect to the main point of our debate.

 

[David Mo]

But I'm surprised you say it would be hard to find someone to argue for female genital mutilation. Simply find a parent who has just chosen it for their daughter. It's only blatantly abhorrent to people outside certain cultures. Within those cultures, it's a way of social control, dividing in-group from out-group, and all the classic urges that keep humans from becoming isolated.

A lot ethnocentric, your outlook. Do you think that people of other cultures are not able to argue?

Perhaps I will be able to do devil’s advocate. Here we go.

My name is Nadifa and I am a Somalian mother. I live in The Hague and I want to do the ablation of clitoris to my daughter. I love my daughter Dolai. I am a good mother. I have protected her when my country was in war with danger from my life. You see this scar on may face. This is because I have fought to save my daughter. And I want to do the ablation because I love my daughter. Here, in Europe, the men are luxurious and have not any fear of God. And I have not any mean to defend my daughter from men. Because the devil’s temptations are everywhere and the flesh of a girl is weak. I have not any other mean to preserve her eternal life. Because the virginity is lost when a woman plays sex with pleasure. Sexual pleasure is the Evil. And if my child loses her virginity he will be condemned for the eternity. I cannot support the idea of my daughter was condemned by God. I cry every night when I thought so. I need to do it. Because I love my daughter. ​

Is Nadifa illogical or we are disagreeing on the main principle of her moral system?

NOTE: Please, don’t attribute to me Nadifa's moral principles. I agree with you that ablation is abhorrent and I have fought for years against it as volunteer of International Amnesty in Spain. I am adopting the position of Devil’s advocate to show that moral disagreements are not frequently a matter of lack of logic or argumentation, but the different starting points.

 

[Leumas]

<snip... pathetic piles of sophistic poppycock>

The feedback speech that you have recited has nothing to do with self-appraisal. Maybe you have no idea of what this word means. Do you need a clarification? Can you explain better this? In other words: What is the relation between hungry, feedback and self-appraisal?

While I was researching the dissimulations mentioned in the previous posts I saw your entrenched anti-science posts and discovered all your previous wrangling against rationality.

So I doubt any further effort on my part would be worth my while trying to convince you of how wrong and uninformed you are when you posted the above and previous twaddle in this thread.

You are obviously not going to change your woo and wishful thinking.

If you ever (and I doubt it) change your mind about your statements in the quoted posts below... then maybe you will figure out the answers to your post above all by yourself.

I suggest you learn some science.

I refuse to waste any more time trying to wrangle with you when you say stuff like the below combined with the other claptrap sophistry.

... But I am not physicalist.This is to say, I don't believe we can (for the moment) translate all our sentences about mental states to sentences about physical or biological states.

...
All the science can do in a question about b) is to establish what are the effective means to reach a determinate thing we want and what are contradictory with our aims. It is an important work, but limited.

 

[David Mo]

Sorry, but I insist:

But I think that Mr. Craig is a bad telologician (from what I know of him), because the debate between religious moral and secular moral is not about objectivity.
The problem from a secular moral (both atheistic and agnostic) is the feeling of responsibility. Fiodor M. Dostoevsky, which was a more clever polemicist than Mr. Craig) has seen this.

According him, the sense of moral responsibility (and guilt) is only possible if I believe in the immortality of the soul. The atheist cannot find any foundation of the moral in the Reason, so he lacks the sense of responsibility and guilt and thinks only in egotistical: "If God doesn't exist all is permitted".

Therefore, the problem is not if the morality is objective, but if moral emotions can arise in an intelligent atheistic mind. (Of course, stupid atheists are other thing).

 

[Leumas]

...
Therefore, the problem is not if the morality is objective, but if moral emotions can arise in an intelligent atheistic mind. (Of course, stupid atheists are other thing).

<SNIP>

Edited by jsfisher: 

Edited for compliance with Rule 12 of the Membership Agreement.

 

[David Mo]

While I was researching the dissimulations mentioned in the previous posts I saw your entrenched anti-science posts and discovered all your previous wrangling against rationality.

"Anti-science"?? I believe that science is the main way of objective knowledge of facts and has an important role in clarification of moral disputes. Do you call this "anti-science"?

I refuse to waste any more time trying to wrangle with you when you say stuff like the below combined with the other claptrap sophistry.

I understand. You have no idea about what you were speaking. I was practically sure. Thank you.

 

[David Mo]

<SNIP>

Sure. Dostoevsky was a ... Christian and this is how he posed the problem. I find this is an interesting moral problem. Better than the alleged "objectivity" of religious moral. And I think the atheists (intelligent) have to find a convincing answer to questions posed by intelligent Christians. I do not care about stupid atheists and stupid Christians.

Edited by jsfisher: 

Moderated content redacted and response to it minimally edited.

 

[IanS]

Well, good for David, since he obviously has found a clearer way of saying what I was trying to say: science produces descriptive, not normative, theories.

You beg the question in the highlighted part, however, by boldly asserting what is not contained in David's characterization: that any such principles must be subjective.

David doesn't make this presumption. He argues that such principles must be (inter-)subjective, but he recognizes an argument is required. (I'm not yet convinced by his argument, but that's another matter).



I don't think anyone here disagrees about this.

Science is very good at drawing conclusions regarding causal connections, and causal connections are essential to means-end reasoning, so science plays an important role in means-end reasoning -- but only once an end is specified.

Perhaps we are all sticking to entrenched positions drawn from our prior beliefs - adults rarely seem open to changing their minds easily in debates like this. However -

- can you give any example of what you would call moral behaviour, that is inherently beyond any scientific investigation?

- can you give any example showing why any moral behaviour is actually "objective" in humans, in the sense that WLC is claiming for his use of the word "objective"?

 

[phiwum]

Perhaps we are all sticking to entrenched positions drawn from our prior beliefs - adults rarely seem open to changing their minds easily in debates like this. However -

- can you give any example of what you would call moral behaviour, that is inherently beyond any scientific investigation?

ETA: Sorry, you asked simple questions and my answers are wordier than perhaps they should be.

I never said that behavior is something outside the scope of science, but normative questions are outside the scope of science. Behavior can be described. It is a feature of the world as it is. But moral claims are about how the world ought to be, and this cannot be discovered directly by experiment and observation alone.

- can you give any example showing why any moral behaviour is actually "objective" in humans, in the sense that WLC is claiming for his use of the word "objective"?

I confess that I haven't looked at WLC's claims, because I'm not particularly interested in a religiously motivated argument for objective morality. I assume that his notion of objectivity is more or less similar to mine: a claim is objective if it is the case that any competent person sufficiently acquainted with whatever relevant evidence and also acquainted with the relevant argument intended to decide the claim would come to the same conclusion as to the truth of the claim[1].

I don't have an argument to the effect that morality is objective. I don't know whether it is. It simply seems to me that (1) it is not obvious that objective morality is an oxymoron and (2) science does not study such things as moral norms, except from a position of describing what people accept, what evolutionary pressures explain this or that normative belief, etc. Science doesn't conclude what we ought to do, although it contributes important data to such deliberations.

[1] This is just an off-hand attempt to define objectivity, similar to one I used before. I think it works, but it hasn't been carefully scrutinized.

 

[tsig]

Sure. Dostoevsky was a ... Christian and this is how he posed the problem. I find this is an interesting moral problem. Better than the alleged "objectivity" of religious moral. And I think the atheists (intelligent) have to find a convincing answer to questions posed by intelligent Christians. I do not care about stupid atheists and stupid Christians.

Can you post some of those questions?

Edited by jsfisher: 

Moderated content redacted.