What is the appeal of "objective morality"

However, I also note that what you actually said was that you could not give a clear definition of what morality is, or what you mean by morality. Instead you said this about it -

Has someone given a definition of "morality" in this thread?

I ask this because "morality" is an ambiguous word. It refers to:

a) A system of rules and beliefs about what is right and wrong in a particular community.
b) A sentence related to the principles of what is wrong and right.

Science can study the morality in the sense a), but science cannot assert any judgement about morality in the sense of b). Because a) is a matter of facts: what the people believe; but b) is a matter of duty: what the people ought to do.

All the science can do in a question about b) is to establish what are the effective means to reach a determinate thing we want and what are contradictory with our aims. It is an important work, but limited.
 
For a moment, I thought you meant you are a dualist, believing in both mind and body!

Not in the sense of Cartesian dualism. I don't believe in a mind independent from the body (brain). No brain, no mind. But I am not physicalist.This is to say, I don't believe we can (for the moment) translate all our sentences about mental states to sentences about physical or biological states.
 
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Not in the sense of Cartesian dualism. I don't believe in a mind independent from the body (brain). No brain, no mind. But I am not physicalist.This is to say, I don't believe we can (for the moment) translate all our sentences about mental states to sentences about physical or biological states.


Yup... that is what I thought.
 
Has someone given a definition of "morality" in this thread?

Not really. I was asked for a definition, and instead I gave some of the features of morality from a realist perspective.

I ask this because "morality" is an ambiguous word. It refers to:

a) A system of rules and beliefs about what is right and wrong in a particular community.
b) A sentence related to the principles of what is wrong and right.

Science can study the morality in the sense a), but science cannot assert any judgement about morality in the sense of b). Because a) is a matter of facts: what the people believe; but b) is a matter of duty: what the people ought to do.

All the science can do in a question about b) is to establish what are the effective means to reach a determinate thing we want and what are contradictory with our aims. It is an important work, but limited.

No disagreements at all.
 
Has someone given a definition of "morality" in this thread?


Yes.

...
Guilt is the a primitive instinct hard wired into the processes of the brain just like hunger and so forth which induce the organism to do what it behooves it to do so as to carry on surviving.

When one feels the EMOTION of thirst, it is because the brain is telling itself that it OUGHT to drink to carry on surviving as a biological organism.

When one feels the emotion of guilt, it is because the brain is telling itself it ought to do whatever social action that it behooves it to do so as to carry on surviving as a social organism.


That is exactly what are fear, disgust lust, hunger, pain, sleepiness, thirst and so on and so forth.

They are exactly positive or aversive appraisal of the self.


EVOLUTION!!! EVOLUTION!!!

Just as all other EMOTIONS evolved to induce actions conducive to continued survival of the biological organism in the ENVIRONMENT... so did all those other emotions you mention above also EVOLVE as chemical reactions and neuronal firings so as to induce the organism to carry out actions conducive to its social survival in the SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT.

Morality is just a linguistic description of these emotional instincts pertaining to survival in the social environment... just like we have the word NEED to describe instincts pertaining to survival in the biological/physical environment.
Society is nothing more than an extension of the biological/physical environment.

Fear to avoid the lion's fangs... guilt to avoid the tribe's fangs.

Just as pain evolved as a mechanism to induce the organism to refrain from doing whatever physically/biologically detrimental action it was doing within the biological/physical environment... so has guilt evolved as a mechanism to induce the organism to refrain from doing whatever socially detrimental action it was doing within the social environment.

By the way... one can think of gods as just extended tribal fangs for reining in those who learned to not fear the normal length fangs.
 
...

Science can study the morality in the sense a), but science cannot assert any judgement about morality in the sense of b). Because a) is a matter of facts: what the people believe; but b) is a matter of duty: what the people ought to do.

All the science can do in a question about b) is to establish what are the effective means to reach a determinate thing we want and what are contradictory with our aims. It is an important work, but limited.


Rubbish!!

...
Guilt is the a primitive instinct hard wired into the processes of the brain just like hunger and so forth which induce the organism to do what it behooves it to do so as to carry on surviving.

When one feels the EMOTION of thirst, it is because the brain is telling itself that it OUGHT to drink to carry on surviving as a biological organism.

When one feels the emotion of guilt, it is because the brain is telling itself it ought to do whatever social action that it behooves it to do so as to carry on surviving as a social organism.
...
 
Yes.

Morality is just a linguistic description of these emotional instincts pertaining to survival in the social environment... just like we have the word NEED to describe instincts pertaining to survival in the biological/physical environment.

If that is a stipulative definition (that is, if you are specifying how you use the term), then there is not much to dispute about your claims.

But, of course, stipulative definitions cannot settle differences of opinions, and when someone else asserts that there are real, objective norms regarding right and wrong, nothing about how you use the term "morality" can serve to settle their assertion.

Either this "definition" is really intended as a synthetic claim about the nature of morality (in which case it is not a definition at all) or it is purely stipulative, announcing the meaning you personally have in mind when you use the term, in which case it cannot settle any difference of opinions over the putative existence of objective norms.
 
...
All the science can do in a question about b) is to establish what are the effective means to reach a determinate thing we want and what are contradictory with our aims. It is an important work, but limited.


Rubbish!

Utter rubbish and poppycock!!

Only people who want to create trapdoors through which to shove imaginary friends and sky daddies would say stuff like the above statement.

Everything in nature is scientifically researchable and investigable.

People who claim that there are things that do not come under the purview of science want to confound and confuse with linguistic legerdemain and puffs of semantic smoke under which to materialize their wishful thinking and illusions.

All their sleights of pen and tongue are of course in order to furtively sneak in their religious and supernatural insults to reason and sanity and establish them as the magical denizens of those fissures and cracks they cunningly created and shrewdly declared off limits for investigation except by their claptrap sophistry and apologetic casuistry.
 
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Rubbish!
All their sleights of pen and tongue are of course in order to furtively sneak in their religious and supernatural insults to reason and sanity and establish them as the magical denizens of those fissures and cracks they cunningly created and shrewdly declared off limits for investigation except by their claptrap sophistry and apologetic casuistry.

And once again, you insinuate (by quotation) that anyone who disagrees with you is superstitious.

But you didn't correct any spelling, so it isn't an ad hominem.
 
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Does sleepiness suppose an appraisal of the self??? Strange.


Every thing the brain does is a FEEDBACK mechanism... I suggest you find out what that means.


I wouldn't say that all the human behaviours are adaptative nor socially advisable.


While you are finding out about feedback mechanisms I suggest you learn about evolution PROPERLY.


I don't know any psychologyist that says the hunger is an emotion. Do you know someone? Thank you.


Emotion

•a natural instinctive state of mind deriving from one's circumstances, mood, or relationships with others.

synonyms: feeling, sentiment; reaction, response

instinctive or intuitive feeling as distinguished from reasoning or knowledge.

synonyms: instinct, intuition, gut feeling; sentiment, the heart​

Origin
mid 16th century (denoting a public disturbance or commotion): from French émotion, from émouvoir ‘excite,’ based on Latin emovere, from e- (variant of ex- ) ‘out’ + movere ‘move.’ The sense ‘mental agitation’ dates from the mid 17th century, the current general sense from the early 19th century.​
 
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Right, terms like "meta-mathematics" are nonsense, complete fluff.

So, it follows, that meta-mathematical theorems like Goedel's incompleteness theorems, the independence theorems of CH and AC, are just so much nonsense, too.

There is a remarkable anti-intellectual bias when it comes to philosophy around here. I won't, of course, defend everything that goes on in philosophy. It's a broad discipline, and some of it looks like nonsense to me.

But the same people who defend (outdated) concepts like the falsifiability principle seem oblivious to the fact that the principle is a philosophical, not scientific, concept. In fact, any discussion about the demarcation between science and pseudoscience is a fundamentally philosophical discussion, not a scientific one. People here should at least have respect for (analytic) philosophy of science, philosophy of math and philosophical logic regardless of their appreciation of ethics, aesthetics or the horrible morass of continental philosophy.

There it is, the all encompassing philosophical claim, that any discussion of science is actually philosophy so in order to talk about it we have to use philosophical terms therefore philosophers are the only one qualified to discuss the true meaning of science.
 
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There if is, the all encompassing philosophical claim, that any discussion of science is actually philosophy so in order to talk about it we have to use philosophical terms therefore philosophers are the only one qualified to discuss the true meaning of science.

It happens that discussion of the methods and principles of science, as well as the demarcation of science, is not itself a part of science (that is, it is not what science does) but traditionally viewed as a part of philosophy. Such discussions occur in philosophy of science.

This does not mean only philosophers can do this or that one must use the philosophical jargon, but the fact is that the actual academic discussion of such issues is regarded as philosophy. And therefore, if you want to provide an informed discussion that includes the opinions of others, then of course it would be sensible to learn a bit of philosophy of science.

That's just the way the discussion has been carved, academically speaking. It's a simple fact that when you refer to falsifiability, you are referring to a philosophical concept that was introduced by a philosopher. It seems odd, then, that you claim that technical terms introduced by philosophers (like "falsifiability") are there only to obfuscate.

ETA: To be sure, I'm not defending all philosophy of science as worthwhile stuff. I don't care for any of the postmodern approaches in the least.
 
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And it seems to me that using precise language, with explanations, is good, that we use it in science as well although the layman may make the same complaint that you make. You've given what appears to me to be an anti-intellectual rant because you have a bias against philosophy, so when a philosopher uses terms that are part of the jargon, you presume they are obscuring the fact they have nothing to say.



I've taught mathematics, but I could not define mathematics. I once took a course in Domain Theory from a very well-respected researcher, and the class waited in vain for a definition of domain. Sometimes, things are hard to define because the term has not one single, universally accepted meaning.

But there are certain features common to morality, at least as defined by moral realists. One of these is that it involves normative claims. It is also a truism that science is a descriptive endeavor, that scientific theories involve descriptive, not normative, claims[1]. And this fact is sufficient to conclude that it is not for lack of a definition that science does not shed light on moral claims, but because it is not in the nature of science to yield normative claims.



First, of course, I'm not supporting WLC.

Second, I haven't really been defending moral realism as correct in this thread. You asked me for a definition of morality, and the fact is that what morality consists of depends on what meta-ethical camp[2] you're in. The approach of moral realism allowed me to make my point most clearly.

There's a sense, for instance, in which science could well study morality as understood by moral relativists, but then the problem comes before that: science does not seem to be able to establish that relativism is the right meta-theory.

I'm really not too sure I'm keen on continuing this conversation much further, because I really am a bit sick of being accused of obfuscating when I work to put things as clearly as possible. You accept the fact that sciences and mathematics use terms that are not immediately clear to lay users, but you immediately presume that any philosophical jargon is a ruse to obfuscate.

It is an uncharitable conceit on your part.

[1] With a possible exception for functional language in biology.

[2] There's no particularly simple way to avoid terminology like this. There are certain fundamental presumptions about morality that occur prior to what we call ethical theories. These are related to morality in the same way that some meta-mathematical camps (like intuitionism) are related to mathematics. Using this terminology is not intended to obfuscate, but only to clarify.


OK, your main contribution is to complain that I am critical of what I'm calling obscurantist mumbo-jumbo language in philosophy. And your justification for that is to say that science also uses "jargon" which lay people do not understand.

However in science, most of what you are calling the "jargon" is description of what at each moment in time were newly discovered events and processes. You cannot avoid new words for such things as sub-atomic particles (actually disturbances in quantized fields), because prior to the discoveries, such things were unknown (not excepting that theory often predicts the discoveries before experimental verification).

If you cannot define what you mean by "morality", or what WLC means by morality, then you do not even know yourself what it is that you are asking science to investigate.

But in fact all you have as "mortality" is a subjective concept dreamed up by humans. And science can certainly investigate what it is that humans such as WLC or you or anyone else actually means when they use a term like "morals" or "objective morality".
 
OK, your main contribution is to complain that I am critical of what I'm calling obscurantist mumbo-jumbo language in philosophy. And your justification for that is to say that science also uses "jargon" which lay people do not understand.

However in science, most of what you are calling the "jargon" is description of what at each moment in time were newly discovered events and processes. You cannot avoid new words for such things as sub-atomic particles (actually disturbances in quantized fields), because prior to the discoveries, such things were unknown (not excepting that theory often predicts the discoveries before experimental verification).

Right, and when people consider certain philosophical concepts in more detail and with more care, they sometimes find that it is useful to introduce terms that were not required before. For instance, prior to the rejection of Descartes's program, there was no need for the terms rationalism and empiricism (as understood in modern philosophy). Afterwards, it was useful to distinguish these two approaches, and so terms were adopted.

There's no real difference there.

If you cannot define what you mean by "morality", or what WLC means by morality, then you do not even know yourself what it is that you are asking science to investigate.

But in fact all you have as "mortality" is a subjective concept dreamed up by humans. And science can certainly investigate what it is that humans such as WLC or you or anyone else actually means when they use a term like "morals" or "objective morality".

That might be a fact, or it might not. One requires argument to settle the point.

I've already told you what a realist thinks is the central feature of moral claims (objective normativity, or objective "ought" statements), and indicated why such claims are not anything that science could produce. Nor could science produce evidence that such claims are impossible. These are just not scientific matters.

Science is a descriptive endeavor. That is, it focuses on discovering how the world is, and not on how the world ought to be. Surely you agree with that? If so, isn't it obvious that if the central feature of morality is about "ought" statements, then morality is not a part of science? (Of course, science can describe what morality people tend to accept, but not the truth of any particular "ought" statement.)
 
Has someone given a definition of "morality" in this thread?


Not as far as I know. I certainly have not tried to do that.

I ask this because "morality" is an ambiguous word. It refers to:

a) A system of rules and beliefs about what is right and wrong in a particular community.
b) A sentence related to the principles of what is wrong and right.

Science can study the morality in the sense a), but science cannot assert any judgement about morality in the sense of b). Because a) is a matter of facts: what the people believe; but b) is a matter of duty: what the people ought to do.

All the science can do in a question about b) is to establish what are the effective means to reach a determinate thing we want and what are contradictory with our aims. It is an important work, but limited.

No disagreements at all.


Well if I understand David correctly, i.e. specifically when he says this -

"b) A sentence related to the principles of what is wrong and right.

Science can study the morality in the sense a), but science cannot assert any judgement about morality in the sense of b). Because a) is a matter of facts: what the people believe; but b) is a matter of duty: what the people ought to do."



- then I would also agree that where item "b" is said to be something or other (not defined) about something called the "principles of" what is regarded by anyone as "wrong" or "right", such that "science cannot assert any judgement about morality in the sense of b)", "because b) ... is a matter of duty: what the people ought to do." ... I would agree with it phrased in that way as David has put it, however, in that phrasing we are confined specifically to the completely subjective notion of what anyone thinks is "a matter of their duty and what they ought to do" ...

... and what anyone thinks is their duty, and what they think they should do in respect of their thoughts, is clearly a matter of their own human subjective opinion (assuming that when David talked of "right or wrong", he did not mean some mathematical or scientific calculated answer which could be regarded as either the correct answer or the wrong answer (e.g. because of a mistake in the calculation)).

IOW - in that description of "b" above, all that David seems to saying is that science cannot accurately tell people as a matter of literal "fact", why they should take one personal subjective decision rather that some other personal subjective decision.

However, if this so-called "personal subjective decision" (I am saying that is what is described above under item "b", i.e. a personal subjective decision about what an individual thinks is the right, wrong, best, worst, etc. thing for him or her to do) is only about what the individual thinks he or she should do in any particular situation, without specifying what their precise aim is, then it's a purely subjective matter for which neither science nor anything else can tell that individual that they must certainly and absolutely do X rather than Y .... because it's being set-up & defined in the first place as a purely personal subjective choice.

If however, the decision was for example, whether or not seek medical assistance if you have cut yourself and are bleeding to death, AND if your aim is to avoid dying from that injury, then science can certainly give a very good explanation of why you ought to seek a particular kind of medical help immediately.
 
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Well if I understand David correctly, i.e. specifically when he says this -

"b) A sentence related to the principles of what is wrong and right.

Science can study the morality in the sense a), but science cannot assert any judgement about morality in the sense of b). Because a) is a matter of facts: what the people believe; but b) is a matter of duty: what the people ought to do."



- then I would also agree that where item "b" is said to be something or other (not defined) about something called the "principles of" what is regarded by anyone as "wrong" or "right", such that "science cannot assert any judgement about morality in the sense of b)", "because b) ... is a matter of duty: what the people ought to do." ... I would agree with it phrased in that way as David has put it, however, in that phrasing we are confined specifically to the completely subjective notion of what anyone thinks is "a matter of their duty and what they ought to do" ...

Well, good for David, since he obviously has found a clearer way of saying what I was trying to say: science produces descriptive, not normative, theories.

You beg the question in the highlighted part, however, by boldly asserting what is not contained in David's characterization: that any such principles must be subjective.

David doesn't make this presumption. He argues that such principles must be (inter-)subjective, but he recognizes an argument is required. (I'm not yet convinced by his argument, but that's another matter).

If however, the decision was for example, whether or not seek medical assistance if you have cut yourself and are bleeding to death, AND if your aim is to avoid dying from that injury, then science can certainly give a very good explanation of why you ought to seek a particular kind of medical help immediately.

I don't think anyone here disagrees about this.

Science is very good at drawing conclusions regarding causal connections, and causal connections are essential to means-end reasoning, so science plays an important role in means-end reasoning -- but only once an end is specified.
 
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...
Science is very good at drawing conclusions regarding causal connections, and causal connections are essential to means-end reasoning, so science plays an important role in means-end reasoning -- but only once an end is specified.


And what makes you think that science has no role to play in formulating those ends too?

What makes you think that those ends are in any way divorced from the chemical and neuronal FEEDBACK processes resulting from interacting with the environment be it the physical, biological or sociological.

Just like science can describe the desired ends for the biological processes so it is entirely within the purview of science to describe the necessary ends for the sociological processes.

There is nothing magical about "ends" or "ought" or "normative" or "morality" or "love" or "guilt" or any other claptrap linguistic terms devised to describe the nature of the physical/biological/chemical/sociological processes called humanity.

All what humans do or ought to do or aim to do or want to do or desire to do or have to do or need to do are products of the human biological, neuronal and chemical FEEDBACK processes fashioned throughout millions of years of EVOLUTION.

Any attempts to impose unjustified sophistic limits on science while also claiming to not believe in physicality and asserting that we do not directly interact with matter become quite transparent.
 
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And what makes you think that science has no role to play in formulating those ends too?

What makes you think that those ends are in any way divorced from the biological and sociological processes as a result of the FEEDBACK processes resulting from interacting with the environment be it the physical, biological or sociological environments.

Science tells us that if we eat food, then we will survive, and that if we do not eat food, then we will die. Science does not, however, tell us which of these two results we should prefer.

To say otherwise is to imply that there is a desire (or set of desires) that is "objectively superior" to its alternatives, and if that's the case, then I'd love to read the peer-reviewed paper on the subject.
 
And what makes you think that science has no role to play in formulating those ends too?

What makes you think that those ends are in any way divorced from the chemical and neuronal FEEDBACK processes resulting from interacting with the environment be it the physical, biological or sociological.

Those two paragraphs address different issues. The first is whether science can formulate ends, while the second is asking whether science can understand the processes by which we formulate ends.
Any attempts to impose unjustified sophistic limits on science while also claiming to not believe in physicality and asserting that we do not directly interact with matter become quite transparent in as what ends they serve.

You are confusing very different conversations here. And I never claimed that I don't believe in physical stuff.
 
Science tells us that if we eat food, then we will survive, and that if we do not eat food, then we will die. Science does not, however, tell us which of these two results we should prefer.

To say otherwise is to imply that there is a desire (or set of desires) that is "objectively superior" to its alternatives, and if that's the case, then I'd love to read the peer-reviewed paper on the subject.

Science can tell us which of those options we do prefer (on average as a species) and why. Trying to stay alive is not objectively superior, because every species is outcompeting every other so all want to eat and those urges come in conflict sometimes, across species as well as within species.

But I think that asking for an objectively superior moral choice is giving too much ground to those who see morals as uniquely human things and maybe even outside of humanity as universal laws.
 

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