What is the appeal of "objective morality"

[Leumas]

Those two paragraphs address different issues. The first is whether science can formulate ends, while the second is asking whether science can understand the processes by which we formulate ends.

You are creating some mysterious magical aura around the word "ends" and earlier, along with others, you revered the words "normative" and "ought"/"should prefer".

I am telling you that this is an unwarranted reverence for those words.

....
Just like science can describe the desired ends for the biological processes so it is entirely within the purview of science to describe the necessary ends for the sociological processes.

There is nothing magical about "ends" or "ought" or "normative" or "morality" or "love" or "guilt" or any other claptrap linguistic terms devised to describe the nature of the physical/biological/chemical/sociological processes called humanity.

All what humans do or ought to do or aim to do or want to do or desire to do or have to do or need to do are products of the human biological, neuronal and chemical FEEDBACK processes fashioned throughout millions of years of EVOLUTION....

 

[phiwum]

You are creating some mysterious magical aura around the word "ends" and earlier, along with others, you revered the words "normative" and "ought"/"should prefer".

I am telling you that this is an unwarranted reverence for those words.

That's nice.

But, of course, you've given no evidence at all that you've considered the question whether science tells us what is or what ought to be. No, you instead treat any disagreement in juvenile terms of good guys and bad guys, and any hint that science has some sort of limit is a sign of superstition.

The fact is that anyone who has considered the sort of methods science uses can see that, while science is fantastically well-suited for telling us about the world around us, it is not well suited for telling us what we ought to desire, or what we ought to do in a moral sense. It can tell us the effects of this or that desire, want, value, preference, etc., but these effects are not either good or bad without some valuational judgment, and that's precisely what science doesn't do.

The bulk of people in this thread, no matter where they stand on the notion of objective morality, seem to see this simple observation: experiments tell us what will happen, not what is good.

 

[Pup]

You say that, but how do you intend to show it is so?

What scientific experiment establishes that there are no objective ends[1]? (Or, what amounts to more or less the same thing, objective norms?)

If morals are defined as something only humans have, then we can explore no further and they might be objective.

If humans are considered as animals, then science can certainly investigate and see what causes animals to behave in certain ways. There would be some similar behaviors in similar species--a mother would feel negatively if she abandoned her young for example--but in species whose young didn't require care a mother would lay eggs and walk away without any pangs that would make her return.

We as humans have traditionally interpreted observations of animals caring for their young as "human-like" but without human morality, while human laws requiring care of children are based on morality, either objective, god-given, etc.

Yet science can in fact investigate why certain species have evolved to consider care of young very important, somewhat important or unimportant as a survival benefit, and where we fit on the continuum and therefore why we have an urge to protect children.

But it also shows morality is species-dependent and relative. If we laid eggs with young that emerged fully functional, we'd surely have no moral sense that caring for helpless young things was good. Dogs will nurse and raise kittens but sea turtles don't cuddle and care for baby fish. One could say that dogs have a survival urge to care for young that spills over into other species, just as humans feel good bottle-feeding and saving abandoned puppies, but sea turtles have no survival need for a similar urge.

Yet many humans say that saving a puppy vs letting it die is a topic for morality, but a dog nursing a kitten is just an animal being motherly. But I expect that what's going on in the brain when we don't help an abandoned newborn puppy and a dog doesn't help an abandoned newborn kitten is similar. But that's something science could investigate.

 

[phiwum]

If morals are defined as something only humans have, then we can explore no further and they might be objective.

Most moral realists don't think that the right way to draw the line is at humans, but some feature which suffices for moral responsibility. Rationality is one possible feature.

If humans are considered as animals, then science can certainly investigate and see what causes animals to behave in certain ways. There would be some similar behaviors in similar species--a mother would feel negatively if she abandoned her young for example--but in species whose young didn't require care a mother would lay eggs and walk away without any pangs that would make her return.

We as humans have traditionally interpreted observations of animals caring for their young as "human-like" but without human morality, while human laws requiring care of children are based on morality, either objective, god-given, etc.

Yet science can in fact investigate why certain species have evolved to consider care of young very important, somewhat important or unimportant as a survival benefit, and where we fit on the continuum and therefore why we have an urge to protect children.

But it also shows morality is species-dependent and relative. If we laid eggs with young that emerged fully functional, we'd surely have no moral sense that caring for helpless young things was good. Dogs will nurse and raise kittens but sea turtles don't cuddle and care for baby fish. One could say that dogs have a survival urge to care for young that spills over into other species, just as humans feel good bottle-feeding and saving abandoned puppies, but sea turtles have no survival need for a similar urge.

Yet many humans say that saving a puppy vs letting it die is a topic for morality, but a dog nursing a kitten is just an animal being motherly. But I expect that what's going on in the brain when we don't help an abandoned newborn puppy and a dog doesn't help an abandoned newborn kitten is similar. But that's something science could investigate.

I don't disagree that science can investigate descriptive morality (and whether the term morality applies when the behavior involves cats and dogs, say, may be a matter of some controversy, but it needn't bother us at present). That is, we can see how people behave, how animals behave, come up with stories of how evolution accounts for this behavior, include in our discussion how evolution also accounts for the praise and blame that humans use to influence behavior -- all of this is perfectly and appropriately a part of scientific study.

Science can also discuss the effects that adopting different rules would have on different societies, to see whether social evolution has chosen rules which benefit social stability.

But, what science could not do is tell me whether I ought to feel bound by these rules. It could say that I'm more or less likely to be reproductively successful on the basis of the rules I seem to live by, but it could not say that I am good or bad, or that I ought or ought not be bound by this rule or that. Maybe a good philosophical argument could show that my tendency to view genocide, say, as objectively bad is just a confusion of strong emotions for objectivity, but science couldn't show any such thing.

I suspect you and I are not at any serious disagreement here. Am I mistaken?

 

[Leumas]

But, what science could not do is tell me whether I ought to feel bound by these rules.

So what does? What commandments tell you to abide?

 

[phiwum]

So what does? What commandments tell you to abide?

If anything is capable of settling questions regarding morality, it must be a matter of reason, reflection, argumentation, because clearly normative questions are not settled by observations of merely the world around us.

And, perhaps these questions are not settleable with any certainty. Perhaps we will have to accept the situation as most people accept the problem of induction: there are fundamental limits to what we can settle through reason, and some issues are undecidable by appeal to experience.

Philosophy obviously hasn't made much progress on these matters. But these particular matters involve concepts that are simply not decidable by science, but that nonetheless seem meaningful (logical positivists would, of course, disagree).

 

[Leumas]

As I quite explicitly said, I am not claiming that there are objective norms.

You are, on the other hand, explicitly claiming that such things do not exist.

Yup... this is starting to sound very familiar.

...I presume you will show me an experiment that settles the issue.

Just like Deep Thought told Lunkwill and Fook when it was about to tell them the answer to the question of life the universe and everything

Yes... but I suspect you really won't like it.​

But here is something you can do with less undesired consequences.... read these articles.

• http://www.traumaticbraininjury.net/does-brain-injury-contribute-to-criminal-behavior/
• http://jnnp.bmj.com/content/71/6/720.full.html
• http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/251798.php

I have no onus, because I don't make a claim regarding objective morality. As I've said, I'm sympathetic to the view, but I don't see any means to decide the issue. I've seen some arguments in favor of realism, and some opposed, but none that struck me as obviously correct.

Yup... this sounds very familiar.

 

[Leumas]

If anything is capable of settling questions regarding morality, it must be a matter of reason, reflection, argumentation, because clearly normative questions are not settled by observations of merely the world around us.

And, perhaps these questions are not settleable with any certainty. Perhaps we will have to accept the situation as most people accept the problem of induction: there are fundamental limits to what we can settle through reason, and some issues are undecidable by appeal to experience.

Philosophy obviously hasn't made much progress on these matters. But these particular matters involve concepts that are simply not decidable by science, but that nonetheless seem meaningful (logical positivists would, of course, disagree).

Neurobiology and Neuroscience have proved you wrong already and are proving you wrong as we speak.

There is nothing to morality... it is a neurochemical feedback process just like all others.

 

[phiwum]

Yup... this is starting to sound very familiar.




Just like Deep Thought told Lunkwill and Fook when he was about to tell them the answer to the question of life the universe and everything

Yes... but I suspect you really won't like it.​

But here is something you can do with less undesired consequences.... read these articles.

• http://www.traumaticbraininjury.net/does-brain-injury-contribute-to-criminal-behavior/
• http://jnnp.bmj.com/content/71/6/720.full.html
• http://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/251798.php

Why don't you tell me why you think this settles the issue?

No reasonable person could deny that there's a correspondence between brain injury and behavior. Indeed, that correspondence is often a reason we consider the person not responsible for his actions. But it does not alter how we separate good from bad actions for those who appear morally responsible.

Let me put it another way. You think that the primary things to know about norms are the following:

(1) Which norms benefit the individual, society or species?

(2) Which norms do individuals tend to adopt?

(3) Which norms do society encourage?

Maybe a few others, but I think these would be up high on your list. Correct me if I'm wrong.

Now, let's talk about someone who commits some horrible act: a serial rapist, murderer, a tyrant who commits genocide, what have you. What judgments would you make about that person?

Would you say, "He has adopted very different norms than me. I'm curious whether he will experience reproductive success?"

Would you think, "He has not adopted the dominant norms of his society and hence does not function well in society. He is malfunctioning, like a teapot that leaks. This is, of course, not a moral judgment, but he functions less well than the average person?"

Would you think of his behavior solely in terms of evolutionary pressures? Because, I must confess, I tend to think of a person who commits genocide as a bad person. I know you can tell me an evolutionary story of why I tend to think that way, but as I reflect, I cannot shake the feeling that there is something fundamentally wrong about treating fellow persons abysmally. I cannot help but believe that a rational person sees himself as one among many, each valuable and each therefore worthy of consideration, and failure to treat others with at least some minimal decency is a great shame.

Oh, I could be wrong and you could be right. Might just be my particular brain structure has evolved in such a manner, and you happen to be clever enough to see through the tricks your own brain structure causes when considering great harms. But I need some argument as to why it's not even possible that these things matter, in an objective sense and not merely as a reflection of my evolutionary history.

And pointing out that brain-damaged folk act differently seems rather beside the point to me. They also may fail to do mathematics correctly, but I don't therefore conclude there is no objectivity to valid argumentation.

 

[phiwum]

Neurobiology and Neuroscience have proved you wrong already and are proving you wrong as we speak.

There is nothing to morality... it is a neurochemical feedback process just like all others.

Yes?

And what does neurobiology say about rules of inference? Are they also merely neurochemical processes? Is mathematics nothing more than certain brain activities?

 

[annnnoid]

Neurobiology and Neuroscience have proved you wrong already and are proving you wrong as we speak.

There is nothing to morality... it is a neurochemical feedback process just like all others.

...uummm. Nope. If you think this is correct, then go find a neuroscientist who agrees with you. Not gonna happen.

...but, in the meantime, we have this.

We're now on our seventh request for your feedback Leumas. Remember how you never stop insisting that science can deal with everything...but for some reason you keep avoiding this.

It's called denial. It's not a river in Egypt. Do you actually not see this post...or do you just kind of blot out stuff that you can't deal with? There must be a word for that...or at least some manner of cartoon.

 

[Pup]

But, what science could not do is tell me whether I ought to feel bound by these rules. It could say that I'm more or less likely to be reproductively successful on the basis of the rules I seem to live by, but it could not say that I am good or bad, or that I ought or ought not be bound by this rule or that. Maybe a good philosophical argument could show that my tendency to view genocide, say, as objectively bad is just a confusion of strong emotions for objectivity, but science couldn't show any such thing. I suspect you and I are not at any serious disagreement here. Am I mistaken?

The part I've highlighted is where I think we disagree the most. If science can show that revulsion at genocide is, in general, helpful to the survival of the species,* then that seems the most logical explanation. The burden would be on the person making a claim that there's another cause for the feeling.

*With the caveats of course that such revulsion is competing with other moral-type urges such as following orders that you've sworn to follow, helping your group survive threats from others, etc., that explain why people have been for genocide at various times and places. And that it's really about genes successfully passing on genes and anything which doesn't hinder that too much will survive as a trait.

 

[phiwum]

The part I've highlighted is where I think we disagree the most. If science can show that revulsion at genocide is, in general, helpful to the survival of the species,* then that seems the most logical explanation. The burden would be on the person making a claim that there's another cause for the feeling.

*With the caveats of course that such revulsion is competing with other moral-type urges such as following orders that you've sworn to follow, helping your group survive threats from others, etc., that explain why people have been for genocide at various times and places. And that it's really about genes successfully passing on genes and anything which doesn't hinder that too much will survive as a trait.

I don't think that's a stupid argument. It's a kind of appeal to best explanation, which gives some support (though not decisive) to the conclusion.

I'll think about that. At present, all I can say is that this argument gives a certain probability that moral thinking is just a product of evolutionary pressures, and that our rational reflection does not yield any insight into these issues at all. Of course, probabilistic conclusions aren't as good as we'd like, but it's a start.

Good point, Pup.

 

[Leumas]

Yes?

And what does neurobiology say about rules of inference? Are they also merely neurochemical processes? Is mathematics nothing more than certain brain activities?

More auras of mysterious magical transcendental stuff that is so wooooo mysterious that science is just not the right tool to demystify.

...
All what humans do or ought to do or aim to do or want to do or desire to do or have to do or need to do are products of the human biological, neuronal and chemical FEEDBACK processes fashioned throughout millions of years of EVOLUTION.
...

 

[Pup]

Would you think of his behavior solely in terms of evolutionary pressures? Because, I must confess, I tend to think of a person who commits genocide as a bad person. I know you can tell me an evolutionary story of why I tend to think that way, but as I reflect, I cannot shake the feeling that there is something fundamentally wrong about treating fellow persons abysmally.

Same here. But...

I think that's the point at which science and personal experience diverge, as they so often do, and part of the reason why we as a conscious species invented "morals" and even a "giver of morality," because it just feels so real. And it does. I'm certainly not denying that.

Other examples: You look up in the starry sky or at a beautiful landscape and feel awe at nature. The god-believer sees it as proof of god. That's one explaination, but science can talk about what brain chemistry it evokes and maybe even why. But even scientists still feel the same awe at the same scene, whether they attribute it to a god or not.

Or dowsing or ouija boards. I can't make them work, but those who can, insist it feels like something outside of them is doing the moving. Even if they are fully convinced the process is just taking advantage of a neurological glitch, it will still feel as if something else is involved.

Or nightmares, especially the odd feeling of sleep paralysis. Even someone who knows it's all imaginary and there's not really an old hag on their chest will still feel the emotions and sensations.

I just think we're at the point of knowledge where talking about morals as possibly exterior things is like insisting we allow for external forces working the rod or planchet, and the burden of proof is on the person who would want to discuss that explanation.

 

[phiwum]

More auras of mysterious magical transcendental stuff that is so wooooo mysterious that science is just not the right tool to demystify.

Let me get you straight.

You are saying, if I understand you correctly, that there is no objective norm concluding that one ought to conclude Q, given that he accepts P -> Q and P.

That all we can say is that we have evolved to accept such principles, but they are on no better footing than the gambler's fallacy, which also seems to be part of our evolutionary heritage.

Is this what you are saying? Or is it something else?

 

[phiwum]

I just think we're at the point of knowledge where talking about morals as possibly exterior things is like insisting we allow for external forces working the rod or planchet, and the burden of proof is on the person who would want to discuss that explanation.

Certainly, the realist has the burden to show that there's some way we can account for objective norms and some means to come to know them.

And your argument may suffice to make it unlikely that there could be such things, but I am not yet ready to concede we need an argument justifying the mere possibility of such things. But it's a good and thought-provoking argument nonetheless.

 

[I Am The Scum]

The part I've highlighted is where I think we disagree the most. If science can show that revulsion at genocide is, in general, helpful to the survival of the species,* then that seems the most logical explanation. The burden would be on the person making a claim that there's another cause for the feeling.

*With the caveats of course that such revulsion is competing with other moral-type urges such as following orders that you've sworn to follow, helping your group survive threats from others, etc., that explain why people have been for genocide at various times and places. And that it's really about genes successfully passing on genes and anything which doesn't hinder that too much will survive as a trait.

This is all true, but it's not really an accurate model for the way we think about things. It's like how notes on a music sheet might be a perfectly accurate representation of a song, but it doesn't compare to actually hearing it.

Think of it this way: For a very long time, way before Darwin, most people have opposed murder. Being that the idea of evolution was not yet a thing, was this opposition justified? Was it a completely irrational shot in the dark prior to Darwin?

 

[phiwum]

This is all true, but it's not really an accurate model for the way we think about things. It's like how notes on a music sheet might be a perfectly accurate representation of a song, but it doesn't compare to actually hearing it.

Think of it this way: For a very long time, way before Darwin, most people have opposed murder. Being that the idea of evolution was not yet a thing, was this opposition justified? Was it a completely irrational shot in the dark prior to Darwin?

What Pup is saying is that, given that we have a good (evolutionary) explanation for our moral opinions, and that this explanation even accounts for the fact that these opinions feel objective, there should be some reason given as to why we continue to look for whether these opinions really are objective. The existence of an explanation which accounts for everything shifts the probabilities so that we needn't entertain any other possibility without good reason.

Pup can correct my summary if I'm mistaken.

 

[annnnoid]

The part I've highlighted is where I think we disagree the most. If science can show that revulsion at genocide is, in general, helpful to the survival of the species,* then that seems the most logical explanation. The burden would be on the person making a claim that there's another cause for the feeling.

This kind of argument has been presented before on these threads, usually in relation to some blatantly abhorrent practice like female genital mutilation. Not easy to find anyone to argue for such a thing (no doubt there are some). But even with such black and white examples there is nothing more than a vague correlation. In no way, shape, or form can science empirically adjudicate ‘revulsion’ and establish some manner of explicit connection to this vague notion of ‘survival of the species’. How do you decide if someone is appropriately ‘revulsed’ to qualify as a metric…just to begin with?

…but the whole thing falls to pieces as soon as you notice that the moral landscape is knee deep in proverbial ‘grey areas’ where there are no clearly defined issues. The only reliable metric is normative. That’s it. Science is utterly lost amidst this landscape. Leumas inevitable opposition notwithstanding.

…and speaking of Leumas…you have yet to explain how ‘science’ provided you with your post. As I pointed out, there is no science on this planet that can even begin to explain how your brain creates a single letter that you write, let alone a single word, let alone a sentence or paragraph. And, as Pixy very helpfully pointed out, if you were stupid enough to apply the formal methodology of science to adjudicate each and every meaning you’re using the process would be so cumbersome that your life would come to a complete stop (this entire forum would have long since vanished before you managed to generate a single paragraph).

So how’s it happening Leumas? It’s indisputably and unconditionally NOT science. So how do you do it?????

Remember…denial is not a river in Egypt.