What is the appeal of "objective morality"

[phiwum]

Both, however, don't really address the two premises of that argument, since both are dependent on the presence of those rational beings. At most it might illustrate why involving humans isn't necessarily subjective, hence that one of the premises is ambiguous.

Note that I'm actually pretty much wilt Mill on that one, and generally in the camp of some moral systems being objectively better than others.

But I don't think that that two-premises-argument is entirely misguided either. While it may not deny the existence of an objectively best morality, it does however make the point that any such system must be based on the people involved, rather than on some imaginary sky-daddy's wishes.

I'm not quite sure I'm following you in this post, but I think that by and large, we agree that an "objective morality" cannot be based on the authority of God, for reasons I mentioned earlier: that God cannot be an authority on good unless we already know that God is good, and hence have a prior knowledge of good.

 

[phiwum]

OK, well I have explained it three times now. So I am not going to keep doing that.

But I did not say that there was necessarily any circularity in a concept of "objective morality". I said that it was circular reasoning in the way that pharphis presented the theist definition of it as exemplified by WLC.

Nor was I talking about anything so tenuous as a notion of "how a conclusion should be fixed".

I was just asking what the conclusion of your argument is. I tried to paraphrase it, and you said that my paraphrase was inaccurate, so I'm asking what your intended conclusion is.

I'm not sure why you think it's a ridiculous question.

And I'm not any more interested in what so-called "Philosophers" have to say than Stephen Hawking is when he says "philosophy is dead". If you want to know how anything in this universe probably works, then we have something called "science" which has proved itself to be by far the most credible way of understanding and explaining things.

I think it's reasonably obvious that the questions surrounding the nature of morality are not fundamentally scientific questions.

But if you're not interested in this discussion, so be it. We can let it drop here.

 

[HansMustermann]

I'm not quite sure I'm following you in this post, but I think that by and large, we agree that an "objective morality" cannot be based on the authority of God, for reasons I mentioned earlier: that God cannot be an authority on good unless we already know that God is good, and hence have a prior knowledge of good.

Well, I was more like agreeing with Hill, but yes, we can agree on that too.

 

[David Mo]

Mr. Craig is wrong when he says that with God any objective moral principle is possible. A madman says the doctor: “God talks to me every day on the phone”. The doctor: “How do you know he is God”. The madman: “He says he is God”. (Jean-Paul Sartre).

Mr. Craig is right in that without God an objective moral principle is impossible.
Explanation:

1. My definition: Moral: Concerned with the principles of right and wrong behaviour.
Moral sentence: X is wrong/right = You ought/not to do X
2. My definition: Objective: existing outside the mind; based on facts that can be proved.
3. “Ought to” doesn’t mean anything as a fact (objective). It is a command or an advice (maybe expression of approval or displeasure). Instrumental advices or orders excluded!
4. “Wrong” or “right” are not factual (objective) properties or attributes of external things. They are not subject of experience.
5. “You ought to do x” cannot be deduced of any factual features of things. YOu cannot pass to “ought to do x” from “x is”. It is logically inconsistent . Hume.
6. Some ethical naturalists claim that “Wrong” or “Right” can be deduced from factual sentences. This is a misunderstanding of the meaning of “wrong/right” that is not a description of anything. Some natural candidates had been proposed in the history in order to substitute “wrong/right”: useful, pleasant, adaptive, altruist, selfish, natural, rational…
7. There is not any contradiction to say “ X is…” (put here whatever factual feature you want) “…but X is not good for me”.
8. All you can do is to find a common point of departure (principle) and begin to arguing looking for a consensual end. But this is not objective, but intersubjective (not subjective neither).
9. Therefore, moral principles are not objective sentences nor mere opinions. They are another thing.

An example (inspired by Mr. Craig):
A Nigerian mother wants to ablate the clitoris of her daughter. She thinks if the clitoris is not ablated her daughter will have sexual pleasure, and sexual pleasure of the girls is worse (a lot) than the pain of the ablation.
I say her that the pain of the ablation is worse (a lot) than sexual pleasure.
Mr. Craig says her that True God doesn’t want the ablation of girls and therefore it is a sin.

Do you think that Mr. Craig or I have “objective” arguments to prove that ablation is worse than pleasure? Or is this a point of departure, an ethical axiom, and the Nigerian mother never will be argumentatively persuaded?

 

[HansMustermann]

It seems to me a rather fanciful use of language to claim that rocks tumbling off a mountain are expressing the notion of gravity, but we needn't debate this point.

Take the argument as before, and replace the word "morality" with any abstract mathematical concept, oh, let's say "categorical limits" (from category theory, which is a beautifully abstract theory). Or the continuum hypothesis. Or the axiom of choice. Something like that.

So long as our choice is suitably abstract, we won't find any bits of nature "expressing" these concepts and even capuchin monkeys seem disinterested in set theory. (I think they're quite taken by category theory, but too shy to say so.) But I also think that mathematics has an undeniably objective component. Theorems that involve categorical limits go beyond mere human opinion -- they are objectively derivable from the axioms of category theory. Similarly, the theorems that the continuum hypothesis and axiom of choice are independent of the axioms of ZFC and ZF, respectively, are objectively true.

Agreed?

I'm still not sure exactly why do you think it makes premise 2 the same. Just like with physics, a rock still falls in the same time even if a human isn't around to calculate it, a mathematical theorem is true or false regardless of whether a human is around to calculate it.

The most trivial example is statistics. If a die has a 1/6 chance of landing on a particular side, it will still have the same chance even if it just fell of a shelf in an eathquake, with no human around.

Or if you want maths theorems, Bayes still applies whether there are humans around to calculate those odds or not. The probability for a bird to be a penguin if it's got a black back is still the same, regardless of whether a human calculates it or not.

The theorem of choice? Sure. It just refers to cartesian products in a nutshell, and you can find cartesian products involved in describing for example joint systems. But guess what? The possible state or phase combinations of such a system are still the same, regardless of whether there's any human around to do the maths or not.

None of that requires a judgment in the same way that morality does.

 

[tsig]

I'm not quite sure how you're suggesting the conclusion should be fixed. Is it enough to simply add the word "objective" to it?



I don't know that I will be able to convince you otherwise, but I don't think that there is any necessary circularity in the concept of objective morality. Let's drop the theologians for a moment and talk about the approach of philosophers.

Kant, for instance, was interested in the necessary preconditions for one to be rational and he believed that one of these preconditions was that a rational being necessarily values existence as a rational being. Insofar as this is really a feature of all rational beings, it is what Kant called an objective value and serves as the basis for all morality.

Mill, on the other hand, argued that happiness is the sole end of all deliberate action, and hence the sole criterion for judging action. Hence, moral judgments must depend on the degree to which a given action actually produces happiness in the aggregate of those affected.

I'm not saying that either of these attempts worked in the end, but we can see that these attempts, though the product of human thought, aim nonetheless at an objective basis for morality, a foundation that any rational creature would agree provides him with a reason to act accordingly. It may well be that Kant and Mill were on a fool's errand, and that there is no basis for objective morality, but I don't think that it's as simple to show that as you suggest.

He defines being rational as being a rational being?


No obvious circularity there.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

He defines being rational as being a rational being?


No obvious circularity there.

Someone: I am rational.
Me: I would like evidence and not just your first person opinion and anecdotal claim that you are rational.

The problem of what rational is, is not just limited to philosophers, tsig. So if you want to claim as a positive that you are rational, I will demand evidence.

 

[phiwum]

He defines being rational as being a rational being?


No obvious circularity there.

I never mentioned his definition of rationality. To be honest, I don't know it offhand and would have to do a little research.

But I certainly did not claim what you suggest.

 

[I Am The Scum]

What do you mean by "objectively wrong"?

I mean definitively, factually, incorrect. Stating something that does not line up with the real world.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

I mean definitively, factually, incorrect. Stating something that does not line up with the real world.

Sorry. But you just keep adding words, which are "up in the air". How can wrong be factual? Are you implying that wrong is a fact like other facts, say gravity or what?

With regards

 

[pharphis]

Hm. Intersubjective seems like a useful word I had never heard about

 

[I Am The Scum]

Sorry. But you just keep adding words, which are "up in the air". How can wrong be factual? Are you implying that wrong is a fact like other facts, say gravity or what?

With regards

I'm not really sure how else to explain it.

"Factual" does not always mean "correct" or "accurate." It can also mean pertaining to facts (as as opposed to opinions). Does that clear things up?

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/factually?s=t

If I say the moon is made of cheese, I have made a factual error.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

Back to the start of my questions about objectively wrong.

The idea of objective morality is not necessarily that morality is completely independent of human opinion/judgment. We can relate this to other issues. Some might say that if human opinion is involved, then it's subjective, plain and simple. This is not correct, though. Take the following claim: Jim prefers chocolate ice cream over vanilla. This is either objectively true or objectively false. In other words, if Jim actually does have this preference, and Sally says that he does not, then Sally is objectively wrong.

So it is a fact, that Sally is wrong, right?!! If so, evidence please.

 

[I Am The Scum]

They're not real people...

Did you understand that this was a hypothetical?

 

[IanS]

I was just asking what the conclusion of your argument is. I tried to paraphrase it, and you said that my paraphrase was inaccurate, so I'm asking what your intended conclusion is

I'm not sure why you think it's a ridiculous question.

I don't think I did say it was a "ridiculous" question. For some reason you keep misunderstanding what I actually wrote by adding things, i.e. attributing things, that I'd never said at all.

I think it's reasonably obvious that the questions surrounding the nature of morality are not fundamentally scientific questions.

But if you're not interested in this discussion, so be it. We can let it drop here.

Oh, I don't think it's at all "obvious" that questions about so-called "morality" are somehow "not fundamentally scientific questions". And one thing that we have certainly learned from science is that explanations for "real" events in this universe (as opposed to mere thoughts or verbal claims) are very often not at all obvious.

If you are going to say that something we call "morality" is not actually open to scientific investigation and explanation (are you saying that?), then I think that you first have to give a clear and precise definition of what "morality" actually is.

 

[IanS]

Sorry. But you just keep adding words, which are "up in the air". How can wrong be factual? Are you implying that wrong is a fact like other facts, say gravity or what?

With regards

If you are going to to keep arguing in the way you are doing, then perhaps you'd better tell us why you just said gravity is a fact, Tommy? What is known as a "Fact" in this universe?

Science does not claim literal "facts". Scientists don't claim absolute literal certainty of "facts".

Scientists usually believe that Theories are almost certainly correct "facts", but they would not, or should not, go so far as to claim that the theories of science are 100% certainties.

However there is a world of difference between what we think is known from science about Quantum Field Theory (say) vs. what anyone outside of science might claim to know about "morality" (say).

And that difference is, by the way, why real research scientists almost never bother to waste their time in philosophical debates about such things as "morality", the nature of "reality", and whether or not anything can truly be determined as a certain "fact" ... they really have far better things to do than spend their time in childish semantic navel gazing of that sort.

 

[phiwum]

4. “Wrong” or “right” are not factual (objective) properties or attributes of external things. They are not subject of experience.

Can we focus on this item for a moment. It consists of two statements. Am I right in thinking that the second statement is intended as a premise which entails the first statement? That is,

"Wrong" or "right" are not subject of experience.
Therefore, “Wrong” or “right” are not factual (objective) properties or attributes of external things.​

If so, I presume that you think that being a subject of experience is a necessary condition for being a "factual property or attribute of external things." Is this correct?

I'm also puzzled about the part "of external things". I'm not sure that right and wrong are regarded as attributes of external things, but rather attributes of certain actions (perhaps in conjunction with certain mental features of the actor). Are you regarding such actions as "external things"?

Thanks.

 

[tsig]

I'm not quite sure how you're suggesting the conclusion should be fixed. Is it enough to simply add the word "objective" to it?



I don't know that I will be able to convince you otherwise, but I don't think that there is any necessary circularity in the concept of objective morality. Let's drop the theologians for a moment and talk about the approach of philosophers.

Kant, for instance, was interested in the necessary preconditions for one to be rational and he believed that one of these preconditions was that a rational being necessarily values existence as a rational being. Insofar as this is really a feature of all rational beings, it is what Kant called an objective value and serves as the basis for all morality.

Mill, on the other hand, argued that happiness is the sole end of all deliberate action, and hence the sole criterion for judging action. Hence, moral judgments must depend on the degree to which a given action actually produces happiness in the aggregate of those affected.

I'm not saying that either of these attempts worked in the end, but we can see that these attempts, though the product of human thought, aim nonetheless at an objective basis for morality, a foundation that any rational creature would agree provides him with a reason to act accordingly. It may well be that Kant and Mill were on a fool's errand, and that there is no basis for objective morality, but I don't think that it's as simple to show that as you suggest.

He defines being rational as being a rational being?


No obvious circularity there.

I never mentioned his definition of rationality. To be honest, I don't know it offhand and would have to do a little research.

But I certainly did not claim what you suggest.

The hilited certainly looks like a definition.

 

[tsig]

I don't think I did say it was a "ridiculous" question. For some reason you keep misunderstanding what I actually wrote by adding things, i.e. attributing things, that I'd never said at all.



Oh, I don't think it's at all "obvious" that questions about so-called "morality" are somehow "not fundamentally scientific questions". And one thing that we have certainly learned from science is that explanations for "real" events in this universe (as opposed to mere thoughts or verbal claims) are very often not at all obvious.

If you are going to say that something we call "morality" is not actually open to scientific investigation and explanation (are you saying that?), then I think that you first have to give a clear and precise definition of what "morality" actually is.

I see I'm not the only one with this problem.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

If you are going to to keep arguing in the way you are doing, then perhaps you'd better tell us why you just said gravity is a fact, Tommy? What is known as a "Fact" in this universe?

Science does not claim literal "facts". Scientists don't claim absolute literal certainty of "facts".

Scientists usually believe that Theories are almost certainly correct "facts", but they would not, or should not, go so far as to claim that the theories of science are 100% certainties.

However there is a world of difference between what we think is known from science about Quantum Field Theory (say) vs. what anyone outside of science might claim to know about "morality" (say).

And that difference is, by the way, why real research scientists almost never bother to waste their time in philosophical debates about such things as "morality", the nature of "reality", and whether or not anything can truly be determined as a certain "fact" ... they really have far better things to do than spend their time in childish semantic navel gazing of that sort.

I don't know that gravity is a fact. I am not a real research scientist. In general I trust the people who know that gravity is fact. So when one of them know that another person as a fact can be wrong, I simply ask how it is known that is fact.