The EDFs exist. The semen stain exists. The feet of Mezzetti and Romanelli and others exist.
Your original comment demands that you say the evidence which was not released should have been released and that which could have been made should have been.
Yet you say only you wish to use what was released. However, you don't use it all. You cherry pick from what there is, but even that you need to manipulate in order to support a guilty interpretation - as if a TMB negative sample could ever be adduced as evidence of blood; as if mixed, undated DNA samples in a shared bathroom belonging to the users of that bathroom could ever be evidence of the commission of a crime.
Of course a blood stain can yield a TMB negative result. Yes, of course it can. Occurrence of this is recorded in scientific literature and expected (TMB is far less sensitive than luminol) and it is recorded even on this trial (for example, Knox's blood drop on her pillowcase was TMB negative; some "cat's" blood drops were TMb negative).
And going back to what I said, this only confirms the principle: evidence depends on logical alternatives.
A TMB negative result has no logical value, especially on a latent stain, because there is no alternative: there are no substances known, compatible with the known data, that have the the property of reacting with luminol but not with TMB.
I only wish to use "what was released"? I do not "wish", I
accept to use what was part of the trial, insofar as I presume the principle that the trial was just, that means, unless proven otherwise, that it was following due procedure. This is quite a key point.
Because when one accepts that the trial was proper in regards to procedure, it also means I can see that the defence were given adequate opportunities to enter new evidence if they wanted to.
Evidence used in a trial is usually (in fact, always) incomplete. It's always possible, theoretically, to "search for more" and more accurate information.
A trial is not a scientific research, it's different from scientific reserach in many aspects, among them in that it serves one main different purpose: it is aimed at taking a decision, which had to be taken necessarily, and almost certainly on incomplete information. Thus a trial is not mainly a "research", it's a decision-taking process.
Both defence and accusation failed to enter some pieces of evidence or refrained from doing that (we don't know if they could be relevant or not, and in which direction). For example, there are no photos of Knox's hands in the trial files. What we know is that the entering of evidence was done following due procedure, and we also know (and that is also my opinion) that evidence was
sufficient to lead to a conclusion of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. So Massei and Nencini concluded whn they refused to test the alleged semen stain or other instances.
When I say the entering of evidence followed due procedure and the parties were given opportunities, and thus it was just, I mean it's something I can see through my eyes. I mean I can
see that if the raw data are not there, this is because the defence didn't want to pursue them. I can tell you for sure they didn't intend to have this data, they were not interested in them, knowing something about the rules; prof.Potenza not requesting them is obvious, defence not even calling him to testify about the knife testing is something obvious and remarkable too, Pascali backtracking from his letter in court, not talking about raw data and instead requesting other things is something obvious, CdV failure to explain the judge what he wanted is obvious, defence not requesting raw data at the Hellmann trial nor at the Supreme Court is also obvious; and even the court-appointed experts C&V stated expliticly that they were not interested.
On the other hand, I do not require the raw data myself for my own decision, because I accept the principle that they may be required only by those who suspect Stefanoni is dishonest, while instead I trust Stefanoni and see no reason to assume she is cheating.
The same concept of opportunity goes for the alleged semen stain. I can well see this structures in the trial. I can see that information would be more complete if the hypothetical semen stain was tested, but I can also see the defence was given opportunities to request such test, and refrained from doing it. So the knives in Meredith's apartment for example: the defence during the incidente probatorio requested to test the stone that was trhown through the window, their request was promptly fulfilled; but they didn't request to test the knives. They had a clear opportunity to do so, it was a defence choice to only request a test on the rock, and not on the knives.
On my part, I apply principles of trust of witnesses, in the absence of evidence of the contrary I won't consider a witness a liar. I also apply a principle of trust to the words of Mignini and Comodi, whose sincerity and honesty I have absolutely no reason to doubt. Those principles however ar not arbitrary: they are also principles of law, and I know it's the parties burden to prove if a witness is lying.
So the question is not whether I am happy or not with investigation and amount of information collected, or if I think the investigation had shortcomings and they should have collected more. The information collected and presented is obviously "incomplete", compared to the potential of collecting information, and this happens basically on all investigations.
The correct question would be: would I conclude for a "non guilty" verdict based on the motivation that information was incomplete? Would I reject pieces of evidence on this ground, and set the condition that they "must" be complete otherwise I won't accept a guilty verdict?
The answer to this question is: no. I consider the evidence incomplete (as on any other trial) but sufficient to draw a conclusion of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
If one day the ECHR said, for instance, that the defence must be given raw data, or that the trial lacked fairness because they did not test the semen stain, that would be ok to me and I would say: let them have raw data. But I am not ECHR, and that would have little to do with the point. If instances were found that caused the trial be unfair, I would agree to fix those instances, maybe through jurisprudence adjustment; but such violations would need to be found, first, and the finding of issues itself won't change the trial conclusion.
