{WARNING - ECHR CASE-LAW DISCUSSION IN THIS POST.*}
There is a potentially important ECHR case relating to violations of Convention Article 3 that appears important for Amanda Knox's application claiming a violation of her rights by Italy due to her conviction for calunnia against Patrick Lumumba. That case is Hajnal v. Serbia 36937/06 19/06/2012. Of interest for this post are specifically paragraphs 94 - 99.
There are several features of Hajnal v Serbia that are important and relevant to Amanda's application. In this post, I will treat only the issue of procedural violation, because it is relatively straight-forward and yet there have been claims (in particular, by "Machiavelli") that Amanda and her defense team did not satisfy Italian law in not filing the proper paper-work complaint, and thus would not have an admissible ECHR regarding a procedural violation of Convention Article 3. A procedural violation of Convention Article 3 occurs when a Council of Europe State does not mount an effective investigation of a credible allegation that State agents have committed acts of torture or inhuman and degrading treatment against a person within the practical jurisdiction of that State.
In Hajnal v. Serbia, the Serbian Government presented two defenses against a claim by the applicant, Hajnal, that it had committed a violation of his Convention Article 3 (procedural aspect) rights. First, it claimed that there was insufficient evidence that in fact any abuse of the applicant had occurred. Second, it claimed that the applicant had not filed a written criminal complaint in proper form regarding his allegations of police abuse as required (apparently by Serbian law), and therefore no investigation had been started.
The applicant maintained that he had brought his complaint properly to the attention of judges and the competent prosecuting authorities.
The ECHR judgment stated the following:
{Bold emphasis added.}
There is a potentially important ECHR case relating to violations of Convention Article 3 that appears important for Amanda Knox's application claiming a violation of her rights by Italy due to her conviction for calunnia against Patrick Lumumba. That case is Hajnal v. Serbia 36937/06 19/06/2012. Of interest for this post are specifically paragraphs 94 - 99.
There are several features of Hajnal v Serbia that are important and relevant to Amanda's application. In this post, I will treat only the issue of procedural violation, because it is relatively straight-forward and yet there have been claims (in particular, by "Machiavelli") that Amanda and her defense team did not satisfy Italian law in not filing the proper paper-work complaint, and thus would not have an admissible ECHR regarding a procedural violation of Convention Article 3. A procedural violation of Convention Article 3 occurs when a Council of Europe State does not mount an effective investigation of a credible allegation that State agents have committed acts of torture or inhuman and degrading treatment against a person within the practical jurisdiction of that State.
In Hajnal v. Serbia, the Serbian Government presented two defenses against a claim by the applicant, Hajnal, that it had committed a violation of his Convention Article 3 (procedural aspect) rights. First, it claimed that there was insufficient evidence that in fact any abuse of the applicant had occurred. Second, it claimed that the applicant had not filed a written criminal complaint in proper form regarding his allegations of police abuse as required (apparently by Serbian law), and therefore no investigation had been started.
The applicant maintained that he had brought his complaint properly to the attention of judges and the competent prosecuting authorities.
The ECHR judgment stated the following:
96. The Court reiterates that where a person makes a credible assertion that he has suffered treatment contrary to Article 3 at the hands of State agents, that provision, read in conjunction with the general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention”, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation (see, among many authorities, Labita v. Italy, cited above, § 131). Whatever the method of investigation, the authorities must act as soon as an official complaint has been lodged.
97. Even when, strictly speaking, no complaint has been made, an investigation must be started if there are sufficiently clear indications that ill-treatment has been used (see Stanimirović v. Serbia, no. 26088/06, § 39, 18 October 2011).
98. The Court has also held that the investigation should be capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible. If not, the general legal prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment would, despite its fundamental importance, be ineffective in practice and it would be possible in some cases for State agents to abuse the rights of those within their control with virtual impunity (see Labita v. Italy, cited above, § 131). The investigation must also be thorough: the authorities must always make a serious attempt to find out what happened and should not rely on hasty or ill-founded conclusions to close their investigation or as the basis of their decisions. Furthermore, the investigation must be prompt and independent. Lastly, the investigation must afford a sufficient element of public scrutiny to secure accountability. While the degree of public scrutiny required may vary, the complainant must be afforded effective access to the investigatory procedure in all cases (see Batı and Others v. Turkey, nos. 33097/96 and 57834/00, § 137, ECHR 2004-IV).
99. In the present case, having already found a substantive violation of Article 3, the Court further notes that the applicant had indeed complained of having been abused by the police. He did so before the investigating judge and the Deputy Public Prosecutor, as well as the trial and appellate chambers (see paragraphs 22, 31, 44 and 46 above). Yet, despite the Convention and the domestic law requiring that an allegation of this sort be explored ex officio (see paragraphs 97 and 54 above, in that order), no separate abuse-related investigation, aimed at the identification and punishment of those responsible, was ever instituted by the competent authorities. It is thus clear that the aforementioned standards have not been satisfied. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
{Bold emphasis added.}
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