I really can't agree with your last para, unless you have something from the ECHR I haven't seen. Under questioning, there is always a danger that you say something that incriminates you. I hardly see that the police from the 2nd to the 4th November were questioning her without purpose or with only the purpose of securing a helpful witness statement. She was already over the 40 hour mark by then.
Using your description - "questioned in a way to induce..." provides on the face of it, a meaningful defence for the police to obtain incriminating statements by asserting that their questioning was not of a character designed to "induce" etc. The position of the ECHR, it seems to me is more protective than that and indeed the court goes so far as to say in Salduz that a lawyer should be provided at the first interrogation.
From what we know of Amanda's interrogation on the 4th, she could easily have buckled then - the police accused her of lying - the interrogation was clearly hostile in nature and she was affected by it. I do not believe it matters at all whether the police were acting rationally when they suspected Amanda. The point is that they did suspect her and it is this which triggers the attachment of her procedural rights.
I think we are in agreement but that there is some confusion about "suspect", "interrogation", and the implications of Salduz v Turkey [GC] compared to Simons v Belgium 71407/10.
You are claiming that Amanda was interrogated on Nov. 4, 2007. I am not disputing that; I am not knowledgeable about the full content of that questioning. Again, she was a suspect at that point IMO. However, while she was not provided with a lawyer for that questioning, nothing from that questioning was, to my knowledge, used to convict her. Thus, there was no violation of Convention Article 6.1 with Article 6.3c from that questioning or interrogation; it is that combination of violations that mark the Salduz case-law (IMO).
In Simons v Belgium, the ECHR ruled that:
32. The Court would observe, however, that this is one of the principles of the right to a fair trial, specifically deriving from Article 6, paragraph 3, of the Convention, which secures among other things the right for a person “charged with a criminal offence” to have legal assistance of his own choosing. It is not one of the “general principles” implied by the Convention, which are, by definition, transversal in nature.
The Court further points out that the general principles implied by the Convention to which the Article 5 § 1 case-law refers are the principle of the rule of law (see Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, § 461, ECHR 2004‑VII) and, connected to the latter, that of legal certainty (see, among other authorities, Baranowski v. Poland, no. 28358/95, § 52, ECHR 2000 III), the principle of proportionality (see, for example, Enhorn v. Sweden, no. 56529/00, § 36, ECHR 2005-I) and the principle of protection against arbitrariness (which is, moreover, the very aim of Article 5 – see, inter alia, Erkalo, cited above, § 52).
33. Thus, whilst the statutory inability for a person “charged with a criminal offence”, who is deprived of his liberty, to receive legal assistance from the beginning of his detention affects the fairness of the criminal proceedings against him, it cannot be inferred from that sole fact that his detention breaches Article 5 § 1 of the Convention for failure to satisfy the requirement of lawfulness inherent in that provision.
34. In the light of the foregoing, having examined the application under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention, the Court finds that it is manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
IMO, Simons v Belgium
suggests that if the results of an interrogation (or questioning) without a lawyer are not used to obtain a conviction in a criminal trial, there
may possibly be no violation in current ECHR case-law. {Please note my quibbling language, emphasized.}
This does not mean that there would not be a violation in domestic law, specifically Italian CPP Article 64, which requires, among other aspects, that a suspect under questioning must be warned of the right to remain silent and that his statements may be used against him and of his responsibility as a witness for any statements about others. Furthermore, CPP Art. 64 prohibits any technique that alters the ability to recall and evaluate the facts of the suspect being questioned. CPP Article 63 requires that a person not initially a suspect who makes an incriminating statement must be immediately advised to appoint a lawyer. Such statements shall not be used against the person who has made them. CPP Article 96 provides that an accused person - and a suspect, based on CPP Article 61, which extends the rights of the accused to those suspected - is entitled to a lawyer.
If one accepts that CPP Art. 64, 63, and 96 were violated by the police and prosecutor to obtain the "reasonable suspicion" (grounds for arrest written on the warrant), one can assert that the arrests of Amanda and Raffaele were not in accordance with law, and thus a violation of Convention Article 5.1. I maintain, from my reading of the English translation of the arrest warrant, that the justification for the arrests ("reasonable suspicion") was primarily and almost entirely based on Amanda Knox's and Raffaele Sollecito's false statements obtained during the Nov. 5/6, 2007 interrogations.
ETA: A definition of "interrogation" from Wikipedia:
Interrogation (also called questioning) is interviewing as commonly employed by law enforcement officers, military personnel, and intelligence agencies with the
goal of eliciting useful information. Interrogation may involve a diverse array of techniques, ranging from developing a rapport with the subject, to outright torture. (my emphasis - in criminal cases, the "useful information" IMO is a confession or incriminating statement)
