But the problem is that Stefanoni tells Micheli that Pascali doesn't
need to see the data. And, what's even more outrageous, that this data would only be of interest or value if she (Stefanoni) had committed fraud in her work.
To make an analogy, imagine if Pascali had requested something that truly
was superfluous and unnecessary, such as every email sent and received by Stefanoni (both work and personal) from the previous five years. For that request, Stefanoni
would be justified in telling Micheli that a) such a request is unheard of in these circumstances, b) nothing useful could be gained from Pascali obtaining this information, and c) the request itself implies some sort of malpractice on her behalf. But if Micheli did somehow decide to allow the request, she could comply.
The problem is that Micheli was not able to distinguish between the second example (i.e. the one in the above paragraph), which is an entirely reasonable (hypothetical) argument from Stefanoni, and the first example (the real-world one), which is an entirely
unreasonable argument from Stefanoni. He is guilty of taking Stefanoni entirely at her word, without (seemingly) stopping to question whether she might possibly have ulterior motives. Furthermore, he should have done enough questioning (including, perhaps, asking several other non-partisan genetic scientists for their opinions) to figure out whether it truly was reasonable for the defence to be asking for the EDFs. After all, even a smidgin of research would have shown Micheli that it is an entirely reasonable (indeed, important) defence request.
As I said before, I think that Micheli got caught out by the misplaced belief that someone like Stefanoni is a) gold standard at her job, b) at the cutting edge of standards and practice in her job, c) incapable of malpractice or mistakes, and d) honest and straightforward at all times. She worked for the police labs, after all! How could she be anything
other than honest, diligent, expert and non-partisan?!