SAUNDERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM 19187/91
This case is relevant to the ECHR application of Amanda Knox in regard to her conviction for calunnia based on statements she made during an interrogation and in custody without a lawyer.
It involve statements made without benefit of an attorney, and indeed under legal compulsion of 2-years prison and a fine, to inspectors. These statements were subsequently used in a criminal trial to convict the applicant of fraud. However, the statements did not incriminate the applicant directly; rather, they reflected his knowledge that someone else may have conducted some fraudulent activity.
However, when the statements were used in the trial of the applicant, they could be inferred as being incriminating to him, because of his knowledge; he was an executive who should (perhaps) have taken action based on that knowledge. At any rate, the statements reflected negatively on the applicant's honesty.
70. It has not been disputed by the Government that the applicant was subject to legal compulsion to give evidence to the inspectors. He was obliged under sections 434 and 436 of the Companies Act 1985 (see paragraphs 48-49 above) to answer the questions put to him by the inspectors in the course of nine lengthy interviews of which seven were admissible as evidence at his trial. A refusal by the applicant to answer the questions put to him could have led to a finding of contempt of court and the imposition of a fine or committal to prison for up to two years (see paragraph 50 above) and it was no defence to such refusal that the questions were of an incriminating nature (see paragraph 28 above).
However, the Government have emphasised, before the Court, that nothing said by the applicant in the course of the interviews was self‑incriminating and that he had merely given exculpatory answers or answers which, if true, would serve to confirm his defence. In their submission only statements which are self-incriminating could fall within the privilege against self-incrimination.
71. The Court does not accept the Government’s premise on this point since some of the applicant’s answers were in fact of an incriminating nature in the sense that they contained admissions to knowledge of information which tended to incriminate him (see paragraph 31 above). In any event, bearing in mind the concept of fairness in Article 6 (art. 6), the right not to incriminate oneself cannot reasonably be confined to statements of admission of wrongdoing or to remarks which are directly incriminating. Testimony obtained under compulsion which appears on its face to be of a non-incriminating nature - such as exculpatory remarks or mere information on questions of fact - may later be deployed in criminal proceedings in support of the prosecution case, for example to contradict or cast doubt upon other statements of the accused or evidence given by him during the trial or to otherwise undermine his credibility. Where the credibility of an accused must be assessed by a jury the use of such testimony may be especially harmful. It follows that what is of the essence in this context is the use to which evidence obtained under compulsion is put in the course of the criminal trial.
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ETA: For "evidence obtained under compulsion" substitute "evidence obtained under coercion" or "evidence obtained under interrogation without a lawyer"