Here's another case for the Remedial ECHR Law course:
CASE OF MATYTSINA v. RUSSIA 58428/10 27/03/2014
Relevance: Conviction after acquittal; Evaluation & admissibility of expert evidence
Summary {excerpts}:
The applicant was an instructor at an institution that provided elements of yoga, special breathing techniques, mantra singing, meditation, listening to music, aromatherapy and other similar practices. Participants were recommended to follow a certain diet and do exercises at home. The intent was to promote a "healthy lifestyle." There was no tuition or fee required, but contributions were requested. The institution had applied for a government license as a sports facility but was denied it on the grounds that yoga, breathing techniques, etc. were not sports or health-improving activities and in any event were not listed in the Unified Russian Register of Sports Activities.
A young woman, S.D., and her twin sister took a series of courses at the institution. S.D. contributed the equivalent of 20 EUR to the institution. At a certain point, S.D. started to develop psychological problems and was eventually diagnosed as suffering from psychosis, with some psychiatrists but not all who examined her stating she had schizophrenia.
According to the applicant, S.D.'s mother, a fervent Orthodox Christian, claimed that the institution was a sect and attributed S.D.'s psychiatric illness to the activities she engaged in at the institution. According to the doctors at the clinic where Ms S.D. was treated, her mental condition was related to her participation in the programmes of the association, which was referred to in the medical record of 2 July 2002 as a “sect”. Later entries in her medical record also mentioned the “religious” character of her delusions. Following the admission of Ms S.D. to the clinic, an internal inquiry was conducted, which concluded that her medical condition was of a “religious and occult nature” and had been caused by her participation in the programmes of the association.
On 24 July 2003 an investigator from the Khabarovsk Region police force questioned Ms S.D. in connection with the events of April-June 2002. According to her testimony, the association received payment from the participants of the programme; the programme consisted of breathing techniques, listening to audio-recordings of the voice of the guru, and other similar practices which Ms S.D. characterised as brainwashing. Ms S.D. testified that she had almost stopped eating completely during the period she was attending the courses because the teachers had told her that food was poison. She had also dropped out of her course at the university. At some point she had lost track of the events and had returned to her normal self only in the clinic.
The Russian prosecutor asked for several psychiatric experts to examine S.D., and also for opinions from several experts as to whether the institution was practicing medicine without a license.
On 26 November 2004 the applicant was formally charged with practicing medicine without a license. She pleaded not guilty from the first questioning.
Other experts, solicited by the applicant's lawyer, opined that these practices were not at all medical and criticized the prosecution's expert reports.
There was a trial at first-level and the applicant was acquitted on 23 July 2007. In particular, the court concluded that the applicant and Ms M.S. f(a co-defendant) had not realised that their activities might fall within the ambit of medical practice or that they could have been harmful to the health of others. The court also found that the programmes of the association did not amount to medical practice.
The court excluded from evidence the expert reports of the prosecution as incomplete, self-contradictory and unreliable.
The prosecution appealed.
On 20 December 2007 the acquittal was quashed by the Regional Court and the case was referred back to the trial court. The Regional Court disagreed with the assessment of evidence by the trial court, and with its decision to declare some evidence, namely, expert reports, inadmissible. The Regional Court also pointed to various procedural shortcomings in the trial proceedings.
In the new trial, the expert opinions of the prosecution were admitted and full value given to them. However, those of the defense were not admitted, for technical reasons relating to Judge M's interpretation of Russian law.
The applicant and her co-defendant were convicted in this retrial. The defence appealed. They complained, in particular, that judge M. had based the judgment on the testimony of witnesses he had not heard in person. They also complained about the refusal of the trial court to admit expert opinions submitted by the defence in evidence and obtain a new expert examination of the condition of Ms S.D. On 25 March 2010 the Regional Court sustained the conviction; it did not find any breach of the domestic substantive or procedural law in the proceedings before the trial court.
The ECtHR Opinion:
205. Again, the Court is not well placed to indicate to the national judge the best course of action. Judge M. had several options: for example, he could have obtained a fresh expert examination of the matter, could have allowed the defence to submit a written opinion by one of their “specialists”, or could have examined Dr A.’s written report or his oral submissions. Instead, Judge M. contented himself with relying on the same written opinions by the prosecution’s experts which had earlier been rejected by another judge as inadmissible, unreliable and inconclusive, that is, without any meaningful verification of their credibility.
206. In sum, the Court concludes that, insofar as the handling of expert evidence concerning the nature of the activities of the association was concerned, the defence was placed in a disadvantageous position vis-à-vis the prosecution and the proceedings were not truly adversarial. That situation is contrary to the requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
207. The Court is mindful of the fact that Judge M. heard a number of witnesses for the defence, examined several expert opinions and studied various documents. However, the question of whether or not the defence enjoyed “equality of arms” with the prosecution and whether the trial was “adversarial” cannot be addressed solely in quantitative terms. In the present case it was very difficult for the defence to effectively challenge the expert evidence submitted to the court by the prosecution. The Court stresses that the case against the applicant was built upon that expert evidence. In those circumstances, the way in which expert evidence was handled made the applicant’s trial unfair. Therefore, the Court does not need to address the other procedural violations alleged by the applicant.
208. On the strength of the above the Court concludes that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
