dlorde
Philosopher
- Joined
- Apr 20, 2007
- Messages
- 6,864
No, of course not; did someone suggest it was?Just because the brain can be mistaken in it's perceptions doesn't mean that seeing color is some strange unknown process.
No, of course not; did someone suggest it was?Just because the brain can be mistaken in it's perceptions doesn't mean that seeing color is some strange unknown process.
And doesn't exist.The monad is independent of physical phenomena.
I wouldn't be so hasty.And doesn't exist.
I wouldn't be so hasty.
This is an artefact of the clunking, vague definition of consciousness around here. I have already pointed out that consciousness is not where it's at and consciousness is not where experience is. Its much more appropriate to refer to the being along with the experience to be in the monad. Consciousness is a metabolic body phenomena and as such is emergent from physical phenomena*. The monad is independent of physical phenomena.
Informational is problematic, as it implies a reader(monad) of the information.
*hence all the hot air and machinations over this debate.
I wouldn't be so hasty.
I was questioning the theory of an informational universe, by drawing the analogy with the monad.You just said that the monad is both independent of physical phenomena and is a reader of physical phenomena...how do you rationalize that?
Well, I can't speak for idealists on this one. Presumably they take it as read that the experience of consciousness is a fundamental and all else is forms and mechanisms enabling this fundamental to manifest in numerous forms. From my perspective the experience of consciousness is an event manifest by physical phenomena, which is known (experienced) by a being. It is the being which is primary, not the experience, or the consciousness.The stated problem wasn't "where it's at", "where experience is" or anything to do with "where" at all, it was how we do experience consciousness.
Yes, I see this. I was referring to the tendency for people to assume the faculties of mind are somehow performed where there is not a mind.No, it makes no such implication though it doesn't preclude it either. As long as said "reader" or just informational process is just information itself.
I was questioning the theory of an informational universe, by drawing the analogy with the monad.
Anyway, I don't see a problem with a monad, independent in its basis of the physical universe, either reading, or interacting with a physical universe. All that would be required would be an underlying basis from which they are both derived.
So they say.Here be dualism matey.
So they say.
Although dualism is difficult to assert, as it requires two absolutely separate sources, as I read it. I can't see how this can ever be, as all things that exist must be related somewhere along the line, especially if one is suggesting they have a common origin as I was.
The way I am reading your previous comments, you're suggesting a monad that is independent of its basis in the physical universe, yet still reading/interacting with it.
That is a loose relation to dualism (loose in that we're essentially replacing the mind with a monad).
I do not understand how you would interpret this rationally; you're essentially arguing a one-way interaction of the monad with the physical universe but no feedback essentially.
It's possible to build such a rational interpretation of a one-way interaction of a monad . . . for example: I note that I do not entertain the same thought continuously during the course of my life, nor the same image, the same emotional state, or state of mind, or memory, etc. The contents of my mind are continuously changing. Over time, with age and experience, the contents of mind can mature in richness.
However, awareness as a 'knowing' (aka monad), is continuous through all experiences. This awareness is unchanged - this awareness is not modified by the contents of the mind. If awareness was modified by the various states of mind, then there would be a lingering sense of happiness, sorrow, pain, view of Eiffel Tower, etc in every experience in each moment. However, our experience of each moment stands alone for what it is - an experience of a state of mind in this moment.
This part...
belies this part...
Or more specifically that "The contents of my mind are continuously changing. Over time, with age and experience, the contents of mind can mature in richness." means that your "awareness as a 'knowing'" is also changing.
Additionally our current experiences are tempered, accentuated and influenced by past experiences. Each moment of experience can't stand "alone for what it is" or you would always be as a newborn babe. Those senses of "happiness, sorrow, pain, view of Eiffel Tower" do linger and those embers can be easily rekindled by just similar parts of experience like a sound or a smell. It is in fact the building upon experience one after and onto of another that shapes our awareness. Take away that process of building up and the dependence of new experience on old and you are just starting from scratch all the time without any awareness that you are experiencing anything.
The contents of mind are tempered with experience - but not awareness itself.
Yes, I was perhaps a bit vague. I was thinking of a monad as independent in its basis, but related in another underlying basis. Multiple bases, I know, but as I was suggesting I don't see any such thing as duality.Rather the appearance of it from certain perspectives and that all existing things derive from one basis(this is susceptible to regression).The way I am reading your previous comments, you're suggesting a monad that is independent of its basis in the physical universe, yet still reading/interacting with it.
Likewise, I view mind and matter as two states of a common material.That is a loose relation to dualism (loose in that we're essentially replacing the mind with a monad).
Yes, there are various ways of seeing this. For example the monad may use the physical body as a vehicle for experience. This would provide the opportunity for the monad to alter the behaviour of the body, or for the experience to alter the monad, or neither, perhaps it is a relation for some other purpose.I do not understand how you would interpret this rationally; you're essentially arguing a one-way interaction of the monad with the physical universe but no feedback essentially.
Yes, I was perhaps a bit vague. I was thinking of a monad as independent in its basis, but related in another underlying basis. Multiple bases, I know, but as I was suggesting I don't see any such thing as duality.Rather the appearance of it from certain perspectives and that all existing things derive from one basis(this is susceptible to regression).
Likewise, I view mind and matter as two states of a common material.
Yes, there are various ways of seeing this. For example the monad may use the physical body as a vehicle for experience. This would provide the opportunity for the monad to alter the behaviour of the body, or for the experience to alter the monad, or neither, perhaps it is a relation for some other purpose.
Pancakes.Bernardo said:What's your best argument for materialism?