Are you a secularist

[godless dave]

Someone claimed good art doesn't exist. That's absurd. Do you agree with that claim?

Nobody claimed that. You are trying to argue by misrepresenting what other people say.

 

[Dani]

No, I'm really saying that normative questions have no meaning.

Then we're using a different meaning for "meaning". What do you mean, exactly?

If you can explicitly state your personal opinions and heuristics, that works too. But if you don't know what they are, then asking whether something is "wrong" isn't meaningful - you don't know what the question means, and you can't understand the answer.

Ah, ok. But then you seem to imply that normative questions can be meaningful if we know what we're talking about. For example, if through context we know the underlying definition. That can happen in serious moral discussions.

You seem to use a more restrictive meaning for "meaning" than the one I and others use. A definition would help clarify your position.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

No, I'm really saying that normative questions have no meaning.

Based on your definition of meaning.

If you can explicitly state your personal opinions and heuristics, that works too. But if you don't know what they are, then asking whether something is "wrong" isn't meaningful - you don't know what the question means, and you can't understand the answer.

So it is subjective and not purely objective. Your meta-answer of wrong and right is that it depends on how you think and feel. We agree - "right" and "wrong" are subjective.

Sorry that I overlooked this answer

 

[angrysoba]

Then we're using a different meaning for "meaning". What do you mean, exactly?



Ah, ok. But then you seem to imply that normative questions can be meaningful if we know what we're talking about. For example, if through context we know the underlying definition. That can happen in serious moral discussions.

You seem to use a more restrictive meaning for "meaning" than the one I and others use. A definition would help clarify your position.

Well, I just asked that in the previous page.

Anyway, I think Pixy Misa is explicitly denying that normative judgements have any meaning at all, and at best they are merely judgements that have not had the detail filled in yet.

Define "meaningful".

An internally consistent finite set of symbolic references.

But Pixy, how does that work for things like numbers which are infinite sets?

And why is "finite" a necessary criteria anyway? Surely this seems to be an arbitrary ruling you are making here.

 

[PixyMisa]

Well, I just asked that in the previous page.

Anyway, I think Pixy Misa is explicitly denying that normative judgements have any meaning at all, and at best they are merely judgements that have not had the detail filled in yet.

You can think of a normative statement as an equation X + Y = Z.

Should we do X? can be translated as Another way Given situation Y, is action X an efficient method of achieving outcome Z?

The problem is, X is stated specifically, Y is at least implied, but Z is undefined. When you define Z, it stops being a normative question (as my translation, for example).

And if Z is not defined, how can we assert that the question is meaningful?

Another way to state my position would be to say that normative questions are unspecific.

One point I made a few times earlier is that the definitions don't have to be objective, just specific. If you lay out all your objective requirements for the outcome with sufficient specificity, a normative question can be objectively answered to your subjective goals.

But Pixy, how does that work for things like numbers which are infinite sets?

When we talk about the real numbers, for example, which are not just infinite but uncountably so, we use a single symbolic reference to do so: Real numbers.

And why is "finite" a necessary criteria anyway? Surely this seems to be an arbitrary ruling you are making here.

I was searching for a better way to describe that requirement, but it was late at night here and I was tired. Put very simply, you can construct meaningful sentences about infinities, but you cannot construct a meaningful sentence that is infinite itself.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

You can think of a normative statement as an equation X + Y = Z.

Should we do X? can be translated as Another way Given situation Y, is action X an efficient method of achieving outcome Z?

The problem is, X is stated specifically, Y is at least implied, but Z is undefined. When you define Z, it stops being a normative question (as my translation, for example).

And if Z is not defined, how can we assert that the question is meaningful?

Another way to state my position would be to say that normative questions are unspecific.

One point I made a few times earlier is that the definitions don't have to be objective, just specific. If you lay out all your objective requirements for the outcome with sufficient specificity, a normative question can be objectively answered to your subjective goals.


When we talk about the real numbers, for example, which are not just infinite but uncountably so, we use a single symbolic reference to do so: Real numbers.


I was searching for a better way to describe that requirement, but it was late at night here and I was tired. Put very simply, you can construct meaningful sentences about infinities, but you cannot construct a meaningful sentence that is infinite itself.

You have to learn to differentiate between I, you, he/she, we, you and them otherwise you take to much for granted.

For situation Y if it includes 2 or more humans it is not reducible to a singular Y. It is the set Y of persons A, B and so on. I know you like reduction, but here is the problem -
For the set Y:
Both Z and W are possible outcomes, but only one is actually possible.
Person A wants outcome Z and not W.
Person B wants outcome W and not Z.

There is a further problem, because you haven't removed the ought. It is simple to get to reappear. Why do you want outcome Z and not W?

Now as to all that jazz about well-defined, correct, valid and what not, please do that for these 3 cases of the verb be:

• The moon is made of green cheese.
• A is not A.
• You are wrong.

Now as to reduce, can you reduce the 3 cases down to one kind of the verb be or are they related, but different kinds?
What does wrong have to do with these 3 examples and is it the same kind of wrong?

For observation as see(A), logic/math as thinking(B) and your "wrong"(C) I agree that they are related under materialism, biology and all that. But can you do A+B+C=? and maintain logic/math or is it in the end A, B OR C?
That is what we are "playing" here

 

[PixyMisa]

You have to learn to differentiate between I, you, he/she, we, you and them otherwise you take to much for granted.

No.

 

[PixyMisa]

Should we do X? can be translated as Another way Given situation Y, is action X an efficient method of achieving outcome Z?

Not sure how that "Another way" got in there, and too late to edit now.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

No.

You and your we. I want no part of your we for which I or anybody else can do differently that your we, if you insist in right/wrong for morality/ethics.

You miss the point - there is no we in evolution. We is reducible to something else. We is not an objective fact, something you can observe like the moon. Nor is there a we simply because you declare a we.

You know - "We know, you are wrong" - works both ways, when it comes to morality/ethics, no matter how much hand-waving you do with correct, proper, well-defined and what not.

So if I have overlooked something, I apologize, but otherwise my point stands. No matter how objective parts of reality are, I still need concrete evidence your subjective "want/definition/what ever" is evidence that someone else can be "wrong".

So again:
The moon is made of green cheese.
A is not A.
You are wrong.

If these are wrong, how do you know that?

And can I be reduced down to a we with science, logic/math and what not?

 

[angrysoba]

You can think of a normative statement as an equation X + Y = Z.

Should we do X? can be translated as Another way Given situation Y, is action X an efficient method of achieving outcome Z?

The problem is, X is stated specifically, Y is at least implied, but Z is undefined. When you define Z, it stops being a normative question (as my translation, for example).

And if Z is not defined, how can we assert that the question is meaningful?

I don't know if that follows. How rigorously do concepts have to be defined before they can serve as meaningful concepts?

I would argue that they need not always be - we managed to muddle along using words like "planet" and we do so with the word "gene" without needing the words to be scrupulously defined.

In fact, part of the job of philosophy is to try to come up with better, sharper concepts that to some extent tie in with our intuitive concepts such as those about "morality" and "justice" which we can talk about quite meaningfully.

Another way to state my position would be to say that normative questions are unspecific.

One point I made a few times earlier is that the definitions don't have to be objective, just specific. If you lay out all your objective requirements for the outcome with sufficient specificity, a normative question can be objectively answered to your subjective goals.

But surely that just transfers the problem. Suppose I said that I have a goal. Why favour that goal over something else?

This it seems is a perennial difficulty in both science and philosophy, that essentially we often end up having to rely on common sense assumptions and values rather than rigorous definitions, as the latter are ultimately impossible.

 

[angrysoba]

I was searching for a better way to describe that requirement, but it was late at night here and I was tired. Put very simply, you can construct meaningful sentences about infinities, but you cannot construct a meaningful sentence that is infinite itself.

Now, I was wondering if there is some body of literature that this definition is based on, but you are giving me the awful feeling that you invented it last night.

I just get the impression you are smuggling in a lot of assumptions here about what is meaningful.

 

[angrysoba]

As I was saying, much of this sounds familiar if you have read A.J Ayer's Language, Truth and Logic.

The book is well-written and superficially compelling, but ultimately it falls apart. I think that Ayer rewrote various parts of it as challenges to his thesis were made.

 

[Dani]

Well, I just asked that in the previous page.

Oops. Sorry. I read that, but I forgot about it while trying to figure out the consistency of PixyMisa's meaning for "meaning".

Anyway, I think Pixy Misa is explicitly denying that normative judgements have any meaning at all, and at best they are merely judgements that have not had the detail filled in yet.

I think it would be less confusing if PixyMisa focused on lack of specificity instead of lack of meaning. Does "government" have any meaning in a given statement in which no particular government is made explicit? Of course, it surely conveys information in a similar way "good" conveys information. Is the statement specific enough, in itself, to be amenable to scientific inquiry? No, because it doesn't contain the specific information about which government we're talking about. The fact that some don't define their terms when they talk about morality doesn't mean that it can't be done. That's why I'm still stratching my head over PixyMixa's definition of "meaning" and his use of it.

 

[The Norseman]

Oops. Sorry. I read that, but I forgot about it while trying to figure out the consistency of PixyMisa's meaning for "meaning".

I think it would be less confusing if PixyMisa focused on lack of specificity instead of lack of meaning. Does "government" have any meaning in a given statement in which no particular government is made explicit? Of course, it surely conveys information in a similar way "good" conveys information. Is the statement specific enough, in itself, to be amenable to scientific inquiry? No, because it doesn't contain the specific information about which government we're talking about. The fact that some don't define their terms when they talk about morality doesn't mean that it can't be done. That's why I'm still stratching my head over PixyMixa's definition of "meaning" and his use of it.

Same thing with "God". Talking about "God" is fine, but without a clear definition of the word, no useful or meaningful talking is going to happen.

 

[angrysoba]

Same thing with "God". Talking about "God" is fine, but without a clear definition of the word, no useful or meaningful talking is going to happen.

I don't think that is true. Definitions of words are notoriously nebulous in most cases I would think. Besides, we do not usually insist that people always define their terms at all times:

"Let's play a game!"
"Define 'game'!"
"Err..."
"Your talk is meaningless!"

The problem with God is not usually a lack of definitions - there are thousands of those - but the fact that the concepts have been refuted either philosophically, on the basis that these concepts are incoherent, or empirically on the basis that claims made for God have been shown to have better explanations.

 

[The Norseman]

I don't think that is true. Definitions of words are notoriously nebulous in most cases I would think. Besides, we do not usually insist that people always define their terms at all times:

"Let's play a game!"
"Define 'game'!"
"Err..."
"Your talk is meaningless!"

The problem with God is not usually a lack of definitions - there are thousands of those - but the fact that the concepts have been refuted either philosophically, on the basis that these concepts are incoherent, or empirically on the basis that claims made for God have been shown to have better explanations.

I disagree. I think that the term "god" is nearly always assumed and that people think they're talking about the same thing. But as I said, talk is fine, I don't believe it'd be meaningful talk without some explicit definitions. I do not apply this criteria to everything; that may mean I'm being hypocritical, but I don't honestly know.

 

[angrysoba]

I disagree. I think that the term "god" is nearly always assumed and that people think they're talking about the same thing.

I think that's true for most people talking about most things. I don't think that natural language is usually used for precise rigorous definitions and if it were then communication would probably be an extremely laborious task.

That said, in the case of "God" in the context of people going to a particular church the term probably means as much as it needs to and the concept is probably about the same for everyone. They will probably have a more simplistic concept than that of the priest or the higher-ups.

I would be a bit careful about making these a priori demands for precise definitions about what is meaningful, because I think the empirical evidence suggests we talk meaningfully enough without them, most of the time.

But as I said, talk is fine, I don't believe it'd be meaningful talk without some explicit definitions. I do not apply this criteria to everything; that may mean I'm being hypocritical, but I don't honestly know.

Actually, I would also say that most "lay" people are very ignorant about science (and I include myself), and could not give you very good definitions of "gravity", "evolution" and how it is not synonymous with "natural selection" and various other terms even as they claim to be thoroughly persuaded that these things are true. In fact, does anyone have a thorough definition of "materialism" in the other thread? I think I know what people mean by materialism, and I think you do too, but I don't think you would be able to come up with the definition without some deliberation and maybe more than one attempt. The same is true for "meaningful" or "meaning" which I think most people would struggle to come up with a definition for, yet in those cases as well we would probably be told "you know what I mean!"

If some young child says that an apple fell from the tree because of gravity, and when asked what she means by gravity she was unable to come up with a definition, does that mean that what she said was not meaningful?

I think it is fine to ask what people mean when they use a term, but I don't think it follows that just because that person cannot give a precise definition that what they are saying is therefore meaningless.

 

[The Norseman]

Yes, good points. Interesting how I am now struggling with these concepts when it seemed so clear a short time ago!

 

[PixyMisa]

I don't know if that follows. How rigorously do concepts have to be defined before they can serve as meaningful concepts?

At all would be a start.

I would argue that they need not always be - we managed to muddle along using words like "planet" and we do so with the word "gene" without needing the words to be scrupulously defined.

We refined those definitions using the scientific method. But the definitions were always in existence, and objective, if vague.

In fact, part of the job of philosophy is to try to come up with better, sharper concepts that to some extent tie in with our intuitive concepts such as those about "morality" and "justice" which we can talk about quite meaningfully.

Yes. But it's not very good at it.

But surely that just transfers the problem. Suppose I said that I have a goal. Why favour that goal over something else?

That's a separate question. What is your goal for that goal?

This it seems is a perennial difficulty in both science and philosophy, that essentially we often end up having to rely on common sense assumptions and values rather than rigorous definitions, as the latter are ultimately impossible.

If you don't know what you mean, you can't define it. So don't use words you don't mean.

If you do know what you mean, why should it be impossible to define?

 

[PixyMisa]

Now, I was wondering if there is some body of literature that this definition is based on, but you are giving me the awful feeling that you invented it last night.

And?

I just get the impression you are smuggling in a lot of assumptions here about what is meaningful.

Name one.