Proof of Immortality II

[Jabba]

Put a different way, here’s what I think. Maybe this way will communicate. I’ve made a few changes.

1. The proper formula to use in determining the post-probability of “A,” given “me” is
P(A|me) = P(me|A)*P(A)/(P(me|A)*P(A)+P(me|~A)*P(~A)).
1.1. “A”: the hypothesis that any potential “self” has only one, finite, life to live` -- at most.
1.2. “me”: the current existence of my, specific, self.
1.3. “~A”: the hypothesis that “A” is not true.

2. My basic claim is that my own current existence makes the post-probability of “A” teensy-weensy.
3. To reach that conclusion, I claim that the likelihood of my, specific, current existence -- given “A” – P(me|A) -- is, at most, 1/10⁸⁰!.
4. The only real issue here is whether or not I can correctly use that figure as the P(me|A) in this formula … even if I’m right about that figure.
5. In a way, the answer to that question is, “Why, the Hell not?!” Isn’t that the very definition of P(me|A)?
6. Unfortunately (for my side), the answer is, “No -- the word ‘specific,’ in 1.2., may not belong.”
7. We need to show that it does belong. If we can’t, the “plug-in” should be 1.00…

8. If you guys can agree with my analysis so far, I’ll try to show why 1/10⁸⁰! does belong.

 

[Jabba]

Dave,
- I disagree. And, I especially disagree when it comes to Bayesian statistics. It just isn't the kind of evidence you're looking for.
- I'll try to get back in touch with the Union Stat Professor to see what he says about this...

I am not aware of any scientific or mathematical discipline where the personal beliefs of scientists is evidence of anything besides what they believe.

Dave,

- I sent Dr. Hoerl a note last Monday (10/6). He got back to me immediately, saying that he would be in touch.

- Otherwise
- From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_probability
- In contrast to interpreting probability as the "frequency" or "propensity" of some phenomenon, Bayesian probability is a quantity that we assign for the purpose of representing a state of knowledge,[2] or a state of belief.[3] In the Bayesian view, a probability is assigned to a hypothesis, whereas under the frequentist view, a hypothesis is typically tested without being assigned a probability.
- And,
- Broadly speaking, there are two views on Bayesian probability that interpret the probability concept in different ways. According to the objectivist view, the rules of Bayesian statistics can be justified by requirements of rationality and consistency and interpreted as an extension of logic.[2][6] According to the subjectivist view, probability quantifies a "personal belief".[3] Many modern machine learning methods are based on objectivist Bayesian principles.[7]

 

[John Jones]

Try showing that immortal souls even exist.

 

[Slowvehicle]

Put a different way, here’s what I think. Maybe this way will communicate. I’ve made a few changes.

1. The proper formula to use in determining the post-probability of “A,” given “me” is
P(A|me) = P(me|A)*P(A)/(P(me|A)*P(A)+P(me|~A)*P(~A)).
1.1. “A”: the hypothesis that any potential “self” has only one, finite, life to live` -- at most.
1.2. “me”: the current existence of my, specific, self.
1.3. “~A”: the hypothesis that “A” is not true.

2. My basic claim is that my own current existence makes the post-probability of “A” teensy-weensy.
3. To reach that conclusion, I claim that the likelihood of my, specific, current existence -- given “A” – P(me|A) -- is, at most, 1/10⁸⁰!.
4. The only real issue here is whether or not I can correctly use that figure as the P(me|A) in this formula … even if I’m right about that figure.
5. In a way, the answer to that question is, “Why, the Hell not?!” Isn’t that the very definition of P(me|A)?
6. Unfortunately (for my side), the answer is, “No -- the word ‘specific,’ in 1.2., may not belong.”
7. We need to show that it does belong. If we can’t, the “plug-in” should be 1.00…

8. If you guys can agree with my analysis so far, I’ll try to show why 1/10⁸⁰! does belong.

None of which takes the teensy-weensiest step toward demonstrating that the "soul" exists, and is "immortal"...

 

[Akhenaten]

Put a different way, here’s what I think. Maybe this way will communicate. I’ve made a few changes.

Yay! Another list!

Jabba, have you not read any of the posts which have pointed out that an inability to communicate is the least of your problems?

With but one exception, everyone here understands exactly what you're trying to say. The problem isn't that we're lacking of comprehension, it's simply that you're completely, utterly, comprehensively and unequivocally wrong.

1. The proper formula to use in determining the post-probability of “A,” given “me” is
P(A|me) = P(me|A)*P(A)/(P(me|A)*P(A)+P(me|~A)*P(~A)).

Whether it's the proper formula or not is irrelevant.

You're overarching failure lies in a lack of understanding of the nature of the value you are calling "me". Your own use of scare quotes when talking about this value seems to indicate that you actually recognise this failure yourself.

1.1. “A”: the hypothesis that any potential “self” has only one, finite, life to live` -- at most.

More scare I'm making my own definitions up here quotes.

1.2. “me”: the current only ever existence of my, specific, self.

FTFY

1.3. “~A”: the hypothesis fantasy that “A” is not true.

FTFY

2. My basic claim is that my own current existence makes the post-probability of “A” teensy-weensy.

A childishly facile claim expressed in childishly facile terms.

Bonus points for consistency.

3. To reach that conclusion, I claim that the likelihood of my, specific, current existence -- given “A” – P(me|A) -- is, at most, 1/10⁸⁰!.

You can claim what you like, using whatever make-believe numbers you want. None of it even addresses the matter of immortality; much less does it offer any support for such a ridiculous notion.

4. The only real issue here is whether or not I can correctly use that figure as the P(me|A) in this formula … even if I’m right about that figure.

No, the only real issue is whether or not you have any evidence for your underlying claim of the existence of immortal souls.

5. In a way, the answer to that question is, “Why, the Hell not?!” Isn’t that the very definition of P(me|A)?

There is no definition of P(me|A). At least not in the real world.

It's just a meaningless expression that you've made up to try and create a veneer of legitimacy for your immortal soul fantasy.

6. Unfortunately (for my side), the answer is, “No -- the word ‘specific,’ in 1.2., may not belong.”

You don't have a side.

There's just you, defending the indefensible, and it really doesn't matter which words you use to embroider your silly claims because the Jabbanese terms you employ are little more than gobbledygook when translated into English.

7. We need to show that it does belong. If we can’t, the “plug-in” should be 1.00…

"We" don't need to do any such thing.

8. If you guys can agree with my analysis so far, I’ll try to show why 1/10⁸⁰! does belong.

What analysis?

 

[jsfisher]

1.1. “A”: the hypothesis that any potential “self” has only one, finite, life to live` -- at most.

Do you realize you have a soul concept buried in there, right?

 

[Humots]

Put a different way, here’s what I think. Maybe this way will communicate. I’ve made a few changes.

1. The proper formula to use in determining the post-probability of “A,” given “me” is
P(A|me) = P(me|A)*P(A)/(P(me|A)*P(A)+P(me|~A)*P(~A)).
1.1. “A”: the hypothesis that any potential “self” has only one, finite, life to live` -- at most.
1.2. “me”: the current existence of my, specific, self.
1.3. “~A”: the hypothesis that “A” is not true.

OK, let's do this again.

Jabba: based on the bold above, P(me|A) would be the probability that you (Jabba) exist, given that any potential “self” has only one, finite, life to live` -- at most

How does any potential “self” having only one finite life to live affect the probability that you exist?

Are you now saying that since (according to you) there are an infinite (or maybe just enormous) number of potential "selfs", the fact that you currently exist means you must have multiple lives to have beaten the odds?

Also, "~A" still means anything other than "any potential self has only one finite life to live", which as was pointed out previously, includes such goodies as "I (Humots) am immortal and nobody else is."

8. If you guys can agree with my analysis so far, I’ll try to show why 1/10⁸⁰! does belong.

I do not agree with your analysis at all.

 

[Jabba]

OK, let's do this again.

Jabba: based on the bold above, P(me|A) would be the probability that you (Jabba) exist, given that any potential “self” has only one, finite, life to live` -- at most

How does any potential “self” having only one finite life to live affect the probability that you exist?...

Humots,
- Let's see exactly where it is that you and I disagree.
- I'm claiming that the likelihood that I would currently exist if each potential “self” has only one finite life to live (at most) would be close to zero.
- Does that help? I accept that it probably won't, but just in case... And, it's only a first step.

 

[Nonpareil]

I'm claiming that the likelihood that I would currently exist if each potential “self” has only one finite life to live (at most) would be close to zero.

Which is irrelevant, as has been explained to you numerous times, including during the last, oh, twenty or so posts responding to your last statement.

It doesn't matter how unlikely any given result is if every other possible result is just as unlikely. One of them is going to turn up.

And beyond that, being improbable in no way implies the existence of a soul.

 

[Giordano]

- I sent Dr. Hoerl a note last Monday (10/6). He got back to me immediately, saying that he would be in touch.

Assuming that this was not an automatic email reply, I like to think that Dr. Hoeri has been following you on this forum and that he has a great sense of irony and humor.

If he really does get back to you, what questions are you planning to ask him? Given that he is a statistics professor, are you going to ask him if infinity is a number that can be used in the Bayesian formula? That the number of people having a belief about a scientific fact can be used as proof of that fact (and if so, how the percent of people believing in a fact can be translated to a number in the Bayesian formula; I assume that given that most scientists when polled do not believe in reincarnation has not been enough for you to abandon your theory)? That the strength of one's belief can be translated into a number in the Bayesian formula (if so, how)? That probability is no more than a measure of one's belief? Or are you going to again ignore his area of expertise entirely and again ask him if he believes in reincarnation?

In any case, do you expressly agree that whatever he says, you will accept it as true? Are you willing to make that promise, right now? Or will you simply again ignore anything he says that, in common with the views of the people on this forum, disagrees with you? If so, why bother him?

I am ignoring your repeated posting of your formula because it is not worth explaining why it is wrong for the 501th time; the first 500 times that I or others explained this to you on this forum are still in this thread and you can simply read them. Assuming that you have any interest and don't already know that you are wrong.

 

[Humots]

Humots,
- Let's see exactly where it is that you and I disagree.
- I'm claiming that the likelihood that I would currently exist if each potential “self” has only one finite life to live (at most) would be close to zero.
- Does that help? I accept that it probably won't, but just in case... And, it's only a first step.

That's what you claim.

What is your reason, your basis, your justification, your support for that claim?

How is "the likelihood that I would currently exist would be close to zero" a logical consequence of "each potential “self” has only one finite life to live (at most)"?

 

[John Jones]

Put a different way, here’s what I think. Maybe this way will communicate. I’ve made a few changes.

[...]
8. If you guys can agree with my analysis so far, I’ll try to show why 1/10⁸⁰! does belong.

Stop assuming we don't understand your position. It appears that all but perhaps one understand it better than you do yourself.

I don't agree with your analysis. You haven't convinced a single person (save perhaps one) in 2 years. Why do you think repeating it for the umpteenth time will make it suddenly acceptable?

 

[Loss Leader]

- I'm claiming that the likelihood that I would currently exist if each potential “self” has only one finite life to live (at most) would be close to zero.

Even if the "self" were a thing that actually existed, the fact that a low probability event occurred is not evidence of anything ... especially since you only have one data point.

 

[zooterkin]

Humots,
- Let's see exactly where it is that you and I disagree.
- I'm claiming that the likelihood that I would currently exist if each potential “self” has only one finite life to live (at most) would be close to zero.
- Does that help? I accept that it probably won't, but just in case... And, it's only a first step.

It only makes sense if the "self" is something separate from your body that is needed for you to exist. That something is commonly called a soul, a term you seem to want to avoid. The fact that you persist with this line of, for want of a better word, reasoning highlights the fact that you still do not understand that consciousness is an emergent property of the brain.

 

[godless dave]

Dave,

- I sent Dr. Hoerl a note last Monday (10/6). He got back to me immediately, saying that he would be in touch.

- Otherwise
- From http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayesian_probability
- In contrast to interpreting probability as the "frequency" or "propensity" of some phenomenon, Bayesian probability is a quantity that we assign for the purpose of representing a state of knowledge,[2] or a state of belief.[3] In the Bayesian view, a probability is assigned to a hypothesis, whereas under the frequentist view, a hypothesis is typically tested without being assigned a probability.
- And,
- Broadly speaking, there are two views on Bayesian probability that interpret the probability concept in different ways. According to the objectivist view, the rules of Bayesian statistics can be justified by requirements of rationality and consistency and interpreted as an extension of logic.[2][6] According to the subjectivist view, probability quantifies a "personal belief".[3] Many modern machine learning methods are based on objectivist Bayesian principles.[7]

I don't see anything there about using the number of people who hold the belief as the basis for assigning the probability.

 

[John Jones]

I don't see anything there about using the number of people who hold the belief as the basis for assigning the probability.

That's probably because there is nothing there that does so. Let's see if Jabba's latest attempt at begging academic concurrence with his belief in immortal souls gets anywhere.

 

[Mojo]

I'm claiming that the likelihood that I would currently exist if each potential “self” has only one finite life to live (at most) would be close to zero.

You're relying on a supposed large number of potential souls competing for existence making it unlikely that your particular soul should exist at this particular time. But proposing that your soul is immortal doesn't reduce the number of potential souls, or provide extra opportunities for your particular soul to exist at his particular moment. These factors are the same whether or not you are mortal. All you can hope to establish with this approach is that the likelyhood that you currently exist is close to zero whether you are mortal or immortal.

If you use your formula to consider the likelyhood that, given a model in which your soul is immortal, your particular soul currently exists, you will find that it is just as unlikely as your existence given a model in which you have one finite existence, because if sticking infinity, or 10⁸⁰!, or whatever into your denominator is valid when considering what you describe as "the standard model" it is just as valid when considering the model in which you are immortal.

 

[Loss Leader]

You're relying on a supposed large number of potential souls competing for existence making it unlikely that your particular soul should exist at this particular time. But proposing that your soul is immortal doesn't reduce the number of potential souls, or provide extra opportunities for your particular soul to exist at his particular moment. These factors are the same whether or not you are mortal. All you can hope to establish with this approach is that the likelyhood that you currently exist is close to zero whether you are mortal or immortal.

If you use your formula to consider the likelyhood that, given a model in which your soul is immortal, your particular soul currently exists, you will find that it is just as unlikely as your existence given a model in which you have one finite existence, because if sticking infinity, or 10⁸⁰!, or whatever into your denominator is valid when considering what you describe as "the standard model" it is just as valid when considering the model in which you are immortal.

Well, that's why he needs to introduce zero - so that one side of the equation becomes impossible and the other side thus becomes an infinitely better choice.

From day one, it's been an intellectual shell game. All of the limits and definitions imposed on one side disappear for the other. In the "scientific" model, there are infinite potential souls. In his "all else," there aren't.

 

[Giordano]

You're relying on a supposed large number of potential souls competing for existence making it unlikely that your particular soul should exist at this particular time. But proposing that your soul is immortal doesn't reduce the number of potential souls, or provide extra opportunities for your particular soul to exist at his particular moment. These factors are the same whether or not you are mortal. All you can hope to establish with this approach is that the likelyhood that you currently exist is close to zero whether you are mortal or immortal.

If you use your formula to consider the likelyhood that, given a model in which your soul is immortal, your particular soul currently exists, you will find that it is just as unlikely as your existence given a model in which you have one finite existence, because if sticking infinity, or 10⁸⁰!, or whatever into your denominator is valid when considering what you describe as "the standard model" it is just as valid when considering the model in which you are immortal.

In fact, Jabba's numbers within his own theory are as bad, or even worse than in his own distorted view of the SM. He has proposed an infinite number of potential "selves" that can be created de novo in his theory that are used in addition to the reincarnated selfs (I'm not clear if one can tell them apart). So, by his own "logic" the chances of making a Jabba in particular, even given his theory, are much worse than the SM mandates and would approach zero as the number of potential selfs approach infinity(as his own theory proposes). I think it is very telling that Jabba has simply refused to deny this flaw in his proof of his theory. Yet I have good reason to believe that he has read this flaw in his theory more than once...

 

[Mojo]

I think it is very telling that Jabba has simply refused to deny this flaw in his proof of his theory.

I refer you to Loss Leader's sig.