I believe you're wrong though. It's handy to now be able to refer to a transcription of Masipa's oral judgement to illustrate this. Page 49 and 50 of that pdf (headed as page 3327 and 3328) contains the crucial passage that deals with dolus eventualis. It's not formatted in such a way as to enable an easy copy/paste into here, but in my view it's absolutely unequivocal in the way that Masipa deals with dolus eventualis: she states clearly that it only applies to "the deceased", and "reasons" that since the court finds that Pistorius truly believed "the deceased" to be in the bedroom at the time the shots were fired, he cannot therefore have had the intent to kill or seriously injure her. One can attach no other meaning to the words given on these pages. I grant that she then muddies the water by her ill-chosen words of "...the person behind the door, let alone the deceased", but the previous passages make it crystal clear (in my view) that she is misapplying the law in assessing intent purely against "the deceased", when in fact she should be assessing it against whomever Pistorius believed to be behind the door (and we know from his own defence that he claims to have believed there to be a human being behind the door, namely the mythical "intruder).
I agree that her reasoning explains why he couldn't have foreseen it was Reeva behind the door, but I think this has to be seen in the context of her previous finding: that his version that he believed it to be an intruder and that he believed his life was in danger was reasonably possible. As you say, it's useful to have the full text to refer to, and I noticed that immediately preceding the bit where she discusses whether he could've foreseen it was Reeva, she does specifically address whether or not Pistorius believed his life to be under threat (ugh, you're right that it's a pain to c&p):
In the present case, on his own version the accused suspected that an intruder had entered his house through the bathroom window. His version was that he genuinely, though erroneously, believed that his life and that of the deceased was in danger.
There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that this belief was not honestly entertained. I say this for the following reasons: The bathroom window was indeed open, so it was not his imagination at work when he thought he heard the window slide open. He armed himself with a loaded firearm and went to the direction of the noise. He heard a door slam shut. The door toilet was indeed shut when he fired four shots at it, after he heard a movement inside the toilet. On his version he was scared as he thought the intruder was coming out to attack him.
It's following this acceptance that it was reasonably possible both that Pistorius believed there was an intruder and that his own and Reeva's lives were in danger that she discusses whether he could have foreseen that "either the deceased or anyone else" would be killed by firing into the door. She then concludes with "It follows that the accused’s erroneous belief that his life was in danger excludes dolus."
Although I agree it's a little confusing, I think her discussion of dolus eventualis doesn't consider his intention to shoot at the intruder, because she's already accepted his claim of putative self-defence on that. Therefore she goes on to consider whether despite his belief that he was shooting at an intruder, he might have suspected that it could have been Reeva or anyone else (aside from the intruder). We'll see if this is clearer when the written ruling eventually comes out (I suspect it will be!).
Incidentally the whole concept of
dolus eventualis is quite bizarre and fascinating - it's a two part test, where the accused not only has to foresee but also reconcile himself with the possibility he would kill. I read about a case the other day where the accused's dangerous driving history meant he was acquitted of murder (dolus eventualis) because the fact he'd driven dangerously before and got away with it meant he believed he was less likely to kill this time! Kind of nuts. Arguably, even if intent were considered in relation to an intruder, Pistorius might not meet that criteria given that he says he shot in a panic and without thinking. But as far as I can see, it's the putative self-defence option the judge is accepting rather than anything else.
Incidentally, it's worth pointing out here that the indictment charged Pistorius with the murder of "a human being", with "namely, Reeva Steenkamp" being secondary. This was very deliberate on the part of the state, and is highly relevant in this discussion.
Do you know if that would normally be written differently?
But Masipa never even addressed (to the point of any sort of judgement/ruling) whether or not she believes Pistorius' claim that his life was in danger! She appears - from her orl judgement at least - to have made her entire judgement on murder vs culpable homicide on the narrower issue of intent. However, here it's very instructive to note that elsewhere in the judgement she seems to reject Pistorius' putative private defence of self-defence, since he testified on the stand to some sort of "automatic" pulling of the trigger.
Now, it may be that Masipa believes Pistorius to have genuinely been in fear of imminent mortal danger when he pulled the trigger, but she certainly hasn't communicated that belief yet. If she does hold that belief, then - as you say - it's a defence against the use of lethal force in self-defence, so the whole "intent" argument is moot. But the crucial factor is that this is not why she acquits Pistorius of murder in her oral judgement. Rather, she purely acquits him on the basis that he did not have the intent of killing or seriously injuring "the deceased" - i.e. Reeva Steenkamp - since the court rules that he genuinely thought that she was in the bedroom at the time.
As above, she does consider whether his belief that his life was under threat was genuine. And really, once you accept he believed it was an intruder, that isn't a hard argument to make at all.
I also suspect that you yourself would accept that his belief that his life was in imminent danger is reasonably possible, once you also accept that he was standing in front a toilet door behind which he believed there to be an armed intruder, and that he heard a noise indicating that intruder was about to come out of the door. I think it's just the fact you don't believe his version in the first place that leads you (and many others) to question whether he really did think his life was in danger. And that, of course, is a completely different discussion!
