Proof of Immortality II

[Akhenaten]

Loss Leader's brain explodes.

The original or the duplicate?

 

[JoeMorgue]

That's just a special case of the same principle.

0 = x not observed

1 = x observed

n = number of trials

(0+0+0+0+0+1)/n=1/6=0.166...

expectation of observing x = 0.166...

Wow a mathematical proof of "We don't know everything, therefore Woo."

Stunning. Simply stunning.

 

[Akhenaten]

- There were three questions in my post, but you quoted only two of them.

There were 578 questions in the 6,000 posts that you've completely ignored since this thread started.

Dave's looking good.

I need an answer to the third question -- i.e., "Are their experiencers different from each other?"

Misplaced the previous 273 answers that you've already been given to this exact same question, have you?

 

[Jabba]

- There were three questions in my post, but you quoted only two of them. I need an answer to the third question -- i.e., "Are their experiencers different from each other?"

The answer to that was included in my answer to the other two, plus it's a question I have answered several times already in this thread.

The experiencers would be two separate, identical experiencers.

- But Dave, are they "different"?
- In an earlier discussion, you seemed to accept that the experiencers would be different. See below.

Dave,
- In that sense, replicating my brain after I die would not bring ME, my experiencer, back to life -- it would bring a new, and different, experiencer to life. It wouldn't be ME -- it would be somebody else.
- The separateness of the brains would result in different experiencers (in that sense).
- How's that?

It would bring a new, identical experiencer to life. It would be somebody else who is exactly identical to you. Just like the body, including the brain, would be exactly identical to your body, but wouldn't be your body.

Dave,
- It would bring a new, identical but different experiencer to life. It wouldn't be ME.
- And, the cause of the difference would be separate (different) brains.
- We've been tripping over the word "different." But, wouldn't you agree with what I just said?

I would agree with that the way you phrased it that time.

 

[godless dave]

- But Dave, are they "different"?
- In an earlier discussion, you seemed to accept that the experiencers would be different. See below.

It depends what you mean by "different". They would be different in that there would be two of them. They would be separate, but identical. Just as you said in the post that I agreed with.

 

[Giordano]

Loss Leader's brain explodes.

I hope you will clean up after yourself...

 

[Akhenaten]

- But Dave, are they "different"?
- In an earlier discussion, you seemed to accept that the experiencers would be different.

Do you really think nobody will notice that you're back to the "same" old childish game of using "different" meanings of "different" within the "same" sentence?


plus ça "change", plus c'est la "meme" chose.

See below.

We already have. Only one person needs to continually repost the entire damn thread in order to fail to make a point and it isn't "us".

 

[Akhenaten]

That's nothing like stating that 1/∞ is a valid expression.

But it is a lot like stating that calling it zero is not going to be much off the mark.

No, it's not a lot like that at all.

So go ahead and call it zero.

Jabba already did that years ago. He was as wrong then as you are now so no thanks.

 

[godless dave]

I really don't understand why we're having this conversation again, Jabba.

The scientific model for human consciousness is naturalistic. Every characteristic of a human consciousness is determined by the brain that produces it.

If you think this model is wrong, then post your evidence. But you're not going to get anywhere by pretending the scientific model says something it doesn't.

 

[jond]

I really don't understand why we're having this conversation again, Jabba.

The scientific model for human consciousness is naturalistic. Every characteristic of a human consciousness is determined by the brain that produces it.

If you think this model is wrong, then post your evidence. But you're not going to get anywhere by pretending the scientific model says something it doesn't.

Please, Jabba: post your evidence already!!! (Or, since you don't have any evidence, get over it!!!)

 

[John Jones]

I really don't understand why we're having this conversation again, Jabba.

[...].

Because he has neither logic nor evidence on his side, he hopes to make up for that lack with magniloquence.

It hasn't impressed anybody yet, and his invisible audience hasn't come out to cheer him on.

 

[carlitos]

Because he has neither logic nor evidence on his side, he hopes to make up for that lack with magniloquence.

It hasn't impressed anybody yet, and his invisible audience hasn't come out to cheer him on.

Googling that was rewarding. Thank you.

 

[jsfisher]

Nor did I introduce it to this discussion. Nor have I been arguing with Jabba about it for months.

Deny it as you may, your post suggests otherwise.

...
Nor has the universe been established to be finite. Nor does the evidence support such an assumption.

Nice attempt to shift the burden of proof, but a failure nonetheless.

 

[Jabba]

It depends what you mean by "different". They would be different in that there would be two of them. They would be separate, but identical. Just as you said in the post that I agreed with.

- The following is what I mean by "different."

Dave,
- In that sense, replicating my brain after I die would not bring ME, my experiencer, back to life -- it would bring a new, and different, experiencer to life. It wouldn't be ME -- it would be somebody else.
- The separateness of the brains would result in different experiencers (in that sense).
- How's that?

Dave,
- It would bring a new, identical but different experiencer to life. It wouldn't be ME.
- And, the cause of the difference would be separate (different) brains.
- We've been tripping over the word "different." But, wouldn't you agree with what I just said?

 

[John Jones]

- The following is what I mean by "different."

More equivocation fallacy.

 

[godless dave]

- The following is what I mean by "different."

Yes, that's what I mean too. Just as there would be two identical brains, there would be two identical "experiencers". Obviously you could not have two brains producing one experiencer in the scientific model, just as you cannot have one brain in two skulls.

I still don't understand the point of this discussion.

 

[Akhenaten]

It depends what you mean by "different". They would be different in that there would be two of them. They would be separate, but identical. Just as you said in the post that I agreed with.

- The following is what I mean by "different."

Dave,
- In that sense, replicating my brain after I die would not bring ME, my experiencer, back to life -- it would bring a new, and different, experiencer to life. It wouldn't be ME -- it would be somebody else.
- The separateness of the brains would result in different experiencers (in that sense).
- How's that?

Still garbage, and quibbling over the meaning of "different" has nothing to do with it.

Replicating your brain after you die would result in nothing more or less than a total of two dead brains.

 

[John Jones]

Googling that was rewarding. Thank you.

My pleasure. I just discovered it myself in a thesaurus today.

 

[Mojo]

- There were three questions in my post, but you quoted only two of them. I need an answer to the third question -- i.e., "Are their experiencers different from each other?"

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?postid=10179615#post10179615

 

[Mojo]

- The following is what I mean by "different."

Yes, it wouldn't be you. But it would be identical to you, because it would be produced by a brain identical to yours.

Remember: if you have two identical things, there are two of them, not one, but they are identical.