Proof of Immortality II

[Toontown]

Pointing out that two identical brains would not be the same brains does not mean their identities are not determined exclusively by their physical organization.

Identical brains have identical physical organizations, but they have different 'identities' - they are different brains.

So any limitation on the number of possible physical organizations is not a limitation on the number of possible identities, according to Jabba, as I understand him. The universe can make any number of identical copies, and every identical copy would have a unique identity.

To further simplify matters, many scientists are now accepting that it is more likely than not that the universe is multiple and eternal. Yes, it is a simplification, but I'm not going to try to explain why. I'll just say that current measurements are difficult to avoid in an inflation model, but require increasingly complicated assumptions in other models.

 

[carlitos]

Many scientists accept that the universe is eternal? Do tell.

 

[jond]

- How about their experiencers? Are their experiencers determined exclusively by their physical organization? Are their experiencers different from each other?

Jabba, as has been explained to you an infinite number of times: the "experiencer" isn't a separate thing, it is an ongoing process. Brain stops, "experiencer" stops.

One more time for the world: in your impossible duplicate brain scenario, the duplicate brain has exactly the same "experiencer" at the moment of duplication. From that moment onward the two "experiencers" diverge, because an "experiencer" is in reality an ongoing process which changes with every bit of information that comes in/goes out. Further, neither "experiencer" would have any way of knowing whether or not it was the one true "experiencer."

Now can we please get over your impossible scenario? It's not helping you at all.

 

[godless dave]

Many scientists accept that the universe is eternal? Do tell.

Yes, if the geometry is flat or nearly flat, as it seems to be, expansion will continue forever, eventually resulting in heat death - no energy available to do work.

 

[Toontown]

Yes, if the geometry is flat or nearly flat, as it seems to be, expansion will continue forever, eventually resulting in heat death - no energy available to do work.

That's a level 1 multiverse, practically guaranteed by current flatness measurements. Any non-positive spacetime curvature mathematically requires the universe to be physically infinite, not just temporally eternal. Current flatness measurements do not rule out any positive curvature, but they do rule out a universe that is anything other than incomprehensibly giganogargantuan.

In addition, inflation theory leads almost inexorably to the level 2 multiverse. And inflation is the model which best fits current measurements.

 

[Giordano]

Identical brains have identical physical organizations, but they have different 'identities' - they are different brains.

So any limitation on the number of possible physical organizations is not a limitation on the number of possible identities, according to Jabba, as I understand him. The universe can make any number of identical copies, and every identical copy would have a unique identity.

I think that you will find that this point was made already in this thread, in multiple ways. I fear you may be confusing Jabba by re-stating it in this fashion (using the word "identities" in physical terms, whereas Jabba appears to relate this more to "self-identity", but a little more confusion will probably not matter. By the way, do you know of a way to exactly duplicate a brain, or is this purely hypothetical anyway? I tried with my kids, but I largely failed.

 

[carlitos]

Yes, if the geometry is flat or nearly flat, as it seems to be, expansion will continue forever, eventually resulting in heat death - no energy available to do work.

Something that will eventually suffer a heat death doesn't strike me as being "eternal." Am I missing something in the translation here? Full disclosure - I haven't made it all the way through Cosmos yet.

 

[godless dave]

Something that will eventually suffer a heat death doesn't strike me as being "eternal." Am I missing something in the translation here? Full disclosure - I haven't made it all the way through Cosmos yet.

The universe will still be here but nothing will be able to live in it and stars won't shine.

It's eternal in the sense that it won't collapse into a Big Crunch.

 

[Loss Leader]

Ahh, thank you kindly! And, thanks for the recommendation of "Tale of the Dueling Neurosurgeons." It is indeed brilliant (I'm about halfway through), and would be a great book for Jabba to read if he had any interest in the actual current state of neuroscience (and history of how we've gotten to where we are).

I'm glad you're enjoying it.

- How about their experiencers? Are their experiencers determined exclusively by their physical organization? Are their experiencers different from each other?

No. Changing the word "identity" to "experiencer" does nothing. You could change the word to eggplant, but as long as you intend it to mean the same as all of your other words for "soul "it will still only ever mean 'soul".

Remember, there is no such thing as an experiencer. Consciousness is a process, not a thing.

 

[Giordano]

I'm glad you're enjoying it.






No. Changing the word "identity" to "experiencer" does nothing. You could change the word to eggplant, but as long as you intend it to mean the same as all of your other words for "soul "it will still only ever mean 'soul".

Remember, there is no such thing as an experiencer. Consciousness is a process, not a thing.

Well, there are eggplants...

 

[pakeha]

- How about their experiencers? Are their experiencers determined exclusively by their physical organization? Are their experiencers different from each other?

No Jabba.
Experiencer is just another name for sense of self.
And we all know what a sense of self is.

 

[Toontown]

By the way, do you know of a way to exactly duplicate a brain, or is this purely hypothetical anyway? I tried with my kids, but I largely failed.

A level 1 multiverse, being more than 1 Hubble volume, is guaranteed to duplicate your brain, at least once per Hubble volume. And the measured spacetime flatness practically guarantees that's what this is.

 

[Toontown]

Something that will eventually suffer a heat death doesn't strike me as being "eternal." Am I missing something in the translation here? Full disclosure - I haven't made it all the way through Cosmos yet.

Yeah. You're missing the level 2 multiverse, which is also strongly implied by the flatness measurement.

 

[Toontown]

I think that you will find that this point was made already in this thread, in multiple ways.

And I think you'll find that Jabba has been trying to use this fact to argue that the number of potential brains is infinite, because even if the number of discrete organizations is finite, duplicate organizations are still different brains.

I don't think this argument holds in a finite universe, because there are a finite number of spacetime locations in a finite universe.

But then I don't think the universe is finite. Nor do I think anyone can adequately support any claim that it is finite. Evidence may be sparse, but what evidence there is supports an infinite level 1 + level 2 multiverse.

Nor do I think an infinity of potential brains is necessary for Jabba's purposes. I think Jabba's real problem is lurking in the immortal soul assumption.

 

[Jabba]

Yes, and to calculate the likelihood of that person existing given "A", you need to include all the factors that A says led to her existence.

Dave,
- For the moment, I'll just say, "No, you don't." Not in Bayesian statistics.
- For now, a better explanation will have to wait. Talk to you soon.

You seem to be confusing the probability of a hypothesis being true with the likelihood of a particular outcome happening given that hypothesis.

Dave,
- The overall Bayesian formula seeks the posterior probability of a given hypothesis, given a newly considered, relevant outcome (event).

Pointing out that two identical brains would not be the same brains does not mean their identities are not determined exclusively by their physical organization.

- How about their experiencers? Are their experiencers determined exclusively by their physical organization? Are their experiencers different from each other?

Yes. Every characteristic of the experiencer is determined by the brain, except for its location, which is obviously determined by the location of the brain.

Dave,
- Does the "Yes" apply to the last two questions immediately above?

 

[carlitos]

Please stop reposting dialogue. It's redundant and annoying. We can all read the thread for ourselves; there is no need to repost post the parts you like best or whatever.

 

[Jabba]

1221

I'm sorry, I don't see how positing time travel or anything else like that gets you to infinity, since the entire possible number of combinations of particles in the volume of the habitable universe over the time period where life can occur is finite. Anything beyond that is simply quibbling over details. Yes, causality limits the possibilities, but even if we ignore causality, the possibility of Jabba existing is still finite. Nothing he's said, or, in my opinion, can say, will lead to or demonstrate his infinite improbability. That line of argument is devoid of reason. Period.
Even if I accept that Cleopatra might have slept with Jabba's dad, that doesn't get you one bit closer to infinity, because every finite number is infinitely far from infinity. Make your denominator as big as you want, Jabba. It's still infinitely smaller than infinity.

xt,
- I assume that you assume that "impossible" precludes "potential." Correct?

 

[JoeMorgue]

There just has to be some sort of remedial "How to behave in a discussion" class we can send people to.

 

[godless dave]

Dave,
- The overall Bayesian formula seeks the posterior probability of a given hypothesis, given a newly considered, relevant outcome (event).

Right. And at the very beginning of this thread, you attempted to use the likelihood of a given event - your existence - to get that probability. And you asserted that likelihood was 1/infinity.

Dave,
- Does the "Yes" apply to the last two questions immediately above?

Generally speaking, if I quote a question from somebody, and then type something immediately underneath that quote, I am answering the quoted question.

Two identical brains would produce two identical experiencers, as we have discussed at length.

 

[Loss Leader]

- I assume that you assume that "impossible" precludes "potential." Correct?

Loss Leader's brain explodes.