Proof of Immortality II

[Slowvehicle]

I should add that if you look at the ingredients for beer, you won't see any alcohol, esters, or carbon dioxide. And yet those are all in the finished product. One might say they have no prior representation.

Calls for intensive research!

(First round's on me!)

 

[Giordano]

Jabba,

To help you out, because you are always looking for agreement and asking us how you are doing: One more time, does anyone here agree with Jabba that there is a non-physical part of us that continues after death and makes us "us?" A self, or soul, or sense of self, or whatever Jabba has tried to call it?

Jabba, it might help if you told us more about what it was that you specifically believe will be reincarnated that represents a continuation of "you." Is it your self identity, your appearance, your loves and hates, etc? I don't think you ever told us specifically. What is this "self" or "soul," the existence of you are seeking to prove?

 

[John Jones]

Jabba,

To help you out, because you are always looking for agreement and asking us how you are doing: One more time, does anyone here agree with Jabba that there is a non-physical part of us that continues after death and makes us "us?" A self, or soul, or sense of self, or whatever Jabba has tried to call it?Jabba, it might help if you told us more about what it was that you specifically believe will be reincarnated that represents a continuation of "you." Is it your self identity, your appearance, your loves and hates, etc? I don't think you ever told us specifically. What is this "self" or "soul," the existence of you are seeking to prove?

Again, not I.

 

[jond]

Godless Dave and Xtifer, as the only two respondents to his Janba-ness, I wonder: do you both (or separately) agree that "the self" is not a thing, but is in fact a process? If so, might you me so kind as to inquire with his Jabba-ness if he will ever address the central issue?

 

[xtifr]

One more time, does anyone here agree with Jabba that there is a non-physical part of us that continues after death and makes us "us?" A self, or soul, or sense of self, or whatever Jabba has tried to call it?

Obviously I don't agree, but that's not quite his argument. It's a little more nuanced than that.

1. The scientific model should include* a non-physical component of consciousness, but suggests that that non-physical component goes away at death.
2. A non-physical component that goes away at death is infinitely improbable.
3. Therefore the scientific model is wrong and immortality is the only conceivable alternative.

He's trying to get us to agree to 1, which does not include life after death, so that he can then triumphantly point out the supposed contradiction. The problem he's having is that we don't agree with 1.

(At least, I don't.)

* "should include" is the exact claim he made at one point, though I'm too lazy to hunt it down.

Godless Dave and Xtifer, as the only two respondents to his Janba-ness, I wonder: do you both (or separately) agree that "the self" is not a thing, but is in fact a process? If so, might you me so kind as to inquire with his Jabba-ness if he will ever address the central issue?

Which central issue?

There's so many weak links in his chain of reasoning that it's really hard to point to just one and say "there's the flaw." All three of the points I mentioned above are required elements of his argument, so all three could be described as central.

So far, we're stuck on 1, but 3 may be a bigger problem overall. And he doesn't even seem to recognize that 2 doesn't necessarily follow from 1, which is another pretty major problem.

 

[Giordano]

Dear xtifr,

Given Jabba refuses to define a "self" other than as a "soul" that is non-physical, but lives on after death, I am trying as best as I could to define "self" the same way as Jabba. Yes, I realize right now he is trying to prove a non-physical "self" exists, but with the ultimate goal of proving this "self" is reincarnated. Therefore I think my question fairly reflects what Jabba is trying to argue. I wished to avoid any discussion of an "illusion of self" being non-physical. Is an illusion not physical? Well, the SM states that illusions are directly linked to the pattern of physical action potentials and biochemical molecules in your brain when you experience an illusion (so even illusions are based on the actions of the physical brain), but I wanted to avoid any philosophical discussion on such an issue. It is the same discussion as "is a thought physical?" A thought is based on and irrevocably tightly dependent on the physics and biochemistry of the physical brain, but some people might define it as physical, and others as non-physical.

These nuances seem unlikely to be relevant, given Jabba's continued confused posts as to how you can have two of the "same" thing.

 

[Loss Leader]

There's so many weak links in his chain of reasoning that it's really hard to point to just one and say "there's the flaw.

Nobody has mentioned the problem of a deterministic universe in months. We have no idea if the universe would run the same way if we started it over. If hte universe is deterministic than the probability of any given person having come into existence is and always was 1. That ends the argument right there.

 

[xtifr]

These nuances seem unlikely to be relevant, given Jabba's continued confused posts as to how you can have two of the "same" thing.

I agree with pretty much all you said, but since his claim is that he can "essentially prove" immortality, I think it's a little misleading to say that he's asking us to accept it as a premise. He really seems to believe that if can get us to accept these other premises, which don't include immortality, then he'll be able to persuade us that immortality is the only logical consequence of those premises.

The problem, of course, is that his premises lack foundation.

 

[Jabba]

Jabba, I was trying to draw an analogy with your statement that a particular self has a 1/infinity chance of coming into existence the first time.
So my question is, did the batch I brewed yesterday have a 1/infinity likelihood of coming into existence before I brewed it?

Dave,
- If I understand your question, the answer is, "No -- but, the likelihood would be 1/(a HUMUNGUS number)."

Correct.
So why do you think the likelihood is different for selves?

- The answer has multiple steps -- here's the first step.
- Because, there is no biochemical recipe exclusive to a particular "experiencer," or SELF.

There's no biochemical recipe exclusive to a particular batch of beer, either.

- That being the case, there is no bio-chemical recipe exclusive to ME. Following my recipe would produce an identical me, but not ME.

Yes, exactly like following my recipe for Brown Ale a second time.

Dave,
- Yeah. That being the case, there is no set of potential SELVES from which to draw new SELVES.

So there is also no set of potential batches of brown ale from which to draw a new one.

- Good. We're on the same page.
- But that being the case, each new SELF is brand new, comes out of nowhere, is created on the spot.

Then each new batch of brown ale is brand new, comes out of nowhere, and is created on the spot?
I'm going out of town for a couple days. I may check in tomorrow if our hotel has wifi.

Dave,

- Unfortunately, you're right...
- But at the same time, I think you've revealed just where it is that we've been passing in the night. Per usual, the particular wording is crucial...

- I probably never should have used the term “exclusive.”
- I should have just said that there is no complete bio-chemical recipe (formula, prescription) for a particular SELF.
- A perfect biochemical replica of a particular "batch of brown ale" would be totally identical to its predecessor. Such, however, would not be the case with a perfect biochemical replica of a "self." The two selves would have different observers (SELVES). In that sense, they would not be identical. Each self would have its own SELF. And while no one could tell -- from watching them -- which entity was which, anyone watching them could tell that they were not just one SELF, observing through both sets of senses and controlling both bodies.
- IOW, there would be an aspect of the new self that is not identical to that aspect in the old self. There would be no such aspect in the two batches of brown ale. That’s how they differ.

 

[xtifr]

- A perfect biochemical replica of a particular "batch of brown ale" would be totally identical to its predecessor. Such, however, would not be the case with a perfect biochemical replica of a "self."

Your second statement is incorrect.

The two selves would have different observers (SELVES). In that sense, they would not be identical.

And the two batches of ale would have different bottles. In that sense, each batch would not be identical.

Each self would have its own SELF.

And each batch would have its own set of bottles.

And while no one could tell -- from watching them -- which entity was which, anyone watching them could tell that they were not just one SELF, observing through both sets of senses and controlling both bodies.

And while no one could tell -- from looking -- which case of ale was which, anyone watching them could tell that they're not just one case of ale, by counting them, or by drinking one up and observing that the other remains. (Assuming you're in any shape to observe anything after drinking a whole case of ale.)

 

[Giordano]

Dave,

- Unfortunately, you're right...
- But at the same time, I think you've revealed just where it is that we've been passing in the night. Per usual, the particular wording is crucial...

- I probably never should have used the term “exclusive.”
- I should have just said that there is no complete bio-chemical recipe (formula, prescription) for a particular SELF.
- A perfect biochemical replica of a particular "batch of brown ale" would be totally identical to its predecessor. Such, however, would not be the case with a perfect biochemical replica of a "self." The two selves would have different observers (SELVES). In that sense, they would not be identical. Each self would have its own SELF. And while no one could tell -- from watching them -- which entity was which, anyone watching them could tell that they were not just one SELF, observing through both sets of senses and controlling both bodies.
- IOW, there would be an aspect of the new self that is not identical to that aspect in the old self. There would be no such aspect in the two batches of brown ale. That’s how they differ.

You are wrong. But there is no reason for me to explain why, given you have totally ignored what we all just told you in the matter, including Godless Dave. So I just will just suggest to you or anyone else the excellent posts that have already explained why you are wrong.

 

[Loss Leader]

The two selves would have different observers (SELVES).

Nope. Remember what a self is, Jabba? It's just a process that occurs when there is a working brain.

And, once again, if you have to invent an entirely new vocabulary to explain your idea, you're probably on the wrong track.

 

[John Jones]

Obviously I don't agree, but that's not quite his argument. It's a little more nuanced than that.

1. The scientific model should include* a non-physical component of consciousness, but suggests that that non-physical component goes away at death.
2. A non-physical component that goes away at death is infinitely improbable.
3. Therefore the scientific model is wrong and immortality is the only conceivable alternative.

He's trying to get us to agree to 1, which does not include life after death, so that he can then triumphantly point out the supposed contradiction. The problem he's having is that we don't agree with 1.

(At least, I don't.)

* "should include" is the exact claim he made at one point, though I'm too lazy to hunt it down.



Which central issue?

There's so many weak links in his chain of reasoning that it's really hard to point to just one and say "there's the flaw." All three of the points I mentioned above are required elements of his argument, so all three could be described as central.

So far, we're stuck on 1, but 3 may be a bigger problem overall. And he doesn't even seem to recognize that 2 doesn't necessarily follow from 1, which is another pretty major problem.

Jabba, your least critical correspondents are talking about the weakness of your arguments. Why won't you address them?

 

[sackett]

All day I've traced the burning waste

without the taste of logic. Cool, clear logic. (Lugubrious guitar solo.)

Aw hell, here I am again. Jabba, let's try this approach:

Suppose somebody cried out to you, "Oh! Thank you, Jabba! You've entirely convinced me that we have immortal souls! This is so wonderful! Tell me, how, how did you arrive at your conclusion? Oh please explain your reasoning! Jabba? Hello?"

What would you say? Really.

 

[abaddon]

Dave,

- Unfortunately, you're right...
- But at the same time, I think you've revealed just where it is that we've been passing in the night. Per usual, the particular wording is crucial...

Really? No kidding.

- I probably never should have used the term “exclusive.”

If you wish to persist in inventing terms and meanings exclusive to yourself then yes.

- I should have just said that there is no complete bio-chemical recipe (formula, prescription) for a particular SELF.

You can say it. Just saying it does not make it true.

- A perfect biochemical replica of a particular "batch of brown ale" would be totally identical to its predecessor. Such, however, would not be the case with a perfect biochemical replica of a "self."

Why not? You continue to avoid the point that a replica would be identical only at the instant of replication, and would diverge thereafter. Is it that you don't agree, don't understand or avoid this as terminal to your argument? Which?

The two selves would have different observers (SELVES). In that sense, they would not be identical. Each self would have its own SELF.

Oh. You do understand, but simply want to brush it under the carpet.

And while no one could tell -- from watching them -- which entity was which, anyone watching them could tell that they were not just one SELF, observing through both sets of senses and controlling both bodies.

Wrong. The self and the replicated self will be identical only at the instant of replication. Thereafter they will diverge.

- IOW, there would be an aspect of the new self that is not identical to that aspect in the old self.

And now you claim that the replicated self cannot be identical to the original self. This must perforce be true. Everyone has been telling you this. Again and again and again. Two years and thousands of post later, you somehow post this as though it is some sort of revelation you are bestowing upon all and sundry.

There would be no such aspect in the two batches of brown ale. That’s how they differ.

Again, wrong. Try doing some home brew to find out how wrong you are.

 

[Slowvehicle]

All day I've traced the burning waste, without the taste of logic. Cool, clear logic. (Lugubrious guitar solo.)

This wins one entire internets. Logically.

Watch your inbox.

:

 

[godless dave]

Dave,

- Unfortunately, you're right...
- But at the same time, I think you've revealed just where it is that we've been passing in the night. Per usual, the particular wording is crucial...

- I probably never should have used the term “exclusive.”
- I should have just said that there is no complete bio-chemical recipe (formula, prescription) for a particular SELF.
- A perfect biochemical replica of a particular "batch of brown ale" would be totally identical to its predecessor. Such, however, would not be the case with a perfect biochemical replica of a "self." The two selves would have different observers (SELVES). In that sense, they would not be identical.

What sense is that? Why can't two observers be identical?

And while no one could tell -- from watching them -- which entity was which, anyone watching them could tell that they were not just one SELF, observing through both sets of senses and controlling both bodies.

Of course not. One observer couldn't possibly be connected to two brains. How would it get sensory input without any neural connections?

- IOW, there would be an aspect of the new self that is not identical to that aspect in the old self.

What aspect is that? Identity? That's not an aspect. That's a consequence of existence. Two identical batches of brown ale wouldn't have the same identity - they would be in different kegs (or bottles, I guess, but that's a lot ofcwork, xtifr) but they would still be identical.

Selves don't have VINs.

If it seems like we've had this discussion before, it's because we have. We're not passing in the night, Jabba, we're repeating ourselves. Next you'll say that you see selves as having a property of identity that makes each one unique, even ones that would otherwise be identical in every respect. Then I'll ask you to support this claim. Will you answer this time?

 

[Hokulele]

- A perfect biochemical replica of a particular "batch of brown ale" would be totally identical to its predecessor. Such, however, would not be the case with a perfect biochemical replica of a "self." The two selves would have different observers (SELVES). In that sense, they would not be identical. Each self would have its own SELF. And while no one could tell -- from watching them -- which entity was which, anyone watching them could tell that they were not just one SELF, observing through both sets of senses and controlling both bodies.

Would those two selves know which one was which? Would the replica know that it is the replica and the original know that it is the original? If so, how?

 

[Mojo]

- But at the same time, I think you've revealed just where it is that we've been passing in the night. Per usual, the particular wording is crucial...

- I probably never should have used the term “exclusive.”
- I should have just said that there is no complete bio-chemical recipe (formula, prescription) for a particular SELF.

The self (whatever term or typography you want to use for it) is the result of the functioning of the brain. It is entirely the result of that.

 

[Mojo]

Why can't two observers be identical?

Because it is necessary to Jabba's agument that they can't.