Proof of Immortality II

[dlorde]

Regarding the emergence diversion, I suspect Chalmers may be particularly relevant - he thinks consciousness is strongly emergent because he feels there's no way - even in principle - that you could deduce from examining the system (brain?) that it would give rise to the sense that it is like something to be that system... [or something along those lines].

I have some sympathy with his viewpoint, but unfortunately it's built on an argument from ignorance, which scuppers it for me.

 

[Giordano]

- I should have said "first instant of consciousness." Would that help?

Why do you ask? You clearly don't care. Wrong. Nope. No. Etc.

 

[pakeha]

- I should have said "first instant of consciousness." Would that help?

Not really, Jabba.
Remember?
Consciousness is an emergent property of a functioning neurosystem.

 

[Jabba]

Dave,
- If I'm correct, it's the part that I don’t want to cease existing at the death of my brain.
- “I” have a “sense of self” that appears to have existed since “I” was 2 years old -- at least -- and that, according to the scientific model, will cease existing at the death of my brain.
- It is that “part” of the self, or “sense” of the self, that I’m claiming cannot come from the chemistry of the brain – If it did, “I” would be brought back to life by producing an exact copy of my brain as it was when it first began to sense its self…

Why wouldn't an exact copy of your brain produce an exact copy of your sense of self?
Do you understand that any brain is going go consider itself as "me"?

- Re #2: Sure.
- Re #1: This is where the words fail us (or maybe, they just fail me).
- Whatever. I’m claiming that each brain copy would produce a different “identity.” IOW, there is something about this sense of self that is not defined by brain chemistry…

Dave,
- You haven't responded. Do you now accept that there is something about this sense of self that is not defined by brain chemistry; are you just otherwise busy; or, are you just getting tired of my density?

 

[Jabba]

… For the moment at least, I’m accepting that the identity could be defined by space/time coordinates -- but only at the instant of consciousness. I include the caveat(?) because each of us experiences (an, at least, illusion of) identity continuity over a lifetime. In the major sense, our identities appear to stay the same over our lifetimes. Our different “characteristics” change from instant to instant, but not our apparent identities.

There is no "instant of consciousness". Consciousness is a process. It continues until it stops, like running.
Except when we switch bodies. Oh wait, that never happens, so this is not even slightly evidence of something not directly tied to a particular body and brain. So that doesn't even slightly begin to address the location issue…

- I should have said "first instant of consciousness." Would that help?

xtifr,
- I assume that it doesn’t help, but I don’t know why it doesn't…

 

[godless dave]

- Re #2: Sure.
- Re #1: This is where the words fail us (or maybe, they just fail me).
- Whatever. I’m claiming that each brain copy would produce a different “identity.” IOW, there is something about this sense of self that is not defined by brain chemistry.

Yes, I know that you're claiming that. My question - again - is, what is your support for this claim?

 

[godless dave]

Dave,
- You haven't responded. Do you now accept that there is something about this sense of self that is not defined by brain chemistry; are you just otherwise busy; or, are you just getting tired of my density?

Sorry, I was out of town over the weekend, visiting my in-laws and failing to catch fish.

I do not accept that there is anything about the self that is not defined by brain chemistry.

 

[Loss Leader]

xtifr,
- I assume that it doesn’t help, but I don’t know why it doesn't…

Because it's nonsense? Because it's like somehow drawing a distinction between a VW going 65 mph and the first instance when the VW hit 65 mph? Because it doesn't actually solve any of the problems with your ideas? Because you're so far afield from your topic that it doesn't matter?

As always, pick the one that offends you least.

 

[Slowvehicle]

Dave,
- You haven't responded.

Good Evening, Mr. Savage!

Do you have ANY idea how impolite, how disrespectful, how utterly astonishingly rude, this statement is? How many times, and to how many posters, have YOU "not responded", repeatedly?

Do you know the word, chutzpah?

Do you now accept that there is something about this sense of self that is not defined by brain chemistry; are you just otherwise busy; or, are you just getting tired of my density?

I, for one, am getting tired of your obduracy. No. The self, the consciousness; these are the same thing, an emergent characteristic (if you persevere with your attempt at an end run, a "weakly" emergent characteristic, the only kind for which evidence has been offered) of a functioning neurosystem, determined by the structure of the brain and its experiences.

The "sense of self" is something that the self does

How many times will you pretend that this has not been explained to you?

ETA: I forgot to say that that shirt really sets off your eyes...is that a new haircut?

 

[JoeMorgue]

- The reason I've resorted to even fewer and shorter posts is that I've promised my wife to give her needs more of my time. She has all sorts of cleaning, gardening and landscaping that she wants to do but that she needs help with...
- I hadn't said anything about it cause you guys haven't wanted to hear my excuses.

Wow martyrdom and sad sacking.

Stunning. Simply stunning.

Yes Jabba you are correct. The rest of us have been neglecting our loved ones in our tireless campaign to point that absolutely everything you have said has been nothing but a load of tripe.

But you know what... the second sentence is dead on. No none of us want to hear your excuses anymore.

How about you stop giving us excuses then?

 

[AdMan]

Sorry, I was out of town over the weekend, visiting my in-laws and failing to catch fish.

Do not feel you need to apologize to someone who routinely displays much more rudeness to other forum members.

P.S. Sorry about the fish.

 

[xtifr]

xtifr,
- I assume that it doesn’t help, but I don’t know why it doesn't…

No moment "defines" consciousness, except, perhaps, now. Which is always-changing. But really, the thing that defines consciousness is the brain.

Consciousness is entirely dependent on the brain. If you create a new brain, you get a new consciousness. It doesn't matter if it's identical. The bodies are identical, but not the same body. The consciousnesses are identical, but not the same consciousness. There's no difference between those cases. There's no special mystical property "allowing" an entirely separate brain to have an entirely separate consciousness. That's simply what happens when you have a working brain.

And you completely ignored this part, which was key:

Oh, and of course, people who suffer brain trauma and can no longer identify with their previous selves. Which again, puts the brain back dead center.

If the sense of continuous self is so vital and indivisible, how is it that some people can lose it without dying?

To me, the answer is obvious: it's a property that emerges from the brain, so damage to the brain can damage the brain's ability to perform this action. If it were independent of the brain, somehow, that wouldn't be the case.

 

[Mojo]

Dave,
- You haven't responded. Do you now accept that there is something about this sense of self that is not defined by brain chemistry; are you just otherwise busy; or, are you just getting tired of my density?

Do you agree with all the posts you have failed to respond to?

 

[Akhenaten]

xtifr,
- I assume that it doesn’t help, but I don’t know why it doesn't…

That's because you've ignored 95% of what's been said to you and wilfully misunderstood the rest.

 

[pakeha]

[ . . .] Do you now accept that there is something about this sense of self that is not defined by brain chemistry[ . . .]

No one does, Jabba.
No one does.

Other posters have ably pointed out the relation between the sense of self and the brain's activity, even patiently and repeatedly explaining how damage to the brain alters the sense of self.

Why say brain chemistry when you mean the functioning of the brain?

 

[Mojo]

Why say brain chemistry when you mean the functioning of the brain?

Jabba seems to think that phsics and chemistry will say different things about whether the soul exists:

“I” have a “sense of self” that appears to have existed since “I” was 2 years old -- at least -- and that, according to the scientific model, will cease existing at the death of my brain.
- It is that “part” of the self, or “sense” of the self, that I’m claiming cannot come from the chemistry of the brain – If it did, “I” would be brought back to life by producing an exact copy of my brain as it was when it first began to sense its self.
- So far, I’m allowing that the physics of the brain may resolve that “dilemma” – that if we could also reproduce the space/time coordinates at the instant my particular sense of self began, doing so might bring my particular sense of self back to life. But that brings more dilemmas (that we haven’t discussed) to resolve…

I suspect that the future may hold an appeal to quantum mysticism, or something similar.

 

[godless dave]

I think I might know where you are going with strong vs. weak emergence.

One interesting thing about human consciousness is that it looks different from the first person than from the third person. That is, from a third person perspective we can observe a human being's behavior, we can observe (with the limited tools we have) which parts of the brain are using the most blood or emitting the most electricity. From a first person perspective, we can observe the impressions our brain makes of sensory input - how my computer monitor looks, the color and texture of my cubicle walls, the feeling of fingers pressing keys, the sounds of my coworkers talking and the air conditioner running.

We cannot, with current technology and knowledge, look at a functioning human brain and say "that brain is receiving data from the eyes that allow it to see tan cubicle walls, a black computer, and a glowing computer monitor". We have a general idea what neurons are doing the seeing, but not how they are representing what they see internally so that the "observer" part of the brain gets those impressions.

It's conceivable that we could, hypothetically, using computing power that is beyond current technology, simulate a human consciousness's reactions using a computer. That is, program a computer to respond to stimuli exactly the same way my brain does, such that you could have a conversation with it and it would respond just like Godless Dave would. William Gibson's "Mona Lisa Overdrive" touches on this concept. But would this simulation think and feel - internally, from the first person - the same way I do? It's an interesting question.

But even if the answer is no, that doesn't mean materialism is wrong. It just means the simulation didn't recreate what goes on - physically - inside my neurons. I very much suspect that is where the observing, thinking, and feeling happens, where the part of my brain is that thinks of itself as "I".

We don't know for sure that everything, including consciousness, has a materialist explanation. But given that, in all of human history, every time we have found an explanation for some phenomenon, it has been a materialist explanation, materialists like me are confident that all natural phenomena have material explanations.

So, in the scientific model, every part of human consciousness has a material explanation.

 

[Loss Leader]

We don't know for sure that everything, including consciousness, has a materialist explanation. But given that, in all of human history, every time we have found an explanation for some phenomenon, it has been a materialist explanation, materialists like me are confident that all natural phenomena have material explanations.

So, in the scientific model, every part of human consciousness has a material explanation.

I just read a book about psychopathy in which the author makes a pretty compelling case that psychopaths have depressed activity in their paralimbic systems, and that they may have it from birth. Exceptionally anxious people have heightened activity in the same areas of the brain.

The fMRI has revealed amazing things about the connection between the psyche and the physical parts of the brain.

 

[Giordano]

xtifr,
- I assume that it doesn’t help, but I don’t know why it doesn't…

What is the point of quoting your own prior posts? Are even you tired of the repetition of typing in the same words over and over again?

Well you are still wrong. Read the other posts to find out why.

 

[xtifr]

Jabba seems to think that phsics and chemistry will say different things about whether the soul exists:


I suspect that the future may hold an appeal to quantum mysticism, or something similar.

No, I'm the one who brought up physics, when I pointed out that identical chemistry didn't mean physical identity. I think I even started chanting "physics, physics, physics" at one point when he kept trying to claim that it was all about brain chemistry.

Not that a whole lot of people hadn't tried to point out the same thing, more or less, but somehow, when I threw the magic word* "physics" in there, he finally acknowledged that maybe chemistry wasn't everything. And he's been promising (and not delivering on that promise) to fit physics into his theory ever since.

* I assume it was the fact that I threw the word "physics" in there, but part of me can't help wonder if it wasn't the fact that I made a point of saying it three times, and we all know that anything said three times must be true (citation: Prof. Charles Lutwidge Dodgson.)