• Quick note - the problem with Youtube videos not embedding on the forum appears to have been fixed, thanks to ZiprHead. If you do still see problems let me know.

[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

Status
Not open for further replies.
Dave,
- I'm claiming that there is something about my "self" that would NOT get replicated if my brain were replicated.

If you can provide evidence for that I'll go look up how you can nominate someone for a Nobel Prize.

That “something” is the thing, process or illusion of my continuous lifetime self that disappears -- supposedly, never to return -- at the death of my brain. You agree that I would not return to life if my brain were perfectly replicated; yet, you claim that every aspect of my particular sense of self would be replicated by replicating my brain. Those seem contradictory to me. This is where we seem to be passing in the night.

It's like you haven't been reading the thread at all.

If we copy your whole body, including your brain, you will see another person who looks like you, has all of your memories, including a memory of moments ago standing where you are now. He will think he is you but from *your* perspective he will not be. If I belted him across the head with frozen tuna you would feel no pain but he would. If he went off to live in a foreign country for twenty years he might come back with a different religion and political perspective than you. He might even come to realize the folly of your efforts on this subject and the Jesus-stained sheet.
 
Last edited:
Dave,
- I'm claiming that there is something about my "self" that would NOT get replicated if my brain were replicated.
Please support that claim, please define what the something even is, please discontinue the impossible replication rhetoric.
That “something” is the thing, process or illusion of my continuous lifetime self that disappears -- supposedly, never to return -- at the death of my brain. You agree that I would not return to life if my brain were perfectly replicated; yet, you claim that every aspect of my particular sense of self would be replicated by replicating my brain. Those seem contradictory to me. This is where we seem to be passing in the night.
Please stop restating the unsupported assumptions and start supporting the assumptions.
 
The main problem with this is that the "self" or even the "sense of self" is not a thing. It is a process, a property, it emerges from a brain, it does not exist as a separate entity of its own. If you are now claiming that the "sense of self" is a separate thing, you will need to provide evidence for this.

We've been urging this same thing for 18 months. Nothing so far.

This issue will only be resolved when Jabba provides evidence that immortality and souls exist, and he has made only the feeblest attempts to do so.
 
Please support that claim, please define what the something even is, please discontinue the impossible replication rhetoric.

Please stop restating the unsupported assumptions and start supporting the assumptions.

He's got nuthin. Never has.
 
Firstly, let me express some small relief that I'm not the only one who checks these things. As it turns out, other somewhat notorious posters do exactly the same thing.

Secondly, I sometimes like to think that on clicking "Preview Post" and reviewing what he's written, Jabba's arguments don't even make sense to himself and he discards them before retiring to the breakfast nook.

Fresh snowfall in New York, probably
 
Dave,
- I'm claiming that there is something about my "self" that would NOT get replicated if my brain were replicated. That “something” is the thing, process or illusion of my continuous lifetime self that disappears -- supposedly, never to return -- at the death of my brain. You agree that I would not return to life if my brain were perfectly replicated; yet, you claim that every aspect of my particular sense of self would be replicated by replicating my brain. Those seem contradictory to me. This is where we seem to be passing in the night.

Let me explain it you in simple term.
YOU as Jabba original would be dead. It would not be YOU. It would be somebody which Smells like you, has your habbits, talk like you, has the same belief as you, the same memory as you. But it would not be you. Nobody would be able to tell it is not you. It is a perfect copy.

But from your perspective, you would live, then you would die and that's it. It is game over. Whereas the copy would have your memory, and continue to live.

Thus there is no contradiuction at all.


To give you an example.

Take a piece of paper.
1) Write a unique serie of letter and number on it. Example "KJAHSHJ87634jJHAS87KJH"
2) Then make a photocopy of it. The photocopy is perfect.
3) destroy the original
4) you can read the serie of letter and number will STILL read "KJAHSHJ87634jJHAS87KJH"

=> the original is gone. From the point of view of the original the end the death came when you destroyed it. It is dead jim. That piece of paper is not coming back ever.
=> the photocopy is undistinguishable from the original so the text is still there.

You are the destroyed piece of paper. You are dead. You cannot live again even if a copy is made. Your personality and memory are copied (the text) but you are gone, from your point orf view you would be dead.

But the piece of paper still replicate the text on it, the memory, the habits and so forth.

So you are both dead, and replicated.

Got it ?

Or will you ignore this and plow ahead feigning incomprehension ?


Gentlemen maybe we are ready to leave the second of february ?
 
- I'm claiming that there is something about my "self" that would NOT get replicated if my brain were replicated.


Let's try this a different way. Let's say that you were selected to undergo a process where you would be completely replicated, brain and all. All of your memories would be retained, just as they are now. You are checked into a hospital, and are put under general anesthesia, so the last memory you have is counting down slowly from 10. You wake up in a generic hospital room, completely by yourself.

Can you tell whether you are the original "you", or the copy? If so, how?
 
Dave,
- I'm claiming that there is something about my "self" that would NOT get replicated if my brain were replicated.
Usually, but not always, one thing would change. And I'll come back to that "not always" in a moment, but first:

That “something” is the thing, process or illusion of my continuous lifetime self that disappears -- supposedly, never to return -- at the death of my brain.
No, that would be replicated as well. The original and the copy would each have an identical and indistinguishable "process or illusion of continuous lifetime self". Subjectively, there'd be no way to tell if you were the original or the copy. Both would feel as if they were the original, in all respects.

The thing that would change is the mathematical identity! Not your personal sense of identity, but the fact of being the same object in the same space-time location. That's all. And in fact, even that might not change in one extraordinary case:

If you were perfectly duplicated, and the original was destroyed, and the duplicate was placed in the exact same position as the original, all within the shortest possible period of time, it would be exactly as if nothing happened! Because the space-time coordinates would be identical, and that's the only thing that actually changed in the other cases. So, in that one case, your copy would be you.

Yes, this also implies that teleportation is indistinguishable from destroying and recreating an object. A fact that has been known to make people uncomfortable, but since teleporting people remains in the domain of science fiction, it hasn't become a major issue. (Outside of science fiction.) :)
 
Usually, but not always, one thing would change. And I'll come back to that "not always" in a moment, but first:


No, that would be replicated as well. The original and the copy would each have an identical and indistinguishable "process or illusion of continuous lifetime self". Subjectively, there'd be no way to tell if you were the original or the copy. Both would feel as if they were the original, in all respects.

The thing that would change is the mathematical identity! Not your personal sense of identity, but the fact of being the same object in the same space-time location. That's all. And in fact, even that might not change in one extraordinary case:

If you were perfectly duplicated, and the original was destroyed, and the duplicate was placed in the exact same position as the original, all within the shortest possible period of time, it would be exactly as if nothing happened! Because the space-time coordinates would be identical, and that's the only thing that actually changed in the other cases. So, in that one case, your copy would be you.

Yes, this also implies that teleportation is indistinguishable from destroying and recreating an object. A fact that has been known to make people uncomfortable, but since teleporting people remains in the domain of science fiction, it hasn't become a major issue. (Outside of science fiction.) :)
xtifr,
- This may sound flippant (or something), but I'm hoping it will establish whether or not you and I are on the same page. In that one case above, what would happen if the original were not destroyed?
 
xtifr,
- This may sound flippant (or something), but I'm hoping it will establish whether or not you and I are on the same page. In that one case above, what would happen if the original were not destroyed?

Good evening, Mr. Savage!

Exercise for the student:

In the proffered physically-impossible-and-therefore-somewhat-misleading hypothetical, what do you think would happen if the original were not destroyed?
 
Not this "same page" rubbish again.

That's just Jabba telegraphing his intention to put words in someone else's mouth.
 
Usually, but not always, one thing would change. And I'll come back to that "not always" in a moment, but first:


No, that would be replicated as well. The original and the copy would each have an identical and indistinguishable "process or illusion of continuous lifetime self". Subjectively, there'd be no way to tell if you were the original or the copy. Both would feel as if they were the original, in all respects.

The thing that would change is the mathematical identity! Not your personal sense of identity, but the fact of being the same object in the same space-time location. That's all. And in fact, even that might not change in one extraordinary case:

If you were perfectly duplicated, and the original was destroyed, and the duplicate was placed in the exact same position as the original, all within the shortest possible period of time, it would be exactly as if nothing happened! Because the space-time coordinates would be identical, and that's the only thing that actually changed in the other cases. So, in that one case, your copy would be you.

Yes, this also implies that teleportation is indistinguishable from destroying and recreating an object. A fact that has been known to make people uncomfortable, but since teleporting people remains in the domain of science fiction, it hasn't become a major issue. (Outside of science fiction.) :)

xtifr, I've seen a lot of speculation along these lines, and this is the first time I've seen it put precisely this way.

When you say that the original was destroyed, and the duplicate was placed in the exact same position as the original, all within the shortest possible period of time, do you mean:
- the original's atoms were destroyed (or possibly dispersed)
- the duplicate's atoms were placed in the exact space/time coordinates as the original's atoms
- all within so short a time (maybe one unit of planck time) that nothing could have changed or moved

then the copy would be the original?

If so, I believe I agree.
 
xtifr,
- This may sound flippant (or something), but I'm hoping it will establish whether or not you and I are on the same page. In that one case above, what would happen if the original were not destroyed?
This question has been answered so many times, Jabba. There would be you, the Jabba we all know and love, and there would be clone Jabba.

You-Jabba and clone-Jabba would be identical at the moment of replication and would thereafter diverge as you each led your own wee lives. You would not be clone-Jabba. Clone-Jabba would not be you. If you die, clone-Jabba lives on. If clone-Jabba dies you live on. You-Jabba and clone-Jabba are absolutely identical only at the moment of replication, but you-Jabba and clone-Jabba are always separate and distinct.

What do you think happens if you make 50 clone-Jabbas? Or a thousand?

ETA: Or does this happen?
 
Last edited:
xtifr,
- This may sound flippant (or something), but I'm hoping it will establish whether or not you and I are on the same page. In that one case above, what would happen if the original were not destroyed?

I will not speak for xtifir, although I suspect what he will tell you. But why do you care? Will you believe xtifir whatever he says? Even if he says he agrees with you (which I doubt) what of the rest of us? What of godless Dave? Oh the humanity! What of the SM itself?
 
xtifr,
- This may sound flippant (or something), but I'm hoping it will establish whether or not you and I are on the same page. In that one case above, what would happen if the original were not destroyed?

Hmm. Interesting question, though I'm afraid it doesn't lead anywhere useful to either of us. I'm not a physicist, though, so I can't give you a definitive answer, but I believe it's simply not possible because of the Pauli exclusion principleWP, which says that two fermions (a class of particles that includes electrons) cannot occupy the same quantum state simultaneously.

Otherwise, I think jamming all those neutrons and protons into exactly the same location would result in a horrific nuclear explosion. Quite possibly large enough that the Earth itself would no longer exist.

If you really want to know, you should probably check with an actual physicist, but I don't think either option (simply not allowed or Earth-shattering Kaboom) reveals much about the nature of consciousness or the self. :)

xtifr, I've seen a lot of speculation along these lines, and this is the first time I've seen it put precisely this way.

When you say that the original was destroyed, and the duplicate was placed in the exact same position as the original, all within the shortest possible period of time, do you mean:
- the original's atoms were destroyed (or possibly dispersed)
- the duplicate's atoms were placed in the exact space/time coordinates as the original's atoms
- all within so short a time (maybe one unit of planck time) that nothing could have changed or moved

then the copy would be the original?

If so, I believe I agree.

Not just atoms, but the basic particles that make up the atoms, yes. Precisely.
 
Checking in again with the CliffsNotes version:

Jabba is such a unique and beautiful snowflake that his snowflakiness could never have existed before or could never exist again, therefore 1/infinity=immortality.

I may have had several adult beverages tonight, but that is my understanding of the conversation.
 
Checking in again with the CliffsNotes version:

Jabba is such a unique and beautiful snowflake that his snowflakiness could never have existed before or could never exist again, therefore 1/infinity=immortality.

I may have had several adult beverages tonight, but that is my understanding of the conversation.
yes, in a nutshell, that's what Jabba claims for 183 pages.:rolleyes:
 
This may sound flippant (or something), but I'm hoping it will establish whether or not you and I are on the same page.

No it doesn't sound flippant, it sounds like you aren't even trying.

No. You and every other single solitary person in this thread are not on the same page. Nor in the same book. Or even in the same library.

Why? Because your "page" is a bunch of self contradictory nonsense.
 
Last edited:
Status
Not open for further replies.

Back
Top Bottom