[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

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- But, why would the odds that I would live again be any less than the odds that I would live the first time?

Look, a water glass! Now I destroy it with a hammer. What are the odds that that particular water glass would be re-manufactured and "live" again? Zero. What is the likelihood that that particular water glass was manufactured in the first place? One. The manufacturer made 1000 water glasses that are "duplicates" of my water glass and can make still more. What are the odds there will be undestroyed duplicate water glasses just like the one that I destroyed? High. What are the odds that they are the very one I destroyed? Zero,

Again, each VW is a separate car, even if it is identical to thousands of others. If I crash it, I can get a replacement that seems to be identical. But the car I crashed is gone. Identical does not equal the same. Two things can be identical, but can never ever be the same thing. Same idea for "sense of selves." You want to claim a magical different "self" in the original and in the copy of a person, while we are saying that we would have two separate, but identical selves in the original and the copy. Maybe this helps: we are claiming separate, but identical selves (senses of self) and I don't think that is how you are using the term different.
 
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Because there is no known mechanism in the scientific model for someone to live more than once. Once the brain starts to decompose or is destroyed, it's gone and cannot be rebuilt.



Edited to add: the odds of a duplicate of you existing in the future might be nonzero, but would be very low, because history does not repeat itself to that level of detail. You would have to rerun the entire history of the universe to get a duplicate of you.
Dave,
- Just to make sure -- such a duplicate of me, would not be the same me. It wouldn't be that I came back to life. Is that correct?
 
Dave,
- Just to make sure -- such a duplicate of me, would not be the same me. It wouldn't be that I came back to life. Is that correct?

Correct.

Just like in Giordano's example:

Giordano said:
Again, each VW is a separate car, even if it is identical to thousands of others. If I crash it, I can get a replacement that seems to be identical. But the car I crashed is gone.
 
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Because there is no known mechanism in the scientific model for someone to live more than once. Once the brain starts to decompose or is destroyed, it's gone and cannot be rebuilt.



Edited to add: the odds of a duplicate of you existing in the future might be nonzero, but would be very low, because history does not repeat itself to that level of detail. You would have to rerun the entire history of the universe to get a duplicate of you.

And that would be a duplicate, meaning a copy with a self identical to your self but not you.
 
- But, why would the odds that I would live again be any less than the odds that I would live the first time?

You wouldn't "live again" because it wouldn't be you; it would be a replica of you. Your scenario doesn't involve you living again.

Your question is like asking, "if I have two apples, does that mean that the odds are zero that one of them is an orange?"

Study these^^^ words, Jabba. Odds are the wrong way to look at it.

You still seem to be thinking that simply by existing, you have somehow "beaten the odds".

I bet that in the back of your mind, you see an infinite number of "selves" floating in limbo with their fingers crossed, hoping that they will win the lottery and be born. And since you were born, you won and are therefore special.

No. Out of an immense number of possible outcomes of DNA combinations followed by effects of environment and experience, "Jabba" was what came up on the dice. Someone was going to.
 
Dave,
- Still trying to figure out exactly where our opinions first diverge.
1. I have a sense of self that science says will not survive the death of my brain, nor will it ever return.
2. There is no biology that exclusively produces me such that by duplicating that biology, I would live again.
- So far, so good?
Dave,
- Just to make sure -- such a duplicate of me, would not be the same me. It wouldn't be that I came back to life. Is that correct?

Jabba, have you forgotten how consciousness is defined?
 
Sometimes I feel like I am ignored, formally or informally, by Jabba and my attempts to correct his ideas are going unnoticed. And yes, this is unbelievably impolite of Jabba. So it appears that Jabba has decided to unilaterally initiate his idea of a two-way debate, despite the obvious failure of this approach when he recently tried it. But then I feel especially sorry for Godless Dave, apparently the individual Jabba has decided to choose as his "debate" partner.

Sorry, Dave! It's not your fault.
 
1. I have a sense of self that science says will not survive the death of my brain, nor will it ever return.
Technically, it never returns after any amount of time passes whether or not you die. The you that exists now is not the you that existed yesterday, despite the subjective feeling of continuity.
2. There is no biology that exclusively produces me such that by duplicating that biology, I would live again.
Not biology alone, but physics could do it.

If I made a perfect copy of you, then destroyed you, and placed the perfect copy exactly where you'd been at the exact moment you'd been destroyed, the net result would be as if I had done nothing at all. There would be no physical difference!

And if I destroyed you and recreated you somewhere else, it would be indistinguishable from teleportation.

The only tricky case comes in when I copy you but don't destroy the original, in which case, there are now two yous. Which is confusing, but irrelevant, since it still doesn't allow you to divide by infinity!
 
Dave,
- Just to make sure -- such a duplicate of me, would not be the same me. It wouldn't be that I came back to life. Is that correct?

Does anyone want to bet that next Jabba will argue that because a physical duplication does not become "me" then "me" must be non-physical?

I think this mis-quoting is inevitable given Jabba's prior posts and his emphasis on this point. Just to clarify, which I suspect Jabba will ignore, his hypothetic exact duplicating of the physical brain, if precise enough, would also duplicate the consciousness and the "self" (sense of self) that Jabba wants to believe is non-physical. Actually the sense of self is the result of the physical brain, so the physical duplicate will think it is you. It will think of itself exactly the way you think of yourself. If asked, the duplicate will honestly think and say it is you. All at time zero that is, before the two you's can diverge due to different experiences. But of course there will be two you's at first, each with an identical sense of being you. If one dies, the other will continue and will think it is you. But one will still be in a casket (will have died) and will be buried. One of the two you's will have died, and there will be only one alive.

If I precisely duplicate a vase, I will have two identical vases, but they will not be the same (i.e. one) vase. They do not need a soul or self to not be the same, but they will still be absolutely identical vases.

Sorry I know we have tried to tell Jabba this before in many different ways. But I want to sidetrack what I suspect might be his next post if he thinks that a duplicate must be the "same thing" unless some non-physical entity distinguishes the two We are not being metaphysical here, just explaining that two objects are not one (the same) object.
 
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- But, why would the odds that I would live again be any less than the odds that I would live the first time?

Because there is overwhelming evidence that people live at least once. The evidence that they live more than once - not so much.

It's this pesky evidence thing that you avoid at all cost to your intellectual detriment. Why do you keep doing that?

You haven't influenced a single opinion yet, as far as I can see.
 
Does anyone want to bet that next Jabba will argue that because a physical duplication does not become "me" then "me" must be non-physical?


If he argues that then he'll be failing to understand the difference between singular and plural. Identical physical duplicates will produce identical "selves", but they won't be the same one because there will be more than one of them.
 
Because there is none that supports his position, and plenty that contradicts it.


So that's it, Jabba? You won't debate evidence because you have none?

Do your family/invisible jury even bother to read what passes for interlocution on this malodorous parody of a discussion?
 
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Our selves are not determined solely by biology. Environmental pressure, in all its complexity, from cradle to grave, influences the psychological make-up of the emergent property of our brains that we call our consciousness.

Continuity of memory is illusion because we can't always tell if we're remembering the actual event, or if we're remembering the last time we remembered that event. We play the broken telephone game with ourselves, and we can't help but lead ourselves down the garden path of inaccuracy.


Can someone please clone Jabba and wait a few decades to see if he agrees with himself?
 
Dave,
- Still trying to figure out exactly where our opinions first diverge.


Given that one finite lifetime wouldn't be enough for you to have got everything he's said so wrong, I'm tempted to suggest that it was during a previous existence.



1. I have a sense of self that science says will not survive the death of my brain, nor will it ever return.


That's not an opinion; that's a fact.



2. There is no biology that exclusively produces me such that by duplicating that biology, I would live again.


I'll never get the hang of Jabbanese.

Anyway, as near as I can parse what you're trying to say, you're wrong. An exact biological copy of you would not be you living again. It would be a biological copy of you - a clone - living for the first time.



- So far, so good?


So far, so wrong.
 
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