[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

[Jabba]

Dave,

- Try this on for size.

- I die.
- Science figures out how to totally replicate a human brain, and they replicate mine.

- (To me, the items below are just different ways to ask the same question. Hopefully, together, they will make sure that you and I are on the same page...)
- According to the scientific model,
1) Would science be replicating my particular sense of self?
2) Would I live again?
3) Would I come back to life?

- My answer to all three questions is, “NO.” I assume that your answer would be “No,” also.
- That being the case, according to the scientific model, my particular sense of self would have had no prior potential biological identity/representation that would be exclusive to itself.
- And, in other words, there would be no limit upon what particular sense of self would occur that second time around.
- How does that fit so far?

 

[Akhenaten]

Dave,

- Try this on for size.

- I die.

End of story.

- Science figures out how to totally replicate a human brain, and they replicate mine.

Why would science want to replicate a dead brain?

- (To me, the items below are just different ways to ask the same question. Hopefully, together, they will make sure that you and I are on the same page...)

Why?

- According to the scientific model,
1) Would science be replicating my particular sense of self?

No.

2) Would I live again?

No.

3) Would I come back to life?

No.

- My answer to all three questions is, “NO.” I assume that your answer would be “No,” also.

Assume? You've been told as much about a thousand times. Why would you need to assume?

- That being the case, according to the scientific model, my particular sense of self would have had no prior potential biological identity/representation that would be exclusive to itself.

non sequitur

- And, in other words, there would be no limit upon what particular sense of self would occur that second time around.

Apart from the ridiculous nature of your hypothetical, the limit would be that whatever experiences contributed to your former self could never be replicated.

- How does that fit so far?

Square peg/round hole. Same as it ever was.

 

[Agatha]

Dave,

- Try this on for size.

- I die.
- Science figures out how to totally replicate a human brain, and they replicate mine.

- (To me, the items below are just different ways to ask the same question. Hopefully, together, they will make sure that you and I are on the same page...)
- According to the scientific model,
1) Would science be replicating my particular sense of self?

No. If 'science' replicated not just your brain (complete with all the experiences and memories you ever had), but also your body, then an identical but separate self would be created, which would have an identical but separate 'sense of self' to the one you had. It would be identical to you, but it wouldn't be you.

2) Would I live again?

No

3) Would I come back to life?

No

-

- My answer to all three questions is, “NO.” I assume that your answer would be “No,” also.
That being the case, according to the scientific model, my particular sense of self would have had no prior potential biological identity/representation that would be exclusive to itself.

That really does not follow. Your sense of self is part of your consciousness, which is an emergent property/process of your (living) neurosystem. Your neurosystem has a biological identity in your DNA, which is exclusive to you. However, simply replicating your biochemical make-up is not enough to replicate 'you', since there is more to your sense of self than just your biochemistry. If biochemistry were enough, identical twins would have identical (but still separate) consciousnesses. However, any attempt to replicate you must begin by replicating your DNA.

- And, in other words, there would be no limit upon what particular sense of self would occur that second time around.

Also does not follow.

- How does that fit so far?

Not at all.

You appear to think that biochemistry is the sum total of what makes you 'you', and nothing else matters. But biochemistry is only one necessary part of what makes a person what they are. It has an influence on the consciousness, but so do many other factors.

You also seem to think that the biochemistry arises out of nowhere rather than being formed from the recombination of your parents' DNA.

DNA is exclusive to individuals - no two individuals (other than monozygotic siblings) have the same DNA. Your DNA (biochemistry) is an integral, necessary part of what you are calling the prior/potential representation of your self.

However, since replication of brains/selves/neurosystems etc remains in the hypothetical realm, do you think you could move on to something which you believe supports the persistence of consciousness after the death of the organism?

 

[Giordano]

Does anyone want to bet that next Jabba will argue that because a physical duplication does not become "me" then "me" must be non-physical?

Do I win, at least sort of?

 

[Slowvehicle]

Do I win, at least sort of?

A fabulous selection of parting gifts, which you will not be able to get on the airplane with, as most are made of metal and have sharp edges...

 

[Mojo]

- Try this on for size.

- I die.
- Science figures out how to totally replicate a human brain, and they replicate mine.

- (To me, the items below are just different ways to ask the same question. Hopefully, together, they will make sure that you and I are on the same page...)
- According to the scientific model,
1) Would science be replicating my particular sense of self?
2) Would I live again?
3) Would I come back to life?

- My answer to all three questions is, “NO.”

They are not all the same question.

The answer to the first question is "yes"; your "sense of self" is a property of your brain, so perfectly replicating your brain will also replicate your "sense of self".

The answer to the second and third questions is "no", because what will be produced will not be your "sense of self"; it will be a replica of your "sense of self". If you produce two identical entities, there will have been two of them, not one, even if they don't both exist at the same time. We're back to your old problem with distinguishing between singular and plural.

 

[Giordano]

Jabba,

You are the one that has stated that the use of specific words are important.
You used "particular" in your description of sense of self. Particular often means "the same." Do you understand that your "particular sense of self" cannot refer to your duplicate, which in your hypothesis has an "exactly duplicated sense of sense." "Particular" does not mean "exactly duplicated." Your "particular sense of self" would die, as would your particular brain and particular face. But your duplicate, who has an identical sense of self, brain, and face to all appearances as you, would live on. As time accumulates, all three would change due to their experiences.

As explained to you before.

It is a very interesting question if an exact duplicate would be doomed to die at the same time as you. Certainly it would have the identical genetic diseases and the identical urge to go for a walk under a loose tree limb as you might have (i. e. is likely to have the same accidents as you). But your duplicate could be informed by others to change from that initial urge ("Don't go for a walk in the park today.")-learn from experience- and not have the same fatal result. But that is a discussion of "free will" I would prefer to not have.

 

[Giordano]

A fabulous selection of parting gifts, which you will not be able to get on the airplane with, as most are made of metal and have sharp edges...

Don't I get the "play at home" version of this forum if I win? Oh, wait, I am...

 

[Mojo]

That being the case, according to the scientific model, my particular sense of self would have had no prior potential biological identity/representation that would be exclusive to itself.
- And, in other words, there would be no limit upon what particular sense of self would occur that second time around.
- How does that fit so far?

And the rest of your post relies on the idea that the "sense of self" is some sort of entity in its own right. It isn't; it's something the brain does.

 

[Giordano]

Jabba,

Just to make it very clear: your duplicate "sense of self" would be identical to your own "sense of self." No differences, except it comes from your duplicate's brain, not from yours. Neither come from somewhere non-physical.

But again, you seem very stuck on this and so far do not seem to understand what everyone else is trying to tell you about "duplicate" not being "same." This is not helping you to present a convincing proof.

You are too caught up in the idea that a duplicated physical brain will not duplicate your "sense of self," by which you really mean [metaphysical] "self." The SM says that there is no metaphysical self, and that duplicating the physical brain will duplicate both it and its "sense of self." You may believe otherwise, but science and the others here believe both are duplicated: brain and sense of self, at least at time 0 before experiences can alter the latter.

 

[pakeha]

...according to the scientific model, my particular sense of self would have had no prior potential biological identity/representation that would be exclusive to itself.
- And, in other words, there would be no limit upon what particular sense of self would occur that second time around.
- How does that fit so far?

"And, in other words, there would be no limit upon what particular sense of self would occur that second time around."

No, Jabba.
Remember what a sense of self is?

 

[Slowvehicle]

Don't I get the "play at home" version of this forum if I win? Oh, wait, I am...

 

[Slowvehicle]

Jabba,

Just to make it very clear: your duplicate "sense of self" would be identical to your own "sense of self." No differences, except it comes from your duplicate's brain, not from yours. Neither come from somewhere non-physical.

But again, you seem very stuck on this and so far do not seem to understand what everyone else is trying to tell you about "duplicate" not being "same." This is not helping you to present a convincing proof.

You are too caught up in the idea that a duplicated physical brain will not duplicate your "sense of self," by which you really mean [metaphysical] "self." The SM says that there is no metaphysical self, and that duplicating the physical brain will duplicate both it and its "sense of self." You may believe otherwise, but science and the others here believe both are duplicated: brain and sense of self, at least at time 0 before experiences can alter the latter.

Good Afternoon,Mr. Savage!

This bears repeating:

The SM says that there is no metaphysical self, and that duplicating the physical brain will duplicate both it and its "sense of self".

It is time, and past time, and past time past time, and on down a long winding path from that, for you to present you counter-evidence for your claim that the scientific model is wrong.

You know--present your evidence, your empirical, concrete, physical, objective evidence, that the "soul" exists, and is "immortal.

 

[Giordano]

Jabba,

I don't think this will help you, but it might (if you read it and the other posts here).

If I exactly duplicated any physical object, a rock for example, I would have two rocks that I cannot tell apart. Each rock would not be "the same" or "the particular" rock as the other; they are two duplicated rocks and "the same" refers in this case to one object. But, except for location, they are indistinguishable if the duplication is exact. But they are not the "same" rock. The fact that they are not the "same" rock does not mean that there are some magical metaphysical aspects imbedded in each rock that makes them different, they are just not physically the "same" rock, in part due to their different spatial coordinates. This also applies to "sense of self": your duplicated brains would produce two indistinguishable senses of self, but they cannot be the "same" sense of self because the two brains that generate them are duplicated brains, but not the "same" brain.

 

[Loss Leader]

How does that fit so far?

It's gibberish. That's how it fits.

 

[Mojo]

- Try this on for size.

- I die.
- Science figures out how to totally replicate a human brain, and they replicate mine.

Why?

 

[Giordano]

Why?

To study it?

 

[godless dave]

Dave,

- Try this on for size.

- I die.
- Science figures out how to totally replicate a human brain, and they replicate mine.

- (To me, the items below are just different ways to ask the same question. Hopefully, together, they will make sure that you and I are on the same page...)
- According to the scientific model,
1) Would science be replicating my particular sense of self?

Yes.

2) Would I live again?
3) Would I come back to life?

No.

A replica of you would live. Something exactly like you. That's what a copy is.

 

[carlitos]

...your "specs" do not specify you specifically.

That is so breathtakingly ridiculous, I don't know where to start. Are we Rredefining words again? What could "specs" possibly specify if not a specific thing?

 

[godless dave]

Well put as always, Giordano.