[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

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- Just to point out:
- I currently have 5 new responses that I would like to respond to. As noted many times previously, these require real thought and I'm slow anyway. In addition, it isn't that each new response poses just one sub-issue. And then, I'm running out of time this morning...
- And, this response probably took only 5 minutes (I didn't waste much time with my excuse).

Or, you could abandon this inept misdirection, and simply present your evidence that the "soul" exists, and is "immortal"...

(How's THAT for a novel idea?)
 
Actually, while I'm afraid he misunderstands, technically, he's not wrong there. The copy is a separate individual, a different (but identical) person. Each individual--the original and the copy--would see the other as a different person. If I were one of them, the other would not be me to me. We wouldn't "see out of each other's eyes".

I quite see your point, of course.
Obviously both individuals would see each other as a different person.

That's where the nature of consciousness, an emergent property of a functioning neurosystem, kicks in. This is why I reiterate the necessity of Jabba to come to an understanding of the phrase an emergent property of a functioning neurosystem.
 
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Jabba, you can find the original posts by following the links that the forum software automatically provides. Your numbers are otiose. You claim to have insufficient time to respond adequately to what others have posted in this thread, and yet you waste time on this.

each human possesses the emergent property of consciousness that automatically takes on its own sense of self which would be different between the different copies from the very beginning...


Nope. The "self" is a property of the brain. If you were to somehow produce a brain identical to your own, then its properties would be identical to the properties of your brain. That's what "identical" means.

You are once again trying to sneak your desired conclusion (that the "self" is something that exists independently of a functioning brain) into your premises.
 
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Jabba, I am not arguing that there is not a difference between human beings and cakes. And I am not making an analogy between human beings and cakes.
I am making an analogy about creating an object according to a specification, and then creating another object according to the same specification.
The point is that a specification of some kind can be used to produce an original and a copy, and that, despite differences, the original and the copy could be impossible to distinguish.
This is in response to what I saw as you possibly thinking that a copy was somehow intrinsically different from the original.
But there’s no guarantee that we know the time of birth. In my analogy, the cakes did not have a date stamped on them.
They don’t have to be copied at the same time for us to be unsure of which was “triggered” first.
And you seem to care who the original was.
To me, it looks like you consider “you” and “copies of you” to be intrinsically different.
Do you? That's what I'm asking.
Humots,
- Just in case this helps -- the word “original” requires that one was produced before the others. That’s why I referred to the age of the original, vs the copies, as being a tip off to whom the original was.
- But whatever, I think that the answer to your question is “yes.” I and my would-be copies would be intrinsically different – we would not house the same observer. When I die, I (my observer) would not live on through my surviving copies.
- Unfortunately, I think that this is essentially what I have said before – hopefully, it will bring a useful twist…
 
6548-6495Humots,
- Just in case this helps -- the word “original” requires that one was produced before the others. That’s why I referred to the age of the original, vs the copies, as being a tip off to whom the original was.
- But whatever, I think that the answer to your question is “yes.” I and my would-be copies would be intrinsically different – we would not house the same observer. When I die, I (my observer) would not live on through my surviving copies.
- Unfortunately, I think that this is essentially what I have said before – hopefully, it will bring a useful twist…

Good Morning, Mr. Savage!

I wonder--how is this evidence, in any way, that the"soul" exists, and is "immortal"?
 
6548-6495Humots,
I and my would-be copies would be intrinsically different – we would not house the same observer.

How does that make them intrinsically different? The reason you all would not "house" the same observer is because there is more than one of you. In the scientific model, there is one observer per brain*.

Are they intrinsically different because they each have their own nose? Their own stomach?

When I die, I (my observer) would not live on through my surviving copies.

Of course not, because the observer emerges from the brain. If your brain dies, that observer dies. There is no way it could live on in the copies, because it is not connected to them in any way.







*Unless you completely sever the corpus collosum, but let's not get into that right now.
 
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6548-6495Humots,
- Just in case this helps -- the word “original” requires that one was produced before the others. That’s why I referred to the age of the original, vs the copies, as being a tip off to whom the original was.

No, it doesn't help. If it was produced first, it is the "original". But age is not a tip-off if you can't detect it. And it is not given that you can.

- But whatever, I think that the answer to your question is “yes.” I and my would-be copies would be intrinsically different – we would not house the same observer.

"House the same observer": Is this the "same self looking out of two pairs of eyes" thing again?

Each copy would house its own observer. But these observers need not be different in a way that identifies them as a copy rather than the original.

intrinsic: to come from the inside, immanent (lat: intrinsecus, "within")

To my understanding, this would mean that the copies have some difference from the original that (1) identifies them as a copy and (2) is observable.

Would all the copies know that they were copies, and the original know that he is the original? Is that the intrinsic difference?

If I say, "one of these two objects is intrinsically different from the other. I just have to be careful not to mix them up, because I can't tell them apart"
then I am speaking contradictory nonsense.

6548-6495Humots,
When I die, I (my observer) would not live on through my surviving copies.

No, of course it wouldn't. So what? Again with the "one self, two pairs of eyes"?

How would we, on the outside, even know that it was the original that died? For that matter, how would you know?
 
I and my would-be copies would be intrinsically different – we would not house the same observer.


Your body and the bodies of any copies would not house "observers", because the "observers" are a property of the bodies, not independently existing entities. You're trying to sneak your desired conclusion into your premises again.

If the bodies were identical in all respects, then while they would have separate "observers" (just as they would have separate noses), those "observers" would be identical (as would be their noses).
 
6548-6495Humots,
- Just in case this helps -- the word “original” requires that one was produced before the others. That’s why I referred to the age of the original, vs the copies, as being a tip off to whom the original was.
- But whatever, I think that the answer to your question is “yes.” I and my would-be copies would be intrinsically different – we would not house the same observer. When I die, I (my observer) would not live on through my surviving copies.
- Unfortunately, I think that this is essentially what I have said before – hopefully, it will bring a useful twist…

Not really, Jabba.
You seem to have forgotten there is no observer, only a sense of self which is a function of consciousness.
 
6548-6495Humots,
- Just in case this helps -- the word “original” requires that one was produced before the others. That’s why I referred to the age of the original, vs the copies, as being a tip off to whom the original was.
- But whatever, I think that the answer to your question is “yes.” I and my would-be copies would be intrinsically different – we would not house the same observer. When I die, I (my observer) would not live on through my surviving copies.
- Unfortunately, I think that this is essentially what I have said before – hopefully, it will bring a useful twist…

I would say "you got it" about the "observers" except for your prior use of the term "observer" as meaning the same as "self." Yes, by anyone's standard use of the term "observer," #1 would observe that they are sitting in chair 1 and #2 is sitting in chair 2, whereas #2 would observe that they are sitting in chair 2 and #1 is sitting in chair 1. They would be different observers as is commonly defined, but they would have (at time 0) an identical consciousness/sense of self, think the same thoughts, and have the same memories because they have identical brains. If you asked them "are you the copy or the duplicate," each honestly would not be able to tell: they would feel the same and not be able to tell from what they remember. They would each remember being a child, growing up, going to school, etc. even if one was created 5 mins ago. They are the same "self" at time 0. Later their different observations/experience are likely to diverge their "selves" - it will certainly make their memories different.

To simplify what you are stating, do you think that these two physically identical people (at time 0) know that they are the original or the duplicate? Can you tell them apart by questioning them? And please make clear if it is your view or what you think is the SM view. Thanks.
 
Jabba,

Although I felt the obligation to clarify your views in my prior post, I do think that this discussion of exact duplication of a brain is best reserved for late night over beers. It is not possible, so it is meaningless. Might as well ask: if a teleporter only duplicated you and beamed your duplicate to a new planet, but had to destroy the original, would you use it? This discussion is irrelevant to your OP, and given the effort you describe for each post, is a waste of your time. Would you please return to your proof?
 
Is the magnetic field created by the running engine of my wife's VW Beetle intrinsically different from the magnetic field created by the running engine of an identical Beetle?
 
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...So, back to the potential point of confusion in the first paragraph. The two individuals would indeed be different people with different-but-identical points of view (a better term to use in this context that "sense of self"). Each would self-identify as a single, separate individual, but each would self-identify as "me" and, for all intents and purposes, would be.
Why is why the language gets tricky. They'd be different people, in one sense, but also the same person, in another. They'd both be Xtifr, but not the same Xtifr. Do you see that now?
Is this...are we actually getting somewhere? I can't be optimistic, because this has gone on too long, with too much confusion and misunderstanding, but it seems like we might! Do you understand the clarifications I've made here, and why the concept of "a perfect copy of the brain" is the important thing to focus on?
Xtifr,
- Though I've been wrong before, I think I understand. But if I do understand, I always have -- and, just haven't expressed myself very well. This is a big part of why I think that studying debate is so important. So often, the two sides in a debate are not isolating their basic points of disagreement -- I can only hope that I have responded appropriately to your question...

- Gotta go. It's my wfe's birthday.
 
6547-6536Xtifr,
- Though I've been wrong before, I think I understand. But if I do understand, I always have -- and, just haven't expressed myself very well. This is a big part of why I think that studying debate is so important. So often, the two sides in a debate are not isolating their basic points of disagreement -- I can only hope that I have responded appropriately to your question...

- Gotta go. It's my wfe's birthday.

OK, here's the basic point of disagreement:
- you continue to insist that the sense of self (or whatever word you choose to put in there) exists as a thing independed of the brain.

- the rest of us, and indeed the scientific model insists that the sense of self is a process, an emergent property of the brain. The brain dies, so does the sense of self.

Simple, innit? Happy birthday to your wife. When you return there is only one item for you to do, which is:
- present evidence to this sense of self exists as a thing, independent of the brain.
 
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Unfortunately, I think that this is essentially what I have said before – hopefully, it will bring a useful twist…

1918-2014

Jabba - you're just going around and around in circles. Each person is a distinct person. Each person who could be created is a distinct person. So the heck what?
 
... So often, the two sides in a debate are not isolating their basic points of disagreement -- I can only hope that I have responded appropriately to your question...

- Gotta go. It's my wfe's birthday.

Most importantly, happy birthday to your wife.

Jabba, you're not in a two-sided debate here. You're in a forum, with all the wealth of variety and diverse experiences a forum gives.
Why settle for a sterile debate when you can have a discussion?
 
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