[Merged] Immortality & Bayesian Statistics

[dlorde]

We heard you the first time

 

[Garrette]

6495-6468

Humots,

- I gotta say that this is really interesting (for me at least) -- we (you guys and I) cannot agree upon almost anything...

- Whatever -- my response is that there is a big difference between humans and cakes, and that this big difference excludes any "analogousness" (analogosity?) between them (re the issue here) -- each human possesses the emergent property of consciousness that automatically takes on its own sense of self which would be different between the different copies from the very beginning...
- Obviously, if we took an original being and replicated its specifications, we could tell (later) which being was the original, by its time of birth. If somehow the original and the copy were triggered at the same time, we would not be able to identify the original -- but then, who cares who the original was anyway? And, I’m not being flippant here -- who the original was has no bearing upon our issue here.

- Humots, I should probably spend more time on this, but I did want to let you know – today -- that I am trying to respond.

I sincerely wish that you would address what I am about to say, which I have said repeatedly before, as have others.

The highlighted part is not only wrong, it is the crux, the absolute center, the undeniable key to the problem.

The "sense of self" IS NOT SEPARATE FROM the consciousness. It is part of the consciousness. It does not arise nor exist separately from the consciousness. There is no circumstance and there is no hypothetical under the Scientific Model that allows you to conclude otherwise.

The "sense of self" only SEEMS to be separate from the consciousness, but it is not.

Can you at least acknowledge that I am saying this and that you understand it, even if you cannot bring yourself to agree with it?

 

[godless dave]

The "sense of self" only SEEMS to be separate from the consciousness

...to Jabba. It certainly doesn't seem that way to me. I've been going along with the "sense of self" terminology for the sake of discussion.

 

[Agatha]

6495-6468

27.

Humots,

- I gotta say that this is really interesting (for me at least) -- we (you guys and I) cannot agree upon almost anything...

I wonder why that is?

- Whatever -- my response is that there is a big difference between humans and cakes, and that this big difference excludes any "analogousness" (analogosity?) between them (re the issue here) --

Indeed, but given that we can't recreate specific humans, we don't have real-world analogies to explain where we believe your thinking to be wrong. Any analogy is going to have flaws, but we can only discuss this in either hypothetical or analogous terms, and even the rich English language sometimes cannot express the concepts precisely enough. See for example the difficulty in using 'same' to mean 'identical' and vice versa.

each human possesses the emergent property of consciousness that automatically takes on its own sense of self which would be different between the different copies from the very beginning...

If the copies were identical in every respect, including memories, observations and past happenings, then at the moment of replication each copy would have a separate but identical consciousness, including a separate but identical sense of self.

Obviously, if we took an original being and replicated its specifications, we could tell (later) which being was the original, by its time of birth.

Ah, I think I see where some of the confusion has arisen. I believe that when we have talked of reproducing a person exactly including memories etc, we are referring to creating a clone of the exact same age and appearance. Despite the original being a singleton birth, we have posited creating an effectively identical twin at some later date. Both the original and the copy would believe themselves to have had the same date of birth.

What you are talking about, I suspect, is using a person's specification to create a new person at a different time, so that they have different ages (like cloning Dolly the sheep). If you look into the story of the sheep-clones, you'll probably note that the Dolly-clone doesn't look like the original Dolly. This is because the specification that makes a person what they are, including their appearance, is more than just their DNA.

Now, if it were possible to somehow replicate a person by repeating not just their DNA but also the subtle DNA changes which occur after conception, their position in the womb, the sounds, smells, sights, nutrition, and the touches that they experience from the first moment of cell division through and including the birth, and so on continuously throughout the years for their neurosystem to mature sufficiently so that we can observe their consciousness, then we would see an identical (but separate) consciousness to our original person. However, such a replication is simply impossible to achieve.

If somehow the original and the copy were triggered at the same time, we would not be able to identify the original -- but then, who cares who the original was anyway? And, I’m not being flippant here -- who the original was has no bearing upon our issue here.

I suspect the two people in question would care which one was the original and which one was the artificially created clone. I can see all sorts of problems where it would be important to determine which is the original, should such a situation arise.

However, I'm not sure what the issue is you are pursuing, to be honest. We're just following along wherever you lead, and trying to correct your misperceptions as we go.

If all this business about replicating a person is part of talking about the consciousness of person A reappearing in person B after the death of A, then consider: person B shares no memories with person B even if they are closely related, because memories differ from observer to observer. Person B has had different experiences from the moment of conception than had person A. There is nothing in the brain or body of person B that is the same as person A was (other than the obvious gross anatomical similarities). Given all that, there is no possible way for the consciousness of person B (an emergent process of the brain of person B) to have anything in common with the long-ceased emergent process of brain A that was person A's consciousness. It certainly cannot be postulated that the consciousness or self of person A is reincarnated in person B.

 

[Garrette]

...to Jabba. It certainly doesn't seem that way to me. I've been going along with the "sense of self" terminology for the sake of discussion.

I agree, and had thought of this while composing my post, but I went with granting Jabba the most possible leeway instead. Perhaps that was a mistake.

 

[Humots]

Why does that matter? The reason it "takes on" its own sense of self is because it emerges from that particular brain. Any sense of self that emerges from a copy's brain will consider that copy to be its self, because that's where it's located.

There's nothing about selves that suggests they can ignore time and location. A self can only see out of the eyes of the body it belongs to.


(Sorry for jumping in, Humots. I'm on my lunch break and had time to reply)

No problem. I'm working on my own response.

 

[xtifr]

- Whatever -- my response is that there is a big difference between humans and cakes, and that this big difference excludes any "analogousness" (analogosity?) between them (re the issue here) -- each human possesses the emergent property of consciousness that automatically takes on its own sense of self which would be different between the different copies from the very beginning...

Technically true, potentially misleading...I'll return to this point below. Yes, a perfect copy (not a clone--that's not what we're discussing) would self-identify as a separate individual, even though an outside observer would have no way to distinguish the two.

I've highlighted the potentially misleading bit.

- Obviously, if we took an original being and replicated its specifications, we could tell (later) which being was the original, by its time of birth.

"Time of birth?" We're talking about perfect copies here! Not clones. The copy isn't born; it's made. If it were born, it would be a different age, which wouldn't be a perfect copy. It also wouldn't have a perfect copy of the original's brain, which is the important part of this exercise.

If somehow the original and the copy were triggered at the same time, we would not be able to identify the original

It doesn't matter when they were "triggered". What matters is that the copy is identical, down to every particle in the brain. If they're identical, you can't identify the original, unless you watched as the copying took place.

-- but then, who cares who the original was anyway? And, I’m not being flippant here -- who the original was has no bearing upon our issue here.

I am so glad you said this, because I was going to try to make this point, and I really thought it might be difficult.

If you made a perfect copy of my brain (along with the rest of me, but that's just coming along for the ride), then there is no real way to distinguish the original from the copy. They are identical. They would have exactly the same memories. They would both self-identify as me, even though both mes would recognize the other as a separate individual, and would not self-identify as that individual.

So, back to the potential point of confusion in the first paragraph. The two individuals would indeed be different people with different-but-identical points of view (a better term to use in this context that "sense of self"). Each would self-identify as a single, separate individual, but each would self-identify as "me" and, for all intents and purposes, would be.

Why is why the language gets tricky. They'd be different people, in one sense, but also the same person, in another. They'd both be Xtifr, but not the same Xtifr. Do you see that now?

Is this...are we actually getting somewhere? I can't be optimistic, because this has gone on too long, with too much confusion and misunderstanding, but it seems like we might! Do you understand the clarifications I've made here, and why the concept of "a perfect copy of the brain" is the important thing to focus on?

 

[Humots]

6495-6468
Humots,
- I gotta say that this is really interesting (for me at least) -- we (you guys and I) cannot agree upon almost anything...
- Whatever -- my response is that there is a big difference between humans and cakes, and that this big difference excludes any "analogousness" (analogosity?) between them (re the issue here) -- each human possesses the emergent property of consciousness that automatically takes on its own sense of self which would be different between the different copies from the very beginning...

Jabba, I am not arguing that there is not a difference between human beings and cakes. And I am not making an analogy between human beings and cakes.

I am making an analogy about creating an object according to a specification, and then creating another object according to the same specification.

The point is that a specification of some kind can be used to produce an original and a copy, and that, despite differences, the original and the copy could be impossible to distinguish.

This is in response to what I saw as you possibly thinking that a copy was somehow intrinsically different from the original.

6495-6468
- Obviously, if we took an original being and replicated its specifications, we could tell (later) which being was the original, by its time of birth.

But there’s no guarantee that we know the time of birth. In my analogy, the cakes did not have a date stamped on them.

6495-6468
If somehow the original and the copy were triggered at the same time, we would not be able to identify the original -- but then, who cares who the original was anyway? And, I’m not being flippant here -- who the original was has no bearing upon our issue here.

They don’t have to be copied at the same time for us to be unsure of which was “triggered” first.

And you seem to care who the original was.

- Then, when I say that you seem to be saying that there are no specifications for you, you say that there are, and provide the above. But, are these the specifications for "you," or are they specifications for copies of you?

Dave,
- Before, you said that specifications of "me" would yield copies of me, rather than me. Do your "expanded" specifications yield you?

- I guess you're saying that your expanded specifications would yield you once, but after that they would only yield copies of you?

Agatha,
- I don't understand the inclusion of that last sentence -- my hypothetical does not include any changes to the DNA. Dave says that an exact recreation of my DNA, and even the first three years of my life, would produce a copy of me, but not me.

To me, it looks like you consider “you” and “copies of you” to be intrinsically different.

Do you? That's what I'm asking.

 

[Giordano]

6495-6468

we (you guys and I) cannot agree upon almost anything...

- Whatever -- my response is that there is a big difference between humans and cakes, and that this big difference excludes any "analogousness" (analogosity?) between them (re the issue here) -- each human possesses the emergent property of consciousness that automatically takes on its own sense of self which would be different between the different copies from the very beginning...
- Obviously, if we took an original being and replicated its specifications, we could tell (later) which being was the original, by its time of birth. If somehow the original and the copy were triggered at the same time, we would not be able to identify the original -- but then, who cares who the original was anyway?

The other answers to you post cover it very well- read them!

But I need to point out that in the SM humans are A LOT like cakes, in that your sense of self, your consciousness, comes directly from a physical brain- if you duplicate the brain COMPLETELY in every detail (including the action potentials and synapses), you will initially duplicate the consciousness and thinking. Just think if you duplicated a cake, it will taste just like the original. Then the two brains would diverge as they experience different things. But they are always TWO brains, not the same brain and not the "same" consciousness: they are two identical consciousnesses. Both think they are "you" and the newly created "you" will remember its life, childhood, and think it was born normally just like the older "you." They would both think they were "you." If that was good enough to allow the older one to be destroyed without bothering it and leaving the younger "you" to carry on, I leave for a discussion over beers. But if your hunchbacked assistant randomized the brains when you were out of the room, in theory there would be no way to tell which was which.

And please stop using DNA in your posts to state that the having the same DNA means the same physical brain. It does not, as you have been told many times here, and as differences in identical twins prove. Identical twins have different fingerprints; does this mean that identical DNAs can produce physical differences? Yes!

 

[pakeha]

...each human possesses the emergent property of consciousness that automatically takes on its own sense of self which would be different between the different copies from the very beginning...

No, Jabba.
You haven't quite grasped what the phrase emergent property means yet.

 

[Giordano]

Jabba,

I must reiterate that this focus on the hypothetic impossible, duplicating a brain in complete detail, is a waste of time. One can't do it and then find out who is correct. It is only a thought experiment that I hoped would help make the SM more clear to you. But that has not happened. Your non-standard theory would predict that the two brains would have different "yous" at time zero. Fine, but that is not the SM!

Just curious: in your non-SM theory, would the duplicate have no self/soul, like a zombie, or would it acquire a different different "self" that had been reincarnated and assigned to it by ???

 

[xtifr]

No, Jabba.
You haven't quite grasped what the phrase emergent property means yet.

Actually, while I'm afraid he misunderstands, technically, he's not wrong there. The copy is a separate individual, a different (but identical) person. Each individual--the original and the copy--would see the other as a different person. If I were one of them, the other would not be me to me. We wouldn't "see out of each other's eyes".

 

[Giordano]

- I gotta say that this is really interesting (for me at least) -- we (you guys and I) cannot agree upon almost anything...

Does it worry you at all that everyone except you agrees on what the SM (the prevailing theory) says and that you disagree with us on what the SM says? You and I do not agree if what the SM says is true, but you should at least agree with us (and the experts that you consulted) what the SM says. The fact you do not agree about what the SM says should worry you. You are wrong in what you think the SM says- and wrong in your own theory as a consequence.

By the way- have you followed up on being told that your ideas on statistics and on the "self" were wrong by the very experts you consulted? Have you read any of the books recommended to you in response to your questions?

 

[Monza]

Everyone here has done well to express the idea of consciousness in many different ways. It is frustrating that Jabba still doesn't get it. His questions and attempts at re-stating what he thinks we've said bear this out.

The problem still seems to be that Jabba believes there is a "self" that gets attached to a consciousness (which is an emergent property of a physical brain). He believes even two identical brains with two identical consciounesses would get different "selves". Jabba, it's fine if you believe this, but it is not the SM.

The "self" is the emergent property. It is not something extra that gets attached. Two 100% identical brains would have completely identical selves. They would be separate, but otherwise exactly identical.

 

[John Jones]

Delete

 

[John Jones]

Delete

 

[John Jones]

repeated...

Again and again since 2012.

Did you have some other, less obvious point?

 

[Slowvehicle]

Once he's got us all used to the numbers, he'll introduce his new calendar, China will invade the Spratley Islands and force the cancellation of the 2012 Olympic Games, and Jabba, having stocked up on duct tape and draught excluders, will get ten wives and immortality.

ETA: sorry, wrong thread.

Not so fast...

 

[Slowvehicle]

Dave,
- To me, you seem to be saying that your specs do not "specify" you, they simply allow for you. Can I go with that?

Good Evening, Mr. Savage:

The question has been called. This bit of floccinaucinillihillipillification is out of order.

And (again, not pretending to speak for godless dave), that is not what he said.

 

[Slowvehicle]

Surely my sarcasm was not that understated.

Given the target, if it did not strike sparks off an anvil, yeah, it was a bit overstated.

"Aim low, he's on a shetland."