• Quick note - the problem with Youtube videos not embedding on the forum appears to have been fixed, thanks to ZiprHead. If you do still see problems let me know.

Yet another Free Will Thread

The impossible remains impossible.

However, HM comes to mind, as does every stroke patient with a component of consciousness wiped from his or her new "reality", amnestics created by trauma and herpes encephalitis, etc. ad nauseum.........
 
I think he would say that while you consciously deny that you have free will, your actions presuppose the belief that you have free will. The fact that you described what you do as "making choices" seems to tell in favor of that suggestion. If there is no free will, then you aren't making any choices, even though it may seem to you that you are. To the extent that you believe that you are making choices, you believe that you have free will. To the extent that you can't help believing that you make choices, you can't help believing in free will.

Ahh, but I believe in Strong AI and think it is meaningful to talk of decision making even regarding a simple if...then statement in code.
 
The impossible remains impossible.

However, HM comes to mind, as does every stroke patient with a component of consciousness wiped from his or her new "reality", amnestics created by trauma and herpes encephalitis, etc. ad nauseum.........

Imagine that! Imaginary constructs at some complex level depending on the imaginary functioning of imaginary constructs at a less-complex level. :D
 
Last edited:
Imagine that! Imaginary constructs at some complex level depending on the imainary functioning of imaginary constructs at a less-complex level. :D

I fear your avatar would consider the words poorly chosen as a philosophic statement, "imaginary" having far too many connotations; though I'm sure he would thoroughly enjoy the joke, as a poet (which is, of course, the much more important stance as far as I am concerned).:)
 
To repeat myself from an earlier thread...

I am not the same person I was when I started writing this sentence.

That's not the sense of person which people use when talking about free will and moral responsibility. The person who is held responsible for a past action is held to be the same person even though in your sense they are not the same person. It's not OK to hold me responsible for something you did yesterday, because we are different people. It's OK to hold you responsible for something you did yesterday, because you are the same person in that sense.
 
The ability-to-have-done-otherwise "Free Will" posited by the OP is a trait of everything, not just man. A ball resting upon a precipice is pushed from the left and falls to the right. Were you able to "rewind" and push it from the other direction, the results would be different.

If you want to call that Free Will, be my guest. However, when someone asks me whether I believe in Free Will, I find it simpler just to say "No".
 
I've been anti-free will ever since I gave up first belief in God, then belief in all paranormal/supernatural/woo/whatever you call it phenomena. It seems to me that we are physical beings and if that's the case, then there just isn't room for free will.

I skimmed a few sites devoted to Kane. It's interesting, but it doesn't solve my problem. One of the sites contained this quote:



"if free will is not compatible with determinism, it does not seem to be compatible with indeterminism either. The arguments here are familiar and have been made since ancient times. An undetermined or chance event, it is said, occurs spontaneously and is not controlled by anything, hence not controlled by the agent. If, for example, a choice occurred by virtue of a quantum jump or other undetermined event in one's brain it would seem a fluke or accident rather than a responsible choice."

That seems correct to me. The simple fact that an action may be indeterminate is not, in and of itself, enough to create free will, regardless of whether the act is rational, or involves mental effort, or whatever.

In order to really postulate free will that is in accord with what we know from scientific observation of the universe, we have to assert the existence of a mechanism by which an agent can not only choose what to do, such as I might choose what to eat after I type this, but that agent would have to have the ability to choose the quantum states the electrons would enter in such a way that "I" ended up deciding to eat pizza, which is very likely going to be my decision. Is there an observer, somewhere, associated with "me" somehow, that forced the electrons inside my brain to settle into a collective "pizza" state, instead of a collective "leftover chicken" state.

If there is none, then it seems to me that free will is not possible. Even if it were not pre-ordained that I would choose the pizza, it wouldn't be a true choice, it would just be the quantum dice roll. If I wish to assert that I truly had a choice, and that I chose pizza, I have to assert that somewhere there is an agent that picked the state of the electrons.

It seems unlikely, and yet, it would fit with how the universe seems to behave. The universe seems to have some indeterminacy. That indeterminacy seems to resolve itself in the presence of an observer. Why must we assert that it was truly indeterminate, but that an observation forced a random settling into one of the many possible states? Why can we not assert, logically, that the eventual state was indeterminate, but that an agent can choose one of the states, and does so when the states are observed?
 
To repeat myself from an earlier thread...

I am not the same person I was when I started writing this sentence.

Interesting. I'd say that a person is an organism and an organism is something that by its very nature changes its parts (atoms) constantly. Personal identity is a very interesting philosophical problem. Most attempts at solving it seem silly to me (such as four-dimensionalism) or are incoherent (most versions of the psychological continuity criterion).

My ontology includes only quarks and organisms. That's the easiest solution to the "ship of Theseus" problem. The answer is that there are no ships, and therefore no problem.
 
Meadmaker, that is simply an example of Kane discussing the problem, not his view on it. He really is a libertarian free will advocate. He edited a good collection of essays covering the issue, imaginatively titled Free Will, that includes pieces by Dennett, van Inwagen (if memroy serves it is a recap of the essay that Freddy mentioned), and himself amongst many others. Here's a link to Amazon for it: Free Will


ETA
He's written or edited several other books on the subject and has published widely on it. You can find 3 or 4 other of his books on Amazon alone.
 
Last edited:
Meadmaker, that is simply an example of Kane discussing the problem, not his view on it.

Actually, it's someone else discussing Kane. Like I say, his stuff looks interesting, and I hope to find the time to read it.

In my very, very, brief skimming, though, he didn't seem to address the problem that I found most interesting. If we have free will, how? We know that we are made up of particles. We know that particles follow the laws of physics. We can say, fairly safely, that for every thought we have, there is a collection of particles that are in a particular state. We might say those particles caused the thought, or we might not. However, we have to say that there is a correlation between the state of the particles, and the thought. If we have meaningful free will, there has to be something, an agent, an "I", that caused those particles to take on their particular state corresponding to the thought or action in my brain or body.

I didn't look long enough to see if Kane addressed this, but it didn't seem to be his focus. I hope to do some more looking later.
 
Well, as I said above, I don't buy his explanation. The brief explanation consists of conjoining our beliefs, predisposistions, desires, deliberations, etc. to undetermined causation. Quantum fluctuations (undetermined) that are used by our belief system (determined) -- what we call our will -- constitute in his mind a form of libertarian free will.

He introduced the idea to our class in the year-long philosphy course for my degree plan in 1981 or 82 and doesn't seem to have substantially changed it much over the years. To his credit, I still got an "A" on the exam in which we discussed free will and took a hard line anti-free will stance. I always assumed one of the graduate students graded my paper, but who knows.
 
I was catching up on old episodes of The Skeptics Guide to the Universe on my flight back home from TAM 5 and listening to the Tom W. Clark interview in episode #20 raised my philosophical ire.

I hate it when naturalists so whole heartedly and easily abandon free will to the spiritualists and the dualists. It doubled my frustration when he so often cited Dennett. Dennett whose whole project in his two major works on the subject of free will (Elbow Room and Freedom Evolves) is reclaiming free will for naturalists and proving that a deterministic universe far from being in conflict with free will it is a necessary condition for its existence.

Apparently Mr. Clark (apologies Dr., if he is a PhD) has read Dennett but didn't get it. I am not going into the intricacies of Dennett's arguments (I highly recommend you buy his books if you are interested in the issue) but I am going to try and set the record straight using my own much simpler and clumsier arguments.

Yes, as far as we know the universe is determined and we as things contained in that universe must also be determined so free will as defined as the ability to act outside of the causal chain of events cannot exist.

But this is a not the really the kind of free will we want. This Bronze Age, metaphysical free will is both myopic and absurd. It also has about the same explanative and functional power as unicorns and fairies.

Think about it. Do we have the free will to act outside of all external causes? If we could chose to ignore the force of gravity or to not die from starvation when denied access to food then we would have this sort of free will.

But this sort of free will would also free you from internal causality as well which is a completely inconsistent notion. What could it possible mean to choose independent of your thoughts, emotions and desires? Is this something we would want or need? "I felt x, thought x, wanted x but I chose y! I wonder why I did that? Not that there is a why, a why is a cause after all, and I have metaphysical free will!" Does this sort of choice resemble the kind you have in your internal life?

So far I seem to be shooting myself in the foot. I have been bad mouthing free will when I set out to defend it and that's because I want to emphasize the distinction that Dennett makes. Really when philosophers have talked about free will through the ages they have muddled two distinct ideas together. There is the nonsensical free will that determinism negates (which is okay because no one really wants that anyway) and there is free will worth having (which Dennett sets out to prove we have and explain how it evolved).

The free will we want is the could-have-done-differently free will and we have that. We get this ability by the virtue of the fact that we are limited agents, working with a limited understanding of the causes around us.

We are designed by our genes to seek some outcomes and avoid others but our genes can't know exactly the situations we will find ourselves in. Our environment is too complex for our genes to perfectly predict the future and script out every motion we are to make through out our lives. If they could do this they would simply make us like clockwork automatons. Our genes cope with the complexity of the world by building flexibility into us: limited senses and limited speculative power so we have limited ability to determine how to reach goals we are designed to reach.

Ironically, our limited ability is the key to free will. If our genes could have designed us as super agents capable of perceiving and processing all causes then we would be no better off than the clockwork automatons, we would simply always take the optimal route (determined essentially by the interest of our genes) and our consciousness would be redundant.

It is in the middle ground of imperfect agency where free will emerges. We are complex multi-state avoiding and seeking machines with a high degree of flexibility. And thus we have the could-have-done-differently free will. Determinism states that everything has one ultimate outcome but within that deterministic universe we have build in flexibility so if it were possible to rewind the deterministic universal tape and whisper a piece of advice into ear of one of us imperfect agents the whole tape from that point on would change. If we could have known better (or just differently) we could have done differently. And in that is the free will we have and desire.

So in the only rational sense of the word we have free will. There are objections I can anticipate to my explanation but this is a forum so I will wait to others raise them to respond to them.

But there is another thing that Tom Clark said that I thought was horrendous. He claimed that (since there was no free will) we can't hold criminals truly responsible for their actions! I know he couched it with provisions that did not follow from his argument to make it more palatable, like we still need a criminal justice system, but seriously this is a complete non sequitur.

First, I resent the intellectual elitism that is implicit in this kind of thinking: we educated, liberal-minded sorts are capable of understanding the big picture but we need to make allowances for those lesser unfortunates without the advantages and abilities we have.

Second, if criminals cannot be held responsible for their actions because they lack free will, how can we (also lacking free will) be held responsible for the way we treat them? Morality goes right out the window.

Third, I think Tom Clark is quick to embrace this faulty reasoning because he is blinded here by his agenda of taking retribution out of the criminal justice system. I sympathize with his cause but there are much better arguments for it, there are studies he could cite for example that I'm sure have been done. Cherry-picking bronze age metaphysical arguments that erode our agency to make your moral point is just as bad as cherry-picking bronze age myths from the bible to make your moral point.


Bravo!

Well said.
 
Actually, it's someone else discussing Kane. Like I say, his stuff looks interesting, and I hope to find the time to read it.

In my very, very, brief skimming, though, he didn't seem to address the problem that I found most interesting. If we have free will, how? We know that we are made up of particles. We know that particles follow the laws of physics. We can say, fairly safely, that for every thought we have, there is a collection of particles that are in a particular state. We might say those particles caused the thought, or we might not. However, we have to say that there is a correlation between the state of the particles, and the thought. If we have meaningful free will, there has to be something, an agent, an "I", that caused those particles to take on their particular state corresponding to the thought or action in my brain or body.

I didn't look long enough to see if Kane addressed this, but it didn't seem to be his focus. I hope to do some more looking later.


More on this:

If we cannot immediately intuit the nature of the mind, we certainly do know the nature of the brain. We know that the brain is physical. We know that in order to interact with the physical, one must possess physical properties. Thus, we have to conclude that the 'mind' must not contain non-physical elements - or else they would be inaccessible to the physical self.
 
Just noticed something, reading burnvictim77's quoting of the OP...
It is in the middle ground of imperfect agency where free will emerges. We are complex multi-state avoiding and seeking machines with a high degree of flexibility. And thus we have the could-have-done-differently free will. Determinism states that everything has one ultimate outcome but within that deterministic universe we have build in flexibility so if it were possible to rewind the deterministic universal tape and whisper a piece of advice into ear of one of us imperfect agents the whole tape from that point on would change. If we could have known better (or just differently) we could have done differently. And in that is the free will we have and desire.

So in the only rational sense of the word we have free will.
There are objections I can anticipate to my explanation but this is a forum so I will wait to others raise them to respond to them.
Note that you are saying "if the antecedent conditions were different, we would have behaved differently." This is 100% compatible with determinism. Free will would be "even if we did not know better, or differently--even if every condition was absolutely identical--we could have done differently."

So in the only rational sense of the word...your example argues against your point.
 
Morality only exists in a free will existence, deterministically you can't be immoral - we're all amoral.

Depends on the frame of reference. From the viewpoint of the universe, morality is possible only if free will exists. But we fudge what we mean by morality in our sphere of action. For us, morality means the rules of human engagement. It exists from that perspective regardless of a universal framework that may be deterministic.

As far as God is concerned there is no human morality without free will. Hence the need for theists to argue for it. Others have no such need since the only freedom we need to speak of morality is freedom from immediate constraint.
 
We know that the brain is physical. We know that in order to interact with the physical, one must possess physical properties.

While that seems to be true from observation, this is beyond what we can say with absolute certainty.

Thus, we have to conclude that the 'mind' must not contain non-physical elements - or else they would be inaccessible to the physical self.

Not so. Even if we accept the previous premise, there could still exist an entity with physical and non-physical elements.

There's no evidence that most of us here find credible that such an entity exists, but it is a matter of observation, not logic, that says they cannot exist.

If free will is real, I have concluded that there must be a non-physical mind, and it must be able to interact with, and influence, the physical world. Sadly, try as I might, I can't find evidence of such a mind. Yet, I wish to believe it must exist, because I wish to believe in free will. If I choose to do so, then the worst I could be accused of is making an irrational choice, but it was no choice at all, because I had no free will to make it.
 
It's even a bit worse. Not only must there be a non-physical component, but that non-physical component must be self-causing for there to be true libertarian free will. You are entirely correct that this idea doesn't contradict logic (it is conceivable at least to some degree though I can't quite wrap my mind around a real definition of it). So we are left with the other possibility as you nicely state it. But if there is no evidence, then there is no particular reason to believe in it. I think there is actually pretty good evidence against it, but no evidence can ever be final with such an "entity".

It is a comforting thought. I think we all believe it at some level, or at least act like we do -- as Freddy mentioned earlier.
 
Just noticed something, reading burnvictim77's quoting of the OP...
Note that you are saying "if the antecedent conditions were different, we would have behaved differently." This is 100% compatible with determinism. Free will would be "even if we did not know better, or differently--even if every condition was absolutely identical--we could have done differently."

So in the only rational sense of the word...your example argues against your point.

His point is that he's a compatibilist. How are you showing him to be incorrect?
 

Back
Top Bottom