Yet another Free Will Thread

[Mercutio]

I don't think parsimony is applicable, but I think it is akin to a category mistake. "Free will" in this variety of compatibilism is not an entity, nor does it defy the experience that Free Willers attribute to Free Will, nor does it defy the confines of determinism. Everybody is happy once the Free Willers realize that the idea they are trying to defend, a will free from causality that violates the laws of the universe, is useless and nonsensical and, most of all, not appealing.

It's no more nonparsimonious than speaking of the mind as a materialist and causal determinist, as we recognize the mind as existent, not as an entity, but as a process.

Who is this "we" you speak of? Not to bog down and derail, but not all of us recognize the mind as existent at all. This is not the place for it (and I do not currently have the time for it), but it is quite arguable that the "mind" is purely an explanatory fiction, that referring to it as "what the brain does" is a complete redefinition (and an inaccurate one at that) of what "mind" has historically meant. As we use "mind" in our common language, it is not seen as a process; defending it as one, rather than jettisoning the term and starting afresh with something that does not carry "mind"'s baggage, is more trouble than it need be.

I think I simply draw my line in a different place than you do. In both cases.

 

[mookid]

We seem to need it, like a drug.

I think we may aswell just close this thread now he just hit the nail on the head

 

[burnvictim77]

But, that's just it. They cannot explain the will. By it's very nature it must be unexplainable.

This is why I contend that it is logically incoherent. We cannot fathom what it would be. But I'll tell you what it is not: free, in control, and useful all at once.

 

[burnvictim77]

Who is this "we" you speak of? Not to bog down and derail, but not all of us recognize the mind as existent at all. This is not the place for it (and I do not currently have the time for it), but it is quite arguable that the "mind" is purely an explanatory fiction, that referring to it as "what the brain does" is a complete redefinition (and an inaccurate one at that) of what "mind" has historically meant. As we use "mind" in our common language, it is not seen as a process; defending it as one, rather than jettisoning the term and starting afresh with something that does not carry "mind"'s baggage, is more trouble than it need be.

I think I simply draw my line in a different place than you do. In both cases.

I won't get you into a long discussion about it, but how do you refer to mind?

 

[Mercutio]

I won't get you into a long discussion about it, but how do you refer to mind?

Heh...How about I refer you to a previous long discussion? In memory of hammegk, and of Interesting Ian...the Emergence of Mind thread....*scary music*


I know it's a lot to read. Some of what you are interested in, though, is right up front. Some is later on, though--the thread asks for a materialist explanation. I give one (if memory serves), but am not myself a materialist, but a pragmatist. It is possible that this is one of those threads that eventually gets to that.

Around page 8 or so, hammegk and I come to an agreement, and there are hugs all around.

 

[burnvictim77]

Heh...How about I refer you to a previous long discussion? In memory of hammegk, and of Interesting Ian...the Emergence of Mind thread....*scary music*


I know it's a lot to read. Some of what you are interested in, though, is right up front. Some is later on, though--the thread asks for a materialist explanation. I give one (if memory serves), but am not myself a materialist, but a pragmatist. It is possible that this is one of those threads that eventually gets to that.

Around page 8 or so, hammegk and I come to an agreement, and there are hugs all around.

Interested thread. Correct me if I'm wrong, but you don't suggest an alternate terminology for mind in this thread, which is what I meant to ask.

 

[Mercutio]

Interested thread. Correct me if I'm wrong, but you don't suggest an alternate terminology for mind in this thread, which is what I meant to ask.

Sorry, I am really slow today: this thread, as in the one we are currently writing in? Or this thread, as in the one I linked? I do not believe I have posted enough in this thread to have gotten around to any suggestions of alternate terminology. Why, would you like some alternate terminology? It is not a simple re-naming; there are things we attribute to "mind" that are clearly things we do (physicalists would say "our bodies do", hammy would say "experience as us"), but there are also things we say about mind that are purely fictional.

 

[burnvictim77]

Who is this "we" you speak of? Not to bog down and derail, but not all of us recognize the mind as existent at all. This is not the place for it (and I do not currently have the time for it), but it is quite arguable that the "mind" is purely an explanatory fiction, that referring to it as "what the brain does" is a complete redefinition (and an inaccurate one at that) of what "mind" has historically meant. As we use "mind" in our common language, it is not seen as a process; defending it as one, rather than jettisoning the term and starting afresh with something that does not carry "mind"'s baggage, is more trouble than it need be.

I think I simply draw my line in a different place than you do. In both cases.

In my previous post, I was refering to the other thread about the emergence of mind.


In my questioning, I'm refering back to this post, Mercutio.

You say redefintions aren't worth while. So, when you discuss what I would call the mind, what do you call it?

 

[Mercutio]

In my previous post, I was refering to the other thread about the emergence of mind.


In my questioning, I'm refering back to this post, Mercutio.

You say redefintions aren't worth while. So, when you discuss what I would call the mind, what do you call it?

Depends on what it is that you are talking about. "What [you] would call the mind" is a huge chunk of property. Some of it would be termed "private behavior"; some of it "explanatory fictions" (to use two technical terms). "Mind" is a very fuzzy term; to discuss that collection of phenomena properly, we need to be more precise.

I don't mean to sound like I am evading; it is a bit like talking about food and cooking--if two people are talking about cooking, they may find themselves confused a bit until they realize one is talking about stir-frying and another is talking about roasting. Which aspects of "mind" do you mean?

 

[burnvictim77]

Which aspects of "mind" do you mean?

I think this illustrates what I'm getting at. You and I (as well as most others who would be having this discussion) both understand what components we would put into this term. It is not practical to abandon the term mind when it is so ingrained in usage. Rather, it is practical to attempt to describe the mind more accurately than the popular culture might use the term. Just like everything else we do in philosophy. Mind is perfectly useful term, and it does not carry any fixed definition, but can be explained by several distinct philosophies.

The debate should not be about whether or not the mind exists, but what the nature of this thing we all understand to be mind is.

 

[Mercutio]

There are many things we can talk about colloquially, but which are another matter entirely when we wish to investigate them scientifically. "Punishment", for instance, is a vastly different thing when defined by a politician and by a behaviorist. Only when we define things clearly can we begin to apply science, and put the power of systematic and controlled observation to work for us. As long as we are willing to accept that mind "does not carry any fixed definition, but can be explained by several distinct philosophies", we will continue to be puzzled by it, and to ask the wrong questions.

"Sunrise" is a perfectly good word, but when we wish to explain it in a useful manner, we abandon Helios and Phaeton and talk of the earth's rotation. As long as we are unwilling to speak of "mind" more specifically, we are left wondering how it is that the sun literally climbs in the sky. Sure, it's romantic and mysterious, but it's the wrong question.

You say that "[y]ou and I (as well as most others who would be having this discussion) both understand what components we would put into this term." Years of discussion on this board and in real life have convinced me that this is not the case. I often will have people demand that I explain the presence in the mind of things which are part of their definition, but things which are there only because their definition places them there. Rather than seeing a tree, they see the image of a tree, then ask me to explain how it is that this image is perceived. (Some who are reading this paragraph understand what I mean, and others think the demand quite a reasonable demand; our differing concepts of "mind" shape our thinking and determine which questions we find necessary.)

We should determine whether dragons exist before we start a taxonomy of them. Likewise the mind. How much of what we believe is there, is in fact there? We cannot expect to progress if we stick with this particular geocentrism.

 

[Humphreys]

Anyone who does not believe in Free Will must also accept that they had no choice but to not believe in it. Accepting that non-believers had no choice but to lack belief in Free Will, how can they logically lack belief with any confidence?

Beliefs are forces completely beyond your control. You don't believe in Free Will because the Universe, something completely out of your control, made that the case.

Fun, huh?

 

[chriswl]

Anyone who does not believe in Free Will must also accept that they had no choice but to not believe in it.

So what? If determinism is true then determinists have no choice but to believe in it and non-determinists have no choice but to not believe in it. But how does that observation help us decide whether determinism is, in fact, true?

 

[chriswl]

But that's just it -- many can imagine libertarian free will, literally as a form of magic. It works like magic. We have these magic little faeries in us that are "us" and provide our decision making ability. It isn't logically impossible. Faerie world ruled by magic. All is spirit and the rest of the real world is just illusion. We are faerie spirit too. Non-corporeal will.

You've not said anything I can imagine here. I can imagine Santa flying on his sleigh delivering presents on Christmas Eve, I can imagine a stagecoach tuning into a pumpkin but I don't know what you mean with your fairy analogy here.

LFW believers claim that there must be something going on that is incompatible with determinism. But they cannot describe what this thing is, nor can they explain what about our experiences is incompatible with determinism.

The logically impossible is impossible by definition -- no square circles, no married bachelors (except as an interesting literary device).

There is no definition for LFW, so its not even false. Isn't that good enough? Its utterly incoherent.

You see free will as impossible and incoherent because you accept determinism.

No. Sorry if that wasn't clear. I think it is quite possible that that some of our actions may be genuinely random in the QM sense. I'm perfectly OK with this logically. But that just means our thoughts are "determined" by random processes. For LFW believers this is not good enough. They think that the existence of any valid description of their actions at a lower level than the psychological is incompatible with their subjective experience of consciousness.

I mean I understand that they feel sleighted by being, in their eyes, reduced to a mere machine. But they they go beyond this emotional reaction and try to claim that the absolute independence of the mental from the physical is self-evident.

Libertarian free will could only make sense from the view of a idealist. But there, again, there can only be one will, which is the will of the ONE, which cannot be explained. The ONE is a mystery

This is silly. We experience our own will as distinct from that of other minds. But when people admit that their own arguments "cannot be explained" or are mysteries we know we can ignore them.

There is no framework, except magic, that can possibly explain libertarian free will for schlubs like us. But magic is not logically impossible.

I totally agree. Just describe what the magic looks like or feels like, what it appears to do.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

You've not said anything I can imagine here. I can imagine Santa flying on his sleigh delivering presents on Christmas Eve, I can imagine a stagecoach tuning into a pumpkin but I don't know what you mean with your fairy analogy here.

LFW believers claim that there must be something going on that is incompatible with determinism. But they cannot describe what this thing is, nor can they explain what about our experiences is incompatible with determinism.

What makes Santa's sleigh fly? You are asking for more explanation with the free will thing and not for Santa. I can imagine Santa flying too. I can't understand how that would work in a magical sense. What's the magical mechanism? In a way it doesn't even make sense to ask that question. That is part of the way that we use the word "magic" for these sorts of entities. Same thing with libertarian free will. Magic.

There is no definition for LFW, so its not even false. Isn't that good enough? Its utterly incoherent.

From a deterministic viewpoint, yes. But they do not argue from that viewpoint. They argue from a different set of assumptions. They believe in the magic of a young girls heart......

I mean I understand that they feel sleighted by being, in their eyes, reduced to a mere machine. But they they go beyond this emotional reaction and try to claim that the absolute independence of the mental from the physical is self-evident.

Hey, I never said they made any sense. I said that libertarian free will is not logically impossible. It is completely incompatible with and incoherent within a deterministic system and viewpoint. I think we can both agree that folks who make these kinds of arguments are very poor thinkers. We just cannot logically prove beyond any shadow of doubt that any sort of libertarian free will is impossible with different assumptions the way that we could if it violated logic directly. We don't have arguments about square circles because a square circle is a logical contradiction. Given the assumptions we make about the world and its function within a deterministic system, libertarian free will is silly. But we don't have a knock down argument against it, the way we do against married bachelors. We're stuck with our typical a posteriori forms of argument against it -- which are overwhelmingly compelling.

This is silly. We experience our own will as distinct from that of other minds. But when people admit that their own arguments "cannot be explained" or are mysteries we know we can ignore them.

Well, Hammy doesn't find it silly. I do. You do. But we are not dedicated idealists. As for the dualist libertarians, of course they are silly. I agree that we can ignore their arguments. I have not been arguing that libertarian free will makes any sense. I have been arguing that we have no knock-down argument against it. It is not logically impossible in the way that we use that term to refer to a priori impossibilities.

I totally agree. Just describe what the magic looks like or feels like, what it appears to do.

Well, from their perspective they would say -- look it causes free will. That's what it appears to do. But it is still magic. So we ignore it.

 

[burnvictim77]

There are many things we can talk about colloquially, but which are another matter entirely when we wish to investigate them scientifically. "Punishment", for instance, is a vastly different thing when defined by a politician and by a behaviorist. Only when we define things clearly can we begin to apply science, and put the power of systematic and controlled observation to work for us. As long as we are willing to accept that mind "does not carry any fixed definition, but can be explained by several distinct philosophies", we will continue to be puzzled by it, and to ask the wrong questions.

"Sunrise" is a perfectly good word, but when we wish to explain it in a useful manner, we abandon Helios and Phaeton and talk of the earth's rotation. As long as we are unwilling to speak of "mind" more specifically, we are left wondering how it is that the sun literally climbs in the sky. Sure, it's romantic and mysterious, but it's the wrong question.

You say that "[y]ou and I (as well as most others who would be having this discussion) both understand what components we would put into this term." Years of discussion on this board and in real life have convinced me that this is not the case. I often will have people demand that I explain the presence in the mind of things which are part of their definition, but things which are there only because their definition places them there. Rather than seeing a tree, they see the image of a tree, then ask me to explain how it is that this image is perceived. (Some who are reading this paragraph understand what I mean, and others think the demand quite a reasonable demand; our differing concepts of "mind" shape our thinking and determine which questions we find necessary.)

We should determine whether dragons exist before we start a taxonomy of them. Likewise the mind. How much of what we believe is there, is in fact there? We cannot expect to progress if we stick with this particular geocentrism.

However, even though the concept of the sun has changed, we still talk of the sun. Some people may still think of it in mythological terms, but this does not mean they cannot understand what it is in terms of science or philosophy. If you want to tell people the sun does not exist because it is not drawn by a chariot, or the sun does not exist because it does not orbit the earth, or there sunrise is no sunrise because the earth orbits the sun, I think you are creating a semantic nightmare.


And I still haven't seen you suggest a viable alternative for the labelling and discussion of the mind.

 

[Mercutio]

However, even though the concept of the sun has changed, we still talk of the sun. Some people may still think of it in mythological terms, but this does not mean they cannot understand what it is in terms of science or philosophy. If you want to tell people the sun does not exist because it is not drawn by a chariot, or the sun does not exist because it does not orbit the earth, or there sunrise is no sunrise because the earth orbits the sun, I think you are creating a semantic nightmare.

"Illusion" does not mean something is not there; it means that something is not what it appears. The sunrise is an illusion; that does not mean I deny what you perceive and label a sunrise.

And I still haven't seen you suggest a viable alternative for the labelling and discussion of the mind.

That is because you have failed to narrow down which aspects of "mind" you wish to discuss. As you can see in the thread I linked, yours is not a simple request. (And, to be fair, I did take the first steps in that direction a few posts ago.)

 

[burnvictim77]

"Illusion" does not mean something is not there; it means that something is not what it appears. The sunrise is an illusion; that does not mean I deny what you perceive and label a sunrise.
That is because you have failed to narrow down which aspects of "mind" you wish to discuss. As you can see in the thread I linked, yours is not a simple request. (And, to be fair, I did take the first steps in that direction a few posts ago.)

Correct me if I'm mistaken, but in the other thread you use the example of a university. Is the university an "illusion?"

 

[Humphreys]

So what? If determinism is true then determinists have no choice but to believe in it and non-determinists have no choice but to not believe in it. But how does that observation help us decide whether determinism is, in fact, true?

It doesn't, it just proves the whole argument is ridiculous. We can't know.

 

[Humphreys]

Let me expand on that.

If determinism is true, and there is no free will, your every thought, feeling, taste, smell, observation, reasoning process and belief is controlled by a force outside of your control. It couldn't have been otherwise, and you did not get the final say in any of it, cause and effect did.

This whole discussion is the equivalent to a play written by someone else, in which you're just an unknowing actor running through the script to its known conclusion.

How can that kind of scenario lead to a reasonable search for truth?

You could be completely and utterly, devastatingly wrong about everything ever yet believe you're right, because that's what the Universe is forcing you to believe.

It seems paradoxical to me, because the existence of free will is what makes rational reasoning so valid and useful, yet rational reasoning itself seems to suggest no such thing exists.