Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

[Henri McPhee]

[citation needed]

Further, Chamberlain couldn't possibly have been the least bit biased about that, could he?

I think that quote saying Chamberlain once said it would have been worse in 1938 came from the David Dutton biography of Chamberlain in 2001 which I once read from the public library. The quote does not seem to be on the internet. There is an intelligent forum on the internet about all this. This is one of the more amusing postings:

https://www.debatepolitics.com/hist...ent-politician-diplomat-history-10-print.html

Are you serious? You've done nothing but post unsubstantiated statements with little to no actual data backing them up, just random statistics and quotes that don't even fully embrace your argument.

You have failed repeatedly to justify your claim that the allies in 1938 could've taken Nazi Germany. The very same arguments you used to say the Czechs would've held their own are the same ones that could've been said for France in 1940.

Quote:

Relatively speaking they were in better shape than they were in 1939.

With the non-mechanized army, no RADAR system, only a handful of modern planes? Yeah, Britain was ready to kick ass in 1938. Give me a break.

 

[Dabop]

I think that quote saying Chamberlain once said it would have been worse in 1938 came from the David Dutton biography of Chamberlain in 2001 which I once read from the public library. The quote does not seem to be on the internet.

We have all seen how accurate your 'quotes' are, so excuse me if I believe it is as accurate as saying the sun rises in the west and sets in the north...
Basically- WE DON'T BELIEVE YOU...

 

[HansMustermann]

There's a reason it's never discussed.
Because it's bollocks.
The Germans had no plan to go beyond the Urals...there was nothing there they wanted.

That is an understatement. They really had no plan to go TO the Urals either. Halder's plan was to advance to a purely arbitrary straight line on the map, from Arkhangelsk to the NE "tip" of the Black Sea. The line wasn't defined by any rivers, mountains or really any geographic features, and wouldn't pin the Soviets against anything (like the encirclement of the allied forces in France was against the sea.) Exactly why he thought the Russians would capitulate if he advances to that line and takes Moskow is not very clear to any historians or generals, as far as I know.

Also, there was no way the German logistics could have allowed them to go all the way to the Urals, really.

Nor would have their fuel reserves. As told to Halder by Hitler himself, they had fuel for 4 months starting the instant they declare war and the USSR stops selling them fuel. Which was remarkably accurate, actually. If you count from mid June, you have July, August, September, October... and, uh, big surprise, they bog down in October.

Exactly on what fuel or transport capacity they'd keep going all the way to the Urals is never explained in such fantasy alt-history scenarios.

 

[HansMustermann]

Also -- much as I caught some flak myself for defending Chamberlain -- let me reiterate my previous point that in 1938 the German army was not yet the formidable army from 1940. Organisation and doctrine wise, a lot had changed in that time.

Because German doctrines and organization didn't START in their final form. Germany had learned the first lessons in Spain, and adapted its doctrines a lot there, but the final lessons came in Poland. After Poland, Germany did a lot of revision and restructuring. E.g., it turned out in Poland that they didn't have nearly enough infantry to support the tanks in a tank division, and the appropriate reorganization ensued at the end of '39.

Really, the big advantage it had over the French and British in '40 was that Germany had had these lessons and took them to heart, while the French and British had not personally had them and largely ignored them when they happened to someone else. Well, the French generals actually were the most inclined to study what happened elsewhere, but they were distrusted by their own politicians, so the impact was minimise. The British mostly went with "not invented here" until it bit them in the ass in Africa. I mean, not even the bite in the ass in France was enough.

But this isn't about the British, it's about the Germans. The biggest advantage Germany had was the reorganization and doctrine revision after Poland.

Start a war with France and the UK in 1938, BEFORE Poland, and that advantage on the German side disappears.

Basically it's not JUST about the number of divisions, or number of airplanes, etc. It's also how you use it. And in '38 Germany hadn't yet learned how to use them well.

 

[SpitfireIX]

I just think there is amazing complacency in thinking that Britain could not possibly have been invaded in 1938 . . .

Then explain, in detail, how Germany was going to invade Britain in the fall of 1938. Specifically:

What troops were going to be used? (Remember, the Wehrmacht also has to fight Czechoslovakia, and guard against any potential French incursions.)

Where was this force going to embark? (The nearest German port is Emden, which is about 220 nautical miles by water from Norfolk, the nearest part of England. But it's unlikely that more than one or two divisions could have embarked from there.)

What sort of transportation was going to be used? How long would it have taken to assemble? (See the Wikipedia article on Operation Sea Lion^WP for some ideas.)

How were the Germans going to stop the RN and the RAF from destroying the landing force en route?

How was the landing force going to be supplied? (See my previous comments about logistics.)

How were the Germans going to cope with the autumn weather in the North Sea?

. . . with no Spitfires . . .

Exactly what aircraft did the Luftwaffe have in service in 1938 that the Hurricane couldn't handle??

. . . and there is practically no discussion that Soviet Russia might have been defeated in a Nazi invasion.

First of all, as has been discussed, there was no chance that Germany could have conquered the Soviet Union. It was simply impossible for logistical, economic, and geographic reasons. The best the Nazis could have hoped for would have been to have conquered enough territory to convince Stalin to have concluded a peace treaty that let Hitler keep some of his ill-gotten gains, such as Ukraine.

Second, how would starting the war in 1938 have made things any harder for the Soviets?

It would have been a military disaster and not good news for the Jews. I remember overhearing some gossip in a shop by an old man once who was around at the time saying it was touch and go and I consider that to be the pure unadulterated historical truth.

Again, exactly how is this relevant to the discussion of appeasement? And as for the hilited, this is frankly a silly comment, and no one cares about your opinion anyway, for reasons that have been thoroughly discussed upthread.

 

[Garrison]

There is an intelligent forum on the internet about all this. This is one of the more amusing postings:

https://www.debatepolitics.com/hist...ent-politician-diplomat-history-10-print.html

You found someone else as clueless as about the reality of the balance of forces in 1938, congratulations. Now perhaps you could offer some evidence to support the claims you and your soulmate make?

 

[Klimax]

I think that quote saying Chamberlain once said it would have been worse in 1938 came from the David Dutton biography of Chamberlain in 2001 which I once read from the public library. The quote does not seem to be on the internet. There is an intelligent forum on the internet about all this. This is one of the more amusing postings:

https://www.debatepolitics.com/hist...ent-politician-diplomat-history-10-print.html

Why are you posting total idocies?

 

[jimbob]

Klimax, do you really need to ask that?

 

[Hans]

That is an understatement. They really had no plan to go TO the Urals either. Halder's plan was to advance to a purely arbitrary straight line on the map, from Arkhangelsk to the NE "tip" of the Black Sea. The line wasn't defined by any rivers, mountains or really any geographic features, and wouldn't pin the Soviets against anything (like the encirclement of the allied forces in France was against the sea.) Exactly why he thought the Russians would capitulate if he advances to that line and takes Moskow is not very clear to any historians or generals, as far as I know.

Also, there was no way the German logistics could have allowed them to go all the way to the Urals, really.

Nor would have their fuel reserves. As told to Halder by Hitler himself, they had fuel for 4 months starting the instant they declare war and the USSR stops selling them fuel. Which was remarkably accurate, actually. If you count from mid June, you have July, August, September, October... and, uh, big surprise, they bog down in October.

Exactly on what fuel or transport capacity they'd keep going all the way to the Urals is never explained in such fantasy alt-history scenarios.

Absolutely and they had made a deal with the Japanese to divide Asia:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Axis_powers_negotiations_on_the_division_of_Asia

 

[Hans]

Pretty much.
I think I've spotted a 10-14 day cycle.
Henri posts nonsense - a day or 2 of chatter - goes quiet - 10 days later Henri posts nonsense again - repeat ad infinitum.

I think you may be right and it also agrees with my theory that he would do this ad nauseam instead of admitting he's wrong.

 

[Hans]

Why are you posting total idocies?

Because he cannot admit when he is wrong - five years from now he'll be posting exactly the same material and saying exactly the same thing. His only plan is to exhaust everyone and finally win when everyone else dies or gives up.

 

[HansMustermann]

Second, how would starting the war in 1938 have made things any harder for the Soviets?

That one is actually somewhat supportable though. The Soviet army had been significantly reduced in the 20's due to economic difficulties, and only in the mid-30's it started growing rapidly again. In 1938, IIRC the USSR technically had 98 divisions, but almost all were the "cadre divisions" of 6950 men each.

So the TOTAL soviet army in 1938 was just a bit north of 600,000 soldiers. Total. Including most of them being dispersed along the border in other places than the western border.

Those divisions also lacked the amount of artillery they'd have by 1941, lacked motorization, lacked AA worth anything, etc. (Seriously. The 45mm AA gun they used at the time was manually loaded, one round at a time, so the rate of fire was glacial, and only had a contact fuse. It was literally just a tank gun on a mount that allowed it to be cranked to shoot upwards. The chance of it actually doing anything to any airplanes was insignificant.)

In 1938 it was then decided to basically double the number of divisions, increase the number of people in a division, dramatically increase the amount of artillery in a division (although actually reaching that quota took several years), etc.

So if you could declare war on the USSR in 1938... well... you'd very probably still get owned in the end, but at least then Halder's plan to take Moskow might have actually had a chance. I mean, not that it would have achieved anything, but he could probably actually make it to his arbitrary line on the map

 

[Craig B]

@ HansMustermann

The only was that Germany could have defeated the USSR would have been if Stalin's regime had collapsed when the blitzkrieg fell on it. It didn't collapse in 1941. Would it have collapsed in 1938 while Stalin's purge was still underway? Perhaps. But was Germany equipped to launch a blitzkrieg in 1938?

 

[Garrison]

Because he cannot admit when he is wrong - five years from now he'll be posting exactly the same material and saying exactly the same thing. His only plan is to exhaust everyone and finally win when everyone else dies or gives up.

See the Jeffrey McDonald thread for further proof of this.

 

[HansMustermann]

@ HansMustermann

The only was that Germany could have defeated the USSR would have been if Stalin's regime had collapsed when the blitzkrieg fell on it. It didn't collapse in 1941. Would it have collapsed in 1938 while Stalin's purge was still underway? Perhaps. But was Germany equipped to launch a blitzkrieg in 1938?

Well, if you've read my last paragraph, you'll know I'm not saying Germany could WIN. They might just get a little further on the map before getting its ass kicked sky high, is all I'm saying

 

[Henri McPhee]

Most people on the internet in discussing Stalin appeasement say that Hitler could not possibly have won in Russia, or gone beyond the Urals, because of a lot of blah-blah about fuel supplies and rail tracks and German casualties and so on. Personally I am not so sure. It was touch and go for a time. There are some interesting opinions about the matter on this website:

https://history.stackexchange.com/q...n-surprised-by-the-german-attack-in-june-1941

Stalin's purges had not only affected the armed forces, but also the intelligence services which were therefore institutionally less experienced and prepared. And their reports to Stalin had a tendency to be massaged to fit his preconceptions: evidence of German possible aggression were downplayed; examples of German forces showing restraint were emphasised. Telling Stalin things he didn't like wasn't a life-enhancing move, and that had the effect of distorting the intelligence to reinforce his hopes of no immediate attack.

 

[SpitfireIX]

Most people on the internet in discussing Stalin appeasement say that Hitler could not possibly have won in Russia, or gone beyond the Urals, because of a lot of blah-blah about fuel supplies and rail tracks and German casualties and so on. Personally I am not so sure.

Which shows that you aren't interested in facts, as if we needed any more evidence of that.

It was touch and go for a time.

Only in how far the Germans advanced, how much damage they did, and how difficult it was for the Soviets to eventually drive them back. Never in terms of the Soviet Union's actually being conquered.

There are some interesting opinions about the matter on this website:

https://history.stackexchange.com/q...n-surprised-by-the-german-attack-in-june-1941

This has nothing to do with how far the Germans could have advanced. Fail.

And when are you going to answer my questions about Sea Lion '38?

 

[jimbob]

Most people on the internet in discussing Stalin appeasement say that Hitler could not possibly have won in Russia, or gone beyond the Urals, because of a lot of blah-blah about fuel supplies and rail tracks and German casualties and so on. Personally I am not so sure. It was touch and go for a time. There are some interesting opinions about the matter on this website:

https://history.stackexchange.com/q...n-surprised-by-the-german-attack-in-june-1941

Why are you so blase about fuel? First you posit German aircraft flying to the UK when they didn't have the range, now you posit German tanks rolling across the steepes of Asia without any ammunition or fuel.

What's next? The Bismark helping a posited invasion of Britain before it was commissioned? Oh,

I agree that the senior officers in the German Navy were not as keen on an invasion of Britain as the German army and air force. I have never researched where the German battleship Bismarck was at the time, but it was a ship that was not to be underestimated. Also Admiral Canaris of the Abwehr it looks like now was one of ours, and he had the ear of Hitler at the time. It has also been said in the past that Corporal Hitler was more of an Army man than a Navy man.

All I know is that General Alan Brooke was expecting an invasion any time in September 1940, unlike many of the subsequent scholars writing about the matter in hindsight.

I agree with what this internet poster has said about the matter, even if he is not a scholar with modern data:

Until August 1940, the Bismark hadn't been launched. She wasn't ready for service until the end of the year.

my highlighting

I suppose a minor detail like a ship not being launched is a rather extreme version of logistics.

Henri - Logistics is important.

 

[Klimax]

Klimax, do you really need to ask that?

Just felt like asking it. Maybe I can get hilariously bad answer...

 

[HansMustermann]

Most people on the internet in discussing Stalin appeasement say that Hitler could not possibly have won in Russia, or gone beyond the Urals, because of a lot of blah-blah about fuel supplies and rail tracks and German casualties and so on.

Because, as the military dictum goes, amateurs talk about tactics, professionals talk about logistics. And in Germany's case, all logistics predictions proved to be spot on. Even their halting to wait for supplies happened remarkably close to where the chief of logistics predicted it would. As in, within kilometres of where Wagner said.

At any rate, that someone who doesn't understand logistics "is not so sure", doesn't change anything. Halder also was not so sure, but it turned out that the logistics officers were right

Edit: but Halder, I suppose, at least has the excuse of only being too stupid to trust his logistics officers' predictions about the future. In the case of internet alt-history dumbasses, we have the even more stupid case of "being not so sure" about WHAT HAS ALREADY HAPPENED. It's no longer just prediction, it's a verified prediction that has actually happened exactly as predicted.

Edit 2: just to make it clear, things going stop-and-go isn't what should give cause to doubt the logistics estimates. It's what happens when you near the end of your logistics leash. It's the symptom that yeah, you do have a logistics problem.