Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

[jimbob]

Don't be hasty Klimax - maybe some new information will come to light.

 

[Hans]

The verdict of history will be that Chamberlain was right.

There has already been a verdict of history: he was wrong.

 

[Hans]

Don't be hasty Klimax - maybe some new information will come to light.

Like what? Its been nearly eighty years what could possibly come to light now?

 

[Klimax]

Don't be hasty Klimax - maybe some new information will come to light.

I cannot even imagine what kind of complexly new information could completely rewrite verdict. Chamberlain was just critically incompetent shortsighted idiotic politician who by throwing my country to Hitler caused brutal war.

Chamberlain apologists had decades to find it, yet there is big bloody zero. Just idiotic nonsense…

 

[fagin]

Just be patient. Henri will never stop reading and posting random ****. One day he might get lucky.

 

[Garrison]

The verdict of history will be that Chamberlain was right.

Perhaps, but the Luftwaffe still couldn't bomb Britain into submission in a week in 1938 so you will always be wrong.

 

[Hans]

Perhaps, but the Luftwaffe still couldn't bomb Britain into submission in a week in 1938 so you will always be wrong.

UNLESS, a time traveling alien mercenary brings anti-matter bomb technology to the Third Reich in 1937. Hitler then sends a neutral freighter ship into the Thames loaded with the bomb (which weighs 50 tons) and set it off - destroying the planet and thereby proving Henri right.

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

My personal take was that the Versailles Treaty created its own problems. As I mentioned before, the popular sentiment was against another war, so basically you had to sell a good casus beli -- a good cause for war -- to the population if you wanted to have one. And just keeping Germany humiliated IMHO was a VERY hard sell as a cause for more loans to send more young men to die.

IMHO that's really what happened in '36 on the British and French side.

Remember that even in '39, hell even in '40 when Adolf actually attacked France, most French just weren't thrilled about it. "Why die for Danzig?" was a very popular anti-war slogan. And it wasn't the fascists that were chanting it, either. It was the left, and especially the communists. And generally a lot of French units faced massive morale problems, which really reduced their fighting effectiveness by a LOT.

But the proof of the pudding, or of my thesis that it was a political problem, is really how it went down in '39. France advanced a bit, met minimal resistance, and then promptly the politicians decided to order the army back behind the Maginot line. Because the popular reaction to France's declaring war was really that bad.

So basically if it was that hard to sell a war to the French in '39, after Hitler had annexed left and right and was the big scary bogeyman across the border, imagine selling it to the same people in '36 with no more justification than that it's to keep Germany humiliated. Yeah, that wouldn't have gone down well at all, _IMHO_.

Which brings us back to Chamberlain. Ok, maybe the Brits are a well 'ard bunch, and would have kept a stiff upper lip and done their duty even in '36. Maybe. We'll never know for sure, but I'll give them that for the purpose of this exercise. Well, they and what army? The British had a total army of just slightly over 200,000 at the time. Unless they could be certain that the French want to dive head first into it (which as we saw, they didn't), what do you do with an army of 200,000 to stop Germany?

Again, my concern isn't with whether Hitler could conquer or bomb England. He couldn't. That's not my concern. But if you declare war, you have to eventually end it, and preferably not with another screw-up like Versailles again. It's not enough that that Adolf bloke can't get his army to London. What's needed is to get your own asses to Berlin, if you want to actually end it.

Well, without any allies, that's gonna be a very long and costly war, is all I'm saying. Bit hard to sell it to the chaps at home if it's just to keep Germany pointlessly humiliated, is all I'm saying.

 

[Garrison]

But the proof of the pudding, or of my thesis that it was a political problem, is really how it went down in '39. France advanced a bit, met minimal resistance, and then promptly the politicians decided to order the army back behind the Maginot line. Because the popular reaction to France's declaring war was really that bad.

Or they concluded that having prepared for a defensive war it was better to dig in and fight a war of attrition with the expectation that the British Empire and the USA would provide an endless supply of resources while the German war machine that had been put under massive strain by even the Polish campaign exhausted itself trying a rerun of the Schlieffen Plan. If Hitler had gotten his way that is exactly what would have happened, he was determined to have an offensive against France in November 1939 and only bad weather and the pleading of the High Command changed his mind. Even as late as February 1940 Germany was still committed to this plan, in the end only the fact that details of the plan fell into French hands let to the adoption of the version we know as being successful.

If you look at the performance of French troops when they weren't being constantly outflanked (in the Dunkirk perimeter and the fighting after the evacuation) it was actually pretty respectable, there's every reason to suppose they would have been pretty effective if the German's had conformed to the original plan. In short much like 1917 French troops may have resisted going on the offensive but fought well on the defense, which was after all what they had been led to expect prior to WWII.

 

[Elagabalus]

Jaw Jaw is better than war war.

Certainly not to any of the "Star Wars" cognoscenti!!

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

Or they concluded that having prepared for a defensive war it was better to dig in and fight a war of attrition with the expectation that the British Empire and the USA would provide an endless supply of resources while the German war machine that had been put under massive strain by even the Polish campaign exhausted itself trying a rerun of the Schlieffen Plan. If Hitler had gotten his way that is exactly what would have happened, he was determined to have an offensive against France in November 1939 and only bad weather and the pleading of the High Command changed his mind. Even as late as February 1940 Germany was still committed to this plan, in the end only the fact that details of the plan fell into French hands let to the adoption of the version we know as being successful.

If you look at the performance of French troops when they weren't being constantly outflanked (in the Dunkirk perimeter and the fighting after the evacuation) it was actually pretty respectable, there's every reason to suppose they would have been pretty effective if the German's had conformed to the original plan. In short much like 1917 French troops may have resisted going on the offensive but fought well on the defense, which was after all what they had been led to expect prior to WWII.

Even granting that, it's not exactly the best ally to bet on if you want to take Berlin and finish the war early, if you wanted to start one in '36 or '38.

Mind you, I'm not picking on the French per se. The units that didn't have the massive morale issues, did fight well.

Well, in as much as can be expected with the '30s doctrines, anyway. The troops that eventually kicked Germany's ass would have a very different organization and doctrines. But that's kinda the nature of the beast when it comes to hindsight vs foresight, and the French did do their best on that aspect. (As I was saying, they studied for example the air aspect of the Spanish war more than anyone else.)

Just looking at the decisions in the '30s as what they IMHO really are: political decisions.

 

[Pacal]

My personal take was that the Versailles Treaty created its own problems. As I mentioned before, the popular sentiment was against another war, so basically you had to sell a good casus beli -- a good cause for war -- to the population if you wanted to have one. And just keeping Germany humiliated IMHO was a VERY hard sell as a cause for more loans to send more young men to die.

The keeping Germany humiliated nonsense was of course a familiar trope of Right Wing German Nationalists between the wars it was repeated at high decibel levels and was associated with hysteria and many, many lies about the Treaty of Versailles. And this nonsense was to a very large extent the shrieks of Right Wing Nationalists who had pushed for the truly savage treaties with Russia and Romania in early 1918. (The German government almost immediately broke the treaties and extorted even more from those two nations. This was of course known to the allies. It was the Right Wing Nationalists who even before the treaty was signed stated screaming about betrayal and the stab in the back myth. You see what bothered them was that peace was being imposed on them instead of Germany grinding its enemies into the dirt. Why? Well because it was just if Germany grinds its enemy into the dirt. Oh and the plans so many in Germany had for peace once they won indicate that yes they wanted to grind their enemies into the dirt.

And between the wars the German military, which even before the Nazis routinely violated the Treaty of Versailles, had drawn up plans for a fourth partition of Poland and vast Eastern conquests. You see to them Germany had been humiliated by not being able to grind its enemies into the dust.

And it was well known that the German governments even of the Weimer Republic refused to accept the boundaries with Poland, which of course made the allies exceptionally wary of allowing a buildup of German military might.

One of the historical myths of the twentieth century is the notion that Germany and the German people were angry and humiliated by the Treaty of Versailles. Actually the initial German reaction was a good deal less negative than in historical myth, and initially Germans were much more likely to blame the military and previous Imperial government for the treaty.

It took many, many years of patient propaganda by right wing nationalists to get the German people to accept the notion of a highly vindictive treaty that was supposedly the source of all Germanys problems. (Another myth propagated by the Nationalist Right wing.)

IMHO that's really what happened in '36 on the British and French side.

In 1936 when Hitler ordered troops into the Rhineland, these troops had instructions to march right back out if the French sent any divisions into the Rhineland in response. Germany was in absolutely no position whatsoever to wage war and Hitler knew and knew he was taking an enormous gamble, which he decided to take because of the feckless response of the British and French to Italy's invasion of Ethiopia made Hitler think they wouldn't do anything in response.

Remember that even in '39, hell even in '40 when Adolf actually attacked France, most French just weren't thrilled about it. "Why die for Danzig?" was a very popular anti-war slogan. And it wasn't the fascists that were chanting it, either. It was the left, and especially the communists. And generally a lot of French units faced massive morale problems, which really reduced their fighting effectiveness by a LOT.

During and after the war the French and others engaged in a lot, for the French self flagulation, about the defeat. This literature s vast and extensive and it appears greatly exaggerated. The book Strange Victory by Ernest R. May. All that stuff about poor morale etc., is bluntly overdone. In fact the evidence indicates that Germany's victory over France in 1940 and a good deal less likely than appeared at the time and almost certainly the original German plan would have failed.

The book The Wages of Destruction, by Adam Tooze makes it very clear that the position of Germany on the outbreak of war in 1939 was very precarious and if a stalemate, which was very likely, lasted for more than two years Germany's economy would be very bad shape and the war lost.

But the proof of the pudding, or of my thesis that it was a political problem, is really how it went down in '39. France advanced a bit, met minimal resistance, and then promptly the politicians decided to order the army back behind the Maginot line. Because the popular reaction to France's declaring war was really that bad.

Actually the feebleness of France militarily in 1939 had more to do with the hidebound conservatism of the French military than popular reaction. But then you have to a large extent repeated popular mythology that grew up after the French defeat in 1940.

So basically if it was that hard to sell a war to the French in '39, after Hitler had annexed left and right and was the big scary bogeyman across the border, imagine selling it to the same people in '36 with no more justification than that it's to keep Germany humiliated. Yeah, that wouldn't have gone down well at all, _IMHO_.

It wasn't that hard a sell. And has for 1936 has mentioned above a few French divisions sent in, German forces would have withdrawn, no war, no real crisis. Oh and has a possible bonus the Nazis regime might have lost so much face that it might have collapsed.

Which brings us back to Chamberlain. Ok, maybe the Brits are a well 'ard bunch, and would have kept a stiff upper lip and done their duty even in '36. Maybe. We'll never know for sure, but I'll give them that for the purpose of this exercise. Well, they and what army? The British had a total army of just slightly over 200,000 at the time. Unless they could be certain that the French want to dive head first into it (which as we saw, they didn't), what do you do with an army of 200,000 to stop Germany?

If the British had decided to act it is virtually certain the French would have supported them in 1936. Which we now know.

[/quote]Again, my concern isn't with whether Hitler could conquer or bomb England. He couldn't. That's not my concern. But if you declare war, you have to eventually end it, and preferably not with another screw-up like Versailles again. It's not enough that that Adolf bloke can't get his army to London. What's needed is to get your own asses to Berlin, if you want to actually end it.[/quote]

Nope. In 1936 and 1938, the Nazis regime was still fairly precarious, a coup was never out of the question during this time period. Faced with stalemate, cut off from vital resources, etc., (Just read Tooze), the Nazis regime would probably have come apart without a march to Berlin. May I point out that Germany in World War I didn't require a march on Berlin to be defeated.

Well, without any allies, that's gonna be a very long and costly war, is all I'm saying. Bit hard to sell it to the chaps at home if it's just to keep Germany pointlessly humiliated, is all I'm saying.

Again nope. The purpose was not to keep Germany "pointlessly humiliated", the point was to keep the Versailles settlement intact and prevent Germany from trying to undo the territorial settlement, especially the one with Poland. As mentioned before even under Weimer the German Generals were making plans to partition Poland, retake Alsace-Lorraine, vast Eastern Conquests. and guess what at least some of the allies knew of those plans. And under the Nazis, people could read Mein Kampf and find in it Hitler's plan for vast territorial conquests. In other words the purpose would not have been to keep Germany humiliated but to preserve the peace. And since Germany, even under Weimer, had made it clear it did not accept the territorial settlement giving in to Nazis crap was self defeating.

But then the German Right Wing Nationalists had done a very good job of selling the poor Germany bedtime story, not just to Germans, but to the allies and many of them bought this lie, much to their detriment. The fact that you seem to think that enforcing a settlement that left Germany the strongest economic power in Europe was "pointlessly humiliating" indicates that you have to some extent bought the poor Germany bedtime story. For a look about how Versailles was not the humiliating etc., treaty it often is cast has see Paris 1919, by Margaret Macmillan

 

[Garrison]

Also there was no need to sell anything in 1938, the British and French expected war to breakout, which is the main reason for the hysterical relief in the aftermath of the Munich Agreement. What prevented war was Hitler's decision to delay, not avoid, war, Chamberlain's willingness to sell out the Czech's simply eased the pain for Hitler and provided a pretext for giving into the reality of how unprepared Germany was. All the talk of 'selling' war does nothing to change the fact that postponing war until 1939 benefited Germany far more than it did Britain or France.

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

It was not supposed to change that fact. I'm just saying that politicians, surprise, occasionally do what's popular as opposed to what is good in the long term but unpopular right now.

 

[SpitfireIX]

The verdict of history will be that Chamberlain was right.

Just to add to what others have said, that's simply wishful thinking on your part. As we have thoroughly demonstrated, and you have completely ignored, neither the facts, nor the overwhelming majority of professional historians who have studied and written on the subject, support your contention. Fail.

ETA: Also, is there some significance to the fact that you decided to post this on the 79th anniversary of the outbreak of World War II?

 

[SpuriusMaximus]

Just to add a bit of data here: when talking about the decision of whether or not to start a war with Germany -- meaning, again, that you would need to actually get some boots to Berlin, not just be happy the bombers can't reach you -- looking at just the number of German soldiers is a bit misleading. Germany may have had about 800,000 or so Wehrmacht soldiers in '38, but it also had over TWO MILLION of the SA brown-shirt guys. And they had been built up as a "people's army" all along.

The SA didn't just disappear after the Night of The Long Knives. It just got downsized by about 40% and lost its political importance. But they were still there. They wouldn't start to be absorbed into the regular Wehrmacht until war broke out in '39, and Hitler decided that he doesn't need to pretend his army is small any more.

Between the SA and the Wehrmacht, I do believe that Germany had enough soldiers to more than match the French and British armies COMBINED at the time.

Mind you, Germany would still have eventually lost, but it wasn't as simple as just Chamberlain says "no", everyone rolls over Germany, and it's back home for tea and crumpets by Xmas. Add the gross overestimation of the Luftwaffe in the Christie report, and there was only one sane estimation of that prospect. The war WOULD be long and bloody -- as it eventually was -- and it's that prospect that made it a rather unpopular choice.

 

[Klimax]

Just to add a bit of data here: when talking about the decision of whether or not to start a war with Germany -- meaning, again, that you would need to actually get some boots to Berlin, not just be happy the bombers can't reach you -- looking at just the number of German soldiers is a bit misleading. Germany may have had about 800,000 or so Wehrmacht soldiers in '38, but it also had over TWO MILLION of the SA brown-shirt guys. And they had been built up as a "people's army" all along.

The SA didn't just disappear after the Night of The Long Knives. It just got downsized by about 40% and lost its political importance. But they were still there. They wouldn't start to be absorbed into the regular Wehrmacht until war broke out in '39, and Hitler decided that he doesn't need to pretend his army is small any more.

Between the SA and the Wehrmacht, I do believe that Germany had enough soldiers to more than match the French and British armies COMBINED at the time.

Mind you, Germany would still have eventually lost, but it wasn't as simple as just Chamberlain says "no", everyone rolls over Germany, and it's back home for tea and crumpets by Xmas. Add the gross overestimation of the Luftwaffe in the Christie report, and there was only one sane estimation of that prospect. The war WOULD be long and bloody -- as it eventually was -- and it's that prospect that made it a rather unpopular choice.

Part of SA would have to be sent against Czech and we were preparing our own home defense. Also of question is their training and competency...

 

[Tolls]

Part of SA would have to be sent against Czech and we were preparing our own home defense. Also of question is their training and competency...

...and available equipment.

 

[Border Reiver]

...and available equipment.

This. At the time of Munich, the Heer was in the process of building up - it did not have large stockpiles of kit to draw on - everything needed to turn the SA from a collection of brawling street thugs into an actual military was being taken by the Heer - trucks, radios, rifles, SMGs, HMGs, artillery, tanks, etc were simply not available. Maybe you could scrape together enough rifles to turn part of the SA into a civil defence force, but that wasn't likely, and it wouldn't be effective.

The training part would have been a huge factor. Lots of the SA in the 20s were veterans of WWI, come 1938 the combat veterans are now going to be in their late 30s and more likely in their early to mid forties - the military skills they learned under the Kaiser have now atrophied, replaced by either the street and tavern fighting skills needed prior to the thirties, or by the skills needed for their day jobs. The men in their early 20s are now in the Wehrmacht, and the fighting efficiency of their sections and platoons is not going to be helped by dropping their fathers into their units and hoping they still remembered everything they learned for Operation Michael....

By 1938, the SA was a the group you called on to look impressive - marching in a uniform, acting tough when you've got the backing of the state for your bullying, but they were not a "People's Army" by any stretch of the imagination.

 

[Garrison]

Just to add a bit of data here: when talking about the decision of whether or not to start a war with Germany -- meaning, again, that you would need to actually get some boots to Berlin, not just be happy the bombers can't reach you -- looking at just the number of German soldiers is a bit misleading. Germany may have had about 800,000 or so Wehrmacht soldiers in '38, but it also had over TWO MILLION of the SA brown-shirt guys. And they had been built up as a "people's army" all along.

They couldn't even equip the regular troops properly in 1938, let alone suddenly provide weapons and ammo for 2 million SA street thugs. It had in no way shape or form been built up as a 'people's army'. The Reich's military budget, already running at ruinous levels for the rest of the economy, was primarily going into preparing the Wehrmacht for offensive war. What resources were spent on defence was spent on the Westwall, which of course was a giant building site in 1938. By 1939 those defences were complete and the Heer, not the SA, had the means to man them.

If war comes in 1938 it's Germany that needs to go on the offensive not the British and French. The Nazi's are the ones who need a quick victory, especially as of course in 1938 they don't have the M-R Pact to help offset their chronic shortages of pretty much everything. the idea that the Allies have to storm Berlin to win is your arbitrary condition.

Also a lot of those 30-something SA men were actually holding down full time jobs in German industry and agriculture, removing them would have meant massive disruption, with no handy sources of slave labour to take their place.