Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

Yes the RN Blockade was attacked when the war started but it cut all German sea trade. Apart frkm a few sneaky merchant ships it held from the Baltic right down the French Coast to Biscay.
You underestimate the strength of the RN and overestimate German dive bombers and subs.

In fact it was RN subs that were one of the strongest parts of the blockade.
They decimated German coastal shipping and later in the war starved German and Italian forces in Africa, sweeping Axis supply shios from the Med.

I just think that's being a bit too gung ho about British naval blockades. Churchill was quoted once as saying the one thing he feared most were German U boats which sank a lot of British shipping until about May 1943.

The matter is discussed at this forum which might not be the historical truth, but which is interesting opinions:

https://ww2aircraft.net/forum/threads/the-british-naval-blockade-failed.32699/

Allied naval blockade in WW2 had only marginal . There were a number of changes compared to WW1.

Germans were prepared for a blockade, they had experience for it from WW1. Advancements in chemical industry allowed for independence from overseas imports of exotic/important raw materials like rubber or oil. Agriculture was prepared to make the country self sufficient before the war, and in addition plenty of supply could be obtained from occupied, agricultural rich countries (Poland, France).

Large investments were made into synthetic chemical products. This was a correct and conscious decision made before the war, even if it went against traditional economic considerations for maximum profit/complementing advantages in production.

Also, unlike WW1, for a large part of WW2 most of Europe was either friendly to Germany or neutral. Their own economic capacity was unhindered by own war effort needs, and the only real trade partner due to the Axis blockade of England was effectively Germany, which had the purchasing power. Rumanian oil, Turkish chromium, Hungarian bauxite and foodstuff, Finnish nickel, Swedish iron ore was available for the Germans regardless of maritime trade.

The USSR was a major supplier of strategic items, and after the conquest of much of the USSR its rich lands remained so regardless. Trading could be also pursued through neutral countries as proxies, like i.e. Spain, though this was limited during the war.

For the above reason, a naval blockade was doomed to fail - Germany was simply not isolated from the rest of the European economy as it was in WW1. Shortages in critical supplies were only felt after the Germans effectively lost the war on the battlefields in 1944, and it prompted Finland, Turkey, Rumania to cease supplies for one reason or another.
 
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The point is that's against all the principles of the concentration of force. That's like Eisenhower's broad front strategy, and his proposal for a cross channel operation in 1942. Just because it's honourable doesn't make it common sense, or the work of a strategic genius. It was the same in a way with Churchill's Gallipoli and Salonika strategy in the First World War, and the Dieppe raid, and even Greece and Crete, and even Norway. There was no real sense to it unless you intended to stay there.
Recognizing that such a discussion is likely pointless, I'll pop in a bit.

First, it's not "all the principles of the concentration of force." Concentration of Force is one principle and one principle only. (In the US, it's called mass, and the principles from country to country don't line up exactly).

Second, the appropriate one at which to look for this purpose would be "Economy of Force."

Third, you're using contemporary principles as opposed to the historical ones. For that time period, you would be better to use Fuller's list. From that you would go with Direction, Distribution, and Surprise (before you criticize my inclusion of that, I suggest reading about it, more than the Wiki entry).

Fourth, as has been pointed out, it was Marshall and not Eisenhower who wanted the cross channel invasion in 1942.

Fifth, the broad front strategy is not automatically a violation of any of these principles, and if you want a discussion on how it can be an excellent implementation, let me know.
 
I just think that's being a bit too gung ho about British naval blockades. Churchill was quoted once as saying the one thing he feared most were German U boats which sank a lot of British shipping until about May 1943.

The matter is discussed at this forum which might not be the historical truth, but which is interesting opinions:

https://ww2aircraft.net/forum/threads/the-british-naval-blockade-failed.32699/
Note the bit I highlighted. Posters here have offered historical truth over and over only for you to ignore it and accept unexpert and oft-refuted opinion in its stead.

I recommend you find the historical truth about comparative naval strengths -- including submarines -- in 1938.
 
Note the bit I highlighted. Posters here have offered historical truth over and over only for you to ignore it and accept unexpert and oft-refuted opinion in its stead.

I recommend you find the historical truth about comparative naval strengths -- including submarines -- in 1938.

Deja vu? Maybe, but I think I already did that up-thread for Henri. The U-boat force in 1938, even 1939 was tiny. Mainly Type II's, just a handful of early Type VII's. Secondly, without bases in France they were mainly limited to the N Sea. Or risk running the channel (extremely dangerous), or go north around Scotland, also pretty dangerous and limited their range.

Edit: what a nice guy I am, I counted. 10 Type VIIA's, and just one type VIIB were commissioned by Sept 1938. And I checked, a single Type IX, the U-37.
 
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The point is that's against all the principles of the concentration of force. That's like Eisenhower's broad front strategy, and his proposal for a cross channel operation in 1942. Just because it's honourable doesn't make it common sense, or the work of a strategic genius. It was the same in a way with Churchill's Gallipoli and Salonika strategy in the First World War, and the Dieppe raid, and even Greece and Crete, and even Norway. There was no real sense to it unless you intended to stay there.

First, deploying a contingent as a show of force/demonstration of intent is not against the principle of concentration of force.

Second, the Marshall's plan for '42 (this has already been mentioned).

Third, Eisenhower's broad front strategy worked. It worked because the Western Allies had a perponderance of men and materiel and were able to direct reserve forces to counter enemy actions, or to take advantage of weaknesses. It also reduced the chances that deeply penetrating forces would be cut off and destroyed.

Fourth, Gallipoli was an idea that had potential, but was very poorly executed at the operational level by commanders who could be generously described as lethargic.

Fifth, the Macedonian campaign was a sound strategic objective - relieve Serbia and threaten Constantinople and Sofia to divert Central Powers forces. The biggest challenge here was dealing with Greece - since her monarch was pro-Central Powers while the citizenry were favourable to the Entente.

Sixth, I've addressed the objectives of Dieppe. Just because you refuse to acknowledge them doesn't mean they are something else.

Seventh, Greece and Crete. Is it your considered opinion that the Axis nations should have allowed to occupy those territories without resistance? If so, why?

Eighth, Norway. This is what happens when one side of a war feels bound to honour other nations' declarations of neutrality and not deploy forward forces to assist in resisting attacks by another nation. Essentially, until the British were actually able to land troops (which was after the invasion) they were unable to intervene without violating either Norwegian or Danish neutrality and potentially driving them into the Axis.
 
Marshal, not Eisenhower.

Norway was botched. There was no way the RN should've allowed Germany to invade them. It wasn't Churchill's fault per se. There was too much vacillation beforhand by the cabinet. Gallipoli wasn't a bad idea, or maybe more accurately knocking out the Ottomans wasn't a bad idea. The blame lies mainly with Ian Hamilton IMO.

Hey it's progress, they were both US generals, and they both were alive at the time.

Little steps.
 
So Henri quotes this:
Large investments were made into synthetic chemical products. This was a correct and conscious decision made before the war, even if it went against traditional economic considerations for maximum profit/complementing advantages in production.

It is true, but utterly misleading as Henri would know if he read something like Tooze's 'Wages of Destruction' The synthetic oil plants in particular were money pits, sucking in huge resources to build them (not to mention slave labour) and their products were several times more expensive than imports would have been, contributing greatly to the implosion of sectors of the civilian economy such as housing and railways. Just to make matters worse at no point were these plants remotely capable of meeting German needs. The capper is of course that in terms of this thread they are irrelevant as all that investment didn't start producing any useful quantities of chemicals until the 1940's, hence a 1938 blockade would have been far more effective, especially if the USSR has declared war in support of the Czechs.
 
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I'm serving as an election worker today, and our polling place doesn't have WiFi, so I'm just posting briefly from my tablet. I'll have much more on his recent posts later in the week, but for now I'd just like to thank Henri for putting me on to yet another reason that appeasing Hitler in 1938 was a mistake: It gave him another year to build the West Wall.
 
I just think that's being a bit too gung ho about British naval blockades. Churchill was quoted once as saying the one thing he feared most were German U boats which sank a lot of British shipping until about May 1943.

The matter is discussed at this forum which might not be the historical truth, but which is interesting opinions:

https://ww2aircraft.net/forum/threads/the-british-naval-blockade-failed.32699/

But the blockade didn't fail. It was enforced. German shipping was destroyed and their sea trade stopped.
Obviously a naval blockade couldn't stop overland trade but that takes nithing away from the implementation.

Plus operating a sub and hunting for it in the confined waters around the North Sea or Baltic coast is different to operating in the vast and deep expanse of the Atlantic.

As for the Battle of the Atlantic. That is a subject for a different thread.
 
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Yes the RN Blockade was attacked when the war started but it cut all German sea trade. Apart frkm a few sneaky merchsnt ships it held from the Baltic right down the French Coast to Biscay.
You underestimate the strength of the RN and overestimate German dive bombers and subs.

In fact it was RN subs that were one of the strongest parts of the blockade.
They decimated German coastal shipping and later in the war starved German and Italian forces in Africa, sweeping Axis supply shios from the Med.

In the Med, that the Italian Navy proved to be pretty inept at Anti Submarine Warfare helped the RN Submarine force a lot.
 
Conditions for subs were difficult in the Med. A lot of it quite is clear and fairly shallow. Subs could be spotted by aircraft and have surface units directed on to them.
 
So Henri quotes this:


It is true, but utterly misleading as Henri would know if he read something like Tooze's 'Wages of Destruction' The synthetic oil plants in particular were money pits, sucking in huge resources to build them (not to mention slave labour) and their products were several times more expensive than imports would have been, contributing greatly to the implosion of sectors of the civilian economy such as housing and railways. Just to make matters worse at no point were these plants remotely capable of meeting German needs. The capper is of course that in terms of this thread they are irrelevant as all that investment didn't start producing any useful quantities of chemicals until the 1940's, hence a 1938 blockade would have been far more effective, especially if the USSR has declared war in support of the Czechs.

One thing the synthetic oil was good for was as a base for aviation fuel

Oil produced by Bergius coal hydrogenation process was rich in aromatic
hydrocarbons (benzene) which were needed for high grade aviation fuel

Allies were able to use high aromatic crudes (pre war from Borneo) and from
the Caribbean as their base for aviation fuel
 
escorted by Me 110 long range fighters.


Thanks for the update - looking at map think that the B variants could reach southern England from Northern Germany (Bremen/Oldenburg) Could be tight - listed range is
1069 miles, distance from Hamburg is 450 miles, less from Bremen or Oldenburg


I don't think that's accurate; that's more like the range for some of the later models. According to History of War, the Bf 110C, which entered service in 1939, had a range of 482 mi.

You can find all sorts of range statistics quoted, but the fact is the Bf 110B couldn't carry drop tanks, and didn't have a conformal fuel tank, so it undoubtedly couldn't reach England from Germany, even flying from Borkum (a small fighter base in the Frisian Islands, ICAO: EDRW), which is 315 miles from London City Airport (LCY); slightly farther if you want to avoid the Netherlands. (Note: I always use LCY because it's just east of the city center, but Heathrow (LHR), on the western outskirts, is probably more realistic as a notional bombing target.)

Further, although a bomber could theoretically perform its mission without ever exceeding cruise power after having climbed to altitude, that's not the case with a fighter. Fighters have to allow significant reserve fuel for combat, or else they're worse than useless. Which means their effective combat radii are even shorter.
 
One thing the synthetic oil was good for was as a base for aviation fuel

Oil produced by Bergius coal hydrogenation process was rich in aromatic
hydrocarbons (benzene) which were needed for high grade aviation fuel

Allies were able to use high aromatic crudes (pre war from Borneo) and from
the Caribbean as their base for aviation fuel

It did prove useful, especially after the USSR ceased being a source of oil, but it was expensive, limited and definitely not available in 1938.
 
Re: stuff from the USSR, and this might have come up earlier, but if Hitler kicks things off in 1938 and invades Czechoslovakia, even assuming the Soviets don't join in, considering their support for the Czechs, wouldn't it be reasonable to assume the USSR might simply embargo stuff to Germany?

And wouldn't that really scupper things?
 
Re: stuff from the USSR, and this might have come up earlier, but if Hitler kicks things off in 1938 and invades Czechoslovakia, even assuming the Soviets don't join in, considering their support for the Czechs, wouldn't it be reasonable to assume the USSR might simply embargo stuff to Germany?

And wouldn't that really scupper things?

They might. But, if Germany doesn't go to war with the Netherlands then they have all the oil they can buy right there.
 
Re: stuff from the USSR, and this might have come up earlier, but if Hitler kicks things off in 1938 and invades Czechoslovakia, even assuming the Soviets don't join in, considering their support for the Czechs, wouldn't it be reasonable to assume the USSR might simply embargo stuff to Germany?

And wouldn't that really scupper things?

The Germans out-tricked the Russians diplomatically. Stalin was only interested in his own territorial demands, and he simply didn't believe the British, or his own spies, that Hitler was determined to march on Moscow.
 
First, deploying a contingent as a show of force/demonstration of intent is not against the principle of concentration of force.

Second, the Marshall's plan for '42 (this has already been mentioned).

Third, Eisenhower's broad front strategy worked. It worked because the Western Allies had a perponderance of men and materiel and were able to direct reserve forces to counter enemy actions, or to take advantage of weaknesses. It also reduced the chances that deeply penetrating forces would be cut off and destroyed.

I flatly disagree. Eisenhower was left with a lack of strategic reserves with his broad front strategy, as was shown by the Battle of the Bulge which caught him with his pants down. Attacks were made along the front in France by the Americans but they came to nothing because of a lack of concentration of force.

Somebody has recently said on TV that Britain would have lost the war if Hitler had not marched on Moscow. That was something Chamberlain was fully aware about. Somebody has also said on TV that Trump is not Chamberlain, and he should be.

The controversy over the broad front strategy is still discussed now. I suppose General Alan Brooke and Montgomery were most severe in their criticism of Eisenhower, but so was the American General Patton. Eisenhower's grandson still defends him but I don't know what he really knows about it:

http://armchairgeneral.com/a-lingering-controversy-eisenhowers-broad-front-strategy.htm

Still, Eisenhower’s broad-front decision sent a discernible chill through Patton and his Third Army staff and seemed confirmation of his pro-British bias. Convinced the winning of the war was being squandered on the altar of Allied cooperation, Patton frequently lamented that they were fighting two enemies, the Germans and SHAEF, writing to his wife, Bea, “God deliver us from our friends. We can handle the enemy.”
 
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Random Henri opinion.....

Somebody has recently said on TV that Britain would have lost the war if Hitler had not marched on Moscow. That was something Chamberlain was fully aware about. Somebody has also said on TV that Trump is not Chamberlain, and he should be.

Some more random stuff....

Henri, random 'somebodies' somewhere on 'TV' are not sources worth quoting.

And whatever faults Chamberlain may have had pale into insignificance next to the heap of steaming poo that is Trump.
 
I flatly disagree. Eisenhower was left with a lack of strategic reserves with his broad front strategy, as was shown by the Battle of the Bulge which caught him with his pants down.

That's a blatant non sequitur, as well as being almost diametrically opposed to being right. The fact that the Ardennes counter-offensive achieved surprise had nothing to do with whether Eisenhower had sufficient strategic reserves to counter it; and, in fact, his very rapid deployment of the reserves he did have immediately to hand was instrumental in preventing it from being more than a brief local reversal of fortune for the Allies until he was able to deploy sufficient forces to stop it dead in its tracks. Overall the main effect of the Ardennes counter-offensive was to deplete the Wermacht of its final reserves in the West by forcing Eisenhower to engage some of his overwhelmingly greater reserves.

Dave
 

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