Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

[njslim]

escorted by Me 110 long range fighters.


Thanks for the update - looking at map think that the B variants could reach southern England from Northern Germany (Bremen/Oldenburg) Could be tight - listed range is
1069 miles, distance from Hamburg is 450 miles, less from Bremen or Oldenburg

C variant did not begin production until early 1939 when Daimler engines began to be available

Then again ME109 E had only enough fuel for 5 minutes to London, after taking off from Calais - closest point to England

 

[Garrison]

The title of this thread is WW11 and appeasement. What I posted about the Dieppe raid is completely relevant to this thread. It doesn't just include 1938.

The only possible link between Dieppe and Appeasement(as in the formal pre-war policy towards Germany) is that it was Appeasement that allowed Nazi Germany to become strong enough to conquer France and thus led to Dieppe, so I guess the blood of those Canadian soldiers is on Chamberlain's hands ultimately?

Personally, I think Churchill was another Master of Disaster, a bit like Mountbatten and Eden

Again what you think carries no weight here unless you are willing to back it up with facts.

but I suppose there is still disagreement among historians about all that.

You wouldn't need to suppose if you would extend your research beyond book reviews and op-ed pieces from journalists.

Churchill was good at talking a lot of hot air and empty waffle.

Finally a topic on which you actually have some expertise!

 

[Henri McPhee]

Unless you are trying to suggest that Britain should simply have thrown in the towel and recognized Hitler as master of Europe? Bit rough on the Jews amongst others, but you've made it clear how you feel about them...

That's a bit unfair. You need a bit of common sense about all this. I hardly know any Jews and a lot of Jews talk sense. I have said on this forum before that the Holocaust was appalling and that there is hard documentary evidence that it happened.

I remember the former Jewish terrorist and Israeli president, or prime minister Begin, saying like people on this forum that the Czechs and Chamberlain should have gone to war in 1938. He struck me as another Master of Disaster. That's ill thought out.

Not all Jews think like that. This is a differing Israeli opinion about appeasement:

https://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/In-praise-of-appeasement-332994

Only a measure of appeasement will give Iran a way out – and the world at large the prospects of a diplomatic triumph. Branding the deal as appeasement, therefore, is not only to fail to condemn it, but it is to hail it for the bold pragmatism that is necessary for diplomacy to win the day.

 

[Border Reiver]

The title of this thread is WW11 and appeasement. What I posted about the Dieppe raid is completely relevant to this thread. It doesn't just include 1938.

Personally, I think Churchill was another Master of Disaster, a bit like Mountbatten and Eden but I suppose there is still disagreement among historians about all that. Churchill was good at talking a lot of hot air and empty waffle.

Speaking of hot air and waffle, your opinion that the Dieppe Raid has anything to do with appeasement.

Appeasement, as understood by people with a sophisticated understanding of geo-politics equivalent to a 10 year old, is a policy by which a nation or group of nations gives concessions of a territorial, economic or political nature to an aggressor nation in order to avoid war.

The purposes of the Dieppe Raid were to:

a. Obtain intelligence on the state of German coastal defences;
b. Obtain intelligence on a new German coastal radar;
c. Give some units of the Canadian Army combat experience;
d. Allow Canada to feel that they were making a contribution to the prosecution of the war beyond training in England; and
e. Demonstrate to the Soviets that the Western Allies were prepared to engage the Germans in ground combat in the European theatre.

Now, I would posit that at no time was there a danger of either Canada or the Soviet Union withdrawing from the war, or of suddenly switching sides.

How in the name of all that is frakking holy is the Dieppe Raid (carried out after Chamberlain was dead) part of the Chamberlain government's policy of appeasement?

 

[Garrison]

That's a bit unfair. You need a bit of common sense about all this.

No Henri you need to stop posting drivel on this thread and start doing the research needed to support you claims and answer the many questions that have been asked of you. Bringing up Dieppe was yet another irrelevant sidetrack on your part. Please address your outstanding claims about bombing Britain in 1938 and that Chamberlain knew Hitler would break the Munich agreement.

 

[Garrison]

So leaving aside Henri's latest diversion a question that's been bugging me, and I really don't have any decent source on is this; were all these pessimistic reports that heavily overestimated German strength being deliberately slanted to make things look worse than they actually were? Were the intelligence assessments perhaps massaged to support the policy of appeasement because that was what the politicians in charge wanted? Or did the military have an incentive to overstate things in the hopes of encouraging rearmament, never anticipating something like the Munich agreement? or maybe a little of both?

Again not aware of any source that would confirm or deny the above so I freely admit it's speculation on my part.

 

[Henri McPhee]

I can understand the arguments for declaring war in 1938 and that weak little Germany might have had a hard time defending itself then. The problem is you need to have a wide and practical experience about all this, and that includes the state of the economy and public opinion and even if the military felt they were capable of going to war in 1938. To my mind being at war then would have involved attacking Germany, and neither the Czechs or French or British were in any military state to attack Germany then. Soviet Russia didn't want to. Chamberlain, or Churchill, would also have been blamed now for starting the war.

There is a bit about Churchill's strategic genius and political genius at this website:

https://www.quora.com/Was-Winston-Churchill-considered-a-good-military-strategist

The raid on Dieppe, pushed for and approved by Churchill, involved a preposterous plan. Insufficient air support, inadequate naval artillery support, one division slated to defeat one dug in regiment in a urban port, and poor tank support resulted in minimal German casualties and the near destruction of the Allied (mostly Canadian) landing force. Someone had clearly learned absolutely nothing from Gallipoli.

 

[Garrison]

I can understand the arguments for declaring war in 1938

Except that you clearly don't otherwise you wouldn't post nonsense about Britain being defeated in a week

and that weak little Germany might have had a hard time defending itself then.

And this fatuous remark proves you really don't understand the arguments.

The problem is you need to have a wide and practical experience about all this, and that includes the state of the economy

Which you have repeatedly demonstrated you do not have. Try reading 'Wages of Destruction' about the German economy during the period of appeasement as a starter and maybe you might actually understand some of the arguments being made here.

To my mind being at war then would have involved attacking Germany, and neither the Czechs or French or British were in any military state to attack Germany then.

The Czechs don't need to attack anyone and the French army was more than adequate to deal with the German army, whether it had the leadership to do so is another matter.

Soviet Russia didn't want to.

But they were tied by treaty to the Czechs and would likely have declared war. They certainly wouldn't have signed a treaty giving Germany huge quantities of desperately need food, oil and raw materials.

Oh and your linked article is yet another op-ed piece that once again attempts to rehabilitate 'appeasement' to support a current day political stance, so utterly useless to this discussion.

The fundamental point you keep ignoring Henri is however poorly prepared Britain, France, et al were in 1938 Germany was in a far worse state. Given what happened to the Czechs, French and Soviets in the actual WWII how exactly do you imagine a war in 1938 against a far weaker Germany could possibly be worse?

 

[Border Reiver]

I can understand the arguments for declaring war in 1938 and that weak little Germany might have had a hard time defending itself then. The problem is you need to have a wide and practical experience about all this, and that includes the state of the economy and public opinion and even if the military felt they were capable of going to war in 1938. To my mind being at war then would have involved attacking Germany, and neither the Czechs or French or British were in any military state to attack Germany then. Soviet Russia didn't want to. Chamberlain, or Churchill, would also have been blamed now for starting the war.

Henri, does it hurt when the strawmen you are fighting hit back?

First, no one has called Nazi Germany "weak". What we have said is that Nazi Germany was much weaker in March 1938 than it was in September 1939, particularly after it absorbed the Czech equipment and production facilities.

Second, it would not have been necessary for Czechoslovakia, France and the United Kingdom to attack Germany for a policy of non-appeasement to have worked. Essentially, war could have been avoided if Hitler and/or the High command believed that:

a. Czechoslovakia would resist any attempt to alter the border by Germany with military force;
b. That France and Great Britain would support Czechoslovakia with military action against Germany.

b. might have been accomplished by little more than announcing that a naval blockade would be imposed in the event of war, and a limited mobilization of French forces, with the deployment of a single unit of British soldiers to the French/German border to demonstrate resolve.

 

[Hans]

...... weak little Germany might have had a hard time defending itself then......

Tsk tsk Henri

 

[Henri McPhee]

b. might have been accomplished by little more than announcing that a naval blockade would be imposed in the event of war, and a limited mobilization of French forces, with the deployment of a single unit of British soldiers to the French/German border to demonstrate resolve.

That's a load of bollocks and you know it. A single unit of British soldiers to the French/German border would have all been taken prisoner. A British naval blockade would have been attacked by German dive bombers and submarines. There were deficiencies in the French forces:

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_...e_czechoslovakia_to_adolf_hitler_seventy.html

First, a look at the military situation. Most historians agree that the British army was not ready for war with Germany in September 1938. If war had broken out over the Czechoslovak crisis, Britain would only have been able to send two divisions to the continent—and ill-equipped divisions, at that. Between 1919 and March 1932, Britain had based its military planning on a “10-year rule,” which assumed Britain would face no major war in the next decade. Rearmament only began in 1934—and only on a limited basis.

The British army, as it existed in September 1938, was simply not intended for continental warfare. Nor was the rearmament of the Navy or the Royal Air Force complete. British naval rearmament had recommenced in 1936 as part of a five-year program. And although Hitler’s Luftwaffe had repeatedly doubled in size in the late 1930s, it wasn't until April 1938 that the British government decided that its air force could purchase as many aircraft as could be produced.

 

[Rincewind]

Henri,

You claimed that Germany would beat Britain "in a week".

Please supply the details...

You've been asked this many times by a number of posters..

Thank you.

 

[Andy_Ross]

That's a load of bollocks and you know it. A single unit of British soldiers to the French/German border would have all been taken prisoner. A British naval blockade would have been attacked by German dive bombers and submarines. There were deficiencies in the French forces:

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_...e_czechoslovakia_to_adolf_hitler_seventy.html

Yes the RN Blockade was attacked when the war started but it cut all German sea trade. Apart frkm a few sneaky merchsnt ships it held from the Baltic right down the French Coast to Biscay.
You underestimate the strength of the RN and overestimate German dive bombers and subs.

In fact it was RN subs that were one of the strongest parts of the blockade.
They decimated German coastal shipping and later in the war starved German and Italian forces in Africa, sweeping Axis supply shios from the Med.

 

[Border Reiver]

That's a load of bollocks and you know it. A single unit of British soldiers to the French/German border would have all been taken prisoner.

If they operated on their own, without support from the French yes a single British unit, say a small corps of 2 divisions, might be taken prisoner. Somehow I think that there might be just a touch more "working with your allies" thing happening and that while if engaged in combat operations there would certainly be casualties, it would not likely result in the capture of the entire force - given that the much stronger German forces were unable to do so 18 months later.

A British naval blockade would have been attacked by German dive bombers and submarines.

Oddly enough, most people in uniform expect that when you are at war that you will be attacked. It's kind of a thing we do.

Given the less ready state of the Kriegsmarine in 1938 and the far less efficient attack aircraft available to the Luftwaffe (and the less than stellar anti-shipping results the Germans achieved with better aircraft), I like the RN's chances.

There were deficiencies in the French forces:

http://www.slate.com/articles/news_...e_czechoslovakia_to_adolf_hitler_seventy.html

Having served for 32 years and studied history for a similar period, I can tell you that no army is every truly "ready" for war. You go with what you have, when you have to go.

The other part that you conveniently ignored yet again is the part where the opinion piece writer you link to stated that Britain's assessments were based on an over-estimation of the German military position prior to Munich and an under-estimation of their own.

Look, we get it. You like Chamberlain. Maybe it's the social policies, maybe it's the way he deferred to dictators, maybe it's the mustache, only you can say for sure. What we can see from an objective analysis of the facts on the ground is that Chamberlain's policy of appeasement benefited Nazi Germany more than it did the United Kingdom and France. And that made WWII longer and bloodier than it might have been had they not decided to believe the Bohemian Corporal's statements about territorial demands...

 

[Major Major]

In fact the British government had intelligence, from a high-ranking official in the financial management of the Reich, of how bad off their finances were:

The "X" Documents by Carl Friedrich Goerdeler, transcribed by A. P. Young.

https://books.google.com/books/about/The_X_documents.html?id=cRJoAAAAMAAJ

 

[Hans]

That's a load of bollocks and you know it.

Is it? You mean facts mean nothing to you Henri? Is it all about what you can make up and worst yet what you believed based on your self-admitted limited knowledge of the subject?

I would recommend that you look behind yourslef and view that cart of opinion you keep wheeling out. Its full of......

 

[Henri McPhee]

If they operated on their own, without support from the French yes a single British unit, say a small corps of 2 divisions, might be taken prisoner. Somehow I think that there might be just a touch more "working with your allies" thing happening and that while if engaged in combat operations there would certainly be casualties, it would not likely result in the capture of the entire force - given that the much stronger German forces were unable to do so 18 months later.


Oddly enough, most people in uniform expect that when you are at war that you will be attacked. It's kind of a thing we do.

The point is that's against all the principles of the concentration of force. That's like Eisenhower's broad front strategy, and his proposal for a cross channel operation in 1942. Just because it's honourable doesn't make it common sense, or the work of a strategic genius. It was the same in a way with Churchill's Gallipoli and Salonika strategy in the First World War, and the Dieppe raid, and even Greece and Crete, and even Norway. There was no real sense to it unless you intended to stay there.

 

[Tolls]

You do realise that Border Reiver is talking about a quick deployment as a show of focre and willing? The whole point is to get something to the French border to show the Germans we mean business and will fully mobilise should things get out of hand.

 

[Dave Rogers]

You do realise that Border Reiver is talking about a quick deployment as a show of focre and willing?

I don't think he realises what anyone in the thread is talking about.

Dave

 

[lobosrul5]

The point is that's against all the principles of the concentration of force. That's like Eisenhower's broad front strategy, and his proposal for a cross channel operation in 1942. Just because it's honourable doesn't make it common sense, or the work of a strategic genius. It was the same in a way with Churchill's Gallipoli and Salonika strategy in the First World War, and the Dieppe raid, and even Greece and Crete, and even Norway. There was no real sense to it unless you intended to stay there.

Marshal, not Eisenhower.

Norway was botched. There was no way the RN should've allowed Germany to invade them. It wasn't Churchill's fault per se. There was too much vacillation beforhand by the cabinet. Gallipoli wasn't a bad idea, or maybe more accurately knocking out the Ottomans wasn't a bad idea. The blame lies mainly with Ian Hamilton IMO.