There is a sensible website about that Munich business . . .
Ah, this is obviously some strange usage of the word "sensible" that I wasn't previously aware of.

And just to add to what
fagin wrote, Harris is not a historian.
Perhaps one of the most surprising aspects of Harris’ presentation is his portrayal of Chamberlain’s raison in dealing with Hitler. He does not see Chamberlain as an appeaser but a skillful negotiator who stalls for time as he gets Hitler to agree to a settlement with the Czechs over the Sudetenland, and also accepts the concept of a stronger Anglo-German approach to peace.
Henri, please explain what measures Chamberlain took to strengthen the Army, the Royal Navy (especially regarding anti-submarine warfare), and any part of the RAF other than Fighter Command, during the year between September 1938 and September 1939. And while we're on the subject, I renew my question, which you've repeatedly ignored: Why did Chamberlain cede the Treaty Ports back to Ireland in 1938 if he knew that war with Germany was inevitable?
In fact in a recent interview (January 19, 2018) on NPR’s “Morning Edition” Harris argued that Chamberlain was the victor at Munich because the war was postponed for a year allowing the English to gain the support of the Dominions and the Empire as a whole . . .
As we've shown, and you've ignored, the idea that the Dominions and the Empire wouldn't have supported Britain in 1938 is specious.
. . . and provided time for the British military production to begin to catch up with Germany.
Aside from the fact that it neglects the issue of French, Czech, and possibly Soviet military production, this statement implies, quite correctly, that German military production was far ahead of British military production in 1938, and was still significantly ahead in 1939. Therefore, Germany produced much more during the extra year than Britain did, in addition to the huge amount of war materiel and industrial capacity gained by looting Czechoslovakia. So kindly explain exactly what Britain and France gained by this delay, compared with what Germany gained.
Further he argues Hitler never wanted to go to Munich, but once Mussolini introduced a conference to settle differences, the Fuhrer had no choice but to attend and forgo Operation Green, the seizure of the Sudetenland and Czechoslovakia as a whole.
Irrelevant to the issue of whether appeasement was a good idea.
Harris’ discussion raises the arguments of British historian A.J.P. Taylor whose 1961 book THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR was greeted with disdain at the time of its publication.
Taylor was a crank (at least with respect to World War II) whose views are rejected by the overwhelming majority of serious historians. Further, he claimed that Hitler never wanted war, which contradicts your assertion that Chamberlain knew Hitler was hell-bent on war.