Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

[Henri McPhee]

at an army would emerge from the Ardennes wasn't considered seriously as it was well understood that a horse drawn army with it's artillery train couldn't get through the narrow roads, forests and hills.
When the Germans attacked through the Netherlands and Belgium as expected the Allies moved north as planned to meet them.
We know the rest

There is a bit about this in the Winterbotham The Ultra Secret book 1974:

Eventually it was one of our Spitfire spy planes flying over the French sector which saw the vast armada of German tanks assembling in the Ardennes on May the eighth. Barratt told me that he had suggested a bombing operation from Britain on the massed armour. It never came off for various reasons, one of which was the lack of bombs large enough to do any real damage.

 

[Hubert Cumberdale]

The key numbers there are the output of Hurricanes and Spits.
In September 1938 there were a handful of squadrons with any Hurricanes, and the first Spitfire only arrived at a squadron in August. A year later there were over 500 Hurricanes in service, and some 300 Spitfires.

That's a marked difference.

So what? The Germans had precisely zero chance of staging a successful invasion of the British mainland at any point since the creation of Germany as a state.

 

[Hubert Cumberdale]

The British Navy were in danger of being sitting ducks in 1938. It was not the same as in the First World War. Air power was now involved. From that The Ultra Secret book:



Britain would have lasted a week in 1938, and Churchill would have fled to America, even if the Czechs lasted for three months.

lolno

 

[ddt]

You need a bit of wisdom and judgment and common sense about this Nazi
General's revolt in 1938. I can't now remember the full details but our secret service had some bad experiences when a couple of our spies were captured by the Gestapo on the Dutch border and sent to concentration camps who were supposedly getting information from revolting German generals. I'm not sure this website is historically accurate, but most of it makes sense to me:

https://www.shmoop.com/rise-and-fall-of-the-third-reich/chapter-12-summary.html

The Venlo Incident was 9 November 1939. I don't know how that would influence British decision making around Munich, unless you again invoke time travel.

 

[Tolls]

So what? The Germans had precisely zero chance of staging a successful invasion of the British mainland at any point since the creation of Germany as a state.

I'm not disputing that.

But from the standpoint of British Generals at the War Office the idea was not to be fighting off an invasion of Britain, but to be fighting in France and the Low Countries. So for that (and any bombing raids they felt the Germans might try) they needed decent fighters, which were few and far between in '38 when compared to the Luftwaffe.

 

[Andy_Ross]

Not only the aircraft. Just as important was the Radar network and command and control infrastructure.
That was as much a part of the Battle of Britain as the aircraft.
It wasn't up and running in any effective way in 38.

 

[Garrison]

Not only the aircraft. Just as important was the Radar network and command and control infrastructure.
That was as much a part of the Battle of Britain as the aircraft.
It wasn't up and running in any effective way in 38.

True but against that with a war in 38 what are the chances the Luftwaffe could mount any sort of air campaign against Britain. The Bf109 was an excellent fighter but lacking range, the Bf-110 was only available in its early less capable variants and the Ju-88 hadn't entered service yet. Add to that a war on two fronts and the lack of bases in Northern France and it's not the threat it would turn into by 1940. And that doesn't allow for the potential issue of fuel with no oil supplies from Russia or Romania.

And on another front neither Bismarck nor Tirpitz are commissioned until 1939 so that's two problems the RN doesn't have to worry about.

Other potential issues for Germany are that they're unlike to get any helpful diversion of British resources as Italy is not formally allied with them at this time and unless the much weaker German forces can repeat their success of 1940 Mussolini is unlikely to pick a fight with the British and French. If he is that stupid there's unlikely to be an Afrikacorps to save him from disaster and no Greek campaign to distract the British.

The Japanese are nowhere near ready for war in 1938, and there's no oil embargo to drive them to desperate action and no reason to impose one as again they aren't a Nazi ally yet.

As costly and difficult as a war in 1938 might have been it would quite likely have been far less so for Britain and France than the historic events.

 

[Henri McPhee]

As costly and difficult as a war in 1938 might have been it would quite likely have been far less so for Britain and France than the historic events.

That's absolute nonsense. Britain would have lost the war in a week with the state of armaments and the RAF in 1938. This is a sensible website about the matter which takes into consideration public opinion about the matter at the time, and the state of British and French military capability. It's no good keep using this weak little Germany argument. Churchill has been described as a blowhard in the past:

http://www.johndclare.net/EII6.htm

Finally, at Munich, Britain had not been strong enough to go to war – it is arguable that Chamberlain was just buying time for Britain to rearm. In January 1939, the navy had been strengthened and production of planes had been increased; in February, defence spending was increased to £580 million and free air-raid shelters were given to ¼ million Londoners. Chamberlain was able to change his policy in March 1939 because Britain had the military capacity to go to war.

 

[Tolls]

True but against that with a war in 38 what are the chances the Luftwaffe could mount any sort of air campaign against Britain. The Bf109 was an excellent fighter but lacking range, the Bf-110 was only available in its early less capable variants and the Ju-88 hadn't entered service yet. Add to that a war on two fronts and the lack of bases in Northern France and it's not the threat it would turn into by 1940. And that doesn't allow for the potential issue of fuel with no oil supplies from Russia or Romania.

Not so sure about France's ability to stand in '39 (say) compared to '40. The leadership was always the problem, and that was the same.

But I do agree that the German ability to push against Britain would be curtailed by events elsewhere.

I do think the people driving strategy in the UK were mostly focused on the ability of Britain and France holding off against Germany, though, which led them to overlook other (possible) advantages. Then again, that's what the politicians should have been doing, and they do seem to have been wary of allying with the Soviets.

 

[Hubert Cumberdale]

That's absolute nonsense. Britain would have lost the war in a week with the state of armaments and the RAF in 1938. This is a sensible website about the matter which takes into consideration public opinion about the matter at the time, and the state of British and French military capability. It's no good keep using this weak little Germany argument. Churchill has been described as a blowhard in the past:

http://www.johndclare.net/EII6.htm

How exactly is Britain going to lose the war in a week?

Come one - explain how that one pans out.

 

[Hubert Cumberdale]

And on another front neither Bismarck nor Tirpitz are commissioned until 1939 so that's two problems the RN doesn't have to worry about.

The German surface fleet was absolutely horribad.

Their destroyers were so top heavy they had to have their fuel tanks filled with concrete.

Scharnhorst and Gneisenau couldn't fire their main batteries in autumn 1939 and it took a near complete re-design of their fire control computers and the removal of twenty kilometers of unnecessary wiring to fix the problem.

In Norway, Scharnhorst and Gneisenau failed to even seriously damage a WWI vintage British battlecruiser.

Graff Spee got itself rekt by a couple of RN cruisers.

The only major success was Bismark (which itself was basically an updated SMS Bayern) landing a lucky hit on another WWI vintage RN battlecruiser, after which the RN turned it into a viking funeral pyre.

Not exactly an illustrious record.

 

[Andy_Ross]

More importantly, how many U-Boats were available in 1938?

 

[Major Major]

More importantly, how many U-Boats were available in 1938?

I have a listing called The Naval Balance 1940. It lists 55 U-Boats on January 1, 1940. But it gives the launch dates, so by 1938 we can see that there were:

Two Type IA
Six Type IIA
Sixteen Type IIB
Two Type IIC
Seven Type VIIA
Two Type VIIB
Two Type IXA

So, only thirteen ocean-going submarines. Now someone who was an avid reader of A. Conan Doyle's Danger! might think that an adequate force, but taking into account logistics. transit time, logistics, refitting and maintenance, and logistics just might say otherwise.

 

[erwinl]

More importantly, how many U-Boats were available in 1938?

I think they had 36 in total. With U-37 being comissioned by august 1938, so probably not deployable yet.

U-1 - U-6 were training boats, so don't count in the total.

Only U-27 - U-36 were of the type VII class u-boats (and U-37 of course), the rest were the smaller type II classes.

With an average of 33% deployable (which is what the Germans used for their planning, and who am I to disagree with them?), 10 u-boats of which 3 were modern.
Maybe a bit more in a surge.

 

[Hubert Cumberdale]

On the other hand by 1940 the RN had around 60 Submarines and the French around 80.

What's more the Germans had no direct access to the Atlantic or the Mediterranean Sea.....

 

[Craig B]

That's absolute nonsense. Britain would have lost the war in a week with the state of armaments and the RAF in 1938. This is a sensible website about the matter which takes into consideration public opinion about the matter at the time, and the state of British and French military capability. It's no good keep using this weak little Germany argument. Churchill has been described as a blowhard in the past:

http://www.johndclare.net/EII6.htm

John D Clare read Modern History at Oxford University, graduating in 1974. He has a Post-graduate Certificate in Specific Learning Difficulties .... He is the author of your linked source

He is the author of some 100 history textbooks, learning packs and children's history books, which have been published in 19 countries and 17 different languages. He has also co-authored a children's bible.
John D Clare retired from Greenfield in 2010, but continues to maintain his website. He is an elected Councillor for both Durham County Council and Great Aycliffe Town Council. He is married, with three grown up children and nine grandchildren.​

 

[Henri McPhee]

How exactly is Britain going to lose the war in a week?

Come on - explain how that one pans out.

That's what Chamberlain thought and believed in 1938, and to my mind with good reason. War could have broken out in 1938. The verdict of history is that Britain was not ready for an aggressive war by Germany in 1938. Chamberlain gave a guarantee to Poland in 1939 which meant war, however weak Germany was at the time. That's not appeasement.

There is some background to this at this website, which I admit may not be the pure unadulterated historical truth, but which does not defy logic or common sense:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/higher/history/roadwar/appease/revision/2/

Military weaknesses

The Government was concerned with the weakness of its armed forces, notably the lack of home defences, especially against the bomber. There had been widespread disarmament in the 1920s; there were no troops immediately available to mount a challenge.

The heads of Britain's armed forces - Chiefs of Staff - consistently warned Chamberlain that Britain was too weak to fight. Alongside this Nazi propaganda encouraged Britain and France to believe that Germany’s forces were a lot stronger than they really were.

 

[Garrison]

That's what Chamberlain thought and believed in 1938, and to my mind with good reason.

Well forgive me for placing very little value on your opinion when your choice of supporting evidence is:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/bitesize/higher/history/roadwar/appease/revision/2/

A site intended for 12-16 year olds cramming for history exams. Not only that but you choose to ignore the part that mentions:

Alongside this Nazi propaganda encouraged Britain and France to believe that Germany’s forces were a lot stronger than they really were.

So no, Britain would not have been defeated in a week.

 

[Garrison]

Not so sure about France's ability to stand in '39 (say) compared to '40. The leadership was always the problem, and that was the same.

But I do agree that the German ability to push against Britain would be curtailed by events elsewhere.

I do think the people driving strategy in the UK were mostly focused on the ability of Britain and France holding off against Germany, though, which led them to overlook other (possible) advantages. Then again, that's what the politicians should have been doing, and they do seem to have been wary of allying with the Soviets.

My reason for thinking France doing better really rests on two things. Firstly that the USSR enters the war and this prevents them concentrating their full weight in the west. Secondly that courtesy of Czech campaign the German armoured spearhead would be far weaker and the historical version of Case Yellow would either not happen (the Ardennes stroke only got adopted in February 1940, it faced a lot of resistance) or would have a much higher chance of failure.

Nothing's guaranteed of course but I think the French chances would have been better in a 'Munich War' than what happened historically.

The German surface fleet was absolutely horribad.

All true, but as with so many other things the British grossly overestimated the capability of the German surface ships, ships still under construction could be largely ignored.

 

[jimbob]

My reason for thinking France doing better really rests on two things. Firstly that the USSR enters the war and this prevents them concentrating their full weight in the west. Secondly that courtesy of Czech campaign the German armoured spearhead would be far weaker and the historical version of Case Yellow would either not happen (the Ardennes stroke only got adopted in February 1940, it faced a lot of resistance) or would have a much higher chance of failure.

Nothing's guaranteed of course but I think the French chances would have been better in a 'Munich War' than what happened historically.


All true, but as with so many other things the British grossly overestimated the capability of the German surface ships, ships still under construction could be largely ignored.

Indeed, the Germans would have started the war on two fronts, and without the Axis alliance