Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

[Craig B]

Just a side point. Stalin had intervened in the Spanish civil war therefore demonstrating a desire/ability to intervene outside of his own country and having no concerns about taking casualties.



A couple of hundred Soviets died in that war.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreign_involvement_in_the_Spanish_Civil_War#Soviet_Union

Was that a premeditated act of Soviet expansionism? Or was it an example of response to a fascist putsch, handled with his usual opportunism by Stalin? It illustrates something else: that in 1938 Nazi and Soviet military personnel were on opposite sides in a war. Soviet planes were engaging German ones. (ETA see Spanish_Republican_Air_Force^WP/ETA). Are we to believe that this war would be happening in Western Europe while the USSR collaborated with Germany in Central Europe, against one of he USSR's most valued allies?

 

[Henri McPhee]

There may have been no guarantee Stalin would have joined the war in 1938, but the chances were far higher than a year later when he was an ally of Hitler and supplying Germany with much needed war materials. All of this after Hitler had acquired valuable equipment and industrial capacity after taking over a prostrate Czechoslovakia.

If you would like to make a case that the delay of 18 months before war broke out was more valuable to the UK than Nazi Germany, feel free. Up to this point all you've posted is irrelevant or just plain inaccurate information from second rate websites.

The geopolitical situation was more complex for Chamberlain than that. That's like saying Chamberlain should have gone to war in 1938 with what? Because he chose dishonour instead?:

http://markcallagher.com/history/ww...n-Aggression Pact with questions - Gelber.pdf

....... French* conducted* their* Moscow* negotiations* without*enthusiasm.*They*sent*comparatively*junior* officials*and*refused*to*engage*in*the*military*talks* which* the* Russians* thought* should* be* the* precondition,*not*the*consequence,*of*the*political* discussions.* These* discussions* finally* came* to* nothing.* The* major* reasons,* according* to* the* British*negotiator,*Mr.*William*(later*Lord)*Strang,* were*twofold:* '……were*the*Western*Powers*to*be*trusted?*Would* they*not,*having*got*the*Soviet*Union*into*war,*leave* her*to*bear*the*German*onslaught*alone?* 'The* British* Government* could* not* in* honour* disregard* Polish* (and* Rumanian)* susceptibilities.

* They*had*tried*to*find*a*way*to*bring*the*Soviet* Union* in* without* doing* violence* to* Poland's* interests.*The*question*was:*if*Soviet*troops*entered* Poland,*even*in*Poland's*defence,*would*they*ever* quit?*This*was*a*question*which*was*never*satis** factorily*answered;*and*upon*it*the*whole*operation* ultimately*broke*down.'*

 

[Henri McPhee]

I'm sorry about those stars which popped up in my previous post.

I remember years ago reading a book from the public library by a senior Czech military intelligence officer at the time of the Munich agreement. The trouble is I have now clean forgotten what he wrote, except for something saying that military intelligence is what is on the other side of the hill, and that he somehow managed to come to Britain during the war.

 

[jimbob]

I'm sorry about those stars which popped up in my previous post.

I remember years ago reading a book from the public library by a senior Czech military intelligence officer at the time of the Munich agreement. The trouble is I have now clean forgotten what he wrote, except for something saying that military intelligence is what is on the other side of the hill, and that he somehow managed to come to Britain during the war.

That isn't the most enlightening post on this subject.

To paraphrase,

I read a Czech officer's autobiography but can't remember anything except for one very obvious thing that he said and the fact that he ended up in Britain, but I can't remember the details... and nothing I remember has anything to do with appeasement

 

[Garrison]

The geopolitical situation was more complex for Chamberlain than that.

What do you base that claim on? you've offered nothing by the way of evidence to support, or established that your opinion should carry any weight, quite the opposite in fact.

Did Chamberlain see Munich as buying time, or did he genuinely think he had obtained 'peace in our time'?

Who benefited more from the Munich Agreement? Britain or Germany?

These are relevant questions in assessing Chamberlain and Munich and so far you've utterly failed to address either of them.

 

[Henri McPhee]

What do you base that claim on? you've offered nothing by the way of evidence to support, or established that your opinion should carry any weight, quite the opposite in fact.

Did Chamberlain see Munich as buying time, or did he genuinely think he had obtained 'peace in our time'?

Who benefited more from the Munich Agreement? Britain or Germany?

These are relevant questions in assessing Chamberlain and Munich and so far you've utterly failed to address either of them.

Chamberlain didn't genuinely believe in "peace in our time" any more than Farage and Boris Johnson believed in an extra £350 million for the NHS after Brexit. Our Secret Service knew from 1934 that Hitler intended to attack Russia, even if Stalin didn't believe it in 1939. Munich did buy time and allowed British armed forces and the RAF to become organised. There is a quote somewhere, which I now can't find, that Hitler blamed his loss of the war on Chamberlain. The matter is mentioned at this website, with which I agree:

http://archbishop-cranmer.blogspot.co.uk/2009/09/neville-chamberlain-ensured-britains_03.html

Top secret intelligence decoding information was available to the British from 1940 onwards, even if it was in its infancy. As F.W Winterbotham wrote in that The Ultra Secret book 1974:

While Britain waited, we in Intelligence believed that the German High Command wouldn't attempt the sea crossing so long as the Royal Air Force was still operational.

The RAF would not have been operational in 1938.

 

[Andy_Ross]

But the Navy would have been there and in 1938 the Germans would have had even less naval assets than they had in 1940.

 

[Henri McPhee]

But the Navy would have been there and in 1938 the Germans would have had even less naval assets than they had in 1940.

The British Navy were in danger of being sitting ducks in 1938. It was not the same as in the First World War. Air power was now involved. From that The Ultra Secret book:

The Germans needed total control of the air, not only for their massive air-lift operations and the defence of their seaborne armada, but also to ensure that no British ships could operate in the English Channel.

Britain would have lasted a week in 1938, and Churchill would have fled to America, even if the Czechs lasted for three months.

 

[Andy_Ross]

How were the RN any more 'sitting ducks' in 1938 than they were in 1940?

Look att he attacks on shipping after Dunkirk and before the 'Blitz' proper. The Luftwaffe had a miserable score against ships in the Channel and North Sea.

How would the Germans have defended their strings of towed barges any more effectively in 1938 than they were expected to do in 1940?

All it needed was for a couple of Destroyer flotillas and a few Cruisers in among them and it would have been a massacre then just as it would have been later.

 

[Craig B]

The British Navy were in danger of being sitting ducks in 1938. It was not the same as in the First World War. Air power was now involved. From that The Ultra Secret book:



Britain would have lasted a week in 1938, and Churchill would have fled to America, even if the Czechs lasted for three months.

Utter nonsense, but gives you a pretext to include a completely unevidenced unprovable slander on Churchill. Maybe Chamberlain would not have fled, but would have personally surrendered to Hitler, and accepted appointment as Gauleiter, for all I know.

 

[Henri McPhee]

I agree with what Chamberlain said about the matter:

http://archbishop-cranmer.blogspot.co.uk/2009/09/neville-chamberlain-ensured-britains_03.html

On the outbreak of war, Chamberlain said: “My long struggle for peace has failed.” Though he was convinced (and it may be true) that by delaying the start of what became known as World War II through the Munich settlement, he significantly increased Britain’s chances of victory. As he told the National Union in 1940:

“After the Munich agreement, the Labour Party were relieved that we had escaped the war. Now they want to know why we did not call Hitler’s bluff. If we get through this war successfully, then it will be to Munich that we shall owe it. In the condition our armaments were in at that time, if we had called Hitler’s bluff and he had called ours, I do not think we could have survived a week.”

‘Peace in our time’ provided valuable breathing space, for the Battle of Britain of 1940 was won only by a whisker, and would almost certainly have been lost had it taken place in 1938.

For this, we must thank Neville Chamberlain.

 

[Hans]

The RAF would not have been operational in 1938.

What are you talking about Henri? lol

1 Jan 1939- At the turn of the year, RAF strength stood at 135 squadrons (74 Bomber, 27 Fighter, 12 Army co-operation, 17 Reconnaissance, 4 Torpedo-bomber and 1 Communications). In addition to this, the Auxiliary Air Force comprised 19 squadrons (3 Bomber, 11 Fighter, 2 Army co-operation and 3 Reconnaissance).

On the whole, it appears very probable that in September 1939 the Luftwaffe was not as superior in the air as it had been a year earlier. Its first-line strength had grown from 2,847 in August 1938 to 3,609 in September 1939 whereas the British first-line metropolitan strength in mobilisable squadrons was 1,854 in September 1938 and 1,978 in September 1939.

http://spitfiresite.com/2010/04/fro...r-force-rearmament-programme-1934-1940.html/8

 

[jimbob]

How were the RN any more 'sitting ducks' in 1938 than they were in 1940?

Look att he attacks on shipping after Dunkirk and before the 'Blitz' proper. The Luftwaffe had a miserable score against ships in the Channel and North Sea.

How would the Germans have defended their strings of towed barges any more effectively in 1938 than they were expected to do in 1940?

All it needed was for a couple of Destroyer flotillas and a few Cruisers in among them and it would have been a massacre then just as it would have been later.

Yes but I seem to recall some bloke in the pub saying something about German engineering being really good.

 

[Degeneve]

Chamberlain didn't genuinely believe in "peace in our time" any more than Farage and Boris Johnson believed in an extra £350 million for the NHS after Brexit. Our Secret Service knew from 1934 that Hitler intended to attack Russia, even if Stalin didn't believe it in 1939. Munich did buy time and allowed British armed forces and the RAF to become organised. There is a quote somewhere, which I now can't find, that Hitler blamed his loss of the war on Chamberlain. The matter is mentioned at this website, with which I agree:

http://archbishop-cranmer.blogspot.co.uk/2009/09/neville-chamberlain-ensured-britains_03.html

Top secret intelligence decoding information was available to the British from 1940 onwards, even if it was in its infancy. As F.W Winterbotham wrote in that The Ultra Secret book 1974:



The RAF would not have been operational in 1938.

Not to forget that the people who where the most disappointed by Chamberlain and Daladier capitulation were some high rank Wehrmacht officer who were hoping on a strong reaction of the British and French governments (including a declaration of war) in order seize this opportunity to force Hitler to resign from his functions and get rid of the nazi party.

Once Hitler could get want he wanted without having to go to war this opportunity was gone and Hitler's popularity at the highest. This made any possibility to set up a coup almost unthinkable.

 

[Pacal]

I agree with what Chamberlain said about the matter:

http://archbishop-cranmer.blogspot.co.uk/2009/09/neville-chamberlain-ensured-britains_03.html

On the outbreak of war, Chamberlain said: “My long struggle for peace has failed.” Though he was convinced (and it may be true) that by delaying the start of what became known as World War II through the Munich settlement, he significantly increased Britain’s chances of victory. As he told the National Union in 1940:

“After the Munich agreement, the Labour Party were relieved that we had escaped the war. Now they want to know why we did not call Hitler’s bluff. If we get through this war successfully, then it will be to Munich that we shall owe it. In the condition our armaments were in at that time, if we had called Hitler’s bluff and he had called ours, I do not think we could have survived a week.”

‘Peace in our time’ provided valuable breathing space, for the Battle of Britain of 1940 was won only by a whisker, and would almost certainly have been lost had it taken place in 1938.

For this, we must thank Neville Chamberlain.

Chamberlain's post hoc rationalizations are just that post hoc. The British rearmament effort had been put in place before Chamberlain became Prime Minister and we now know that Chamberlain didn't like it but was forced to accept it. Chamberlain genuinely wanted peace and felt that he had indeed achieved "Peace in our time". Chamberlain didn't want war with Germany and strove right to the end to avert it. It is known that even after Hitler invaded Poland Chamberlain sought to avoid war, trying to use petty and technical excuses to avoid it. His Cabinet revolted and forced him to send the ultimatum to Germany and then when Germany rejected the ultimatum declare war.

Chamberlain showed his commitment to preparing Britain for war by ending the agreement with the Republic of Ireland that allowed Britain to use Irish ports in the republic in the event of war. This would cause never ending headaches for Britain in the Second World War. Further even after Hitler broke the Munich agreements by seizing Prague and turning Slovakia into a protectorate Chamberlain allowed the Czechoslovakian gold reserves held by the Bank of England to be sent to Germany. Thus strengthening Germany. Right to the end Chamberlain pursued appeasement.

Further Hitler's Germany gained through Munich the considerable military material of the Czech state along with Czech industry and a considerable armaments industry and financial resources. And of course Germany had c. 1 more year to re-arm. And of course the British-French alliance system in Eastern Europe was largely destroyed by Munich giving the area to German diplomatic and economic penetration.

I could mention that yes Hitler desperately wanted war in 1938 but was forced by his Generals to back down because they felt that Germany was not ready for war at that time. In effect the Germans while they dealt with Czechoslovakia would have had to leave skeleton forces in the west facing France. In fact some German generals felt so strongly about this they plotted a coup against Hitler and tried to gain contact with France and Britain. They were rebuffed. Bluntly the German Generals overall felt Germany was not ready for war in the fall of 1938, hence they basically forced Hitler to accept Chamberlain's mediation instead of the war Hitler wanted with Czechoslovakia.

If France and Britain gained by a c. one year delay; Hitler's Germany gained more. Hitler later in the war complained that he would have been better off if he had started the war in 1938. The likelihood is that here has in so many military matters Hitler was wrong.

 

[Henri McPhee]

You need a bit of wisdom and judgment and common sense about this Nazi
General's revolt in 1938. I can't now remember the full details but our secret service had some bad experiences when a couple of our spies were captured by the Gestapo on the Dutch border and sent to concentration camps who were supposedly getting information from revolting German generals. I'm not sure this website is historically accurate, but most of it makes sense to me:

https://www.shmoop.com/rise-and-fall-of-the-third-reich/chapter-12-summary.html

 

[Henri McPhee]

There is an interesting opinion about all this so-called appeasement on the internet which makes sense to me:

Interesting post. But I am not sold on it yet. The French Army, alone, was indeed bigger than the German Army in 1938, but France was just finishing the building of the Maginot Line and its military mindset was wholly defensive. France sat through the Phoney War until it was attacked in 1940; I contend that it would have been even more inclined to sit out a Phoney War in 1938, especially as the concrete on its spectacularly passive barrier to the German threat was still drying. I cannot see the circumstances under which the USSR would have attacked Germany in 1938; they seem to have a much more step by step game plan... Finland, Baltic States, Poland. The British were ready for nothing in 1938 and needed until 1940 to be able to cobble together even the flimsy British Expeditionary Force which was quickly overrun, even on the defence-favouring semi-urban and bocage terrain of Belgium and north France. If you're looking to France and Britain to nip German ambitions in the bud in 1938, I just can't see it. I see the Allied brass breathing a sigh of relief when they saw Neville Chamberlain waving his piece of paper.

Of course the German generals didn't want to go to war as soon as 1938 but it does not mean that they would have lost it. I reckon that we can see from Allied actions and decisions in 1940 that they would have been beaten in a similar way in 1938, regardless of the fretting of some of Germany's generals. More pertinent perhaps is whether French generals thought they could beat Germany in 1938, 1939 or 1940.

Your point about the Czechoslovakian army and its fortified positions is very interesting but are we assuming that the hypothetical war that replaces the actual war that "Neville Chamberlain could have avoided" would have had the same sequence of conquests?

 

[Henri McPhee]

Chamberlain showed his commitment to preparing Britain for war by ending the agreement with the Republic of Ireland that allowed Britain to use Irish ports in the republic in the event of war. This would cause never ending headaches for Britain in the Second World War.

This was a matter of difficult Anglo-Irish relations which continue to this day. There is a bit of waffle and background to this matter at this website:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty_Ports_(Ireland)

With the outbreak of the Second World War in September 1939, Churchill's concerns appeared justified. The escort Groups refuelling facilities at Berehaven and Queenstown were 200 miles (320 km) further west than the nearest ones in Northern Ireland and Great Britain. To compensate for the distance, allied convoys from North America were routed via Iceland to the ports in Northern Ireland in the early months of the Battle of the Atlantic.

However, this decision eventually proved more practical because the shorter sea lanes around Ireland's southern coast soon became vulnerable to German anti-shipping air attacks following the fall of France in June 1940. The Iceland route also provided better air cover and escort refuelling for allied convoys. Nevertheless, many in the Royal Navy felt resentment towards the handover of the Irish Treaty Ports because they would have provided some cover to convoys heading south to Gibraltar and North Africa.

 

[Andy_Ross]

France mobilised as soon as war was declared but, as it had a mostly reservist army it took a long time.
Then they sat doing nothing and some units were demobilised as they were needed to go back to work.
Because of that when the Germans finally attacked the French were caught in a semi mobilised state.
The plan wasn't entirely defensive.
History taught that the Germans came in through Belgium, it was open flat country ideal for an advancing army.
When an attack came the Anglo French forces were to push forwards in to Belgium and using the western end of the Maginot line as a pivot swing north and to the east like a door turning on it's hinges.
Essentially the Maginot line wasn't going to be a shell that the French hid behind, it was intended as a funnel to push the Germans in to the chosen battle ground.
This would ensure any fighting was in Belgium and not France.
That an army would emerge from the Ardennes wasn't considered seriously as it was well understood that a horse drawn army with it's artillery train couldn't get through the narrow roads, forests and hills.
When the Germans attacked through the Netherlands and Belgium as expected the Allies moved north as planned to meet them.
We know the rest

 

[Tolls]

What are you talking about Henri? lol

http://spitfiresite.com/2010/04/fro...r-force-rearmament-programme-1934-1940.html/8

The key numbers there are the output of Hurricanes and Spits.
In September 1938 there were a handful of squadrons with any Hurricanes, and the first Spitfire only arrived at a squadron in August. A year later there were over 500 Hurricanes in service, and some 300 Spitfires.

That's a marked difference.