Split Thread WWII & Appeasement

[theprestige]

Fascism was no more opposed than communism. What was opposed was continued Nazi aggression in Europe.

This signature is intended to irradiate people.

 

[Craig B]

Fascism was no more opposed than communism. What was opposed was continued Nazi aggression in Europe.

This signature is intended to irradiate people.

That has to be true. Fascism flourished in Portugal and Italy, then in Spain, but these countries at first abstained from aggression in Europe (although they perpetrated it in Africa); and consequently remained unmolested by the Entente powers, or other European democracies.

 

[Henri McPhee]

I didn't know until recently that there was a Spanish division on the Russian Front. I don't think that is given much publicity nowadays. That was in addition to the Italian and Rumanian and Croatian and Waffen SS troops from Belgium and Holland and, I think Norwegian troops, and of course Finland troops, which I did know about.

 

[Tolls]

The division included Portuguese as well.

And then there were the SS volunteer units, which came from all over the place.

 

[Craig B]

I didn't know until recently that there was a Spanish division on the Russian Front. I don't think that is given much publicity nowadays. That was in addition to the Italian and Rumanian and Croatian and Waffen SS troops from Belgium and Holland and, I think Norwegian troops, and of course Finland troops, which I did know about.

Prior to these fascists' participation in the Nazi invasion, none of their countries had been at war with the USSR, except Finland which had been the victim, not the perpetrator, of aggression in that earlier conflict. These anti-Soviet interventions were done by puppet governments, responding to German pressure, or by individuals who were particularly attracted by Nazi aggression and triumphalism.

 

[Border Reiver]

I didn't know until recently that there was a Spanish division on the Russian Front. I don't think that is given much publicity nowadays. That was in addition to the Italian and Rumanian and Croatian and Waffen SS troops from Belgium and Holland and, I think Norwegian troops, and of course Finland troops, which I did know about.

The Spanish or Blue Division was a German Army division manned by Spanish volunteers and to which the Portugese Legion was later attached.

The Norwegian unit was a unit of Norwegian, Danish and Swedish volunteers with the German SS. It was not a part of the Kingdom of Norway's military.

These units can be looked at in a similar way as the French Foreign Legion.

The Romanian, Italian, Croatian and Finnish units were part of those country's actual armies serving as allied forces with Nazi Germany.

 

[Tolls]

The Norwegian unit was a unit of Norwegian, Danish and Swedish volunteers with the German SS. It was not a part of the Kingdom of Norway's military.

The imaginatively named SS Viking division.
It included a couple of other countries volunteers as well.

 

[Henri McPhee]

Hungarian forces were also involved in the invasion of Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union in 1941.

There was a John Amery, who was the son of the politician Leo Amery, who made a speech in the Norway debate in 1940 in the House of Commons telling Chamberlain "You have sat too long here for any good you have been doing, depart I say and let us have done with you. In the name of God go." This despite the fact that Norway was Churchill's responsibility.

John Amery went to Germany in 1942 to recruit British and Commonwealth prisoners of war to join the Nazi army. He was an appeaser and he was hanged after the war.

There were about 8000 Ukrainian migrants to Britain after the war, who lived in places like Wimbledon, and who all categorically denied they were fleeing war criminals. I don't think that matter was ever properly or thoroughly investigated. I'm beginning to think Churchill and Eden were Big Soft Things.

 

[Henri McPhee]

I can't quite see how you can say there was appeasement when Chamberlain was involved in rearmament at the time.

 

[Border Reiver]

I can't quite see how you can say there was appeasement when Chamberlain was involved in rearmament at the time.

Who are you talking to, or to what statement are you responding?

 

[Craig B]

John Amery went to Germany in 1942 to recruit British and Commonwealth prisoners of war to join the Nazi army. He was an appeaser and he was hanged after the war.

That's rather misleading. He was not charged with "appeasement" so whether he was an appeaser or not is not relevant to his trial or execution. Wiki relates that

Amery's sanity was questioned by his own father, Leo, but all efforts to have the court consider his mental state were unsuccessful. Further attempts at a defence were suddenly abandoned on the first day of his trial, 28 November 1945, when to general astonishment, Amery pleaded guilty to eight charges of treason. He was immediately sentenced to death. The entire trial lasted just eight minutes from start to finish.​

So he confessed to being a traitor, not an appeaser, and his father dissociated himself from his son's ideas on the grounds of the latter's insanity. Your post names both father and son, and may give the impression that they acted together in a common enterprise, which is completely false.

 

[Garrison]

I can't quite see how you can say there was appeasement when Chamberlain was involved in rearmament at the time.

Because if you did any research you would know that the two ran side by side. Britain wanted to rebuild its defensive strength to discourage aggression while at the same time offering concessions to Nazi Germany to tie it into the normal process of international diplomacy. Both strands of policy were ultimately aimed at preventing war and if they had been dealing with a rational leadership the plan would probably have worked. Reading the Wages of Destruction by Adam Tooze and he points out that in 1936-37 Nazi Germany was seemingly the most reasonable of the dictatorships, given the actions of Mussolini, Franco, and the Militarists in Japan.

 

[Henri McPhee]

Because if you did any research you would know that the two ran side by side. Britain wanted to rebuild its defensive strength to discourage aggression while at the same time offering concessions to Nazi Germany to tie it into the normal process of international diplomacy. Both strands of policy were ultimately aimed at preventing war and if they had been dealing with a rational leadership the plan would probably have worked. Reading the Wages of Destruction by Adam Tooze and he points out that in 1936-37 Nazi Germany was seemingly the most reasonable of the dictatorships, given the actions of Mussolini, Franco, and the Militarists in Japan.

I don't think that's quite correct.

Diplomacy has been described in the past as lying on behalf of your government. What is now described as appeasement by Chamberlain was in fact just diplomacy.

I agree that Chamberlain seemed to have attempted to split Musso in Italy from Hitler before the war. In 1935 Musso had protested about German rearmament. In one book Chamberlain is quoted as chiding Eden with regard to Musso that "You have missed chance after chance, Anthony. You simply can't go on like this." It was only with the fall of France that Musso finally threw in his lot with Germany.

There are people who think that Chamberlain's strategy was for Germany to invade Russia. That's what I believe as well. Chamberlain knew from our secret service that this was going to happen, if not from the public and House of Commons who only understood straight lines. Chamberlain wrote a memo in about 1937 insisting that the Spitfire was developed so that any ordinary pilot could fly it. That's common sense. Chamberlain encouraged radar for air defence.

In that World at War TV documentary Eden is quoted as saying that he visited the Home Counties in 1940 and that the British army had no tanks or anti-tank guns. That's a serious matter. The German army and navy were quoted as saying that they were against an invasion of Britain unless the Luftwaffe had air superiority which thankfully never happened.

This so-called appeasement policy is relevant to events today. This is from a Wikipedia about the matter:

After the Second World War: politicians[edit]
Statesmen in the post-war years have often referred to their opposition to appeasement as a justification for firm, sometimes armed, action in international relations.

U.S. President Harry S. Truman thus explained his decision to enter the Korean War in 1950, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden his confrontation of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser in the Suez Crisis of 1956, U.S. President John F. Kennedy his "quarantine" of Cuba in 1962, U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson his resistance to communism in Indochina in the 1960s, and U.S. President Ronald Reagan his air strike on Libya in 1986.[46]

During the Cold War, the "lessons" of appeasement were cited by prominent conservative allies of Reagan, who urged Reagan to be assertive in "rolling back" Soviet-backed regimes throughout the world. The Heritage Foundation's Michael Johns, for instance, wrote in 1987 that "seven years after Ronald Reagan's arrival in Washington, the United States government and its allies are still dominated by the culture of appeasement that drove Neville Chamberlain to Munich in 1938."[47]

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher invoked the example of Churchill during the Falklands War of 1982: "When the American Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, urged her to reach a compromise with the Argentine's she rapped sharply on the table and told him, pointedly, 'that this was the table at which Neville Chamberlain sat in 1938 and spoke of the Czechs as a faraway people about whom we know so little'." [48] The spectre of appeasement was raised in discussions of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s.[49]

U.S. President George W. Bush and British Prime Minister Tony Blair also cited Churchill's warnings about German rearmament to justify their action in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq War.[50]

In May 2008, President Bush cautioned against "the false comfort of appeasement" when dealing with Iran and its President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.[51]

Dutch politician Ayaan Hirsi Ali demands a confrontational policy at the European level to meet the threat of radical Islam, and compares policies of non-confrontation to Neville Chamberlain's appeasement of Hitler.[52]
Tibetan separatists consider the policy of the West towards China with regard to Tibet as appeasement.[53]

 

[Dave Rogers]

In that World at War TV documentary Eden is quoted as saying that he visited the Home Counties in 1940 and that the British army had no tanks or anti-tank guns. That's a serious matter.

It's rather critical to ask, at what point in 1940? It's well-known that a large amount of materiel was left behind in France after the evacuation of the BEF at Dunkirk, though rather less well-known that there were subsequent evacuations of forces further south that also resulted in abandonment of vehicles and guns. It's not surprising that the British army was short of tanks and guns immediately after suffering a major defeat in the Battle of France in which they lost a lot of them.

As far as I'm aware, as soon as possible after Dunkirk, the First Armoured Division was brought up to something like full strength with whatever tanks could be found, though many were initially lacking some fairly important equipment (for example, a lot had a main gun but no co-axial MG), and stationed in the south-east as the main counter-invasion striking force. Second Armoured was then equipped with whatever ragtag mixture of light tanks and Bren Carriers was left over and stationed in East Anglia in case of an attack north of the Thames. Depending on where you're referring to as the Home Counties (not a very exact geographical location), it may be that the army had no tanks or AT guns there because they were all concentrated where they might actually be needed.

Dave

 

[Border Reiver]

An interesting note is that the only division in Britain with a full complement of trucks and artillery pieces was the First Canadian.

And that only because the CO of their artillery regiment defied orders to load his guns and trucks back onto the ships that had just brought them to France.

 

[Garrison]

I don't think that's quite correct.

And which episode of 'World at War' do you base that on?

Diplomacy has been described in the past as lying on behalf of your government. What is now described as appeasement by Chamberlain was in fact just diplomacy.

Ah so you now recognize this statement:

I can't quite see how you can say there was appeasement when Chamberlain was involved in rearmament at the time.

is nonsense?

I agree that Chamberlain seemed to have attempted to split Musso in Italy from Hitler before the war.

who exactly are you agreeing with? Because I posted no such suggestion.

In 1935 Musso had protested about German rearmament. In one book Chamberlain is quoted as chiding Eden with regard to Musso that "You have missed chance after chance, Anthony. You simply can't go on like this." It was only with the fall of France that Musso finally threw in his lot with Germany.

So I'm guessing the Pact of Steel is something else you haven't heard of? Italy and Germany made a formal alliance in 1939.

There are people who think that Chamberlain's strategy was for Germany to invade Russia. That's what I believe as well. Chamberlain knew from our secret service that this was going to happen, if not from the public and House of Commons who only understood straight lines.

Utter nonsense, and yet again you provide no reference for this claim. Chamberlain's policy was to avoid war, they actually tried to get Stalin onside but failed because they couldn't offer to carve up Poland the way the Nazi's could. Have you forgotten that the Nazi's and Soviets were allies for two years? During which time Nazi Germany invaded France. Oh and a bit difficult for Chamberlain to know about Barbarossa, he was dead before Germany made that plan. If on the other hand you mean Hitler's general goal of conquest in the East, well anyone with a copy of Mein Kampf handy knew about that.

Chamberlain wrote a memo in about 1937 insisting that the Spitfire was developed so that any ordinary pilot could fly it. That's common sense. Chamberlain encouraged radar for air defence.

And another unsourced claim.

In that World at War TV documentary Eden is quoted as saying that he visited the Home Counties in 1940 and that the British army had no tanks or anti-tank guns. That's a serious matter. The German army and navy were quoted as saying that they were against an invasion of Britain unless the Luftwaffe had air superiority which thankfully never happened.

Do you have any other reference source than the DVD box set of The World at War you appear to have acquired recently? It was intended as a broad overview of events in the war and included much that was anecdotal. There was also a vast amount of information about the war which was still classified at the time it was made. It was a good programme in its time but its no basis from which to be making claims about appeasement or the conduct of the war.

This so-called appeasement policy is relevant to events today. This is from a Wikipedia about the matter:

But is completely irrelevant to the subject at hand.

 

[Henri McPhee]

It was Stalin who was the appeaser, and who signed a piece of paper with Ribbentrop with amazing complacency, and even stupidity, just because he didn't believe a word the British told him about proper warnings. Stalin had previously killed off 90% of his Generals and 80% of his Colonels. That was not good for any very efficient army. There was nothing Chamberlain could have done to help the Czechs, and not much Chamberlain, or Churchill, or Roosevelt, could do to help Poland.

With regard to the proposed German invasion of Britain, the German air force was all for it, but I think only amateur strategists and internet posters would think it would have been a good idea unless the Germans had air superiority. I agree the British Army mainly only had rifles after Dunkirk.

There is a bit about what one of Hitler's best Generals, Von Manstein thought about the matter on the Wikipedia internet:

Main article: Operation Seelöwe

Manstein was a proponent of the prospective German invasion of Great Britain, named Operation Seelöwe. He considered the operation risky but necessary. Early studies by various staff officers determined that air superiority was a prerequisite to the planned invasion. His corps was to be shipped across the English Channel from Boulogne to Bexhill as one of four units assigned to the first wave. But as the Luftwaffe failed to decisively beat the Royal Air Force during the Battle of Britain, Operation Seelöwe was postponed indefinitely on 12 October. For the rest of the year, Manstein, with little to do, spent time in Paris and at home.[49][50]

 

[jimbob]

It was Stalin who was the appeaser, and who signed a piece of paper with Ribbentrop with amazing complacency, and even stupidity, just because he didn't believe a word the British told him about proper warnings. Stalin had previously killed off 90% of his Generals and 80% of his Colonels. That was not good for any very efficient army. There was nothing Chamberlain could have done to help the Czechs, and not much Chamberlain, or Churchill, or Roosevelt, could do to help Poland.

With regard to the proposed German invasion of Britain, the German air force was all for it, but I think only amateur strategists and internet posters would think it would have been a good idea unless the Germans had air superiority. I agree the British Army mainly only had rifles after Dunkirk.

There is a bit about what one of Hitler's best Generals, Von Manstein thought about the matter on the Wikipedia internet:

Even if the Germans had had air supremecy (not just superiority) Sealion would still have been a disaster.

It probably would have been a disaster with air and naval superiority. They had no realistic plan.

 

[Craig B]

It was Stalin who was the appeaser, and who signed a piece of paper with Ribbentrop with amazing complacency, and even stupidity, just because he didn't believe a word the British told him about proper warnings. Stalin had previously killed off 90% of his Generals and 80% of his Colonels. That was not good for any very efficient army. There was nothing Chamberlain could have done to help the Czechs, and not much Chamberlain, or Churchill, or Roosevelt, could do to help Poland.

Does criticising Chamberlain imply support for Stalin? You write as if there could only be one appeaser. But there were more than one. Stalin was desperately afraid of attack from Germany, for which he was unprepared, and did all kinds of things to avert or at least delay a Nazi onslaught. Not only did the British warn him prior to Barbarossa; so did his own intelligence services, and he didn't believe them either.

Main problem was, people had been warning him of an attack in May, which was correct at the time; but the attack was postponed by a month because of the crisis in Yugoslavia, so May passed without incident, and Stalin's informants started predicting June, which by then was correct too. But the false alarm in May gave Stalin the opportunity to disparage his informants and ignore their warnings. Churchill specifically referred to the "Serbian Revolution" in his warning to Stalin, but this was fruitless.

Stalin ignored him too. He was unappreciative of British warnings, because the British had been taken by surprise by the recent German offensive against UK forces in Crete. If they're so damned good at foreseeing invasions, he observed, why couldn't they see one coming when they themselves were the target?

 

[Garrison]

It was Stalin who was the appeaser, and who signed a piece of paper with Ribbentrop with amazing complacency, and even stupidity, just because he didn't believe a word the British told him about proper warnings. Stalin had previously killed off 90% of his Generals and 80% of his Colonels. That was not good for any very efficient army.

So Stalin makes a deal with Hitler and that's appeasement, but when Chamberlain does the same its not?

There was nothing Chamberlain could have done to help the Czechs, and not much Chamberlain, or Churchill, or Roosevelt, could do to help Poland.

Actually there was a great deal they could have done. In 1938 the German army was nowhere near ready for war and had fallen well behind in its rearmament plans. Had the British and French appreciated how weak Germany really was things might have been rather different. As for Poland. Germany had stripped its defences in the west to mount the assault and the French did actually mount an offensive, but it was a half hearted affair and the opportunity was lost.

With regard to the proposed German invasion of Britain, the German air force was all for it, but I think only amateur strategists and internet posters would think it would have been a good idea unless the Germans had air superiority. I agree the British Army mainly only had rifles after Dunkirk.

Again who exactly are you agreeing with? As other posters have pointed out this assertion that 'the British only had rifles' is simply incorrect.

There is a bit about what one of Hitler's best Generals, Von Manstein thought about the matter on the Wikipedia internet:

And if you moved beyond World at War and Wikipedia you would find that most scholars who have studied Sealion have concluded it was never feasible. The Germans had no navy to escort it, no landing craft to deliver the troops and equipment and in fact the Wehrmacht could never agree on an attack plan. Sealion was an ad hoc affair, compare it to Operation Husky, or Overlord.