Would you use a Star Trek type transporter?

[Checkmite]

This is wrong. There is the same continuity as always.

Look at what happens in the body of someone who doesn't use the teleporter. There is a particle A that bounces into a particle B, leading to a change in B. This is a "causal" event, because A "caused" the change in B. If you wanted to, you could track all the causal events that led to A being in the state it was in immediately prior to interacting with B. It might look like this:

event(1 ) --> event( 2 ) --> ... --> event( n ) --> event( A hits B ) --> < the future >

Now can you tell me how this causal sequence is changed by inserting a teleporter event somewhere? Suppose the teleporter magicks the person to another location instantly. The sequence might look like this:

event( 1 ) --> event( 2 ) --> ... --> event( n ) --> TELEPORT --> event( A hits B ) --> < the future >

Look carefully -- do you see how the TELEPORT event completely invalidates the rest of the sequence? No, you don't -- because it doesn't. The sequence of causal events leading up to the current moment in time are identical, except for a single extra event, that doesn't alter the relative states of any of the particles in the person's brain. From the perspective of the particles -- and hence any physical process in your body -- the TELEPORT event is a No-op.

To the extent that there exists any continuity in the physical processes ( which isn't a simple yes/no, mind you ), it is entirely preserved by the teleport.

No, I don't think that's right. Let's say at the moment of your "dissolution", particle A is about to hit particle B. You're saying that on your new "resolution", particle A is set up again by the transporter to hit particle B, and things begin right where they were left off.

My argument is that, upon your resolution, it's NOT particle A which is set up to hit particle B, it's some particle C that's set up to hit some particle D in the same way that particle A was about to hit particle B before the dissolution...but that doesn't make them particles A and B. Particles A and B remain on Earth - no longer about to collide perhaps, maybe doing other things instead, scattered about, kept in a tank of particles...but they still exist there; they can't be in two places at once. Once the brain that the processes exist in is dissolved, the continuity is broken, period. The next brain can be created and its processes kicked off in a "mid-stream" state - the tape is started in the middle rather than from the beginning - but the original stream of brain processes is terminated.

Again, you continue to avoid the "what if it doesn't kill the person the information is copied from" hypothesis and its implications.

Let's make it even simpler: suppose your "transported copy" isn't resolved on Mars; suppose it's resolved on the other side of the room you started in. Now there's two human bodies standing in the same room, not one - correct? Two subjects? You can touch one without touching them both?

 

[rocketdodger]

No, I don't think that's right. Let's say at the moment of your "dissolution", particle A is about to hit particle B. You're saying that on your new "resolution", particle A is set up again by the transporter to hit particle B, and things begin right where they were left off.

My argument is that, upon your resolution, it's NOT particle A which is set up to hit particle B, it's some particle C that's set up to hit some particle D in the same way that particle A was about to hit particle B before the dissolution...but that doesn't make them particles A and B. Particles A and B remain on Earth - no longer about to collide perhaps, maybe doing other things instead, scattered about, kept in a tank of particles...but they still exist there; they can't be in two places at once. Once the brain that the processes exist in is dissolved, the continuity is broken, period. The next brain can be created and its processes kicked off in a "mid-stream" state - the tape is started in the middle rather than from the beginning - but the original stream of brain processes is terminated.

There are two ways I can respond to this.

First, I'm saying the process is not the particles -- it is the sequence of causal events between the particles. If two sequences of causal events are identical, then the process is identical. Whether the particles are the same particles is irrelevant. You can swap out A for C and B for D and the sequence would be identical into the future ( as long as A and C are entirely equivalent, etc ).

Second, I don't think physics necessarily supports the idea that a particle remains the "same" particle over time. A particle could disappear and another one reappear to take it's place and all physical laws remain intact as long as that event happened inside of a planck time. This sort of invalidates the criteria we humans use for "sameness" because you could do something like teleport a whole person inside of a planck time and then ask "which particles are the originals and which are the copies?" and there is no possible correct answer.

Again, you continue to avoid the "what if it doesn't kill the person the information is copied from" hypothesis and its implications.

Let's make it even simpler: suppose your "transported copy" isn't resolved on Mars; suppose it's resolved on the other side of the room you started in. Now there's two human bodies standing in the same room, not one - correct? Two subjects? You can touch one without touching them both?

No I'm not avoiding it. Everyone agrees that *after* the teleport there are two people. The question is what happens at the exact moment of the materialization of the copy.

At that moment, the particles in the copy are, physically speaking, the *same* particles as those of the original. You could even have the teleporter just create the copy in the same position as the original, to illustrate the issue.

 

[Roboramma]

I disagree with Nick227 on this. There are no rational grounds for thinking it is acceptable that the original is destroyed besides some obscure zero sum resource allocation nonsense ( like, you can only ever have x of you walking around because of food or energy or whatever ).

How about the physical fact that it's impossible to copy the quantum state of system without destroying the original system?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No-cloning_theorem

The no-cloning theorem is a result of quantum mechanics that forbids the creation of identical copies of an arbitrary unknown quantum state.

 

[Asm]

Once the brain that the processes exist in is dissolved, the continuity is broken, period.

I don't understand this "continuity". What is it exactly, and how is it important to your sense of self?

Again, you continue to avoid the "what if it doesn't kill the person the information is copied from" hypothesis and its implications.

It's really more of a thought experiment than a hypothesis.

Anyway, imagine that I make a copy of you, and pause time at the exact moment of (instant) duplication. Now I have two identical yous, YouA and YouB. What sets YouA apart?

Remember, YouB is a perfect copy. If there was a sense of self and continuity in YouA, then there is the same sense of self and continuity in YouB.

"YouA is the original" you say. Ok, then I'll also swap around your positions, so that YouB is now in the exact same spot as YouA were and vice versa. Which one is now the original? And why?

I really want to know. Because intuitively (I would hesitate to use a Star Trek type transporter) I'm with you, intellectually I'm not.

 

[rocketdodger]

How about the physical fact that it's impossible to copy the quantum state of system without destroying the original system?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No-cloning_theorem

Alright, that seems like a very good reason.

However, this implies that the original is destroyed *as* the copy is made, not after. Does it not?

 

[megaresp]

I don't understand how you could reach that conclusion. I would have been destroyed and an exact copy been made. Unless you believe in a "soul" or something religious then the beamed down me is no more the original than a copy of a CD is the original. It is exactly the same with the same memories (apparently, I can't see how that would actually work) but it is not me.

So...what exactly is 'you' then?

 

[megaresp]

...It does not matter if reconstitute a 100% copy at the end. That person will be virtually identical to the universe, but the original died.

Sure, but so what?

If all the things I think of as me (i.e. the sum of the squishy bits between my ears) carry on in a different location I'm happy as Larry.

I would undergo this type of transportation (once proven to work with the same level of safety as air travel).

In particular, I'd much rather do this in January than what I'll actually be doing - which is hopping on a plane at Heathrow, undergoing 26 hours of torture (i.e. flying economy class to New Zealand), and then doing the reverse journey 3 weeks later.

Having my atomic information scanned in London, being painlessly and instantly disassembled, and then having the information reconstituted in some different set of atoms seconds later in New Zealand is much more palatable to me than enduring airports, airlines (and their 'food')...not to mention the cramped indignity of trip itself.

Not having to use an airline loo after 13 hours in the air is, in and of itself, reason enough to 'fax' myself rather than fly.

And yes - even the scenario mentioned up-thread where they don't disassemble me in London until they've confirmed I've been properly reassembled in NZ is perfectly fine by me. It's still far better than the alternative.

 

[Roboramma]

Alright, that seems like a very good reason.

However, this implies that the original is destroyed *as* the copy is made, not after. Does it not?

Yeah, I think so

 

[blobru]

Alright, that seems like a very good reason.

However, this implies that the original is destroyed *as* the copy is made, not after. Does it not?

Yeah, I think so

I'm not sure about that (though not a physicist so subject to correction). I think it's to do with having to disturb the quantum state in order to measure it: consequence of the famous uncertainty principle (measure one aspect of the state, such as momentum, and you disturb its paired aspect - for momentum, position - and vice versa); so it's a fundamental limit on knowledge, irrespective of whether the original is destroyed or preserved. Since measurement alters the state in random ways - the better you measure one thing, the less you know about its paired property - there's simply no way to completely "know" the quantum state of the original in order to copy it. More apropos of this thread, it's stated outright in the - surprise, surprise - No-teleportation theorem^WP.

Which is why the question of an actual Star Trek transporter shouldn't take too long to resolve, perhaps; unless QM is wrong, it's physically impossible (quantum-level duplicates, at least). However, even if it's not science, it's still, to quote one imaginary user of the imaginary transporter, "fascinating" as a thought-experiment in philosophy, as a way to test notions of identity, continuity, consciousness and such. In fact, not under the name "teletransporter" obviously but as a question related to Christian notions of the resurrection of the dead post-Apocalypse, it goes back centuries, as least as far as Thomas Aquinas writing thirteenth century in the Summa Contra Gentiles (Book IV - 81.[7] & thereabouts):

What does not bar numerical unity in a man while he lives on uninterruptedly, clearly can be no bar to the identity of the risen man with the man that was. In a man's body while he lives, there are not always the same parts in respect of matter, but only in respect of species. In respect of matter there is a flux and reflux of parts: still that fact does not bar the man's numerical unity from the beginning to the end of his life. ... [Rickaby transl.]

Resurrection of the Geeks, indeed.

 

[Travis]

And the fact that 'stuff' includes spending your cash and banging your girlfriend doesn't bother you at all?

Good point. Instead of copying yourself, copy your girlfriend.

I'd be down with two girlfriends.

Heck, maybe four. Then we can get really kinky.

 

[Jalok]

Dunno about that, annoying enough when just the one has a headache...

jalok

 

[Thunderchief]

From my personal perspective nothing is lost because there has never been anyone there to lose it,merely the illusion that there was. And that too will be perfectly replicated.

Nick

I still don't see why just because the "I" is an illusion it is acceptable to kill the brain producing the illusion. Surely it's not rational to think that just because a copy exists, when your illusion ceases, it will magically transfer to the copy? That would imply something beyond materialism wouldn't it? What you think of as "you" is bound to the hardware that produces it, by definition of materialization, producing a copy would not transpose your perspective.

 

[Thunderchief]

How about the physical fact that it's impossible to copy the quantum state of system without destroying the original system?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No-cloning_theorem

That is very interesting, I knew there was some reason why you couldn't create an Identical copy in reality, it could be very close but not identical. but I couldn't remember the actual theory.

It does imply that if you create an identical copy, the original would be destroyed imediatley, a bit like the one plank length transporter someone mention earlier.

If I'm understanding this correctly, (and there is a good chance I'm not) it seem perhaps you could create a physical copy and then change its quantum state to exactly match that of the original, and at the same moment the quantum state of the original would change to match the copy. it's not likely to ever be possible but, intriguing non the less

I'm not sure I would be happy to use this sort of transporter, but it is possible. you could test it by creating the nearly identical copy. Tell it "oh your on Mars by the way" flip the quantum state and ask him where he is, if he says "Earth" bobs your uncle.

(Pretty sure you couldn't actually do that, but intriguing non the less)

 

[Trish Randall]

More than a Star Trek transporter I always wanted one of those robot bodies that was promised to Uhura in the episode Mudds Women. Having had life long digestive problems due to multiple GI birth defects, the idea of an immortal body incapable of puking has been appealing to me since I first saw the episode in childhood.

 

[Nick227]

Surely it's not rational to think that just because a copy exists, when your illusion ceases, it will magically transfer to the copy? .

The idea that there is something that would need to be magically transfered is the illusion.


Nick

 

[Nick227]

I disagree with Nick227 on this. There are no rational grounds for thinking it is acceptable that the original is destroyed besides some obscure zero sum resource allocation nonsense ( like, you can only ever have x of you walking around because of food or energy or whatever ).

Well, if everyone was teleporting about the place and you didn't destroy the originals, a heap of social problems would rapidly accumulate.

Off to work in the morning, out to lunch, back home to meet the 3 odd copies created that day. Which of you sleeps where and with whom, who eats what. The earths population would expand exponentially.

You have to destroy originals.


Nick

Eta - plus the OCDs would repeatedly push the red button resulting in rapidly multiplying numbers at the destination. Certain personality traits would fight with their copies, others repeatedly push, the whole evolution of the race would be skewed.

 

[Mudcat]

In reality I couldn't see teleportation to be safe to use on living beings. Or anything volatile. Or anything with moving parts. Or anything that needs to be in a certain state when it arrives, like medical supplies. Or much anything for that mater. So no.

 

[Beelzebuddy]

Well, if everyone was teleporting about the place and you didn't destroy the originals, a heap of social problems would rapidly accumulate.

Off to work in the morning, out to lunch, back home to meet the 3 odd copies created that day. Which of you sleeps where and with whom, who eats what. The earths population would expand exponentially.

You have to destroy originals.


Nick

Eta - plus the OCDs would repeatedly push the red button resulting in rapidly multiplying numbers at the destination. Certain personality traits would fight with their copies, others repeatedly push, the whole evolution of the race would be skewed.

Bull. That's a flimsy basis for your assertion. I think you're just uncertain how to treat the situation where the originals are not destroyed, so you're insisting that's the only way it can possibly work.

In reality I couldn't see teleportation to be safe to use on living beings. Or anything volatile. Or anything with moving parts. Or anything that needs to be in a certain state when it arrives, like medical supplies. Or much anything for that mater. So no.

Raw materials. Given a 5% failure rate, say, it'd be insane to use on humans, but shipping steel, air, etc to a colony on Mars would be invaluable.

 

[Nick227]

Bull. That's a flimsy basis for your assertion. I think you're just uncertain how to treat the situation where the originals are not destroyed, so you're insisting that's the only way it can possibly work.

I originally said that there was no rational grounds for a materialist to object to using the teleport. This is because nothing is lost and no one dies (emphasis on one). This thought experiment had been used for decades to distinguish between genuine and false materialists. Nick

 

[rocketdodger]

Well, if everyone was teleporting about the place and you didn't destroy the originals, a heap of social problems would rapidly accumulate.

Off to work in the morning, out to lunch, back home to meet the 3 odd copies created that day. Which of you sleeps where and with whom, who eats what. The earths population would expand exponentially.

You have to destroy originals.


Nick

Eta - plus the OCDs would repeatedly push the red button resulting in rapidly multiplying numbers at the destination. Certain personality traits would fight with their copies, others repeatedly push, the whole evolution of the race would be skewed.

All you have to do is supplement the teleporter to merge people back together. It's really not a big deal.

Who would use a teleporter anyway, if they couldn't ever share the experiences of the copy? The whole point is to make it like a trip. One of you goes there, does stuff, comes back, rejoins, and you have all the memories of whatever you did over there. Plus, you did stuff over there.