Drooper said:
As I said hedging costs are tiny in relative terms.
They are still artificial costs with no benefits for efficiency of production or transport, so they impede trade for no good reason. In principle, therefore, doing without them is desirable (unless you live amongst the money-changers). The absolute amounts are irrelevant to the argument.
The effects of German monetary union are still being felt partly because of:
1. lack of nominal currency adjustment between Eastern and Western and Lander, and
2. lack of nominal currency adjustment between Germany and the rest of the Eurozone.
Are you saying that monetary union has led to a fall in East German living standards or productivity since the fall of the Wall? Not the failed socialist economy? How exactly do you distinguish between the effects of the bankruptcy of that economy and those of monetary union with West Germany? East German industry wouldn't have suddenly become competitive by converting to a fully-traded currrency. And with Russian oil supplies also becoming fully-traded, rather than subsidised within Comecon, the results would have been disastrous. A flood of refugees would have headed westward.
On the second points you raise, I think you misunderstood my post. I stated that the UK itself, Italy itself, Germany itself are at the limits of an optimal currency area and could possibly benefit from regional currencies.. This you acknowledge youself.
In fact you seem to get a bit muddled here. You state that a single currnce imposes no costs and then you claim that regions within Europe would benefit from seperate currencies.
Given that trade currently takes place in a multi-currency environment, regions such as Wales would indeed benefit from being part of the Euro, or at least out from under the dead weight of the City. A single world currency would be even better.
Argentina was not a case of a government maniipulating an exchange rate.
They dollarised the economy. The dolar was the official currency of Argentina. It was effecitvely in a unilateral monetary union with the US. But it was not an optimal currency area and a large economic shock, which effected Argentina more than the US led to MASSIVE costs for the Argentinian people.
The official currency of Argentina is the Argentinian peso, and has been for a long time. Dollarisation involved the government backing the currency with dollars at a fixed rate. If that's not manipulation, I'm at a loss. It had no control over the US money supply, and the US did not take Argentina into account when making monetary decisions. The peso being over-valued, there was a distinct sucking sound and Argentina's dollar reserves disappeared. When the government could no longer redeem pesos with dollars, splat.
The fact is the thought of widespread common currencies appeal to laymen.
As more an unfrocked priest, I also find them appealing.
But the literature and stylised facts suggest that the imposition of monetary unions accross heterogeneoous economies, with limited labour mobility tend to impose very large cost due to the way the prevent nominal relative price adjustment. This is something the Euro area is proving now.
(Stylised facts? Que?) What the Euro is proving is that inefficiencies previously covered-up by inflation and devaluation need to be addressed. If you can't do something competitively, don't do it. Do something you
can be competitive at. Division of labour - regarded by most as a something desirable.
I suggest you go read the literature on optimal currency areas, it is quite interesting. An interesting statistic to note is that labour mobility in the US is about 20 times that of Europe
It's hardly surprising that labour mobility is higher in a society descended from people who crossed an ocean - voluntarily or not - just to start the thing, and has subsequently spread across a large part of a continent in a couple of centuries. (And has had a single currency, which would tend to increase labour mobility, since a new currency is one thing you don't have to get used to). Europe filled up a long time ago, but there was significant mobility beforehand. Late Roman times, for instance; there was a lot of to-ing and fro-ing around then. (Damned Saxons.) Scandinavians, Magyars, Slavs, it was all go for a good while.
I've read a lot of argument against globalisation, and I'm not convinced. As long as there's a level playing-field, so to speak, and externalities are properly taken account of, I see no problems with it. In fact, I see it as inexorable and inevitable absent a major economic breakdown.