Ichneumonwasp
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- Feb 2, 2006
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That is not true. Plato's concept of the soul was not unitary but ternary.
I thought that was his concept of mind in The Republic, not soul. It's been a while since I read the The Republic, though. I stand corrected.
Your problem obviously is that you assume metaphysical concepts need to 'make sense'.
True, but it's usually a good place to start.
As soon as you start discussing 'mechanisms' for how it does what it does, you stop discussing metaphysics and you start considering physics.
Depends on what we mean. A pure materialist position is a metaphysical position that consists completely of physics, so the distinction cannot hold completely.
You are taking the analogy too far. Obviously there are differences between brains and televisions, just like there are differences between brains and computers or whatever you like to compare them to. But none of those differences can prove that there isn't some mysterious outside force acting on them, as a differently constructed receiver may also "do things" and "remember things".
Again, I'm not offering proof, only the likelier possibility based on the available evidence. Of course this assumes a metaphysical position to some degree and an epistemic position that I can and should trust what I experience as reality, but still.....
I don't think that is true. If there were pixies acting out television shows, they would not be metaphysical but rather physical beings inside your television and we estimate how probable it is that they exist.
But these pixies are not a material reality. They look just like the pictures in your TV screen and "live" in the 8th dimension. They just appear to us here like TV images.
We know that the mind stops having a method of communicating to the physical world that it exists. If it has a metaphysical component that does not necessarily mean it stops completely.
But there is no memory and no experience. We know what occurs with sleep and dreams -- we are not able to communicate with the outside world, but there is still experience and we experience the passage of time. When the brain is turned off there is no experience of the passage of time.
That is not at all how the brain works.
I am not arguing that the brain is a digital computer, but that otherwise inert material stuff can do the sort of thing that was thought impossible for otherwise inert material stuff to do -- but only by functioning, not by being present. Not by receiving. By acting.
Or maybe they do, and just can't communicate outward that they do. Taking the batteries out of a radio does not mean the radio signal disappears, it just means it cannot sound it out.
But the soul would not stop being in that situation. It should still hang around somewhere and experience the passage of time. If it didn't, then what is it? If it has no dimension, no materiality, and no experience how can it be said to exist in any way. If we stop the brain, does a person die?
Only if those philosophical stances have different empirical consequences. If two philosophical positions make the same predictions about what sort of evidence can be found, you cannot assign different probabilities to them.
What I am saying is that they have different empirical consequences. I don't see how an immaterial soul received by the brain could act the same as a mind created by brain chemistry. The other issues I've raised are those other consequences. How could stimulating nervous tissue produce anything coherent if it were merely a receiver?
Exactly my point. It is a preference.
Then we agree. But one preference has evidence to back it up and one does not. Again, I am not trying to prove the absolute impossibility of an immaterial soul, only its relative unlikelihood.
My point is that the only difference between a materialist and a dualist view of the workings of the brain is your personal beliefs and philosophical preferences. If you see problems with one view, it is only because you can't make that view fit into your own.
I don't know, I think I would probably state that more forcefully. It isn't just a difference in personal beliefs and preferences. One possibility makes more sense with the available data. It's like literature interpretation. While all views are potentially valid, some interpretations are better than others. I just don't buy the Huckleberry Finn was an alien implant theory.