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11. Discussion of the Insurrection Act.
The Committee has been troubled by evidence that President Trump’s
possible use of the Insurrection Act was discussed by individuals identified
in this Report. Congressional Committees of jurisdiction should further
evaluate all such evidence, and consider risks posed for future elections.
That intelligence included information about specific planning by the
Proud Boys and Oath Keepers militia groups who ultimately led the attack
on the Capitol. By contrast, the intelligence did not support a conclusion
that Antifa or other left-wing groups would likely engage in a violent coun-
terdemonstration, or attack President Trump’s supporters on January 6th.
Indeed, intelligence from January 5th indicated that some left-wing groups
were instructing their members to “stay at home” and not attend on Janu-
ary 6th.
DISCUSSION OF THE POTENTIAL FOR VIOLENCE
Federal and local agencies agreed that there was a potential for violence on
January 6th. As noted above, the intelligence leading up to January 6th did
not support a conclusion that Antifa or other left-wing groups would likely
engage in a violent counter-demonstration, or attack President Trump’s
supporters on January 6th. In fact, none of these groups was involved to
any material extent with the attack on the Capitol on January 6th.
That said, certain witnesses testified that they believed that there would
be violence with Antifa or similar counter protest groups. President
Trump’s National Security Advisor, Robert O’Brien, said the White House
saw a risk of violence from counter-protesters.46 Then Acting DHS Secre-
tary Chad Wolfe said that his “main concern [. . .] at the time was what we
had seen throughout the summer and throughout the fall, which was you
were going to have groups on either side, and so you were going to have
counterprotests. And usually where those counterprotests interacted was where you had Violence.
General Milley said the potential for violence was clear to all: “Everyone
knew. I can't imagine anybody in those calls that didn't realize that on the
6th was going to be the certification of an intensely contested election, and
there were large crowds coming into town, and they were coming into pro-
test. And everybody knew there was a probability, more than a possibility, a
probability of violence.”48 He expected “street fights when the sun went
down,” while [Deputy Secretary] Norquist said the most dangerous thing
was assault on the Capitol.49 Director of DHS Special Operations
Christopher Tomney remembered, “[T]here was broad discussion/
acknowledgment that folks were calling for bringing weapons into the city
on that day, so there was no surprise, there was no—you know, no one dis-
agreed that there was going to be the high likelihood that there could be
some violence on January 6.”50
Acting Deputy Attorney General Richard Donoghue described the dis-
cussion about the threat landscape as “generally about left-wing, right
wing, or Pro-Trump, anti-Trump groups coming to the Capitol. It didn't
really matter what they called themselves. It was a matter of they're upset,
they're coming to the Capitol, and there's a potential for violence.”51
Donoghue added: “Everyone knew what everyone else was doing. Everyone
knew that there was a danger of violence. Everyone knew that the Capitol
and other facilities were potential targets. And I think we all felt comfort-
able that we were aware what the situation was, and we had the resources
in place to address it.”52