White Cat Experiment

[davidsmith73]

Yes, I would agree that Occam's Razor should lead us to believe that others are conscious.

Why?

 

[davidsmith73]

You know, it depends on what you mean by "directly". If we want to nitpick about it, our brain observes nothing directly.

Hoorah! I agree with you on something Hans. Well almost.

First, we must agree that your statement is posed from within the assumption that there exists an experience-independent reality that observations can refer to. Lets call this experience-independent reality "objective reality".

Then there's the interesting bit.

If we make an observation of objective reality then I would agree, given the above assumption, that this observation is not direct observation of objective reality. For example, an observation of an apple is not a direct observation of the objective apple because we hypothesise that photons are reflected from the apple, travel to our retina, excite neurons and this somehow creates the experience of the apple. It is clear that the physical processes going on within neural networks are not the same physical processes we think are going on in the apple. Therefore we cannot directly observe objective reality.

However there is one way in which, as a materialist, you could say that observations are direct observations of objective reality. Since it is hypothesised that neural processes are the same thing as an experience then the experience of the apple is a direct observation of your neural processes. In fact we can drop the phrase "direct observation" here because it simply means "experience".

However, how certain physical processes are experiences but others are not is a question we don't really want to go into again is it Hans?

 

[MRC_Hans]

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Originally posted by MRC_Hans
Excuse me, but what do you mean by saying that there is no code inside a computer. What is your definition of "code"?

Hans
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I think it would be more fair if you define that, since it was you that brought up the term 'encoded' before anyone else.

No problem, but then there is certainly code inside a computer.

Code: A system that maps input to output in an algorithmic way.

Code can be hard-coded, or it can be variable.

Hard-code example for computer: CPU micro-code.
Hard-code example for brains: Inherited instincts, like reaction to pain (for a human brain very few, if any, things are titally hard-coded).

Variable-code example for computer: Programs you load temporarily, self-modifying code.

Variable-code example for brain: Experiences, things you learn.


Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

Hoorah! I agree with you on something Hans. Well almost.

First, we must agree that your statement is posed from within the assumption that there exists an experience-independent reality that observations can refer to. Lets call this experience-independent reality "objective reality".

OK.

Then there's the interesting bit.

If we make an observation of objective reality then I would agree, given the above assumption, that this observation is not direct observation of objective reality. For example, an observation of an apple is not a direct observation of the objective apple because we hypothesise that photons are reflected from the apple, travel to our retina, excite neurons and this somehow creates the experience of the apple. It is clear that the physical processes going on within neural networks are not the same physical processes we think are going on in the apple. Therefore we cannot directly observe objective reality.

Unless we choose to define "us" as our entire system, thus, whenever stimuli arrives at one of our sensory interfaces to the outside world, we accept it as observed, without bothering about how it is subsequently processed inside our system.

If we then also define the reflected light system from an apple as part of the "apple system", then we do interact and observe directly. Not to mention if we were to touch and taste it.

However there is one way in which, as a materialist, you could say that observations are direct observations of objective reality. Since it is hypothesised that neural processes are the same thing as an experience then the experience of the apple is a direct observation of your neural processes. In fact we can drop the phrase "direct observation" here because it simply means "experience".

That is another way of defining it, yes. However, I would prefer to reserve the term "experience" for the more complex process of storing and processing observation, including asigning a meaning to them.

However, how certain physical processes are experiences but others are not is a question we don't really want to go into again is it Hans?

We could, if you can show some that are not (show, not just claim, mind you )

Hans

 

[davidsmith73]

Unless we choose to define "us" as our entire system, thus, whenever stimuli arrives at one of our sensory interfaces to the outside world, we accept it as observed, without bothering about how it is subsequently processed inside our system.

In which case this interaction at the interface falls under the category of physical processes that are experiences and are directly observed.

If we then also define the reflected light system from an apple as part of the "apple system", then we do interact and observe directly. Not to mention if we were to touch and taste it.

We can define away to our hearts content as to where the cut-off point lies between the part of objective reality that entails experiences and the part which does not. We need a predictive theory to explain where the cut-off point lies and that is lacking at the current time. Furthermore, if we do not even allow for a cut-off point then we could in principle state that any experience is the direct observation of all of objective reality since the reflected light system from the apple was preceded by an interaction with X and X interacted with Y and so on. And since all physical effects must have a cause, the set of physical processes that are included in the processes of direct observation expands ad infinitum. To break this chain we must have a cut-off point and posit that certain physical processes are directly observed (usually hypothesised as occuring in the brain) and others are not. Otherwise all physical processes are directly observed and it's meaningless to talk about an experience-independent reality.

 

[Humphreys]

"Being able to run" is entirely as valid a construct as "experiencing red"

I disagree. An experience actually exists, whereas a "being able to run" does not.

Consider two cars, one (A) with a defunct engine, another (B) with a working engine. Both are stopped, yet it is certainly a property of car B that it is "able to run", a property that car A does not have.

It's a description. We're describing the current state the car is in. It's a phrase to describe the way the matter is arranged in the car.

Would we think of "being able to run" as a state, rather than a property? I certainly wouldn't say a "being able to run" is a property any car has.

Edited for lots of silly errors.

 

[Humphreys]

Yes, I would agree that Occam's Razor should lead us to believe that others are conscious.

Why?

I'm conscious, and my behaviour is just like yours. We explain thoughts, feelings, and even our own consciousness, in very much the same way.

It's a little harder for me to explain reality if I assume that I'm the only person in the whole world who is conscious.

 

[Piscivore]

Are you saying that the physical activity in the brain precedes the manifesation of mental phenomena? And that because the activity in the brain precedes the manifestation of mental phenomena then mental phenomena must exist?
[/B]

Of course not, because as you well know such would be a logical fallacy.

There is evidence much more compelling to link the "mental phenomenon" of which you speak to the physical activities in the brain than simple Post Hoc, but as I'm sure you also know the experiments to confirm this relationship are currently outside the bounds of our culture's mores. Perhaps if Mengele had been more interested in this question we might have an answer, but as it stands there has been (to my knowledge) no one who has displayed these "mental phenomenon" that has been observed to lack the physical processes, and in every person in which these physical activities have been observed to cease, so went the "mental phenomenon." If you know differently, please do enlighten me.

What I am saying is that "consciousness" seems immaterial because it is just a name for an effect, not something that exists on its own. Can your white cat come over and eat the food in my cat's dish? Can it hunt crickets in my garage? Can it act in any way on the world I percieve? It is just an effect created by the neurons firing in your brain, and is not in any way accessable to or interactive with the objective world. What you are trying to do with your "experiment" is re-define "consciousness" to mean "soul", something unique to humanitiy that elevates humankind superior to the universe we are an intrinsic part of.

 

[Filip Sandor]

No problem, but then there is certainly code inside a computer.

Code: A system that maps input to output in an algorithmic way.

Code can be hard-coded, or it can be variable.

Hard-code example for computer: CPU micro-code.
Hard-code example for brains: Inherited instincts, like reaction to pain (for a human brain very few, if any, things are titally hard-coded).

Variable-code example for computer: Programs you load temporarily, self-modifying code.

Variable-code example for brain: Experiences, things you learn.


Hans

So code is just a name we use to describe certain physical processes then, correct? My interpretation of this is you believe, simply put, that mental phenomena is just the physical processes that comprise certain parts of the brain. Please do correct me if I'm wrong.

(note to other readers, please finish reading the entire post before you accuse me of implying anything you think I believe)

So Hans, tell me this then, why is it that the mental image I perceive of a white cat in my mind has no resemblance whatsoever to my brain or any part of it? Let's even assume that in the future I can actually look at the parts of my brain, using super advanced MRI technology, which comprise my mental images. What do I need to do to see the 'mental' stuff. Do I need to magnify the image more?? Should I shrink it?? Look at it from a particular angle?? In my mind I see a complete mental image, not just a grey blob or cells or atoms, but if I interpretted your theory correctly (that mind is matter) then I should be able to observe something with at least some similar qualities in my brain shouldn't I?

Furthermore, if the white cat is really just a group of physical processes in my brain, how can I be 100% sure it exists when it bears no resemblance to those parts in my brain, which you claim it is?

I also want to make a note here that all my questions are based on your theory here and some things I know about some simple physics and technology. I don't beleive most of what I'm implying and I'm implying it based on your theory (if I interpretted it correctly).

 

[Filip Sandor]

double posted - sorry!

 

[Filip Sandor]

Of course not, because as you well know such would be a logical fallacy.

I'm sorry, is there a rule somewhere that you can't make a logical fallacy?!! (just a joke!)

There is evidence much more compelling to link the "mental phenomenon" of which you speak to the physical activities in the brain than simple Post Hoc, but as I'm sure you also know the experiments to confirm this relationship are currently outside the bounds of our culture's mores.

I'm pretty sure I haven't implied anywhere that I don't believe there to be a connection between mental phenomena and the physical state of the brain so this is entirely irrelevant to my arguements. (if I did imply this please show me where)

Perhaps if Mengele had been more interested in this question we might have an answer, but as it stands there has been (to my knowledge) no one who has displayed these "mental phenomenon" that has been observed to lack the physical processes, and in every person in which these physical activities have been observed to cease, so went the "mental phenomenon." If you know differently, please do enlighten me.

See above.

What I am saying is that "consciousness" seems immaterial because it is just a name for an effect, not something that exists on its own. Can your white cat come over and eat the food in my cat's dish? Can it hunt crickets in my garage? Can it act in any way on the world I percieve? It is just an effect created by the neurons firing in your brain, and is not in any way accessable to or interactive with the objective world. What you are trying to do with your "experiment" is re-define "consciousness" to mean "soul", something unique to humanitiy that elevates humankind superior to the universe we are an intrinsic part of.

For the record, this experiment is NOT INTENTED TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF A SOUL. It is intented to show that mental phenomena is non-material.

 

[Piscivore]

I'm sorry, is there a rule somewhere that you can't make a logical fallacy?!!

Unfortunately, none of which I am aware.

I'm pretty sure I haven't implied anywhere that I don't believe there to be a connection between mental phenomena and the physical state of the brain so this is entirely irrelevant to my arguements. (if I did imply this please show me where)

My apologies, then. I seem to have spent entirely too much attention on plonkers like lifegazer and jumped to an unfounded conclusion or two.

For the record, this experiment is NOT INTENTED TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF A SOUL. It is intented to show that mental phenomena is non-material.

What is the difference between "non-material mental phenomena" and a soul?

As I said, your error in this experiment- as others have pointed out- is that you are trying to treat the interaction of physical processes as a discrete entity in itself.

If I come home late, and my wife is annoyed at me for it because dinner is cold and I haven't called and she's had to deal with our insolent and wholly disobedient pre-teen children herself for hours on end despite having to work a full-time job of her own, and meanwhile I'm annoyed at having to stay late answering inane questions for bored and lonely old people about coverage they "used to have, that one time, on that car we had, you know, the blue one" and I haven't been able to call and I'm hungry and tired and have to drive home in the dark now to face an irritated spouse as well as insolent and wholly disobedient pre-teen children who categorically refuse to clean up their rooms, never mind the cat box... well. Is the argument we are about to engage in a thing? Does it exist independantly somewhere, lurking about waiting for just the right couple to inflict itself upon?

No?

Then why do you insist on treating "mental processes", let alone "consciousness", as such?

 

[Filip Sandor]

As I said, your error in this experiment- as others have pointed out- is that you are trying to treat the interaction of physical processes as a discrete entity in itself.

I would interpret this statement from you to imply that you believe mental phenomena are the physical processes in the brain.

The fact is that I'm trying to imply the opposite so I would reserve this accusation to those people who claim that a code exists inside a physical structure (the code in this case being the 'discrete entity' within the interaction of physical processes in a physical structure).

What I am trying to show is the logical reprocusions of the fact that we can and do believe in mental phenomena (and the white cat) without any physical evidence of it. To imply that mental phenomena doesn't exist would be stretching it and I am not claiming that mental phenomena doesn't exist, but to claim it is physical seems to me illogical given the fact that we can be 100% sure the mental phenomena we experience exists before we ever see any physical evidence of it. Just because two phenomena correlate to eachother somehow does not make them one and the same.

This is obviously something that materialists have a very tough time digesting when it comes to the brain because it is so much more intruiging for them to talk of this hidden 'information' or 'code' substance in the brain. Yet, oddly enough, they have no problem with this line of reasoning if the physical phenomena in question doesn't exhibit any behaviours which we might interpretted as unusually ordered or 'thinking'.

So why is it people believe mental phenomena is physical? This is what I don't understand.

 

[MRC_Hans]

So code is just a name we use to describe certain physical processes then, correct?

To be quite precise, "code" is the rules that these processes work by.

My interpretation of this is you believe, simply put, that mental phenomena is just the physical processes that comprise certain parts of the brain. Please do correct me if I'm wrong.

Correct.

So Hans, tell me this then, why is it that the mental image I perceive of a white cat in my mind has no resemblance whatsoever to my brain or any part of it?

What?? Why should it resemble you brain? Look at the screen in front of you right now. What do you see? What you see is indisputably the result of a process in your computer (requiering code ). Do you think it looks like any part of the working part of your computer? I can tell you it doesn't.

Let's even assume that in the future I can actually look at the parts of my brain, using super advanced MRI technology, which comprise my mental images. What do I need to do to see the 'mental' stuff. Do I need to magnify the image more?? Should I shrink it?? Look at it from a particular angle?? In my mind I see a complete mental image, not just a grey blob or cells or atoms, but if I interpretted your theory correctly (that mind is matter) then I should be able to observe something with at least some similar qualities in my brain shouldn't I?

Ehhh? If you could read the exact signals in your brain, and knew the code so you could decode it, then you would see a white cat. (provided you were thinking of that).

Furthermore, if the white cat is really just a group of physical processes in my brain, how can I be 100% sure it exists when it bears no resemblance to those parts in my brain, which you claim it is?

Where on Earth did you get the idea that it should resemble your brain?????

Hans

 

[Filip Sandor]

[bad post sorry]

Be back later.

 

[Roboramma]

Who invented "2" and "+" and "4" and the logic that goes with it.. the transistors and silicon chips that make up the computer?

Human beings did. But I don't see how that matters. The system in the computer still works the same as the system in the human mind. Or, at least I can't see any reason to suggest it doesn't.

Who 'invented' our own mental hardware? Simple - no one, it evolved. But that doesn't make it any less a physical system.
In fact, given that our brains did evolve like the rest of us, and given that you would probably agree (correct me if I'm wrong) that our mental processes are more advanced than those of our 4 million year dead ancestors, how did conciousness evolve if it isn't physical?
Evolution can only work on gene frequencies, and genes can only synthesize protiens. And that can only have a physical effect on the system. I'm not sure that you accept evolution, but if so, how did conciousness evolve if it isn't physical?

I don't mean to be rude here, but I get the feeling as though you expect me to explain how computers work and everything about the nature of mental phenomena.

No worries. I don't. I'm trying to say that I can't see any difference between the way a computer works and the way our minds work. And that while I enjoy your examples, I don't agree with them. I've given my reasons for not agreeing with them. That doesn't mean I don't know anything about computers or minds, just that I don't agree with your reasoning.
And if you want to make your point clearer, you do have to say what it is about the way computers work that you see to be differing from the way minds work. Just as I'll try to say what I see as being the same, and why I find that to be so. I don't mean to be rude either if I am. I certainly don't harbour you any ill will.

Without our invention of language this text that you are reading right now would mean absolutely nothing! It would just be a bunch of confusing, black markings on your monitor, so why on earth would it mean anything to your computer??

These words might not, but the words written in a programming language, and run on the computer would. It would interpret them to binary sequences, and rules of what opporations to run. It could then when given some input come out with a result that wasn't necessarily obvious from the input.
In what way is that different from you taking observations, analysing them, and coming up with some solution? Yours may be a more complex analysis, but I don't see any observable difference between what it does and what you do. (Or I do.)

P.S. I'm gonna try and figure out exactly how logic gates work and present a comprehensive example for us to study, it's the least I can do to uphold my belief in the importance of the implications of my theory.. just give me some time cause I'm pretty busy lately, but I'll try to do it within the next couple of days.

Cool, my thanks, as my knowledge on this isn't that complete either.

 

[Piscivore]

I would interpret this statement from you to imply that you believe mental phenomena are the physical processes in the brain.

No implication necesary. I will state it outright. "Mental phenomenon are inseparable from the physical activity in the brain." As I said, this is an assertion, but it is the most parsimonous of those I've yet seen offered that is consistant with the data of which I am aware.

The fact is that I'm trying to imply the opposite so I would reserve this accusation to those people who claim that a code exists inside a physical structure (the code in this case being the 'discrete entity' within the interaction of physical processes in a physical structure).

If they were in fact asserting that this "code" existed as a discrete entity I would agree. But that's not what I'm reading.

What I am trying to show is the logical reprocusions of the fact that we can and do believe in mental phenomena (and the white cat) without any physical evidence of it.

I "believe in" mental phenomenon as a phrase we use to describe the interactions of the physical processes in our brain with each other and external stimulii. I don't consider "mental phenomenon" entities. The phrase describes a verb, not a noun.

As for your "white cat", it is a concept, "immaterial" in exactly the same way as a "cat" seen in a cloud is.

To imply that mental phenomena doesn't exist would be stretching it and I am not claiming that mental phenomena doesn't exist,

Neither am I, and I haven't heard anyone else do so either.

but to claim it is physical seems to me illogical given the fact that we can be 100% sure the mental phenomena we experience exists before we ever see any physical evidence of it.

Really? How?

It seems "illogical" to you because you have obviously already granted these "mental phenomenon" discrete existance.

Just because two phenomena correlate to each other somehow does not make them one and the same.

But at the same time you cannot assume they are not the same either. As I said, the research needed to confirm the relationship is inhumane.

This is obviously something that materialists have a very tough time digesting when it comes to the brain because it is so much more intruiging for them to talk of this hidden 'information' or 'code' substance in the brain.

As opposed to the "ghost in the machine"? I am a materialist and I have no trouble understanding what you are saying, and I hold to no postulated "code." Neither do the others. You are building a strawman by taking their analogies out of context.

Yet, oddly enough, they have no problem with this line of reasoning if the physical phenomena in question doesn't exhibit any behaviours which we might interpretted as unusually ordered or 'thinking'.

What behaviours are "unusually ordered" to you?

So why is it people believe mental phenomena is physical? This is what I don't understand.

Simple. Shut off the physical processes in the brain and the "mental phenomena" dissapears. Additionally, there are no "mental phenomena" observable absent some physical process.

Why do you insist "mental phenomena" are not physical- apart from the wish for something to survive the eventuality of your body ceasing function?

 

[Filip Sandor]

Simple. Shut off the physical processes in the brain and the "mental phenomena" dissapears. Additionally, there are no "mental phenomena" observable absent some physical process.

It simply amazes me how casually you guys talk of mental phenomena and physical phenomena in the brain being two separate things and then claim they are one and the same thing. It also amazes me that none of you have given physical proof of mental phenomena or a valid physical theory of it, yet you collectively believe that you have! I have to say, it is truly amazing me how the materialist mind works.

Please spare me the criticisms, 50% of what you guys say should be investigated by you and not by me since I am not the ignorant one. I also don't get why you people keep asking me stupid questions repeatedly, like why I would believe that mental phenomena should resemble the physical phenomena in the brain when it is your own theories that imply this.

I understand if talking with too many paranormalists can make you go a little mad yourself. So if that's case, this debate needn't continue. If on the other hand you consider yourself competent enough to follow along without getting lost and having random outbursts of cynical arguements then let's continue.

So far we have heard that:

Mental phenomena is the code inside the brain.
Mental phenomena is what happens inside the brain.
Mental phenomena is a product of what happens in the brain.

Plus a few others, but let's start with these.

Mental phenomena is the code inside the brain.

We know from this statement that whatever the 'code' is, it is assumed to be physcally inside the brain (since this theory comes from a materialist).

Here are a couple definitions that have been given to the term code so far:

- A system that maps input to output in an algorithmic way. (MRC_Hans)

- Logical processes applied to inputs (by a computer for example). (Roboramma)

Let's analyse each one of these:

A system that maps input to output in an algorithmic way. (MRC_Hans)[/quote]

Does anybody see a problem with this definition? Well I do!

It refers to a "System" (the parts of the 'system' are lacking a physical definition - not even basic description is given) which "maps" (again, it is not known what is meant physically by "mapping") in an "algorithmic" way (another term without any physical definition or description). Apparently, most of you seem to believe this constitutes physical evidence or a valid physical theory of 'code'.

Hans, maybe you care to elaborate on the actual physical aspects of those terms!

Next we have: Logical processes applied to inputs (inside a computer for example). (Roboramma)

No physical definition of 'logical processes' has been given, once again, it is simply assumed that the logical processes are physical. Unfortunately this does not constitute physical evidence of 'code', nor does it qualify as a valid physical theory, since 'logical processes' have not been physically defined.

Both of the definitions above use terms that have not been physically defined. Now I know this may come as a shock to some of you, but in order to prove that 'code' is physical we actually need a physical description of it.

So those theories are both FALSE.

Next we have: Mental phenomena is what happens in the brain.

I assume this is referring to the actual brain itself - and what it does in any given amount of time. However, no distinction is made between mental phenomena and the physical processes in the brain; except a singular phenomena is given two names, for no apparent reason. Why not just call it 'what happens in the brain'? As far as I know it doesn't make any sense to call one thing by two names without making some distinction as to why it should be called by two names unless it is for the purpose of communicating the idea in a different language, which is apparently not the case here.

Ok, next definition: Mental phenomena is a product of what happens in the brain.

I do not see a physical description of the 'product' in this definition or any valid physical theory that depicts the 'product' so this is a logical fallacy. Please do correct me if I am wrong (by showing me why I am wrong).

So far I have seen no logically coherent, physical description of mental phenomena. If I have missed something, please point it out to me. In other words, don't tell me I am ignorant or that I don't seem to undertsand what anyone is saying - point me to the physical evidence you speak of, which has not been refuted yet in this post!

 

[Piscivore]

It simply amazes me how casually you guys talk of mental phenomena and physical phenomena in the brain being two separate things and then claim they are one and the same thing.

I didn't say "Mental phenomena" and "physical phenomena in the brain" are the same thing- I don't remember mentioning "physical phenomena in the brain" at all, because such a term is very vague. I said that what most people, especially imaterialists and wannabe mystics call "mental phenomena", are nothing more that the interaction of the physical processes (see the different word there?)- the brain's electrochemical reactions.

It also amazes me that none of you have given physical proof of mental phenomena or a valid physical theory of it, yet you collectively believe that you have!

Who claimed to? I said "mental phenomena are a description of an interaction of the physical processes". Can you give physical proof of an argument? Of "love"? Of course not. Yet yu do not seem eager to present those as "imaterial" entities. Why not? Why not just go full-blown Platonic Idealist while you are at it?

I have to say, it is truly amazing me how the materialist mind works.

Yes, it is. You might try studying it instead of trying to make sh1t up about "proving" your ghost in the machine.

I also don't get why you people keep asking me stupid questions repeatedly, like why I would believe that mental phenomena should resemble the physical phenomena in the brain when it is your own theories that imply this.

I didn't ask you that. I asked you:
1) How can we be 100% sure the mental phenomena we experience exists before we ever see any physical evidence of it.

2) What behaviours are "unusually ordered" to you?

3) What is the difference between your "non-material mental phenomena" and the idea of a soul?

And I'll add another:

4) What do you consider the difference to be between "mental phenomena" and "physical phenomena"? If "mental phenomena" are meant to be imaterial as you claim, then there must be some difference, yes?

I understand if talking with too many paranormalists can make you go a little mad yourself.

That's not what did it.

So if that's case, this debate needn't continue. If on the other hand you consider yourself competent enough to follow along without getting lost and having random outbursts of cynical arguements then let's continue.

I don't think that I've been cynical as yet.

So far we have heard that:

Mental phenomena is the code inside the brain.
Mental phenomena is what happens inside the brain.
Mental phenomena is a product of what happens in the brain.

I didn't say any of these things, so if you would like to continue this discussion you'll have to leave off burning strawmen and address what I did say.

If any of the other posters feel as if these statements accurately reflect their assertions- and from what I read they do not- then they'll have to deal with them. I personally do not agree with any of those statements: number one is an imaterialist assertion- the "ghost in the machine", number two is a description of the physical processes alone, and number three again assumes that the "mental phenomena" are an entity unto themselves.

 

[Roboramma]

- Logical processes applied to inputs (by a computer for example). (Roboramma)

Are you suggesting that computers don't apply logical processes to inputs in order to create outputs?
Or are you accepting that they do and suggesting that our brains don't?
I'm not trying to be rude, just want to clarify before I start arguing with you about something you may not have said.