Where is your experience?

[Lowpro]

So, in your opinion, one thing is "consciousness" and another, related but different is "mind"? And "consciousness" happens in or at the "mind"? I don't see any reason to make a distinction. I believe this is kind of a reminiscent of dualism approaches, and that it is based on naive realism. Ultimately, both the brain+body and the environment are unified in the experience, and I choose monism anytime instead of dualism. Now, no, I'm not saying I'm a monist, as that would mean that I ascribe myself to an ontology, and I believe ontology is moot. Maybe another look to what Model Dependent Realism is would clarify this for you.

MEANWHILE, there's an actual physical relation within the brain that begets consciousness that I am talking about. It's not about the content of the experience, it's about what the reactions in the brain are doing; THAT is what consciousness arises from. You can call it the mind; what determines self is via the content and experiences. That's not what consciousness is though. You can think of consciousness as the studied neurological process involved in summating stimuli (the stuff that's actually going on in your head). When you invoke the mind, you're invoking the experiences and these experiences develop your brain, which makes it personal and subjective. I would actually consider the idea of a "self" to be naive.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

I am in two places, my body and sense organs are in the train, my brain and the experiences are in the vat.

I say that the processing is the experience. Therefore I am in the vat. I would no more be on teh train than if I was using a web cam and waldoes.

And I do better when I have Chrome to correct my spelling.

This is what is contradictory, maybe, maybe, its a problem with semantics, I'm not sure. But I strongly believe this is a misunderstanding coming from a BELIEF. Now, things get worst because, IMO, most people is confused when trying to separate beliefs from facts.

The misunderstanding can be traced to a "fallacy in rhetoric" in this case, I believe your claim is theoretical, while mine is factual. Let's get to the core of this. For me, a fact is an objective and verifiable observation. With this in mind, it is obvious that the fact is that your experience (in any practical sense) is at the train, as you would report, and casual observers would report.

Now, that you have knowledge, regarding that the "processing" (so to speak) is done in another place, is another thing. The actual you, is at the train.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

That depends, my physical body and brain is at the KVM interface. Yes. *I* am at the local machine using the KVM interface.

Exactly, the argument ends there.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

MEANWHILE, there's an actual physical relation within the brain that begets consciousness that I am talking about. It's not about the content of the experience, it's about what the reactions in the brain are doing; THAT is what consciousness arises from. You can call it the mind; what determines self is via the content and experiences. That's not what consciousness is though. You can think of consciousness as the studied neurological process involved in summating stimuli (the stuff that's actually going on in your head). When you invoke the mind, you're invoking the experiences and these experiences develop your brain, which makes it personal and subjective. I would actually consider the idea of a "self" to be naive.

I still believe that the (arbitrary) distinction between "the content" of the experience and the "experience itself" is unnecessarily. Consciousness arise FROM THE PROCESS that occurs between the body and the environment. Now, sure, the brain is an essential component, as much as the rest of the body AND the environment. The idea of a "self" is a construct, that's for sure, but I'm not sure about calling it naive.

 

[Lowpro]

I still believe that the (arbitrary) distinction between "the content" of the experience and the "experience itself" is unnecessarily. Consciousness arise FROM THE PROCESS that occurs between the body and the environment. Now, sure, the brain is an essential component, as much as the rest of the body AND the environment. The idea of a "self" is a construct, that's for sure, but I'm not sure about calling it naive.

That is not necessarily true depending on your definition of consciousness. There is plenty with regard to consciousness that occur within just CNS; body and environment take a back seat ( I would also argue that history/memory of environment(s) play a huge role...since they do, particularly in brain development). SURE, you won't have as robust a consciousness because you're lacking the stimulation of faculties (maybe more depending on how developed the brain is before we sever communication with the body...). If you define consciousness as being created via experience, then the body will have a lot to do with it; luckily we can do better when it comes to describing the phenomenon. It's why I mentioned you should read more about neurology/neuroanatomy.

And I agree that there is little distinction between the content and the experience, but I don't believe I was arguing for such a distinction. The brain will have a consciousness without the experiences derived from the body's stimuli, that much we know. It won't be as robust as those with a body, but it's still there. The correlates are there by virtue of development and they're being stimulated within the CNS; there are physiological responses within both CNS and PNS that exacerbate some stimuli and even inhibit others, but they aren't defunct either.

I would find it hard to argue for a "self" that is not naive though =\ self is referential; completely naive...unless again we find ourselves struggling to define what "self" is...

 

[PixyMisa]

I still believe that the (arbitrary) distinction between "the content" of the experience and the "experience itself" is unnecessarily. Consciousness arise FROM THE PROCESS that occurs between the body and the environment. Now, sure, the brain is an essential component, as much as the rest of the body AND the environment. The idea of a "self" is a construct, that's for sure, but I'm not sure about calling it naive.

Nope. It's the brain. You need a body of some sort to keep the brain alive; you need information of some sort. But the body and the information aren't involved in the process.

 

[punshhh]

That makes complete sense.

(Well, I'd prefer the term model rather than projection, but no other objections.)

I used the word projection for a reason, its not a model.

The conscious experience is projected as a 3D overlay into/over the sensory apparatus.

 

[H'ethetheth]

I still believe that the (arbitrary) distinction between "the content" of the experience and the "experience itself" is unnecessarily. Consciousness arise FROM THE PROCESS that occurs between the body and the environment. Now, sure, the brain is an essential component, as much as the rest of the body AND the environment. The idea of a "self" is a construct, that's for sure, but I'm not sure about calling it naive.

Okay, another try at clarifying my position on this.

My mind interacts with the universe where my 'sensors' and 'actuators' are. That is, I would say that I am where my body interacts with the universe, but my consciousness, being a collection of processes that happen exclusively in my brain, is therefore in my brain. In your example, these locations are not identical.

Luckily, they usually coincide.

 

[Mashuna]

Irrelevant. I believe you lost the arguments at some point. Let's do it again. If you are the one with his brain in a vat, and your body was traveling with me in the train... where would YOU consider YOU would be? If I asked you to point at yourself, what would YOU do? Remember, you don't know the surgical procedure happened, and are completely unaware of the fact that your brain is not on your head.

Now, as far as your objections, you fail to realize that they are no less speculative than mine. A brain alone, disconnected from any sensorial aparatus/body, would be unable to develop or sustain consciousness. That's what I believe... and your stance is a belief too.

Again, I have not argued at any point about the brain is not necessary to consciousness, I argue that it is a necessary condition but not sufficient.

I can see the belief that a brain alone would be unable to develop consciousness, but not to be able to sustain consciousness is a bit more of a reach for me. To take your train scenario as an example, if there were a 30 minute break between the brain in a vat and the body on the train, is it your contention that the brain would effectively shut down (in a general anaesthetic manner) until reconnected, rather than continue to process and think in a normal manner, albeit without sensory input?

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

Regarding your last point. Yes, organisms developed senses and CNS in order to interact with the environment. It is logical to assume that they are all interconnected and are mutually dependent. Consciousness cannot arise if something is missing.

Well yes, biologically speaking, the development of a nervous system (and a brain) is probably highly connected with motricity. Plants don’t move, nor do they need a brain. The tunicate is a good example:

The larval forms of tunicates or ‘sea squirts’ (Ascidiacea), equipped with a ganglion containing approximately 300 cells, go through a brief phase of free swimming. Upon finding a suitable substrate, the larva buries its head into the selected location and becomes sessile. Then it absorbs most of its small brain and nervous system and returns to a rather primitive condition.

However, once we have an organism capable of experiencing in the way humans do, your model becomes somewhat problematic (i.e., once we have such a system up and running, which also indicates it has developed sufficient levels of “systemic autonomy”).

Again, sensory deprivation seems to alter experiencing – we could talk about altered states of consciousness, if you wish. But that does not mean loss of consciousness. So, the reduction of extrospective stimulation and motor activity alters experiencing, but does not terminate it. Rather, it appears that the brain starts to “fill in” or “compensate” for the change (we start to hallucinate). This is one example that seems to go against your model. It seems that the internal brain processing involved in experience-production could be more autonomous than what your model suggests, at least in regards to short time spans.

And, yet again, take the case of general anaesthesia (or deep dreamless sleep): it does not terminate the sensory system in and of itself; it alters the way sensory input is processed further up in the chain (it might be considered as suppression of sensory information processing in the brain). The causal chain does not have to be in accordance to how your model would present it: rather than sensory reduction causing unconsciousness, it seems that unconsciousness is caused by alteration in brain processing, which in turns results in the suppression of sensory information processing (which is why we don’t feel pain during surgery).

Hence … It seems to me that your model is more useful when looking at biological/evolutionary development of conscious experiencing in organisms in general, than when we are looking at already fully functioning organisms with highly complex brain functioning, like humans. The latter scenario needs another viewpoint; another model is probably more useful when tackling the consciousness-unconsciousness problem.

 

[Dancing David]

This is what is contradictory, maybe, maybe, its a problem with semantics, I'm not sure. But I strongly believe this is a misunderstanding coming from a BELIEF. Now, things get worst because, IMO, most people is confused when trying to separate beliefs from facts.

The misunderstanding can be traced to a "fallacy in rhetoric" in this case, I believe your claim is theoretical, while mine is factual. Let's get to the core of this. For me, a fact is an objective and verifiable observation. With this in mind, it is obvious that the fact is that your experience (in any practical sense) is at the train, as you would report, and casual observers would report.

Now, that you have knowledge, regarding that the "processing" (so to speak) is done in another place, is another thing. The actual you, is at the train.

And that is rhetorical, the actual events that create the perceptions occur in the brain.

 

[Dancing David]

Exactly, the argument ends there.

No, that does not apply to the train and brain, so it does not.

 

[TeapotCavalry]

Well, the whole body is sensible, from toe to head. Every part of it, with more or less detail, is able to provide sensations of temperature, density, texture, pain, etc. So, if the whole body is the source of the experiences, and consciousness is based on them, it is logical to assume that the whole body is part of it.

Yes, part of it - the part that does the input. This is the task of the body, to provide sensory input. The brain is where it all is put together into a subjective experience.

I see no mystery. In the computer example, no, the CPU does nothing UNLESS IT IS CONNECTED TO THE REST OF THE COMPUTER. Otherwise, is just a collection of transistors.

This is where this analogy reaches its limits. A brain is more than just a cpu, it is also a RAM and hard drive. Obviously brain has evolved to deal with sensory input, so I honestly don't know what would happen to a brain that was born without any sense data at all. But a brain that already has some data, it has no need for a body (except to keep him alive, but in this hypothetical that's already covered). Take isolation tanks for example. The reduction of sensory input does not lower the consciousness, in fact, if anything, it does the opposite. Or a better way to say is it alters it.

LOL! You have to resort to "how things really..:" I know, the temptation is way to big. The problem (AND THIS GOES FOR EVERYONE IN THE DISCUSSION) is that we are accustomed to have an ontology, we are used to take for granted that there most be an ontology. Well, my ideas are based on the assumption that we don't need any ontology, which, of course, its perfectly compatible with Model Dependent Realism. That said, some philosophers of mind have worked on the same model you rise, differenciating the "content" of the experience from the experience. IMO, this is nonsensical. The experience is based, per definition, on its contents.

The experience is based on its content, if by "based" you mean what's it about. The experience itself is something else. It's like a roll of film. The roll itself is not what it projects. So the mind puts together the content of the experience into a roll that it plays to itself.

I understand your point, mine is exactly the opposite; The ONLY thing we have, is our subjectivity. We live immerse in our EXPERIENCE, not in "the universe" as this last one is a construct (a model) designed to accommodate the experience. Again, I most point to Model Dependent Realism articles in order for this to be clearer.

I think it's a matter of living in our world to realize that all what you know might not be true (if there is no "really" in your philosophy, as I understand it, is there a "true/truth"?) and your sense input can not be the sole arbiter of real vs non-real. Apart from we having scenarios showing it to be non-functional model for reality (hallucinations, illusions), it would make science nonsensical. This view is solipsistic.

Regarding your last sentence, I argue that the magic happens where the brain meets the senses, not before, not after.

By "where" I presume you meant "when" (otherwise it's a nonsense statement to me). So, simultaneously? I simply don't think that's true. And the original question was, after all, "where", not "when". It takes place in the brain. After the sensory input has reached the brain.

Because those problems only arise if we sustain some form of naive realism.

Just to be clear, I don't sustain any form of naive realism, as I have pointed out. And these hypotheticals can be brought forward with any philosophy that distinguishes between and acknowledges objectivity and subjectivity.

Ultimately, there are no "truths". Either our models represent the observations or they do not. But if another model represents the same observations we cannot determine if one model is "better" than the other. It is a futile exercise.

In that context I see no practical difference between "truth" and "ability to represent the observations".

Not solipsistic at all, there are other beings around us, from animals to other humans and (most likely) other forms of life in the universe. Regarding Ben, yes, it is true, FOR HIM FB does not exists. If he is introduced to it, merely by someone talking about it, at that point he is presented with the first clue, or evidence, that might lead him to experience it.

Sure, you would say that it is matter of incomplete knowledge, and that FB "really exists"... and again, I would bring Model Dependent Realism to the table

Ok. The thing here is that you have as many sets of realities as you have subjective observers. I would solve this problem with applying a simple everyday label "lack of knowledge", but according to you there is no such thing, there are only models, each one as true as the next one, they simply represent different observations. Is that correct?

As a sidenote:I haven't read up on model dependent realism, I've been going on only what you've said here. At this point, it seems... impractical.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

I'm going to answer all later today, nevertheless (and meanwhile), I believe that an important point is that most people is confusing the place where the iterations between "sensed inputs" and "body actuators" are "computed" with the actual place where "the action" takes place. But, the self only arises (and I believe it can only arise) where the action takes place, and this is the place where the body is.

 

[dlorde]

I can see the belief that a brain alone would be unable to develop consciousness, but not to be able to sustain consciousness is a bit more of a reach for me.

Yes; from what I've heard of neural networks, and the effects of various kinds of sensory deprivation, I would expect the brain of a conscious subject, when deprived of sensory input, to generate 'phantom' sensations arising from neural 'noise', especially from unsolicited firings of neurons, in first stage afferent processing, deprived of the usual stimulus. So I would expect the subject to continue to be conscious, but in an increasingly confused and disoriented state. For how long this state could be considered conscious, and whether it would stabilise or degenerate, I doubt we'll ever know (how could we, unless the deprivation was reversible?).

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

The brain will have a consciousness without the experiences derived from the body's stimuli, that much we know. It won't be as robust as those with a body, but it's still there. The correlates are there by virtue of development and they're being stimulated within the CNS; there are physiological responses within both CNS and PNS that exacerbate some stimuli and even inhibit others, but they aren't defunct either.

What do you mean by consciousness I guess. I also have no idea what you mean by "robust", in which sense, in relation to what, how is quantified, who decides what is robust enough, and so on. There are no brains without bodies, ergo, as far as I can see, this is just speculation from your part. What do you count as "consciousness" is the tricky part of course. If you read, from the outside, the responses at neuronal level, you might say that there is activity (and I would of course agree), but what type of activity can be labeled as conscious and what doesn't?

I would find it hard to argue for a "self" that is not naive though =\ self is referential; completely naive...unless again we find ourselves struggling to define what "self" is...

Exactly, I hardly see the naiveness you are referring to. YOUR WHOLE WORLD lives only in your self. It only exists there.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Okay, another try at clarifying my position on this.

My mind interacts with the universe where my 'sensors' and 'actuators' are. That is, I would say that I am where my body interacts with the universe, but my consciousness, being a collection of processes that happen exclusively in my brain, is therefore in my brain. In your example, these locations are not identical.

Luckily, they usually coincide.

Exactly, they usually coincide, that is why we have so much trouble with this mental exercise. You started ok, your MIND interacts with the world where the sensors and actuators are. This is where YOU are, this is your consciousness. That some processes are needed in order to raise it, and those need more elements, is correct, but your consciousness is where you are.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

I can see the belief that a brain alone would be unable to develop consciousness, but not to be able to sustain consciousness is a bit more of a reach for me. To take your train scenario as an example, if there were a 30 minute break between the brain in a vat and the body on the train, is it your contention that the brain would effectively shut down (in a general anaesthetic manner) until reconnected, rather than continue to process and think in a normal manner, albeit without sensory input?

Interesting. I believe I have to agree. The body would remain inert, like in a vegetative state, without any kind of consciousness. No one knows what would happen to the brain... I believe the general consensus is that it will still retain some imagery, for a time, but my guess is that it would cease to have experiences at some point.

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

Well yes, biologically speaking, the development of a nervous system (and a brain) is probably highly connected with motricity. Plants don’t move, nor do they need a brain.

Exactly.

Again, sensory deprivation seems to alter experiencing – we could talk about altered states of consciousness, if you wish. But that does not mean loss of consciousness. So, the reduction of extrospective stimulation and motor activity alters experiencing, but does not terminate it. Rather, it appears that the brain starts to “fill in” or “compensate” for the change (we start to hallucinate). This is one example that seems to go against your model. It seems that the internal brain processing involved in experience-production could be more autonomous than what your model suggests, at least in regards to short time spans.

I believe there is no evidence for that. For instance, even when someone had an accident and loses body sensations and motor ability, the spine and remaining senses are enough to "feed" the brain the necessary data for keeping it functioning in a recognizable way. Isolation chambers, and the experiments regarding sense deprivation. Are also incomplete and rather primitive ways to attempt to cut sensory input to the brain.

Now, when we do have complete control, apparently the brain "shuts down" the conscious process, like in the well known phenomena called Ganzfeld effect, in which people staring at an undifferentiated white starts at some point to see black (the brain become effectively blind)

And, yet again, take the case of general anaesthesia (or deep dreamless sleep): it does not terminate the sensory system in and of itself; it alters the way sensory input is processed further up in the chain (it might be considered as suppression of sensory information processing in the brain). The causal chain does not have to be in accordance to how your model would present it: rather than sensory reduction causing unconsciousness, it seems that unconsciousness is caused by alteration in brain processing, which in turns results in the suppression of sensory information processing (which is why we don’t feel pain during surgery).

Still, for me the general anesthesia its a better example, as the pathways normally used to feed the brain with information apparently shut down. Nobody understands fully what happens during the anesthesia, but even externally, seems that consciousness is completely gone, the body doesn't show any reflexes. Even corneal reflex is gone (and the brain continues to function, this is why I don't believe, like others in this thread, that the brain alone can have experiences).

 

[Bodhi Dharma Zen]

And that is rhetorical, the actual events that create the perceptions occur in the brain.

The processing occurs at the brain, not consciousness. Consciousness occurs where the senses/actuators are.