what's the difference between "knowledge" and "belief"?

[mijopaalmc]

I'm familiar with Gettier. It's an unusual little quirk that almost never applies when we talk about beliefs and knowledge. It is interesting though.

Seems like mistaken beliefs—either in truth or in justification—are a rather large and important class of statements that are questionably not knowledge.

However, the discussion in this thread has, for the most part, been nonsense. It's not even getting the basics right. Most important of all, I think, is that knowledge is in the category of belief. In other words, how can I know that which I do not accept as true? If we can't agree on that, then I don't see any point in addressing the fiddly bits.

Perhaps, because your belief that the Gettier problem are "fiddly bits" is itself only a belief and not knowledge.

 

[I Am The Scum]

Perhaps, because your belief that the Gettier problem are "fiddly bits" is itself only a belief and not knowledge.

Could be.

Do you agree that knowledge is in the category of beliefs?

 

[mijopaalmc]

Could be.

Do you agree that knowledge is in the category of beliefs?

Yes, but I'm sure you can see that whether belief is a necessary condition for knowledge is irrelevant to objection that either truth or justification may be neither sufficient nor necessary, especially since the Gettier problems elaborate on those specific conditions, not the belief condition.

 

[Tricky]

The line is fuzzy. Knowledge can be a belief, for example, I know gravity works. I also believe it. But not all beliefs are knowledge. Here's a hierarchy I wrote some time ago: The closer to the top of the hierarchy, the more reliable the belief.

***
I) Beliefs based on empirical evidence
___1) Based on personally observed empirical evidence
______a) Evidence is always the same (e.g. “gravity works”)
______b) Evidence is often the same (e.g. “aspirin works”)
______c) Evidence is reliable more than half the time (e.g. “dark clouds mean rain”)

___2) Based on reliable studies
______a) Large volumes of consistent evidence (e.g. “germ theory of disease”)
______b) Smaller volumes of consistent evidence (e.g. “polio vaccine works”)
______c) Inconsistent but with predominance of evidence (e.g. “global warming”)

II) Beliefs based on moral code
___1) Unshakable moral beliefs (e.g. “murder is bad”)
___2) Conditional moral beliefs (e.g. “lying is bad, unless you are a POW being questioned”)
___3) Variable moral beliefs. (e.g. “homosexuals are bad, except the ones I know and like personally”)

III) Beliefs based on faith
___1) Witnessing
______a) Personally witnessing phenomena you cannot explain but by faith
______b) Anecdotal accounts of phenomena you cannot explain but by faith

___2) Based on teachings of a person of faith that you respect.
___3) Based on a feeling that “it must be so”.

 

[mijopaalmc]

And where mathematical theorems and logical systems fit into such a taxonomy of knowledge?

 

[Wowbagger]

However, if I said, there are X number of atoms in my body (fact) and I believe that there are X number of atoms in my body (thought) and I based this on a reading from my Atom-o-reader (justification) then I have knowledge.

I don't disagree that those would can be used in that way.

But, I also suspect that is not what is intended by the opening post.

When someone asks "What is the difference between 'knowledge' and 'belief'?", they seem to typically mean: "How can we tell the difference between what constitutes a piece of knowledge vs. a belief?" (as nouns).

These are words that are, too often, used interchangeably: It is too easy to claim that a belief is "true knowledge", and for someone to dismiss a piece of knowledge as "mere belief".

So, in that context, it pays to communicate the difference as concisely as possible, whenever someone asks. That is what I was trying to do.



Your usage of the word is merely an alternative meaning. I don't think it is a helpful one for the purposes of this thread. But, it is generally useful in other contexts.



Imagine this conversation:

"What does 'literally' mean?"

"It denotes that something was actually done, in the strictest sense; as opposed to a loose usage of the term, such as an exaggeration or sarcasm."

"That is not true! I just heard someone say 'My head literally exploded!', even though it did not really do so!"

"Ah, that would be an alternative usage, then. They are, rather ironically, using the term sarcastically."

"That is not satisfying to me! If someone's head really did explode, they would say 'really did'! They would not even use the term 'literally', anymore. And, also: that is not even what 'ironic' is supposed to mean! Just what kind of language maven do you think you are?!"

Eh, language changes, and words can be very context heavy. That is what this seems to boil down to.

 

[angrysoba]

NM

 

[lenny]

And where mathematical theorems and logical systems fit into such a taxonomy of knowledge?

in the tautology category: trivially consistent conditioned on a set a agreed assumptions.

and how do mathematical theorems relate to our knowledge vs belief regarding the real world? (distinction defined a la Wowbagger's post)

 

[mijopaalmc]

in the tautology category: trivially consistent conditioned on a set a agreed assumptions.

Except that Tricky's taxonomy contains no such category. In fact, all of Tricky's taxonomic categories relate to statements with respect to empirical verification.

and how do mathematical theorems relate to our knowledge vs belief regarding the real world? (distinction defined a la Wowbagger's post)

Presumably he is attempting to be descriptive of the usage of the word "knowledge", and, by not explicitly including mathematical theorems and logical systems, he is not addressing a huge class of statements that are commonly referenced as "knowledge".

 

[lenny]

by not explicitly including mathematical theorems and logical systems, he is not addressing a huge class of statements that are commonly referenced as "knowledge".

understood. agreed. while i personally tend to speak as if i held maths to be knowledge, i am happy to follow whatever convention the thread agrees (for the sake of discussion).

In fact, all of Tricky's taxonomic categories relate to statements with respect to empirical verification.

i do not mind discussing this (sub)category. i am not clear on how empirical evaluation could ever lead to JTB in the physical sciences, which include another huge class of statements that are commonly referenced as "knowledge".

(i think i get the sheep behind the hill story).

 

[Wowbagger]

Presumably he is attempting to be descriptive of the usage of the word "knowledge", and, by not explicitly including mathematical theorems and logical systems, he is not addressing a huge class of statements that are commonly referenced as "knowledge".

I think that if mathematical theorems and logical systems are reliable, they can be considered a form of knowledge. Knowledge does not need to be only empirical facts.

Though, it is possible to demonstrate logic and math is correct or not, empirically.

 

[mijopaalmc]

Though, it is possible to demonstrate logic and math is correct or not, empirically.

Really? How?

Please describe with an experiment to test the law of the excluded middle.

 

[mijopaalmc]

I thought what the OP asked for was a description of what knowledge is, not prescription for what knowledge should be. So far, most of the posts have been of the latter variety adding the requirement that knowledge should be empirically verifiable seemingly echoing the logical empricist/logical positivist verification priciple of meaning without any acknowledge of the problems inherent to such a definition that have been common knowledge since the early 20th century.

 

[Wowbagger]

Please describe with an experiment to test the law of the excluded middle.

Any concepts in logic that are found to persistently lead to unreliable conclusions would not work so well as a form of 'knowledge'.

I do not know enough about the Law of the Excluded Middle, to tell you how reliable it is. But:

If the Law were to persistently yield results that are not accurate, according to empirical tests, then the Law would not be considered knowledge, no matter how obvious it was within the realm of logic.

If the Law turns out to be useful, in obtaining reliable, productive results, then it stays on as piece of knowledge.

Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the conclusions deduced by logic can be empirically tested. And, by extension, the logical concepts behind them.

I thought what the OP asked for was a description of what knowledge is, not prescription for what knowledge should be.

When the term is used honestly, I don't think there is a difference.

So far, most of the posts have been of the latter variety adding the requirement that knowledge should be empirically verifiable seemingly echoing the logical empricist/logical positivist verification priciple of meaning without any acknowledge of the problems inherent to such a definition that have been common knowledge since the early 20th century.

There are ideas that are claimed to be knowledge, but aren't. How do we know? We put it to some kind of test: Empirical or mathematical proof, etc. Something that will demonstrate reliability.

 

[mijopaalmc]

Any concepts in logic that are found to persistently lead to unreliable conclusions would not work so well as a form of 'knowledge'.

I do not know enough about the Law of the Excluded Middle, to tell you how reliable it is. But:

If the Law were to persistently yield results that are not accurate, according to empirical tests, then the Law would not be considered knowledge, no matter how obvious it was within the realm of logic.

If the Law turns out to be useful, in obtaining reliable, productive results, then it stays on as piece of knowledge.

Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that the conclusions deduced by logic can be empirically tested. And, by extension, the logical concepts behind them.

Except the question still remains about whether such tests invalidate the logic as a logic or just as a way of reasoning about the particular empirical phenomena under examination.

When the term is used honestly, I don't think there is a difference.

It's always ironic when "honestly" is used dishonestly.

There are ideas that are claimed to be knowledge, but aren't. How do we know? We put it to some kind of test: Empirical or mathematical proof, etc. Something that will demonstrate reliability.

And yet you haven't demonstrated that empirical "proof" and logical proof actually provide justification in ways which are mutually comparable.

Would you say that, for instance, the definitionof "knowledge" itself constitutes knowledge?

 

[lenny]

Any concepts in logic that are found to persistently lead to unreliable conclusions would not work so well as a form of 'knowledge'.

in mathematics, there are many many things that do not apply (yet) to anything in the world. yet they are still as much a part of maths as those results which have proven useful (and do not "persistently lead to unreliable conclusions").

nothing within mathematics itself distinguishes one type of result from the other. i think you have to take them all or exclude them all. what do you prefer?

 

[mijopaalmc]

in mathematics, there are many many things that do not apply (yet) to anything in the world. yet they are still as much a part of maths as those results which have proven useful (and do not "persistently lead to unreliable conclusions").

nothing within mathematics itself distinguishes one type of result from the other. i think you have to take them all or exclude them all. what do you prefer?

That's the point that I was making: that certain physical phenomena may not obey the laws of, for instance, classical logic doesn't necessarily invalidate any of the theorems of classical logic. Instead, it means that it is possible that classical logic is a poor logical system for reasoning about such physical phenomena.

 

[Wowbagger]

I think this thread is getting off-topic. Perhaps we can discuss the matter of 'reliability of logic' in a new thread?

I agree that logic and math can be a form of knowledge, no matter who's definition we are using, here. So, there's no point in debating that angle so much.

 

[mijopaalmc]

I think this thread is getting off-topic. Perhaps we can discuss the matter of 'reliability of logic' in a new thread?

I agree that logic and math can be a form of knowledge, no matter who's definition we are using, here. So, there's no point in debating that angle so much.

Except that you have yet to demonstrate "reliability" does not have some sort of empirical component, which is why other posters have objected to your assertion that "reliability" is a necessary condition for knowledge. How you consider logical theorems to be knowledge when their truth doesn't originate in their relationship to empirical evidence (i.e., their "reliability") is very much on topic in thread in which you have made "reliability" a characteristic of knowledge.

 

[Wowbagger]

Except that you have yet to demonstrate "reliability" does not have some sort of empirical component, which is why other posters have objected to your assertion that "reliability" is a necessary condition for knowledge. How you consider logical theorems to be knowledge when their truth doesn't originate in their relationship to empirical evidence (i.e., their "reliability") is very much on topic in thread in which you have made "reliability" a characteristic of knowledge.

I already explained this:

I think that if mathematical theorems and logical systems are reliable, they can be considered a form of knowledge. Knowledge does not need to be only empirical facts.

Perhaps I could clarify this way:

I think that if mathematical theorems and logical systems are reliable, within the context of logic and/or math, they can be considered a form of knowledge. "Reliability" does not need to be only empirical facts, it can depend on context.​

Does that sound better?

Perhaps you are still bothered by this one:

Though, it is possible to demonstrate logic and math is correct or not, empirically.

Which I already clarified by saying "The conclusions of logic can be tested to be correct or not; and by extension the logical concepts behind it."

If this second idea is what you want to debate, then we can move it to a separate thread.