Yep "but I want magic"
If you found out this was a simulation, would you be skeptical of telepathy? Would you be skeptical of anything? Why would you be? The same thing applies with idealism and dualism.
That makes nothing that could even be mistaken for sense in bad lighting.
"If reality isn't real, I get to invoke magic."
Okay but that's what... you... are... doing.
This isn't an intellectual or philosophical or even argumentative argument. It's setting up an emotional "gotcha."
Your argument is, literally, that if you can introduce some level of doubt to the base concept of reality then the big mean skeptics would no longer be allowed to introduce doubt to whatever magic you want to invoke because... reasons.
And your response will be a showy, trying-too-hard act of angry incredulity.
No, it's not. It's an argument that a certain model of reality (materialism) has failed to explain a fundamental aspect of the world we all experience: consciousness and subjective experience.
No, it's not. It's an argument that a certain model of reality (materialism) has failed to explain a fundamental aspect of the world we all experience: consciousness and subjective experience. Nothing could be more fundamental. It doesn't appear that it will ever explain it, and the possible explanations that have been offered all fall prey to reductio absurdum. Therefore, it's not a good model of reality.
A question, if you don't mind...If you found out this was a simulation, would you be skeptical of telepathy? Would you be skeptical of anything? Why would you be? The same thing applies with idealism and dualism.
If a model of reality is deeply flawed, as I believe materialism is, then the skeptical position would be to reject such a model and embrace the consequences of non-materialistic models of reality.
No, I believe it should be obvious to anyone that materialism has failed to explain consciousness and subjective experience.
There's no question begging: materialism is a failed theory for specific reasons. No theory that fails to explain something as fundamental as consciousness and subjective experience is plausible. You can argue that that's not the case, but there's no question-begging in that assertion.
It's no different than having five suspects for a murder, and exculpatory evidence emerging that exonerates two of the suspects. The probability that one of the three remaining suspects is the murderer is going to increase. There's no way it can't.
If a model of reality allows for radical change (e.g., simulation theory), then the bar for radical changes has to be lowered.
Suppose this is all a simulation. Then we're at the mercy of the programmer(s), are we not? Living in a simulation would entail the nature of reality could change on a dime, and other crazy things become much more probable: the simulation could allow for miracles to occasionally happen, or that the simulation started five minutes ago and we all have false memories, or that miracles happen constantly but our minds are being scrubbed of the memories. It would all depend on the simulation creator.
If you found out this was a simulation, would you be skeptical of telepathy? Would you be skeptical of anything? Why would you be? The same thing applies with idealism and dualism.
If you found out this was a simulation, would you be skeptical of telepathy? Would you be skeptical of anything? Why would you be? The same thing applies with idealism and dualism.
A question, if you don't mind...
We have a number of senses. We can also send signals to others by sound, gesture and so on.
Apparently, belief in these does not go hand in hand with a metaphysical position.
They can be and are studied. But apparently that has not yielded firm conclusions about the nature of reality or consciousness.
Apparently no one expects any big, philosophical answers from the study of perception.
What makes telepathy so different?
Yes, of course I would be skeptical of telepathy.
For the simple and obvious reason that this simulation does not seem to be simulating any kind of measurable, or even observable, telepathy.
If this is a simulation, how do you know there aren't "special" simulated people walking among us who are extremely good at telepathy and only use it when they're around each other? Or when they do demonstrate it, our memories of it are simply erased? How do you even determine the odds when you have no idea what kind of simulation the programmer is running or what their motives are? Perhaps the programmers are constantly intervening on a massive level, but only when they're not being observed.
See what kind of rabbit hole simulation theory is? You can't really believe anything, if it's true. Even mundane facts like how old you are would be up for grabs.
By default, I remain equally skeptical of all these hypotheses that have so far yielded zero observations and measurements.If this is a simulation, how do you know there aren't "special" simulated people walking among us who are extremely good at telepathy and only use it when they're around each other? Or when they do demonstrate it, our memories of it are simply erased? How do you even determine the odds when you have no idea what kind of simulation the programmer is running or what their motives are? Perhaps the programmers are constantly intervening on a massive level, but only when they're not being observed.
Simulation theory is really more like simulation idea. And the rabbit hole isn't actually very deep at all. Not once you realize that "reality could totally different from what you observe!" doesn't have any practical effect on how we relate to what we do observe.See what kind of rabbit hole simulation theory is? You can't really believe anything, if it's true. Even mundane facts like how old you are would be up for grabs.
Aren't you just describing a version of "brain in a vat"?
By default, I remain equally skeptical of all these hypotheses that have so far yielded zero observations and measurements.
Simulation theory is really more like simulation idea. And the rabbit hole isn't actually very deep at all. Not once you realize that "reality could totally different from what you observe!" doesn't have any practical effect on how we relate to what we do observe.
Go ahead: Give us one practical application of the idea that telepathy may be real but unobservable.
I'm not making a practicality argument. This is a theoretical exercise on what the proper epistemic position should be regarding certain "extraordinary claims" (which I don't think are extraordinary at all).