What should Morals and Ethics be?

There's also arbitrary and Arbitrary.

I believe people should be free!

I also believe black people should be enslaved!

To believe both is necessarily to believe in a contradiction.

I can't prove that coherence should be at least one factor of a successful ethics, but I believe it should be.
 
The issue I have is your claim that because of the incontestable fact that different people and different groups have different ideas of what is moral, that it follows from that that each individual and group ought to follow those moral values.

Well I'm sure it will please you to know that this is not what I argued at all.

What I meant was essentially that you can't "should" moral values because they are the axioms. They are the ones that determine what should. To do otherwise is just to highlight disagreements between two value systems.
 
Begs the question that there should be a bridge in the first place. This isn't complex, it's fundamentally unanswerable.

Let's say that's true.

It's fundamentally unanswerable it's pointless.

Falsifiability doesn't cease to be a thing in this topic.

Questions without answers by design are fundamentally flawed.
 
Belz..., how would you adjust the following to better reflect your position?

---

Should the Nazis murder Jews?

No.

Why not? They believe they should murder Jews. Why isn't that sufficient?

Because their victims might disagree.

No. They shouldn't murder Jews because I disagree. That's how morals work.

Then we have two moralities in conflict with each other. Which one should prevail?

Should has nothing to do with it. It's about which one of the two wins, either by convincing the other to follow your values or by forcing it upon them. I mean, that's what it's always been like.

The only way you can answer a "should" question is with your own value system. So if I were to give an actual answer to your question here, the answer would be "mine".
 
Well I'm sure it will please you to know that this is not what I argued at all.

What I meant was essentially that you can't "should" moral values because they are the axioms. They are the ones that determine what should. To do otherwise is just to highlight disagreements between two value systems.

Huh? How do you square that with this?

Well my implied answer is that they should be about whatever each individual and group makes them about.
 
This ain't that hard people.

Right handers: "I can only achieve happiness by killing the left handers."
Left handers: "Well to achieve happiness I sort of need to be... yah know alive and all that jazz"

... isn't a moral question. It's a manufactured absurdity.

Unless someone really think killing Jews was the only way the Nazi could achieve happiness or if they happiness they achieve by killing them outweighed the happiness they took from the Jews by... ya know killing them.

"Maximize happiness" doesn't equate to "Just do / let happen anything anyone says makes them happy."
 
Huh? How do you square that with this?

Quite easily, actually.

As I said, you can't "should" morals. Morals are the things that "should" other things. So unless you want me to impose my morality on others, theoretically or otherwise, I can only say that morals "should" be whatever they are, and obviously people will (and probably should) act according to their own morals.

What's the issue here?
 
Quite easily, actually.

As I said, you can't "should" morals. Morals are the things that "should" other things. So unless you want me to impose my morality on others, theoretically or otherwise, I can only say that morals "should" be whatever they are, and obviously people will (and probably should) act according to their own morals.

What's the issue here?

The issue is this.

You say, people should do whatever they do.

Then, when asked, should the Nazis kill the Jews, you say:

No they shouldn't.

You have ideas about what people should do, and pretend you don't at the same time.

This is incoherent.
 
This ain't that hard people.

Right handers: "I can only achieve happiness by killing the left handers."
Left handers: "Well to achieve happiness I sort of need to be... yah know alive and all that jazz"

... isn't a moral question. It's a manufactured absurdity.

Unless someone really think killing Jews was the only way the Nazi could achieve happiness or if they happiness they achieve by killing them outweighed the happiness they took from the Jews by... ya know killing them.

"Maximize happiness" doesn't equate to "Just do / let happen anything anyone says makes them happy."

It does, however, mean making people unhappy if they get in the way of your principle of maximizing happiness.

And when did we agree that maximizing happiness was the basis of morality, anyway?

So what if Hitler sought to increase his happiness at the expense of Jewish happiness? Is that so wrong?
 
You say, people should do whatever they do.

No, that's not what I said. The question was about what morals should be about.

Then, when asked, should the Nazis kill the Jews, you say:

No they shouldn't.

Yeah, according to MY morals.

You have ideas about what people should do, and pretend you don't at the same time.

This is incoherent.

Are you seriously confused about the fact that I can have a personal opinion about something while at the same time saying that it is not an objective truth?
 
The issue is this.



You say, people should do whatever they do.



Then, when asked, should the Nazis kill the Jews, you say:



No they shouldn't.



You have ideas about what people should do, and pretend you don't at the same time.



This is incoherent.

Not necessarily. Belz is saying he thinks they shouldn't. He's not saying he's right and they're wrong. And he's not saying they should agree with him.
 
So what if Hitler sought to increase his happiness at the expense of Jewish happiness? Is that so wrong?

I'm saying it only becomes an legit moral quandary when reducing someone else happiness really is the only way for a person/group to achieve their happiness and it very, very rarely if ever is.

Bill has a toy. Ted wants the toy. They fight over it. That's only a moral quandary where we have to start weighting happiness against happiness in a world that's the only toy in existence.

Now to the base question is it "wrong" to increase your happiness at the expense of someone else?

No, not in the abstract. It's inevitable in a society where people want and need things from other people.

The problem is people see making other people unhappy as the easiest way to get to that happiness instead of other ways.

Making someone unhappy to make yourself happy when there were other options is certainly immoral.

Hitler didn't have to kill Jews to be happy.
 
Of course. Empathy is the basis of morality.
I don't agree. Empathy might have something to do with the origin (the historical contingencies of a particular field of inquiry) of morality, but it is not the basis (the logical and philosophical foundation) of morality. The earliest known mathematics were developed in order to do things like levy taxes, facilitate trade, and track celestial bodies, but it would be an error to say that any of those things are the basis of mathematics.

Empathy makes for a poor foundation on which build a normative code, not least because of the underlying presumption of ethical egoism. Empathy could only be the basis of morality if my feelings are the basis of morality, which would be an absurdly self-important thing to believe, and immediately runs into problems with the relativity of pronouns. If I reject ethical egoism, then I have no immediate use for empathy--I can just value the well-being of others directly, since I would then have to concede that there's nothing special about me.

caveman1917 said:
What other motivator of your actions would there be?
Consideration of the interests of others.

You presented a situation with two conflicting desires, the desire for good WiFi access and the desire to act ethically, and you choose to follow the latter.
I stipulated the idea that I had conflicting desires, in order to demonstrate that the idea fails either way, while making it clear that I did not in fact experience the dilemma as conflicting desires--instead, the conflict was between my desires and what I owe to others. You can, if you're a high-level Freudian, decide that I must have a desire to fulfill my obligations to others, despite the fact that I say that I don't, if you want to define "desire" as "that which motivates intentional action". But you'd then be left with a vacuous tautology--we are motivated to do that which we are motivated to do.
 
No, that's not what I said. The question was about what morals should be about.

What's the distinction between saying that the Nazis' morality should be about their killing of the Jews, and that Nazis should kill the Jews?



Yeah, according to MY morals.

Yes, and...?

To say, "I think morality should be about [insert moral beliefs here]" and "Morality should be about [insert moral beliefs here]" is really no distinction.



Are you seriously confused about the fact that I can have a personal opinion about something while at the same time saying that it is not an objective truth?

No. I am not addressing any claims of yours about objective truth.
 
Not necessarily. Belz is saying he thinks they shouldn't. He's not saying he's right and they're wrong. And he's not saying they should agree with him.

To make a moral prescription: "You shouldn't..." inherently implies that one action is right and one wrong.

The question is whether Belz thinks "It is right if you believe it, even if I don't believe it is right", which I find incoherent.

Well, I think they should, but "should" is inherently a subjective moral judgment. It has no objective value.

Huh? The Nazis should kill the Jews, now? Is this because they believe they should?

I really am confused by your position.
 
What's the distinction between saying that the Nazis' morality should be about their killing of the Jews, and that Nazis should kill the Jews?

I'm not sure where you're going with this. The Nazis' morality wasn't about that. It was about hard-right, crazy nationalism. Antisemitism was certainly part of it.

Yes, and...?

And nothing. That's the entire argument. I disagree with their moral values and their actions. It doesn't mean they were objectively wrong because such a concept is meaningless, which was my whole point.

To say, "I think morality should be about [insert moral beliefs here]" and "Morality should be about [insert moral beliefs here]" is really no distinction.

But that's not the distinction I'm making. In fact that distinction makes no sense.

The question was "what should morals be about?" Well, the answer is "they should be about what I find important, and here's what that is." But that's not very interesting because we'll never agree to that. What I said is that there's no objective answer to that.

No. I am not addressing any claims of yours about objective truth.

You are, actually, since you responded to it.
 
Huh? The Nazis should kill the Jews, now? Is this because they believe they should?

Maybe if you slowed down and read the post I was responding to in its entirety, especially the bit I quoted before responding, right until the end, you might clear up that confusion.

The question is whether Belz thinks "It is right if you believe it, even if I don't believe it is right"

Of course not. It's right if I agree with it.
 
Again not that hard.

Differences in moral codes should be tolerated, even celebrated, when they don't cause objective pain and suffering.

We not limited to "It's my way or the highway, no questions, no context allowed" and "Everything is subjective, nothing is right or wrong."
 

Back
Top Bottom