What is Volition?

[AkuManiMani]

Wait, wait, wait... Are you saying I don't choose at my own discretion?

No. I was saying there's no particular reason for any particular timing--and that you were oversimplifying things. By that I mean specifically that you are not even bothering to address the analysis. It seems you're still doing this. That's fine... I'll just call you out on it again.

The thing is, all those lines of 'analysis' can be addressed with a simple statement: "Choice is a conscious decision to perform an act and, as such, precedes the act."

This means that the subject has no choice BUT to be aware of the lifting their arm because it was their conscious choice precipitated it.

I prefer being as clear and concise possible, but since you're apparently aching for a verbose exchange I'll oblige you:

yy2bggggs: "You agreed with me earlier that there's a global workspace. A choice has been made somewhere--"pick up the apple", let's say. Let's zero in on exactly when this choice is made--the one that seems to be indeterministic to you. Now some signal somewhere in your head actually triggers picking up the apple--this is the signal that starts to go to the part of your brain responsible for reaching for the apple--what's going to actually begin triggering your motor responses. There's also a signal, probably the same one, that tells you that you just decided to reach for the apple. For you to be informed, this signal has to make it to a number of modules in the global workspace.

Now, first question: Do you not agree that these are two different things? That the act of starting to actually lift your arm, and being aware that you're going to lift your arm, is different? That one is the signal going to the specific part of your brain that controls the motor responses, and the other is just generally going to multiple other interested modules? (For example, a module capable of reporting that you've decided to pick up the apple?)"

The 'global workspace' is the area of a subject's mind that they are conscious of -- their awareness. The distal stimuli^WP of an apple enters the subjects awareness as a mental object. If the object elicits a strong enough subjective response the subject may build motivation which is probably expressed as a readiness potential^WP in the brain. The choice is then made as to whether or not the subject will interact with the object. The decision to interact or refrain originates from the subject's awareness so the subject is always directly aware of of their choice to do so. So again, the deliberate choice to act precipitates the act. If the subject does not consciously initiate the act it's involuntary.

But if you say "X is true", then I want to know how you know it's true.

In the same way that I KNOW the feeling of pain, the taste of this bowl of cereal I'm eating, or what I'm thinking: I AM DIRECTLY AWARE OF IT.

I'm uninterested in demonstrating that it's false, but that doesn't oblige me to accept that your claim that it's true holds any legitimacy.

Of course you're not obliged -- its your CHOICE whether or not to accept it. However, if you really are skeptical of my claim that my choices are indeterminate put it to the test. Either put-up or shut-up.

Its determined once some outside agency [usually a user or admin] enters a particular input.

Okay, then we're on the same page... we really are talking about the same sort of indeterminacy.

But in both the computer's case when performing a long computation, and my case when I make decisions; I'm only aware of the result when it's presented to me, and I perceive what it is. And by introspection, all I can possibly know about is what I'm aware of. Because of this, I doubt that I have the capability to distinguish between a choice being made by a deterministic part of me that I'm simply not aware of the details of, and its being made by an indeterministic part of me.

I can't speak for you, but I directly know that I consciously control what my choices are, when they are made, and how they are carried out. I directly know that I can vary them freely and arbitrary, which is why I am personally responsible for every one of them.

Are you saying that you're better than I am? If so, I'd like to learn how to be better. Please teach me.

If you don't know whats going on in your own mind thats just tough luck. You can't be taught to be self-aware any more than you can be taught how to see. You either can or you can't.

Would you be willing to argue that its possible for one to predict, to an arbitrary degree of accuracy, what a person will do? If so, what evidence do you have that this is the case?

No, not really. I believe it's possible to predict what a person would do to an arbitrary degree of accuracy, primarily, because that's the opinion that the experts in cognitive science hold, and I've no reason to believe they are wrong. I wouldn't be shocked if it were shown that indeterminacy did sneak in somewhere, though, nor do I really emotionally require only determinacy for one reason or the other.

So basically, you're accepting what you are and aren't capable of, purely on the authority of others.

But I will argue, do argue, and am arguing, that you cannot possibly know that it's impossible to predict what a person will do by introspection.

Being as how I'm the source of my thoughts and motivations [and the only one with direct access to them] I KNOW that it is impossible for you, or anyone else, to predict the choices I will make.

And it would be nice if you could actually address that argument--by simply stating how you can tell the difference between a PRNG and an RNG.

I can randomly produce numbers, therefore I know I have RNG capabilities. It's that effing simple, dude.

As far as you're concerned I might as well be an "RNG".

Even if you were, though, you wouldn't be able to know you were. Even if you were and claimed that you were, you wouldn't know you were an RNG via introspection (ob ref to Gettier Problem again). Somehow, the random nature of the thing in itself has to cause you to believe that it has random nature, and I think anything an RNG can cause you to believe by introspection, a PRNG would equally suit.

I -AM- 'the thing in itself'.

Nears I can tell, there is no "I" absent consciousness. To be unconscious is to be absent. To be dead is to be absent permanently.

But this is insufficient to establish that the "I" is consciousness in itself.

So what do you think distinguishes the "I" from consciousness?

Essentially, somewhere in your story, you have "and... poof!" (aka, indeterminism, yet somehow, still caused by you), and that's the part of your story I disagree with.

I'm sorry to tell you but "and...poof" is a feature of reality, whether you like it or not.

Your response failed to address what you responded to.

I am the source of my choices and I know, with absolute certainty, that I can generate them arbitrarily -- ex nihilo. Incidentally, modern physics happens to confirm that such processes can and do occur.

 

[Soapy Sam]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet

If anyone in the debate has not read of Libet's investigation of action potentials , I suggest it would be worth it.

 

[AkuManiMani]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet

If anyone in the debate has not read of Libet's investigation of action potentials , I suggest it would be worth it.

That study was already addressed in a previous thread. Thanks, tho

 

[!Kaggen]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Libet

If anyone in the debate has not read of Libet's investigation of action potentials , I suggest it would be worth it.

Libet defined volition in his experiment as the act performed when aware of an urge.
He made the same mistake as Pixy, he defined his terms to suite his results.
The whole point of volition is that there "is a choice".
If we are not conscious of a choice there is none and we are not testing volition.

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

Regarding Libet … there’s newer version of a test setting which is somewhat similar in design. Although here the findings seems to point to a predictability of (sometimes) up to 7 seconds for how the test subjects were going to decide. It seems unconscious preparation is used as a key term here. Decision-Making May Be Surprisingly Unconscious Activity

 

[AkuManiMani]

Regarding Libet … there’s newer version of a test setting which is somewhat similar in design. Although here the findings seems to point to a predictability of (sometimes) up to 7 seconds for how the test subjects were going to decide. It seems unconscious preparation is used as a key term here. Decision-Making May Be Surprisingly Unconscious Activity

Interestingly enough, In the article it says:

"This unprecedented prediction of a free decision was made possible by sophisticated computer programs that were trained to recognize typical brain activity patterns preceding each of the two choices. Micropatterns of activity in the frontopolar cortex were predictive of the choices even before participants knew which option they were going to choose. The decision could not be predicted perfectly, but prediction was clearly above chance. This suggests that the decision is unconsciously prepared ahead of time but the final decision might still be reversible."

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Interestingly enough, In the article it says:

"This unprecedented prediction of a free decision was made possible by sophisticated computer programs that were trained to recognize typical brain activity patterns preceding each of the two choices. Micropatterns of activity in the frontopolar cortex were predictive of the choices even before participants knew which option they were going to choose. The decision could not be predicted perfectly, but prediction was clearly above chance. This suggests that the decision is unconsciously prepared ahead of time but the final decision might still be reversible."

Your point being what? These are standard fMRI type findings. They are never absolutely clear cut since fMRI is a fairly crude measure that generally requires pooling of results. Someone needs to do this with MEG.

 

[stamenflicker]

ALL HORSES RUN A LITTLE FASTER FOR THE BUTCHER’S SON. ~ Sananda Maitreya

 

[AkuManiMani]

Your point being what? These are standard fMRI type findings. They are never absolutely clear cut since fMRI is a fairly crude measure that generally requires pooling of results. Someone needs to do this with MEG.

Erm... I've been arguing my point in every post on this thread. Whats yours?

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

Interestingly enough, In the article it says:

"This unprecedented prediction of a free decision was made possible by sophisticated computer programs that were trained to recognize typical brain activity patterns preceding each of the two choices. Micropatterns of activity in the frontopolar cortex were predictive of the choices even before participants knew which option they were going to choose. The decision could not be predicted perfectly, but prediction was clearly above chance. This suggests that the decision is unconsciously prepared ahead of time but the final decision might still be reversible."

But it’s a start, and a way for us to zoom in on the whole problem. It seems plausible that what they call unconscious preparation is necessary for the decision-making process on the empirical level, thus indirectly part of what we, on a much more abstracted philosophical level, call volition (or ‘making a decision’ as felt from a first person perspective).

I would also say that we should expect different decision-making mechanisms depending on what task we’re analyzing. The volitional processes in more abstract tasks, requiring higher order reasoning, might look vastly different from “simpler” more mechanical tasks; they might have different timing contexts, triggers, overriding mechanisms (also being dependent on which areas are involved) etc.

Here’s another study I find interesting (albeit limited in its scope, like most studies, of course): Simple Brain Mechanisms Explain Arbitrary Human Visual Decisions.

 

[AkuManiMani]

But it’s a start, and a way for us to zoom in on the whole problem. It seems plausible that what they call unconscious preparation is necessary for the decision-making process on the empirical level, thus indirectly part of what we, on a much more abstracted philosophical level, call volition (or ‘making a decision’ as felt from a first person perspective).

I would also say that we should expect different decision-making mechanisms depending on what task we’re analyzing. The volitional processes in more abstract tasks, requiring higher order reasoning, might look vastly different from “simpler” more mechanical tasks; they might have different timing contexts, triggers, overriding mechanisms (also being dependent on which areas are involved) etc.

Here’s another study I find interesting (albeit limited in its scope, like most studies, of course): Simple Brain Mechanisms Explain Arbitrary Human Visual Decisions.

It seems to me that the unconscious mechanisms of the decision making process are preparatory measures. If the subject anticipates that they are going to carry out some motor task [such as moving an arm] the brain must be prepared to act on the pending choice. Of course, just as the above study has shown, the subject is still liable to choose not to carry the action.

 

[Mark6]

Here is an example of a brain tumor which turned a normal man into a pedophile. When tumor was removed, his sexual obsession disappeared. When a year later he noticed same desires, he went to oncologist, and sure enough, the tumor was back (it was successfully removed again).

Now, vast majority of people would agree that a person whose sociopathic behavior is caused by a brain tumor should be medically treated, and not be held criminally responsible. But then, logically, how can he hold ANYONE responsible for their sociopathic behavior? Is a "normal" individual any more responsible for the wiring of his brain than a sociopath? It's not like you or I chose our brain chemistry.

In short, no, I do not believe there is such thing as volition. There is only poorly-as-of-yet understood brain chemistry.

 

[lupus_in_fabula]

It seems to me that the unconscious mechanisms of the decision making process are preparatory measures. If the subject anticipates that they are going to carry out some motor task [such as moving an arm] the brain must be prepared to act on the pending choice. Of course, just as the above study has shown, the subject is still liable to choose not to carry the action.

In some cases there’s only the appearance of a choice, which through movement then translates to a sort of confirmation about having done it volitionally (yet not being volitional in the traditional philosophical sense). Here’s what I mean – from an earlier post of mine in a different thread: Rodolfo Llinás explains his little experiment.

Now I have experienced something like that with a simple EMS/Tens device. It’s simply a way of activating muscles via electric stimulation. Hence when my foot moved due to the stimulation (in two second bursts), it first felt like I was somehow doing it volitionally or directly responsible for the movement (even though I simply tried to relax and let the machine do its thing). Only after 15 minutes or so did it sort of level out; the sensation of me actively doing it started to fade away; and after that my foot sort of pulsated without the sensation of volitional input. I can only imagine how much stronger such sensation was for Llinás who had a coil attached to his head, so that he even at one point said he had changed his mind about trying to move his foot in the opposite direction from what the electrical stimulation caused.

 

[AkuManiMani]

In some cases there’s only the appearance of a choice, which through movement then translates to a sort of confirmation about having done it volitionally (yet not being volitional in the traditional philosophical sense). Here’s what I mean – from an earlier post of mine in a different thread: Rodolfo Llinás explains his little experiment.

Now I have experienced something like that with a simple EMS/Tens device. It’s simply a way of activating muscles via electric stimulation. Hence when my foot moved due to the stimulation (in two second bursts), it first felt like I was somehow doing it volitionally or directly responsible for the movement (even though I simply tried to relax and let the machine do its thing). Only after 15 minutes or so did it sort of level out; the sensation of me actively doing it started to fade away; and after that my foot sort of pulsated without the sensation of volitional input. I can only imagine how much stronger such sensation was for Llinás who had a coil attached to his head, so that he even at one point said he had changed his mind about trying to move his foot in the opposite direction from what the electrical stimulation caused.

Sounds to me like a method of overriding a person's will with a more powerful stimulus. I wonder if varying the strength of the field would have varying results. In other words, is their some threshold at which the subject's intent would be able to override the impulse generated by the coil?