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What is the appeal of "objective morality"

pharphis

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I've spent a decent amount of time over the last few years learning about religious argumentation through debates, lectures, and other formats and there's something on my mind at present which I can't wrap my head around: objective morality.

Now, what's most commonly done (in my experience) is that when someone's religious moral views are challenged, the theist will exclaim that without religion (or some belief system) you can't have Objective Moral Values (OMV). They will then attack moral relativism as if it's the only alternative since they see it as entirely subjective (I'm not sure, tbh).

Ofc, I see their religious views as subjective even if the morals themselves are supposed to be objective (after all, it's based on interpretation or emotion, both of which are considered to be NOT objective at least under WLC's definition)...

I'm fine with all of this but I wonder what the appeal is in the first place for a system of objectivity when it comes to morality. I know we like to have simple answers to complicated questions but I wonder if that's not only unrealistic but is it even desirable outside of convenience?

I honestly don't know and am just rambling a bit. Feel free to share your thoughts.
 
I've spent a decent amount of time over the last few years learning about religious argumentation through debates, lectures, and other formats and there's something on my mind at present which I can't wrap my head around: objective morality.

Objective Morality: the belief that there is a super-natural force that imposes arbitrary rules upon us using a "Zero Tolerance" policy: everything is "Black" or "White". It is the wish to be free from thinking about how difficult morality is to discover and apply. It is the desire of an infantilized mind to be told what to do.
 
...I'm fine with all of this but I wonder what the appeal is in the first place for a system of objectivity when it comes to morality. I know we like to have simple answers to complicated questions but I wonder if that's not only unrealistic but is it even desirable outside of convenience?


If morality is not something that is part of the human evolutionary process and is not relative and subjective but instead is an objective reality then that entails that their sky daddy must be the one who set those "laws" outside of humanity and human nature.

In their warped illogical way of "reasoning", if morals did not emanate from human essence then it must come from some other essence which then they proceed to assign as their imaginary friend and more specifically their ill begotten son of a ghostly 1/3rd of the piece of vile fetid monstrous turd who is the Sky Daddy invented by Imperialist Persian Zoroastrian missionaries as a means for pacifying the Canaanite/Phoenician/Assyrian populations of ca. 450 BCE.

They keep on ignoring utterly any explanation based upon evolution and social evolution because of course to them evolution does not make any sense when applied to biology let alone when applied to sociology and anthropology.

In summary... objective morality ---> external rules ---> voila Ten Commandments.

Also related to that desire to shove their sky daddy through the trap doors of illogic is the desire to maintain that the descriptive rules of nature we have been able to derive as a means for describing what is, are PRESCRIPTIVE LAWS of nature that mandate what should be. Consequently, yet again, their imaginary friend and more precisely his ill begotten son must be the ones who ordained things be as they are.

In summary... prescriptive laws of physics and morals ---> a prescriber who ordained them ---> PRESTO ... an ill begotten son who became a human blood sacrifice to his adulterous rapist sky daddy who prefers wife-pimping cowards over all of humanity.
 
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Not all arguers for objective morality are religious. Sam Harris puts forward some convincing arguments when he talks about the Worst Possible Misery For Everyone.
 
Not all arguers for objective morality are religious. Sam Harris puts forward some convincing arguments when he talks about the Worst Possible Misery For Everyone.

I know, but I was specifically referring to religious arguments. Ofc, I'm open for discussion about either but wanted to make it clear what I was referring to.

I'm not sure how Harris defines objective, but I don't think I would call his moral system objective (from memory)
 
Not all arguers for objective morality are religious. Sam Harris puts forward some convincing arguments when he talks about the Worst Possible Misery For Everyone.


That is not the same "objective" as the theists try to argue.

He is arguing "objective" as in not personal or even societal but rather instinctive as part of genetic evolution of the human species... so it is still subjective in that it relates to the species but objective in how it relates to any members of the species.

Similar to the instinct that allows birds to build elaborate nests or perform ritualistic dances they have never been taught by any other member of the species.
 
Leumas

I like your post! It's a pity it is going to take such a long time for there to be a sensible understanding of the fact that there is no such thing as objective morality.
 
Leumas

I like your post! It's a pity it is going to take such a long time for there to be a sensible understanding of the fact that there is no such thing as objective morality.
(emphasis added)

It's already been the entire stretch of human memory, even quite likely having begun long before that.
 
I've spent a decent amount of time over the last few years learning about religious argumentation through debates, lectures, and other formats and there's something on my mind at present which I can't wrap my head around: objective morality.

Now, what's most commonly done (in my experience) is that when someone's religious moral views are challenged, the theist will exclaim that without religion (or some belief system) you can't have Objective Moral Values (OMV). They will then attack moral relativism as if it's the only alternative since they see it as entirely subjective (I'm not sure, tbh).

Ofc, I see their religious views as subjective even if the morals themselves are supposed to be objective (after all, it's based on interpretation or emotion, both of which are considered to be NOT objective at least under WLC's definition)...

I'm fine with all of this but I wonder what the appeal is in the first place for a system of objectivity when it comes to morality. I know we like to have simple answers to complicated questions but I wonder if that's not only unrealistic but is it even desirable outside of convenience?

I honestly don't know and am just rambling a bit. Feel free to share your thoughts.
Insert deity of your choice, obviously.
 
It's a simple fact that human morals are inconsistent. It is trivial to conjure up a scenario in which most people act one way in a particular circumstance, but the opposite way when a minor part of the scenario is changed (see the Trolley problem: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trolley_problem).

On the other hand, our brains are wired to seek out consistency. We crave a way to break up our world in a way that is consistent across boundaries. Philosophers spend their whole lives trying to break down morality into easily defined chunks, and yet we (as a species) can still not agree as to which moral philosophy is The Correct One.

Religion, and by extension objective morality, provides an easy out. With that worldview, it is easy to wave away the inconsistencies by appealing to some sort of third-party moral source.
 
That is not the same "objective" as the theists try to argue.

He is arguing "objective" as in not personal or even societal but rather instinctive as part of genetic evolution of the human species... so it is still subjective in that it relates to the species but objective in how it relates to any members of the species.

Similar to the instinct that allows birds to build elaborate nests or perform ritualistic dances they have never been taught by any other member of the species.

Yeah, that's lovely, but there will shortly be an appeal to the Spaghetti Monster of the Gaps. Nothing you or I can do about it, the believers can't help themselves.

All you can do is shrug and say "again with the baloney".

One might as well get vexed about mermaids.

ETA: Oh, it behoves me to add that what I really wanted to post contained so many naughty words that I would be banned.
 
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Not all arguers for objective morality are religious. Sam Harris puts forward some convincing arguments when he talks about the Worst Possible Misery For Everyone.

You are right. When Sam Harris talks about "Objective Morality", I know what he means. However, when a Christian Apologist talks about Objective Morality, then you can forget ever getting from him some sort - or any sort - of coherent definition of the term. A Christian Apologist speaking about "Objective Morality" is like a squid spurting ink: it's a screen meant to confuse.
 
I've spent a decent amount of time over the last few years learning about religious argumentation through debates, lectures, and other formats and there's something on my mind at present which I can't wrap my head around: objective morality.

Now, what's most commonly done (in my experience) is that when someone's religious moral views are challenged, the theist will exclaim that without religion (or some belief system) you can't have Objective Moral Values (OMV). They will then attack moral relativism as if it's the only alternative since they see it as entirely subjective (I'm not sure, tbh).

Ofc, I see their religious views as subjective even if the morals themselves are supposed to be objective (after all, it's based on interpretation or emotion, both of which are considered to be NOT objective at least under WLC's definition)...

I'm fine with all of this but I wonder what the appeal is in the first place for a system of objectivity when it comes to morality. I know we like to have simple answers to complicated questions but I wonder if that's not only unrealistic but is it even desirable outside of convenience?

I honestly don't know and am just rambling a bit. Feel free to share your thoughts.

Here's my rambling take.

The argument takes two premises, and the conclusion is "Therefore, one ought to believe that God exists." The first premise looks something like this:

(1) Theism and only theism entails the existence of objective moral values.

This thesis is dubious. It seems to suggest that the only way to have such objective values is for God to say, "These things are good." But, of course, it has long been argued (famously by Plato, but Kant also) that in order for God to serve as a reliable authority for what is good, one must first know that God is good, but to know this requires a prior knowledge of goodness[1]. Thus, God cannot be the ultimate authority for what is good.

This seems to put the theist in the same position as the non-theist. Either there is a way to determine what is God, independent of God's authority, or we cannot learn what is good.

The second premise seems to be one of the following.

(2a) It is better if persons believe in objective moral values.
(2b) There are objective moral values.

Premise (2a) may be justified by saying that the world as a whole works better for people if everyone takes morality seriously and the OMV is the most reliable method for ensuring this. In any case, (2a) reduces the argument to an appeal to consequences fallacy, and so we may dismiss it.

Premise (2b) requires argument. As it is, the premise looks comparably dubious to the conclusion. Without any argument to the effect that there are objective moral values[2], we have no reason to believe the conclusion.

So, seems to me that both premises (1) and (2b) are dubious, and maybe premise (2a) as well, but since it occurs in a fallacious argument, we may ignore it.

[1] This is my own bastardized version of Plato's and Kant's arguments. I don't think I'm sticking too close to the original, but I hope it's close enough.

[2] As some may know, I am somewhat sympathetic to moral realism, but I've never seen any convincing argument that it is true -- nor that it is false.
 
It's a simple fact that human morals are inconsistent. It is trivial to conjure up a scenario in which most people act one way in a particular circumstance, but the opposite way when a minor part of the scenario is changed (see the Trolley problem: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trolley_problem).

On the other hand, our brains are wired to seek out consistency. We crave a way to break up our world in a way that is consistent across boundaries. Philosophers spend their whole lives trying to break down morality into easily defined chunks, and yet we (as a species) can still not agree as to which moral philosophy is The Correct One.

Religion, and by extension objective morality, provides an easy out. With that worldview, it is easy to wave away the inconsistencies by appealing to some sort of third-party moral source.

It's hard to think of any act no matter how vile we think it, that wasn't held as a sacred duty by some group of humans.
 
Here's my rambling take.

The argument takes two premises, and the conclusion is "Therefore, one ought to believe that God exists." The first premise looks something like this:

(1) Theism and only theism entails the existence of objective moral values.

This thesis is dubious. It seems to suggest that the only way to have such objective values is for God to say, "These things are good." But, of course, it has long been argued (famously by Plato, but Kant also) that in order for God to serve as a reliable authority for what is good, one must first know that God is good, but to know this requires a prior knowledge of goodness[1]. Thus, God cannot be the ultimate authority for what is good.

This seems to put the theist in the same position as the non-theist. Either there is a way to determine what is God, independent of God's authority, or we cannot learn what is good.

The second premise seems to be one of the following.

(2a) It is better if persons believe in objective moral values.
(2b) There are objective moral values.

Premise (2a) may be justified by saying that the world as a whole works better for people if everyone takes morality seriously and the OMV is the most reliable method for ensuring this. In any case, (2a) reduces the argument to an appeal to consequences fallacy, and so we may dismiss it.

Premise (2b) requires argument. As it is, the premise looks comparably dubious to the conclusion. Without any argument to the effect that there are objective moral values[2], we have no reason to believe the conclusion.

So, seems to me that both premises (1) and (2b) are dubious, and maybe premise (2a) as well, but since it occurs in a fallacious argument, we may ignore it.

[1] This is my own bastardized version of Plato's and Kant's arguments. I don't think I'm sticking too close to the original, but I hope it's close enough.

[2] As some may know, I am somewhat sympathetic to moral realism, but I've never seen any convincing argument that it is true -- nor that it is false.

Every time I've seen WLC make this argument he takes for granted that "objective moral values" exist. As far as I can tell, he's never tried to justify this outside of attacking moral relativism outside of appealing to human emotion and opinion *the very thing he defines as being NOT objective). He does this every debate.

Can you expand on moral realism?

Another thought I've had is that even if you somehow KNOW that objective moral values exist, that doesn't get us any closer to knowing WHAT they are, and therefore any "objective" system for morality is no better than the subjective counterpart (it comes down to holy book interpretation, after all). In other words, if god existed and we knew this we have no way of knowing exactly what these objective moral values are anyway, so talking about them and religious systems as though they are objective is meaningless.
 
Every time I've seen WLC make this argument he takes for granted that "objective moral values" exist. As far as I can tell, he's never tried to justify this outside of attacking moral relativism outside of appealing to human emotion and opinion *the very thing he defines as being NOT objective). He does this every debate.

WLC? I'm coming up blank.

Can you expand on moral realism?

First, let me say that my terminology may be a bit off. I taught a course in ethical theory last semester, but when you don't deal with this stuff regularly, it's easy to blur distinctions which are standard in the literature.

Moral realism is, roughly, the thesis that moral claims are either true or false, i.e., that they are full-fledged propositions.

Whether it is opposed to relativism depends on what one takes relativism to mean. If it means, "All moral claims are mere opinions," then the two are incompatible, but if it means, "One (objectively) ought to live by those moral rules he (subjectively) affirms," then relativism is just an odd realist theory.

The obvious difficulty in moral realism is that, unlike most sentences we take to be propositions, it is difficult to see how to establish a moral "ought" statement as either true or false. Unless realism somehow establishes a test that it clearly stands as a legitimate, objective means of telling true "ought" statements from false, it is hard to see how the (meta-)theory can yield practical consequences.

On the other hand, some folks balk at the claim that "Genocide is a bad thing," amounts to nothing more than mere opinion, that there is no objective truth expressed in that sentence, but only a subjective opinion or even a non-propositional expression of strong, negative emotional reaction to the thought of genocide. Unfortunately, a very strong feeling that the sentence expresses some undeniable fact about right and wrong is perfectly consistent with any reasonable non-realist interpretation of morality, so nothing is thereby settled.

Another thought I've had is that even if you somehow KNOW that objective moral values exist, that doesn't get us any closer to knowing WHAT they are, and therefore any "objective" system for morality is no better than the subjective counterpart (it comes down to holy book interpretation, after all). In other words, if god existed and we knew this we have no way of knowing exactly what these objective moral values are anyway, so talking about them and religious systems as though they are objective is meaningless.

The big ethical philosophers attempted to show that there were fundamental moral principles that could be derived from careful reasoning, and that these principles served to derive all particular moral claims. Of course, had they actually succeeded, we wouldn't be having this conversation, since all reasonable persons would already know the objective difference between right and wrong.

But the alternative to moral subjectivism is not deference to religious authority. Instead, one would want to find a rational basis (for instance) from which moral rules can be derived. It is, of course, not at all clear that this can be reasonably done.
 
William Lane Craig. His morality debate with Shelly Kagan is worth watching. It's on youtube somewhere.

I'm not familiar with him, but having skimmed a portion of his WP page, I'm not sure I'm interested.

I'm not opposed to philosophers of religion. I rather like the topic, though I've very barely become acquainted with it. But the discussion on his take of the cosmological argument leaves me uninterested. A very old and unconvincing argument, coupled with some nonsense about the supposed impossibility of "actual" infinity.
 
William Lane Craig. His morality debate with Shelly Kagan is worth watching. It's on youtube somewhere.

I'm not familiar with him, but having skimmed a portion of his WP page, I'm not sure I'm interested.

I'm not opposed to philosophers of religion. I rather like the topic, though I've very barely become acquainted with it. But the discussion on his take of the cosmological argument leaves me uninterested. A very old and unconvincing argument, coupled with some nonsense about the supposed impossibility of "actual" infinity.

:rolleyes:
 
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