Functional analysis is the heart of behaviorism.
Cognitive scientists have a different understand of what functional analysis is.
Merely inferring causation after the fact is what is circular. Tell me how one has ever either manipulated or measured the mind without manipulating environment and measuring behavior, and you will have made your point.
This is where I think radical behaviorism is at its most absurd. To erect so impermeable a barrier against inference renders the greatest theoretical advances in the history of science invalid. Dalton was wrong to propose his atomic theory without observation of the atom, Darwin could not actually describe traits as passed from parent to offspring without understanding of genetics, and it was a mistake for Einstein to propose relativity without direct evidence. As Chomsky quipped, behaviorism would render physics the science of reading meters. It is impossible to directly measure the mind, because mind is an emergent property of brain. It is nevertheless useful to speak of cognition, and of cognitive function as information processing. It is quite possible, given this, to generate and test falsifiable hypotheses which support the foundational assumptions of cognition. Miller's experiments about the effects of representation on short-term memory leap to mind. Observation of the panicked behavior of captive chimpanzees exposed to snakes for the first time also implies innate cognitive structures. Both of these can be seen as reactions to environment, but only in the most trivial sense; something else is clearly going on.
And please, don't think behaviorism is stuck at Watson's year--modern behaviorists recognise private behavior such as thinking and remembering; they just think of them as behaviors, not as "mind".
I don't, I think it's stuck on Skinner. His consignment of thought, feeling, belief, memory and so on to behavior, external to his black box of physiology, is an arbitrary and specious assumption driven an invalid induction, not science. Nothing about this assumption is obvious or intuitive, and there is no way to show that thought is strictly behavioral, and never itself directly causative.
Both are quite obviously still there, and quite influential. Eschewing inner causes in favor of environmental causes, for instance, is at the heart of virtually any application of social or cognitive psychology.
Herein lies the difference between theory and application. I'm not hostile to application; it's vital to create a body of evidence from which theory can be inferred. But radical behaviorists do seem quite hostile to theory, for reasons unknown.
Honestly, I had thought behaviorism had reconciled itself with cognition to some degree, which is why I see your comments as something of a throwback.