A few hundred billion unranium atoms, and a geiger counter à la Schrödinger's cat? Isn't that a finite system?
*Sigh*
Jimbob - there is no point arguing about this. It is just what the mathematics
say.
If it is finite it
CANNOT be random
AND deterministic - it simply flows from the definitions.
If you are not being formal do not be formal. If you are being formal then you are wrong. There is no point arguing about it.
It depends on what you mean> by selection criteria. For an individual, I would say it is "probabilistic", for a population, I would say that the pressure is nonrandom.
*Sigh*
jimbob - can you not see that
NOTHING but your
labelling has changed in the situation between the individual and the population?
The criteria are changing, so they are dynamic, but I would say that because of my disbelief in the inevitibility of any particular forms arising
Argument from incredulity is still a fallacy jimbob.
How humanity has affected wild animals and how bacteria/viri have affected humanity's development is eviolution and non-artificial, how humanity has affected the development of domseticalted animals is a mixture of "natural" (unintientional) and "artificial" (intientional).
I see. You
do think you are outside the system with yet another bifurcation that seems to create two distinct and separate concepts in the human mind which, on closer analysis, are not.
Remember, 'artificial' and 'natural' are
lies - they may sometimes be
useful but here it only muddies the water with anthropocentric thought.
There is a difference when a breeder sees a wall-eyed dog and says, "I like wall-eyed dogs because they might intimidate the sheep more" so selectively breeds from these dogs, compared to rats evolving resistance to warferin, which certainly was unintentional, even if that was predictible.
The difference is not of function - it is of form.
The ability to hypothesize future states does not wield any more power than trial and error - not least of which because eventually a hypothesis will have to be tested and it could well be wrong.
That's what we call 'learning'.
You see one as intentional, the other as unintentional - but what is your intent if not wrought from a series of prejudicial desires arising from your construct? Do you really have a choice over what you 'intend'?
This is the problem with trying to place yourself outside the system jimbob - you are, as they might say, in the matrix. You might well reason about what it is like to be outside it but you are still in it and that is forever so.
Of course for most people this kind of thought is just as counter-intuitive as the idea that intentionless molecules could eventually evolve to form beings with concepts of it. It is perfectly inevitable for you to think in these separating terms - to make decisions about object classes. I have, as always, from the beginning, been trying to express the fallacy of the distinctions you are making with respect to ideas of 'intent' and so forth.
Of course organisms affect the evolution of other organisms, but I would argue that you could say selective breeding is a very special case, and would be better described as an interaction of a purposeless and a purposeful process.
Very special? Really?
Sounds very anthropocentric to me. I think the distinction you are making is artificial.
Hmm...
In the nozzle example there is no chance of one of the best nozzles in a generation not being selected by the algorithm.
Ah - so you think the algorithm is fundamentally different.
This is not the case: all that is required is a higher order selection criterion.
In evolution an organism could have what seem like "fitter" traits than another, but fail to reproduce.
And I could be the cleverest man in the world and killed by the stupidest little bacterium.
You seem to think that perfect strategies should exist. The point of the Poker analogy is that this is not possible in a system where complete information is not available for such a strategy to exist.
I still say that defining the fittest orgainsims solely as those that reproduce is less informative than saying that having beneficial traits increases the probable number of reproducing offspring.
No. It is the
most general description. You object to it not because it fails to capture evolution concisely but precisely because it does not allow you to spin off higher-order sub-concepts.
Nonetheless all those higher-order sub-concepts you are trying to position as paramount all derive from the same basic algorithmic concept.
Again, since it is a human tendency to chunk information in such a way I am hardly surprised you are so attached to these notions. So I say again: they are useful lies, but they do not represent the most general of the useful lies about evolution.
I can not think of any other situation where one organism conciously plans what traits they would encourage in another. There may not be a "designer" in selcetive breeding, but there certainly is an intelligent agent controlling the other species reproduction and the direction in which it is developing.
And in continuing with today's theme this is where I again ask you to consider why you think doing it intelligently is so very different. I suggest it is because you are entirely prejudiced to do so - by the very organ you state intelligent.
I would say that equating artificial and natural selection, you are begging for people to claim that "maybe God evolved us, through a process of "theistic selection".
That is their prerogative. They would, of course, not have understood the argument at all.
There are an indefinite number of optimisations possible, and as long as two are not mutually exclusive, the final direction can keep changing.
Yes it can.
Of course the more possibilities there are to choose from the harder it is to create a simple model...
(And we come full circle at the earlier 'model != reality' point.)
I spend a lot of time with similar sums, so the exponential growth is implicitly obvious to me in my treatment, indeed I would have thought it was explicit, but obviously not.
I still don't think you understand what I am getting at at all.